The first limited edition of Ron Riley’s ‘Yorkshire Rebel’ appeared in 2013 , the year of the 50th Anniversary of E P Thompson’s seminal ‘Making of the English Working Class’, in which he set out to rescue early working class radicals from ‘the condescension of posterity’. The present revised, updated and new format edition was launched in 2020 to mark the bicentenary of the Yorkshire Radical uprising, which is the central theme of the book. Ron Riley’s work is therefore very timely as he sets out to rescue one of those revolutionaries, not only from condescension but also from obscurity, vividly locating him in that time of profound economic, social and political changes which have become subsumed under the title of the Industrial Revolution.
The picture Ron Riley paints is in stark contrast to the Jane Austen view of the period. He describes the trials and tribulations of working class life and work in careful detail, reconstructing conditions in the West Riding communities which shaped Lindley’s view of the world. The reader can almost feel the heat of the nail-makers workshop where Lindley learned his trade.
The wider backdrop of movements and ideas is also clearly described, bringing to life the political ferment which influenced Lindley’s ideas and set him and hundreds of others on a course of action which could have proved fatal. Although we have no record of Lindley’s personal thoughts, the milieu in which he circulated gives us some idea of what his concerns and ideals must have been. Ron Riley again depicts this with precision – the mounting anticipation of the insurrection, the disillusionment of defeat and the anxiety of the treason trials.
Ron Riley also follows Lindley on the convict ship and into exile in Van Diemen’s Land showing that he was no ordinary convict, but a man with some standing and respect both in the community he left and, as his early return home testifies, the one he was transported to.
The immense changes during Lindley’s remaining lifetime are also brought into the picture. ‘Yorkshire Rebel’ is not merely the story of one man, but an account of the working class in the West Riding as a whole. Ron Riley has not been content to rest with John Lindley as a small twig on a family tree. He has generated not only a rich foliage and colourful blossoms but also described the ecology in which John Lindley and other working class radicals flourished. ‘Yorkshire Rebel’ is an important contribution to our working class heritage and a valuable reminder of the struggles for freedom which still have a resonance today.
It has been a tough twelve months for bricks and mortar bookshops so I would love to think that potential readers would like to put orders their way. If you want to read the book but money is tight, you can also buy a paperback edition on Amazon for a bit less than the hardcover. £19.99 for the hardcover and £15.99 for the paperback.
German internationalist in Rojava: “I can only advise you: Come here!”
Internationalist Goran Kobanê is from Germany and lives in Rojava. He advises others to come to the autonomous region of northeast Syria themselves to get involved in the grassroots democratic project and learn from it.
MUSTAFA ÇOBAN
DÊRIK
Saturday, 1 May 2021, 18:48
Goran Kobanê is an internationalist from Germany and has been living in Rojava for six years. In an interview with ANF, he explains why he went to northern Syria in the summer of 2015 and what motivates him to stay there. He advises all people to come to the self-governing region of northern and eastern Syria to see and learn from the grassroots democratic project and the women’s revolution.
“I am originally from Germany and came to Rojava, to Kobanê, about six years ago, in the summer of 2015. The crucial point and motivation was the battle for Kobanê. That was in the media at the time, it was in the press in Germany, in Europe, internationally, and somehow everyone was aware of it. IS was at the height of its power at the time. They had taken so many cities in Syria, in Iraq, and Kobanê was something like the decisive battle. At the time, it was said that if Kobanê fell, ISIS would be well on its way to marching directly to Europe. And that motivated me at the time to come here and see how I could help.”
The fight for Kobanê: “It was madness”
The resistance in Kobanê was very impressive for him, says Goran Kobanê and continues: “The friends fought with simple, light weapons against tanks and a superior number of opponents. The courage that the friends had here, that was madness. They went into battle partly expecting to die, but they knew they were falling for a good cause and were willing to make that sacrifice. They knew that if they didn’t fight, then all of Kurdistan would be in danger, then Kobanê would be in danger. And who knows how many civilians would have been murdered.” Above all, he said, he was impressed that so many internationalists from different parts of the world wanted to resist.
Meanwhile, Germany continued to support the Turkish state, Goran Kobanê said, “And the Turkish state has demonstrably provided logistical support for ISIS. They took care of the wounded, they provided border crossings, and that was obvious to the world. And yet the German state continued to support the Turkish state. There was no military help, which the friends here would have needed to resist.
German society, it must be said, has already taken this on board. They followed it, they sympathized with the Kurds and with the resistance, but someone really stood up and said: I’m taking a risk, I’m taking a risk and maybe I’ll come here and help,’ that’s something very few people have done. That was another motivation for me to say: Now more than ever. I have two healthy hands, I can come here. I am healthy, why not. I have no excuse to say I can’t help here.”
The defeat of ISIS in Kobanê was like the breaking of a myth: “Until then, ISIS had only won, won, won. They were advancing and it was thought that they could no longer be stopped. And then, thanks to the heroic resistance of the Kurds and their friends, they were defeated and had to retreat. Later, they were pushed back further and further, and that was more or less the beginning of the end for ISIS. And if Kobanê had fallen, who knows how it would have turned out.”
“Germany has itself blackmailed by Erdogan”
Even after the ISIS has been defeated territorially, the Turkish state supports and protects Islamist troops, who today would only call themselves something else, the internationalist continues: “In my opinion, this has only one goal: to break the Kurdish resistance, ideally to wipe out all of Kurdistan and to destroy this really successful model of self-government. Germany nevertheless continues to support the Turkish state, even though it’s obvious that they’re committing human rights violations here, that they’re expelling people here, that they’re murdering people.”
“The German government is allowing itself to be blackmailed by the Erdogan government with the refugees in Turkey. That’s over three million. Turkey and Erdogan are constantly threatening to open the borders, and this allows Germany and the EU to be blackmailed. Pressure should be put on them very clearly and they should say: withdraw from Afrin, withdraw from Serêkaniyê, withdraw from the occupied territories, or our economic relations will be broken off. But unfortunately, the German state is not doing that. They don’t do anything. They cooperate with Erdogan as if nothing ever happened. German society could do more, it definitely has to do more. People have to go out on the streets, they have to put pressure on the politicians. What are the weapons financed by? They are financed by tax money. The bottom line is that it’s everyone’s fault that people are dying here because the weapons come from Germany.”
Germany supports Turkey primarily for economic reasons, says Goran Kobanê: “Germany makes billions with these arms deliveries. Turkey has bought dozens of tanks to use against northern Syria. Germany is making billions and doesn’t want to risk economic relations. The human lives in northeastern Syria do not count and it is accepted that hundreds of people would be killed and entire areas depopulated.
“Take to the streets, put pressure!”
Asked what he expects from people in Germany, the internationalist answers, “Take to the streets. Protest. Put pressure. Here, dozens of people are dying every day, displaced, and this is happening with Germany’s guilt. Show the politicians and those responsible what you think about it. It’s up to you, it’s in your hands.”
The German internationalist adds, “There are many internationalists in Rojava who have taken the risk of coming to the region. They are happy here and contribute their share. They can contribute a lot and learn an extreme amount here. They learn about the system of self-government, which is an example of how a democratic, good, equal world can work. How the role of women is promoted here in the Middle East, you don’t see that anywhere else. And that’s just a wonderful example of how it can be. I can only advise you to come here, check it out, even if it’s just for a few months. It’s incredible.”
The Kurdish-led administrations in both Syria and Iraq faced an existential threat from the savagery of ISIS fighters at the height of their power. Yet, in victory, the Rojava revolution in NE Syria seeks to defuse, through rehabilitation, the time bomb ticking away in the mini-ISIS caliphates being set up by cooped up prisoners – men, women and children – physically defeated but not necessarily ideologically shaken.
While across the border in KRG-controlled Iraq, the time bomb is defused by summary trials and execution.
The case for ISIS fighters to be treated humanely isn’t just future-proofing against the pent-up anger of ISIS generations to come although that would be a welcome side-effect, but is an example of what a justice system committed to transformation of society should look like.
Nassra Khalil, co-chair of the Justice Council in the Euphrates region of Rojava (AANES), explains poetically in an email interview, that their system is driven by ‘the aim of eliminating the soil in which grievances grow and working out solutions that address the root of the problems by tackling these problems and the social structure in which they arose.’ However these admirable aims are constantly undermined by the lack of resources.
British media’s frenzied interest in ‘jihadi brides’ shone a light on the dire conditions in the Al-Hol camp in Rojava which holds over 60,000 ISIS prisoners, women and children, particularly the infamous Shamima Begum who lost her last baby to pneumonia there. This fits in with public expectations of Syrian refugee camps but very few narratives dig deeper to reveal the true picture.
Many Western countries have refused to repatriate their citizens in a shortsighted case of political expedience leaving foreign fighters and the Rojava administration in limbo. Shamima Begum was stripped of her citizenship in a shameful decision by the Supreme Court in February.
Rima Berakat, Co-Chair of the Justice council, responsible for law and order in all of Rojava, outlined the scale of the problem in a Zoom interview. They have approximately 12-15 thousand ISIS prisoners (mostly Syrian and Iraqi, but including 50-80 foreign fighters) awaiting trial. Since 2014, they have tried 8000 Syrian nationals and there are 1000 prisoners on trial at this moment. There are simply too many detainees and too few resources for the overstretched Rojava administration to attempt ideological cleansing of ISIS fighters on a large scale. As ISIS fighters remain a huge security threat, with uprisings in overcrowded prisons and escape attempts, Rojava, ever-pragmatic, has been unable to put its rehabilitation programs into operation apart from the ‘most basic teaching of language, culture and philosophy’. They have adopted a conventional legal strategy of trial and conviction but with humane sentences recognizing differences between those who laid bombs or laid food on the table for ISIS.
They have introduced amnesties for low-level ISIS operatives who have served half their sentences. This is partly to avoid their further radicalisation in prison, living cheek by jowl, with hardened ISIS fighters. This does not include ISIS ideologues or those who were engaged in war crimes, drug trafficking, honour killings, and espionage. Their risk levels are assessed, which includes an assessment of theirs’ and their families’ ideological commitment to ISIS, before they are released into the community. It is also in keeping with Rojava’s ‘decentralized, confederal decision-making on the local level’ reports the Rojava Information Centre: those areas which were liberated by SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) from ISIS are mostly populated by Arabs who have historically been hostile to Kurds and also do not share their revolutionary ideals. A key demand that emerged in consultations with these communities was amnesty for low-level ISIS members.
Responding positively to that demand, according to the Rojava administration, promotes better community relations and is one way of countering ISIS ‘attempts to sow discord, sectarianism and violence.’ To date 4000 women and children and 630 odd men have returned.
Small scale rehabilitation is carried out for groups of up to 20 women who sign up voluntarily in the Al-Hol and Al-Roj camps by Waqfa Jin, a local women’s group. They undertake consciousness raising sessions which talk about women’s empowerment and education, subverting ISIS teachings indirectly. They also run sewing and handicraft making sessions to skill them up for life outside the camp. In the smaller, better resourced, Al-Roj camp, the women who attend must follow rules such as no ‘black clothes’ and no niqabs, the closest they get to challenging ISIS ideology head-on. Such sessions, of course, do not begin to encroach upon the consciousness of those ISIS women in the now infamous Al-Hol camp who have reintroduced the strict dress and moral codes of their previous lives on pain of death. The Rojava administration is keen to set up separate camps for those ISIS women who are showing signs of rejecting their ISIS history so as to complete their process of deradicalisation. But they lack the resources.
The limited resources that they do have, have been poured into the Huri Centre, where 100 young boys from the age of 11 upwards, known as the Cubs of the Caliphate, who were battle hardened fighters and suicide bombers are being rehabilitated. The decision to staff the centre with women with whom the boys refused to make eye contact or shake hands when they first came to the centre was their first indirect lesson in gender equality. Apart from providing a peaceful environment where misbehaviour is resolved through discussion, not punishment, the young men are exposed to music and the arts – subjects that were banned under ISIS. In fact, the biggest challenge for the administration is the diehard ideological commitment of the foreign ISIS members, be they men, women, or children. Local fighters often joined ISIS for financial reasons because of their attractive salaries or protection of their families and are generally easier to deradicalise.
Across the border in KRG (Kurdish Regional Government) which operates the same penal code as the central government in Iraq, many ISIS prisoners have been executed after a summary 15 minute trial according to Human Rights Watch. All ISIS suspects are tried under the counter-terrorism laws and no distinction is made in terms of severity of charges. The process by which they are identified as ISIS members is flawed, very little evidence is provided at trial, and confessions are extracted by torture. There are widespread allegations of ill-treatment. Human Rights Watch recommends a more conciliatory approach, similar to that in Rojava, to prevent problems in the future. It is well known that prisons have been the hothouse for incubating terrorists of the future: AQI, the predecessor of ISIS, was hatched at Camp Bucca.
The Iraqi system is corrupt: prisons are paid per inmate so there are financial incentives to delay trials; prisoners are made to pay for better food, visits from relatives and access to mobiles. Several hundred ISIS prisoners have been executed since the fall of Mosul in 2017. In November 2020 alone, 21 prisoners were sentenced to death. There has also been an unquantified number of extra-judicial killings of ISIS members by the Iraqi army, wreaking revenge after victory.
Yet the UK government has poured £31million into KRG/Iraq since 2016 via UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) but not Rojava, despite UK’s commitment to global security, its avowed opposition to the death sentence and the importance it places on stabilisation of areas liberated from Daesh’s control. The government website states ‘we will not consider providing any stabilisation assistance in Syria without a credible, substantive and genuine political process firmly underway.’ This makes no sense at all given that there is a substantive political process under way and the UK was part of the coalition which put boots, arms, and training on the ground in the battle against Daesh in Syria. That is exactly the point that Rima Berakat makes, ‘We fought against Daesh together, we captured their fighters together, we must prosecute them together also. One side cannot carry the burden alone.’
I asked the foreign office, ‘If Britain will not take back its ISIS citizens, please explain why it won’t fund the humane regime in Rojava?’ A Government spokesperson responded with an answer to a question I hadn’t asked, ‘Those who have fought for or supported Daesh should face justice for their crimes. We are clear that this should happen in the most appropriate jurisdiction, which will often be in the region where their offences have been committed.’
In fact Rojava is poised to do so. Berakat said it is ‘our right, as victims, to prosecute Daesh because they have violated the laws in this region.’ After years of calling for an international court to be set up in Rojava went unheeded, she announced their intention to put the foreign fighters on trial.
The ISIS fighters should consider themselves lucky as they are unlikely to face as humane a jurisdiction anywhere else. If they open their minds up to the Rojava democratic experiment on earth, they may find that they are no longer interested in 72 virgins in heaven.
Home/Reports/Northern Syria’s Armenians commemorate 106th anniversary of Armenian Genocide HomeReports
Northern Syria’s Armenians commemorate 106th anniversary of Armenian Genocide
2021-04-24 1 minute read
Armenians commemorate the genocide in Tel Goran village – North Press
HASAKAH, Syria (North Press) – On Saturday, theArmenian Social Council and Armenian military force commemorated the 106th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in Tel Goran, in the countryside of Hasakah city, northeast Syria.
24 April 1915 is held as the starting date of the genocide, since on that day Ottoman authorities arrested and deported from Constantinople (now Istanbul) to the region of Angora (Ankara) around 250 Armenian intellectuals and community leaders. Most were murdered.
The Armenian Genocide was the systematic mass murder and expulsion of more than 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Turkey, according to historical documents.
Manuel Demir, the commander of northeast Syria’s Armenian military force known as the Martyr Nubar Ozanyan Brigade, said that “we, as an Armenian military force, celebrate this memory to deliver a message to the world that we have not forgotten and we will not forget what happened to our Armenian ancestors at the hands of the Ottoman Empire…we reject and denounce the ongoing Turkish aggressions, which are similar to the criminal policy of the Ottoman Empire of 1915.”
He added that the genocide was not committed against Armenians only, and that its massacres in Syria, whether by its occupation of Ras al-Ain (Sere Kaniye), Tel Abyad, or Afrin, and its continuous attacks on Ain Issa, confirm the restoration of Ottoman politics and its massacres.
Arif Qasabiyan, of the Armenian Social Council, says that “the extermination was committed against other peoples such as the Romani, Syriacs, Assyrians, and Kurds.”
“The Ottoman policy continues to exterminate the rights of other peoples and eliminate their cultures, histories and languages, as in Shengal, Sere Kaniye, Tel Abyad and Afrin.”
Its worth mentioning that the European Union parliament voted “by a wide majority” on 16th April 2015 overwhelmingly in favor of recognizing the mass-murder of Armenians by Ottoman Turkey as a genocide, commemorating the centennial of the genocide.
PYD member denounces international silence regarding Turkish attacks
The Member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), Berivan Hassen, denounced the international silence about the recent attack launched by the Turkish occupation state on the house in which the leader Abdullah Ocalan stayed, and asked whether community is satisfied with the crimes Turkey is committing against the peoples of the region?
In a repeated scene of the scenario of the Turkish hostility to north-east Syria, the attacks of the Turkish occupation state continue amid international silence that may open the way to a threat that may affect global security, according to political analysts’ point of view.
In addition to the continued bombardment of Ain Issa and al-Shahba, a reconnaissance aircraft belonging to the Turkish occupation army targeted the house in which Leader Abdullah Ocalan stayed in the village of Albalur, west of Kobane city in 1979, while crossing the borders of Northern Kurdistan to Rojava, known as the leader’s house, at dawn on the 16th of this month.
Concurrently, the Turkish occupation army and its mercenaries stationed on the western bank of the Euphrates River in villages of the occupied city of Jarablus shelled with mortars Boraz village and the surrounding villages in the west of Kobane city.
The Turkish occupation army and its mercenaries continue their attacks on north-east Syria, amid the silence of the Russian guarantor and the international community, despite two separate ceasefire agreements between the Turkish occupation, Russia and America.
‘International silence is a green light for more crimes’
The Member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Union Party, Berivan Hassen, said: “Turkey’s targeting of the house in which the leader stayed is a clear indication of Turkey’s fear of the thought and philosophy of Mr. Abdullah Ocalan and the idea of achieving democracy that poses a threat to its authority.”
Berivan Hassen indicated that Turkey was not content with imprisoning the leader Ocalan and imposing strict isolation on him, but also attacked every place that has a footprint or memory of him.
Berivan denounced the international silence regarding Turkey’s attacks on the region, and said: “We see Turkey continuing to launch its hostile attacks on the region and its people, in addition to imposing strict, illegal isolation on leader Abdullah Ocalan amid international silence from all world countries and human rights organizations.”
Berivan Hassen stressed that the world powers must take a firm stand towards the violations and crimes committed by Turkey against the region and its people.
At the end of her speech, Berivan Hassen asked in an indignant tone, “Are the international community satisfied with the crimes committed by Turkey against the people of the region?” Adding, “They give the green light to Turkey to commit more crimes through their silence.”
It is worth mentioning that an unmanned aerial vehicle of the Turkish occupation state bombed a civilian house south of Kobane city on the 22nd of last January, which resulted in the injury of a civilian, and preceded it the massacre committed by a Turkish drone in Helenj village on the 23rd of June of last year.
SYRIE / ROJAVA – Le régime syrien qui a suit une déroute dans le quartier Tayy de ville kurde de Qamishli où il voulait créer le chaos, veut se venger en s’en prenant aux quartiers de Sheikh Maqsud et d’Ashrefiye à Alep abritant une importante population kurde. Selon l’Organisation des droits humains d’Afrin, les forces des forces gouvernementales syriennes représentées dans la quatrième division et la branche de la sécurité de l’État ont décidé vendredi de harceler la population de Sheikh Maqsud et Ashrefiye à Alep, à la suite des affrontements intenses qui ont éclaté en la ville de Qamishlo entre les Forces de sécurité intérieure, les Asayish et le groupe de mercenaires du régime syrien depuis mardi dernier. Après que le quartier Tayy ait été débarrassé des mercenaires de la Défense nationale, la quatrième division a verrouillé le point de contrôle de Jazira menant à Sheikh Maqsud tandis que Awaridh est restés ouvert, ce qui a créé de longues filles d’attente au milieu d’opérations d’inspection et de contrôle. Des sources locales ont rapporté que des Kurdes ont été arrêtés à Bustan Basha, Ashrefiye, Midan, Catstello et près du carrefour Jendul où des voitures ont été immobilisées et des civils à bord arrêtés. Régulièrement, le gouvernement syrien a utilisé Sheikh Maqsud et Ashrefiye comme une carte contre l’Administration autonome du Nord et de l’Est de la Syrie (AANES) chaque fois que ses milices créent des émeutes et du chaos à Hasaka et à Qamishlo.
Clashes escalate between Asayish and pro-government National Defense in Syria’s Qamishli
2021-04-23
Members of Asayish Special Forces deployed in al-Tai neighborhood in Qamishli – North Press
QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – Al-Tai neighborhood, south Qamishli, northeastern Syria, has witnessed violent clashes with medium and light weapons between the Internal Security Forces (Asayish) and the pro-government National Defense forces (NDF).
Since the early hours of Friday morning, NDF snipers stationed in al-Tai neighborhood have intensified their targeting of civilian residential buildings surrounding al-Wehda roundabout in the city center.
According to field sources, late Thursday night, Asayish advanced and were close to the al-Tai roundabout.
Late Thursday night, Sheikh Hayyes al-Jaryyan, a prominent figure of the Bani Saba’a tribe, was assassinated, succumbing to his wounds after he was targeted by snipers from the pro-government NDF near his home northeast of the National Hospital.
On Tuesday, ten-year old Abdulsalam was killed by the targeting of the pro-Syrian government NDF near al-Wehda, Roundabout in Qamishli, while others were wounded.
Since Tuesday, Qamishli has been witnessing clashes between the Asayish and militants from the pro-government NDF.
On Thursday, Asayish found a quantity of weapons and ammunition in Lilo Detachment in al-Tai neighborhood, amid continuing clashes with the NDF.
The circle of clashes between Asayish and the NDF expanded to include Helko neighborhood as well, where before it was confined to al-Tai neighborhood.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are sharing control of the city with the Syrian government forces, who control a small part of it, while the SDF controls most of the city.
North East Syria Internal Security Forces: This operation aims at saving people from ISIS threats
The Internal Security Forces launched a ‘Humanitarian and Security Operation’ in Hol camp. The operation also aims at saving those living in the camp from the threats posed by ISIS members.
ANF
HESEKÊ
Sunday, 28 Mar 2021, 09:49
North and East Syria Internal Security Forces launched an operation called “Humanitarian and Security Operation” in Hol camp. The operation is being carried out with the collaboration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the People’s Defense Units (YPG)
Spokesperson for the SDF Gabriel Kino, spokesperson for the YPG Nuri Mehmud and the Jazira Region Assembly General Command Member Ewinar Derîk attended the statement made on the operation. The statement was read by the General spokesperson of the Internal Security Forces, Elî El-Hesen.
The statement said: “The Syrian war has been going on for about 10 years. This war resulted in thousands of victims and millions of Syrians forced to leave their homes and to migrate around the world.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) defeated the ISIS terrorist organization on a territorial basis with the support of the International Coalition two years ago. However, ISIS continues to pose a great threat to the whole region and the world. Secret cells of ISIS still target civil society administrators and civilians in Northern and Eastern Syria every day. The Internal Security Forces continue to fight these terrorist organizations in cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Hol Camp has represented a serious threat to the region and the world for a long time. More than 60,000 people stay in the camp, with children making up the majority of the population in the camp. There are ISIS mercenaries or members of mercenary families. These people aim at defend the ISIS organization and revive it when the time will be deemed appropriate. They are doing so by establishing a special administration for them. ISIS policemen called Al Hesbe established their own special courts. At the same time, they teach children in the camp the Islamic State precepts. This represents a big threat as aims at creating a new generation of terrorists all over the world. Children must be saved from this fate.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria met all the needs of the camp within its own means. Internal Security Forces also ensure the security of the camp with the support of SDF. However, the Hol camp has turned into a center where ISIS is being reorganized. Civilians inside the camps are attacked, murders are carried out. This situation poses a danger to everyone inside the camp. There have been 47 murders in the camp just since the beginning of this year.
Today, with the SDF, YPG, YPJ, the Internal Security Forces launched an operation called ‘Humanitarian and Security Operation’ which aims at breaking the ISIS influence in the camp. The operation will continue to protect civilians. With this operation we aim at saving the camp residents from the threats posed by ISIS.”
Women’s Protection Units, the YPJ, indicated that putting fighter Çiçek Kobanê on trial is a breach to the international law, calling on the international community to condemn this action and to release all female detainees held in Turkish State jails, assuring perseverance with fighting for the sublime human norms and feminist emancipation.
WOMAN 26 Mar 2021, Fri – 11:32 2021-03-26T11:32:00 NEWS DESK
On the verdict given by the Turkish authorities to the fighter Çiçek Kobanê, General Command of the YPK issued a statement reads:
” another blatant breach against the international human law and the Law of Armed Conflicts is being committed by the Turkish Occupation State by putting member to the YPJ Çiçek Kobanê on trial that was captured on October 21st, 2012, in a Tal Ayad village in North Eastern Syria by a mercenary group affiliated to the Turkish Occupation Army, in the Turkish Occupation Operation in the region, on which she was transferred into Turkey illegally to be receive a life imprisonment by the Turkish court on March 23rd, 2021, without committing any offense or crime against Turkey or any Turkish individual or causing it any damages”.
” since our comrade that was captured in an armed conflict, this authorizes her to be treated in accordance with all agreements and norms relevant to prisoners of war that give her protection and proper treatment”.
”Since Syrian territories were occupied by the Turkish Occupation Forces and the affiliated mercenary groups in North Eastern Syria, Syrian citizens are systematically being transferred into Turkish territory, and detained illegally, that all have been proven and condemned by the UN and other human rights associations that called on Turkey to stop all these violations but it ignored that intentionally and put our comrade on trial and gave her a life imprisonment sentence, on which we call on all active and concerned associations more notably those members to the UN, to condemn the Turkish action and to release immediately all Syrians detained illegally in Turkey”.
All these actions will not deter us, rather they will make us more determined to proceed fighting against occupation and oppression as we well know that these actions are in revenge against ISIS defeat that was sponsored by the Turkish State that is still attempting to revive it’s sleeper cells in the region, the verdict given to our comrade is not an accidence as the whole world commemorates the ISIS Baghouz Defeat”.
”we call on all women to show solidarity via condemning this action that is a revenge against all women, the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention proves this, based on this, from this moment onward, we will increase our resistance and determination on the course adopted by our comrades and those in captivity in the Turkish State jails for thye sake of sublime human values and the feminist emancipation”.
Why has the Turkish state escalated its attacks on Ain Issa?
Baz Jindirêsê, one of the SDF commanders, stated that the Turkish state and its gangs had to retreat after suffering huge blows during the three-day attacks.
HÎVDA HEBÛN
AIN ISSA
Wednesday, 24 Mar 2021, 07:47
WHY AIN ISSA?
Since the invasion of Girê Sipî, Ain Issa has been bombed by the occupying forces again and gain. However, the attacks have intensified since November. The villages of Mışerfe, Cehbel, Mieleq and Seyda are especially targeted. What is the goal of the Turkish state in Ain Issa?
Ain Issa has a strategic location. It connects many cities. For this reason, there have been constant attacks. However, these attacks failed because of the resistance of the SDF fighters. The attacks have intensified in the last five months. They started to carry out intense attacks on the villages of Mieleq, Mişerfe, Seyda and Cehbel around Ain Issa. Because these villages are the closest to the M4 highway. Since they could not occupy Ain Issa directly, they tried to encircle the city by trying to occupy these villages at first. All of their attempts were frustrated by the great resistance of the SDF fighters every time.
The invaders launched another aggression on March 19th. It is of course significant that they carried out this attack especially during the Newroz process. The whole world knows very well that Newroz is important and sacred for all Kurds. March 21 is celebrated with great enthusiasm by the Kurds all over the world. The occupiers specifically chose this date to destroy the enthusiasm and demoralize the people.
ATTACKS FAILED
SDF fighters defeated them. The attacks were intense. They got very close to the Seyda village. As a result of the great resistance of our fighters, their attacks have been frustrated. They had to retreat, suffering a large number of casualties. During the attack on the 19th, two armored vehicles belonging to them were destroyed, they had 15 dead and many more injured. They attacked again on the second day. They suffered a great blow in this attack as well. Two of their vehicles were destroyed and they retreated with nearly 18 casualties. On the third day, they attacked again in the morning hours and this attack was repelled thanks to the heroic resistance of the SDF fighters. They also used fighter jets. However, despite all their attempts, the SDF fighters did not allow them to advance and occupy these villages.
TURKEY BUILT 5 BASES IN AIN ISSA
In November last year, three observation points were established under the supervision of Russia to prevent the attacks of the Turkish state and its gangs, but after the establishment of these, both the attacks and the number of military bases of the Turkish state in the region have increased. Russia remains silent as before. How do you evaluate this situation?
As we said, these attacks have been going on for a while. And their purpose was to occupy Ain Issa, take strategic road lines and separate cities from each other. However, when they failed to do so, they tried to take control by establishing military bases on the M4 international road. They have set up 5 military bases so far. The purpose of these bases is to control the M4 highway, to control transportation and to prevent the use of the road by intimidating the people.
Russia established three military observation points in partnership with the Ba’ath regime, supposedly in order to prevent the Turkish state’s attacks and to check whether the Turkish state remains committed to the 2019 agreement. However, after the establishment of these points, the situation has become even worse than before. The attacks became more intense, and the Turks increased the number of their military bases. Supposedly, these observation points were established to ensure the safety of the people and to enable them to live more comfortably in their villages. However, it was also seen in the attack on the 19th that this is by no means the aim. People fromthe Seyda and Mieleq villages wanted to return to their homes. We then tried to provide the conditions for them to return to their villages. The Russians also accepted this so that the people would not be harmed and that they could return home safely. While the people were going back to their villages, the Russians supposedly accompanied them. However, as soon as the people returned, they were attacked by the Turkish forces and allied gangs. Although the Russians saw these attacks, they remained silent.
EVERYONE SEES OUR RESISTANCE AND DEDICATION
Does Russia’s pressure to give the area to the Ba’ath regime continue?
Some time ago, news was disseminated by the Ba’ath regime and some media outlets close to Russia that the SDF would give Ain Issa to the Ba’ath regime. These fake news were made by Russian hand. Actually, this is what Russia wants. Our people and everybody know very well that the SDF would not easily hand over a place where it shed its blood. Russia’s aim is to strengthen the Baath regime in the field and to leave the control of the area to the regime. Russia wants to put pressure on us through these attacks. Thus, it wants to strengthen the regime’s hand in the field. Russia paves the way for these attacks and remains silent on the attacks of the Turks. However, whenever an attack is launched, they witness the resistance of the SDF fighters. They also see very clearly that our lands will not be given away so comfortably. Our resistance will continue until there is only one person left. We will continue to protect our people until the end. There have been attacks on the area for a long time and these attacks continue. Our attitude is clear. We will never back down. We will keep the promise we have made to our people until the end, and we will always continue to follow our martyrs, we will protect these lands.
SDF: 34 Turkish-backed mercenaries killed in Ain Issa
SDF published a balance sheet on the three days of fighting around the northern Syrian town of Ain Issa. According to the report, four SDF members were martyred, and there were at least 37 casualties in the ranks of the occupation forces.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Monday, 22 Mar 2021, 19:52
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) published a balance sheet on the fighting around the town of Ain Issa from March 18 to 20. According to this, at least 37 members of the Turkish and allied jihadist occupation forces were killed in the clashes. Another 18 attackers were injured.
“In an attempt to justify their attacks against Ain Issa, the Turkish occupation state and its mercenaries spread claims that they were attacked by our forces and heavy casualties were suffered in our ranks. These statements do not correspond to the facts in any way. The side that is both attacking and suffering heavy casualties is the Turkish state. Such statements serve the sole purpose of hiding their own losses and distorting the truth,” emphasized the statement by the SDF.
The SDF continued, “The Turkish occupation army and its mercenaries carried out intensive attacks on the M4 highway and on the north of Ain Issa in the period between March 18 and 20. Our forces displayed unprecedented resistance to the attacks carried out with heavy weapons and repulsed them in the spirit of Newroz.”
According to the statement, 16 mercenaries were killed and 7 others injured as SDF fighters responded to the attacks on the villages of Seida and Mealik on March 19. The occupation forces targeted civilians with heavy weaponry, killing a child and injuring five civilians.
Having suffered heavy losses during clashes, the Turkish forces and allied mercenaries carried out attacks with tanks, howitzers and mortars on March 20. The response of our forces left 10 mercenaries dead and another 4 injured in the Seida village. On the other hand, 8 mercenaries were killed and 5 others injured in the village of Mealik. In addition, 2 panzer vehicles were destroyed and another 2 damaged.
On the same day, sabotage by SDF fighters killed 3 mercenaries and injured 2 others.
On March 21, Turkish army heavily shelled the villages of Misherfa, Seid, Mealik, M4 highway and vicinity of ain Issa. Sporadic clashes took place till the noon.
During three days of clashes, 4 SDF fighters were martyred, and 4 others injured.
A+A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region — The commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on Sunday welcomed a recent European Parliament decision condemning Turkey’s military occupation in northeast Syria and abuses against the Kurdish population.
“We welcome the EU parliament’s resolution calling for the withdrawal of the illegal Turkish occupation forces from northern Syria and share the EU parliament’s concerns over ethnic cleansing attempts by Turkey against Kurds in Syria,” tweeted SDF General Commander Mazloum Abdi early Sunday morning.
He was reacting to a resolution adopted by the European Parliament on Thursday that called on “Turkey to withdraw its troops from Northern Syria which it is illegally occupying outside of any UN mandate.”
Turkey, with its Syrian proxies, has conducted three offensives into northern Syria since 2016. The first, Operation Euphrates Shield, saw Turkey seize control of territory in northern Aleppo province from the Islamic State group (ISIS). The goal of the operation was to push ISIS militants away from the border with Turkey and prevent Kurdish forces from taking control of the territory.
The second, Operation Olive Branch, was in 2018 against Kurdish forces in the northwest enclave of Afrin. The most recent operation, Operation Peace Spring, was also against Kurdish forces along the Syria-Turkey border between the towns of Gire Spi (Tal Abyad) and Sari Kani (Ras al-Ain). That offensive ended with ceasefires brokered by Washington and Moscow that gave Turkish-backed forces control of the territory seized during the operation with Russian and Syrian regime forces acting as a buffer along the border.
Tens of thousands of people have been displaced from their homes because of Turkey’s military operations.
Turkish forces and their Syrian proxies are accused of committing human rights violations in the territories they seized. Charges include hostage taking, torture, rape, destruction of property, arbitrary arrest, and pillaging. A United Nations commission in September 2020 said these charges may amount to war crimes and called on Turkey to reign in its proxies.
The European Parliament said it is “worried that Turkey’s ongoing displacements could amount to ethnic cleansing against the Syrian Kurdish population” and stressed that “Turkey’s illegal invasion and occupation has jeopardised peace in Syria.”
Turkish-backed forces are also accused of illegally transferring tens of people to Turkey to face trial on alleged links to the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish armed force that Ankara believes is a branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Human Rights Watch documented at least 63 cases of illegal transfers.
The European Parliament condemned the transfers as a violation of international law and urged “that all Syrian detainees who have been transferred to Turkey be immediately repatriated to the occupied territories in Syria.”
The parliament also condemned the Syrian regime’s “long-standing discrimination against Kurdish Syrians.” Under the regime, tens of thousands of Kurds in Syria were denied citizenship as part of systemic discrimination against the minority.
Why is Syrian military deploying in Kurdish-held areas?
The Syrian government seeks to strengthen its military presence in Ain Issa and the area overlooking the M4 international highway, which are under control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. A Russian soldier stands guard as troops escort a convoy of Syrian civilians leaving the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Hasakah province, to return to their homes in the northern town of Ain Issa in the countryside of the Raqqa region, via the strategic M4 highway on Jan. 10, 2021. The town of Tal Tamr is on the front line between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian factions supported by Turkey. Photo by DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP via Getty Images. Khaled al-Khateb
@khaleedalkhteb
Mar 12, 2021
ALEPPO, Syria — The Syrian government, with the support of Russia, is trying to boost its military presence in the areas of northeastern Syria controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which can be considered a violation of the agreement signed by the regime with the SDF under the auspices of Russia in October 2019. The agreement provides for a specific deployment for the regime’s army and without heavy weapons along the Syrian-Turkish border to prevent a Turkish offensive.
The regime allegedly violated the agreement by sending in early March a military convoy heavily armed with weapons toward Ain Issa and the outskirts of the M4 highway connecting the governorates of Hasakah and Aleppo, which heralds the return of arrests and escalation between the two sides.
Khaled al-Homsi, a journalist who works for the opposition-affiliated Orient website in the Tell Abyad area near Ain Issa in the northern Raqqa governorate, told Al-Monitor, “The regime’s military reinforcements began to reach the area adjacent to the M4 highway in the countryside of Raqqa and Hasakah governorate in northeastern Syria since the beginning of March. These reinforcements have so far included some heavy artillery bases, missile bases and troop carriers. The regime forces have also implemented a new redeployment operation, and the largest force is stationed in the villages of al-Maalak, al-Hoshan and al-Khalidiyah, which are adjacent to the M4 highway. The regime forces are also stationed in the Electricity Company in the vicinity of Ain Issa.”
A military official in the SDF stationed in Ain Issa told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, “The SDF leadership is not pleased with the Syrian regime bringing in military reinforcements with heavy weapons to the area even though these reinforcements are so far relatively modest. The regime cannot just change the balance of power on the ground. Some leaders in the regime forces said the reinforcements are to counter any attempt by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Turkish army [to attack the area], but the SDF fears that the regime will continue its policy of strengthening its military presence in the area with Russia’s support.”
It seems that the Syrian military is trying to pressure the SDF and impose a new military reality in the Ain Issa area, as long as it has not achieved — with Russia‘s help — what it has been aiming for since the end of 2020, which is forcing the SDF to withdraw from Ain Issa and preventing the opposition factions and the Turkish army from taking control. The regime strengthening its military presence near the M4 highway prevents a military operation by the opposition and the Turkish army in order to expand and control the area. The efforts of the Syrian regime reflect its interest in the vital and strategic roads that it cannot afford to lose in light of the stifling economic crisis.
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Col. Mostafa Bakkour, a defected Syrian regime officer, military analyst and researcher living in Idlib, told Al-Monitor, “The SDF will not respond to the pressure of the Syrian regime and will not allow it to expand and boost its military presence in its areas of control. If the regime continues to send reinforcements and heavy military equipment, tension will erupt between the two sides in the area. As a result, Russia would intervene as a mediator, despite its public support for the regime. Russia is pursuing a policy of mediation, or at least so it claims, to preserve its interests and at the same time exploit any action and disagreement between the conflicting parties.”
Ali Tami, spokesman for the Kurdish Future Movement in Syria, told Al-Monitor, “The regime’s military moves in the Ain Issa area and near the M4 international highway aim to further pressure the SDF to resume oil exports to the Syrian regime, which is trying to boost its military presence in the area in order to prevent oil exports from the SDF to the Syrian opposition areas in the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib. The regime and Russia do not want the oil to flow to the opposition areas.”
On March 5, Russia struck the Hamran crossing linking the SDF with the opposition near al-Bab and the rudimentary oil refining stations in the countryside of Aleppo. The attack may also point to the regime’s plan to pressure the SDF to stop exporting oil to the opposition and resume exporting to the regime-held areas.
On March 7, the SDF resumed the supply of oil to the regime-controlled areas after a monthlong hiatus, which caused a fuel crisis in the regime-held areas.
Firas Faham, an Istanbul-based researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies, told Al-Monitor, “The regime’s attempt to reinforce its military presence near the M4 highway comes in the context of pressuring the SDF to withdraw from Ain Issa. There seems to be a Turkish-Russian understanding; either Russia expels the SDF from Ain Issa, or Turkey launches a military operation.”
Faham added, “Yet it seems that Russia is trying to avoid a Turkish military operation because it does not welcome Turkey’s growing influence, especially since the Turkish army and the FSA making their way into more areas would pave the way to connect the Peace Spring area with the Euphrates Shield area in the countryside of Aleppo. This is why pressure is being exerted on the SDF to withdraw or at least reduce its military presence in Ain Issa, which will lead to the return of the regime’s institutions to the area.”
It seems that the SDF understands Russia’s intentions in northeastern Syria, and the Russians prefer to avoid the military option to keep channels of communication open with the Kurds and not allow the United States to use this against them and turn the Kurds into enemies. The SDF is also well aware that Russia does not welcome the expansion of Turkish influence and will thus not allow for any military operation. At this point, the SDF will show resistance to the regime’s demands regarding its control of Ain Issa.
Fighters of the Women’s Defense Units (YPJ) in Hesekê celebrated March 8 with an impressive military ceremony. The highlight was an address by YPJ General Commander Newroz Ehmed.
ANF
HESEKÊ
Sunday, 7 Mar 2021, 16:01
Fighters of the Women’s Defense Units (ku. Yekîneyên Parastina Jin, YPJ) celebrated International Women’s Day March 8 with an impressive military ceremony in Hesekê on Sunday. The spectacular performance by hundreds of female fighters was attended by numerous personalities from the military structures, civil society and the local population. The highlight was a speech by Newroz Ehmed, one of the general commanders of the YPJ.
Ehmed began by thanking Clara Zetkin as the initiator of International Women’s Day and all other women pioneers for women’s rights and equality. “But we don’t limit women’s struggle merely to celebrations like those of today,” Ehmed continued. “March 8 has become a symbol of all human values and an achievement for all humanity in the person of women. However, the attacks of the male-dominated mentality continue. However, it should not forget that women have fought for their rights at great sacrifice. March 8 is not a day that the patriarchal mentality has ‘graciously’ left to us.”
Capitalist modernity wants to destroy women’s liberation struggle through well thought out methods, said Newroz Ehmed and continued, “We as women in Northern and Eastern Syria know this approach from Afrin, Serêkaniyê and Girê Spî in the form of patriarchal violence, rapes and kidnappings by the fascist Turkish state and its mercenaries only too well and will not forget it. This fact underlines that a free life will not be possible as long as the male-dominated mentality continues to exist. In order to end the existence of the patriarchal mindset, we must continue to educate and organize based on the memory of our fallen companions who sacrificed themselves to defeat this mentality and defend the revolution in this way. As women, we are closer to freedom today than ever before. If there is to be a life, it must be a free life. This freedom can only be achieved with the participation of all sectors of society.”
“The fact that the YPJ’s paradigm – “Free women are the basis of a free society” – is the right path to a free life is also shown by the international support for this idea. The participation of women from all over the world in the resistance for free life, first and foremost friend Lêgerîn (Alina Sanchez), highlights once again the importance of women’s values in building a society. The struggle of the YPJ in northeastern Syria will pave and enlighten the way to freedom for all women of this world,” said Ehmed.
After the speech, there was a cultural program, including a theater performance, folklore performances and a performance by a choir. The celebrations were concluded with joint Govend dances.
Salih Muslim: The conspiracy against Öcalan and the Kurdish people has failed
Salih Muslim, a member of the PYD co-presidency council, said: “Every moment Leader Apo continues to remain under those conditions is a great shame for us.”
SILTAN TEMO
QAMISHLO
Saturday, 13 Feb 2021, 11:02
Reminding that the conspiracy forces wanted to destroy the Kurdish people’s leader Abdullah Öcalan after 1990, PYD co-presidency council Member Salih Muslim underlined that “the Kurdish people have reached the mechanism to develop democracy in the Middle East. Those forces could not tear the head off the body. That is why the aggravated isolation imposed on the Leader has been going on since 2015. They do not allow a single word of the Leadership to come out, because under all circumstances he continued to lead the people and the Movement.”
PYD co-presidency council member Salih Muslim spoke to ANF about the anniversary of the international conspiracy which led to the capture of Öcalan.
What was the purpose of the forces involved in the international conspiracy?
First of all, we condemn the international conspiracy against Leader Apo once again on the 22nd anniversary. It is a dark day for the Kurdish people. The Kurdish people’s leader is still in their hands, and the conspiracy continues as long as his captivity continues. In this sense, we have to do everything we can. The conspiracy was made against all Kurds and peoples of the region in the person of the Kurdish people’s leader. In time, it became clear what the purpose of the conspiracy was and who planned it. In fact, it had already been mentioned and evaluated by the Kurdish people’s leader many times.
The peoples of the region needed democracy and freedom. Hegemonic powers wanted to rule these peoples as they wanted. In the 90’s they were talking about the redesign / restructuring of the Middle East. They were working on a restructuring plan in 1995 to consolidate their interests. These forces feed on conflicts and contradictions between peoples to achieve their interests. In this way, they would strengthen their rule over the peoples. The Kurdish people, on the other hand, were experiencing an awakening with the Kurdish Freedom Movement and was leading this process.
The Kurdish people actually served as a dynamo force for the people’s struggle for freedom and democracy. Of course, it was leader Abdullah Öcalan who provided all this and brought the people to this situation. Therefore, they wanted to eliminate him. The leadership was leading the peoples with his idea, philosophy, discourse and ideology. For this reason, it was an obstacle to the plans of the hegemonic powers.
After 1980, all peoples started to rise up and joined him. The Kurdish people tied all their hopes to this revolution and acted accordingly. There was both ideas and ideology and a force to mobilize this idea and ideology; and that force was the Kurdish people. For this reason, they first wanted to eliminate the Kurdish people’s leader and then dismantle the organizational unity formed within the Kurdish people. In this way, they would be able to rule the people as they wanted.
The biggest defenders of this conspiracy were international forces. The Turkish state was given the duty to be the guardian in this conspiracy. At that time, we remember Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit saying, ‘They dropped a bomb in our lap, we don’t know what to do’. The laws on Imrali today are neither the laws of the Turkish state nor the laws of Europe; are special laws. In fact, we cannot even speak of laws, because there is no law. The conspiracy was not successful. They could neither eliminate Leader Apo, nor split the Kurdish people. The conspiracy did not achieve the desired result, but it goes on. Of course, we also see this and we are fighting in this direction. The struggle of the Kurdish people continues.
How did the Kurdish people’s leader play the role of spoiling this conspiracy?
After 1990, their only effort was to destroy Leader Apo. The Leader, while protecting the movement and himself, carried the struggle to such a position that the Kurdish people have reached the mechanism to develop democracy in the Middle East. The Leader managed to send his defences to the people through its lawyers and courts. The enemy could not tear the head off the body. That is why the aggravated isolation on the Leader has been going on since 2015. They do not allow a single word of the Leadership to come out, because despite all circumstances he continued to lead the people and the Movement.
Therefore, the conspiracy is still going on. They want to prevent the Kurdish people from using their dynamism to lead the struggle for freedom and democracy, they want to eliminate this force. They can’t do that, however. The revolution taking place in Rojava is obvious. The leadership’s democratic nation project is being put in practice in Rojava. This project seems to be the best model for the people. For this reason, they are getting more and more nervous and increase their attacks. These attacks are against the democratic nation project. The democratic nation project will develop not only in Rojava, but throughout Syria and the Middle East.
What should be done to protect the Rojava Revolution and its achievements?
Of course, the more you claim, protect and struggle, the more success you will achieve. This is possible with the organization of the people. The victory of Kobanê was the result of this. Although there was not the level of organization we would like, there was some degree of organization. For this reason, the Kobanê resistance took place, it was claimed, it was successful. The more we expand this organization, the more we can include other peoples, the more successful will be this struggle.
However, there are many forces in Syria: America, Russia and other states and powers. We should never stay away from them. It is necessary to have a political experience and a political view. You have to meet and be in dialogue with them for your own benefit, just as they give and take for their own benefit. You will give and receive according to your own opinion and philosophy, but your door will also be open to everyone. The North East Syrian administration, has not interrupted dialogue with anyone until now. If we are to be hostile, let’s know why we are hostile, and if we are going to be friends, the same applies.
Our top priority task is the organization of peoples and change in mentality. If we can achieve this, it is possible to live within the framework of the democratic nation project with our own culture, beliefs and colours. At the same time, we should not forget that every moment that Leader Apo spent in such conditions is a great shame for us.
Syrian Kurds ready to accept U.S.-led talks with Turkey, commander says
Feb 26 2021 01:06 Gmt+3
Last Updated On: Feb 28 2021 04:00 Gmt+3
General Mazlum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) spoke to Mutlu Çiviroğlu of Voice of America about recent developments in North and East Syria, often referred to as Rojava.
The transcript below has been translated and amended from MedyaNews for clarity.
I would like to ask your opinion about the new U.S. administration and especially your relations with U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State (ISIS). I also want to ask about the operation you started against ISIS in Deir-Ez-Zor. And what situation is now in Rojava?
As you know, ISIS has not been defeated and their attacks continue. Recently, they targeted our civilian workers, and two women political leaders were martyred. As the attacks continued, we launched a major operation against ISIS.
The ISIS group consisted of six people and attacked our friends, we killed four of them, one of them managed to disappear and we caught the other one. Many other people were also arrested in the region. In general, I can say that the danger of ISIS continues and the terrorist organisation is trying to revive itself. They are coming from territory under the control of the Syrian regime, and Iraq. But with our operations with our allies from the US-led coalition against ISIS continue successfully.
The widespread opinion was that ISIS was defeated. Former U.S. President Donald Trump frequently made statements about the end of ISIS. What has happened now ISIS can launch attacks again? The U.S.-led coalition made statements that the alliance with you will continue. What role should U.S. politicians take against these attacks?
Coalition forces withdrew after Raqqa and Kobani were liberated from ISIS and the group benefited from this withdrawal and recovered. As I mentioned, they come to our region from territory under the control of the Syrian regime, and Iraq. The political future of the region has not yet been clarified, so ISIS benefits from that as well. In order to prevent the resurrection of ISIS, we need to first clarify the political future of the region. Coalition forces should continue their work. If they support the civilian administration in the region, we can wage a more effective fight against ISIS.
It is known that President Joe Biden and his administration are aware of the Kurdish problem. You said that the situation in Syria should be resolved politically. What are your political expectations from the new U.S. administration? What can this administration do differently from the past as part of the solution process in Syria?
We welcomed the new administration. We hope that the wrong policy in the past will be set right. We hope the United States will play an important role in the solution process in Syria. Following a solution, the Syrian regime should have a status in the regions we liberated from ISIS with the help of the coalition. The rights of the Kurdish people and the rights of other peoples in our region should be protected by law and the problems in Syria should be solved completely. We want Washington to conduct an effective policy on this issue.
You said that some mistakes were made under the previous administration. Trump’s desire to withdraw U.S. forces generated strong reactions in Washington and across America. What was the effect of the decision on you and on civilians?
There were some issues we dealt with during the previous administration. The people here, Kurds and Arabs, relied heavily on the U.S. forces, and this trust still exists. But this trust was damaged when the United States allowed Turkish forces to attack Serekaniye and Afrin.
We are trying to restore the trust between the U.S. forces and the people. Hundreds of thousands of people in Afrin had to leave their homes and now live as refugees. There were 90 to 95 percent Kurds in Afrin, but now that rate is around 30 percent. The Turkish state implemented demographic changes through Turkmen and Arabs.
Hundreds of thousands of people from Serakaniye and Gira Spa had to migrate during the attacks in 2019 and now they are staying in refugee camps and their condition is not good. They are waiting to return to their homeland. A new policy conducted in this new period should see people returned to their homes and regions returned to their natural state.
What can the new administration do concretely in a short time? If you had the opportunity to meet Biden, what would you request concretely?
We want the problems in the region to be resolved through dialogue. We ask the United States to assist this dialogue and to ensure peace in the region. We are waging a fight against terrorism here and they can support us against attacks from our neighbours, which is urgently needed. Unfortunately, the previous administration paved the way for threats to the region. This should not be repeated. In order for the struggle against ISIS to be effective, the United States has to provide support to the political administration here.
You talked about attacks from neighbours. Turkey says that Kurds in Syria pose a threat to its security. Are the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Syrian Kurds a threat to Turkey?
We have said this before, we pose no threat to Turkey. Turks know this better than we do. The Turkish state attacked our lands. We are not a party to the war waged by the Turkish state against other Kurdish forces. We want to solve the problems with the Turkish state through dialogue. I think the United States can play an effective role in advancing this dialogue, and we remain open to it.
So you are ready to respond positively to the Biden administration’s call for a dialogue with the Turkish state?
Of course. We have lands occupied by the Turkish state. We want to solve the problems with the Turks through dialogue, we are ready for dialogue and there is no serious obstacle to this. We want to solve problems without fighting.
White House National Security Advisor Jack Sullivan previously touched on the rights of the Kurds and called for a new settlement process between the Kurds and the Turkish government. Does the SDF see such a process positively? Would you take part in this process?
The truth is, the situation in all four parts of Kurdistan is interconnected. The Kurdish political movement has had a great impact in Turkey. It is difficult to have a solution in other parts without a solution in Turkey. The solution in Rojava is also related to the solution in Turkey. A solution initiated with (Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader) Abdullah Ocalan will have a positive impact on other parts, especially Rojava. This is the best method to solve the problem between the Kurds and the Turkish state.
Why do you think that such an initiative would be important for the safety of the American people? Why would the United States support a political solution in Syria?
If the problem is solved in our region, it will impact the world. We think that if the problem in northeast Syria is not solved, the problems in the whole country will not be solved. If there is no solution, ISIS and other elements will become stronger and continue to threaten the security of the American people.
I would like to ask about the situation of Yazidi Kurds and Christian minorities in the region. According to reports from Afrin, the situation is severe. What would you like to say about the current situation of Christians and Yazidis?
The representation of Christians and Yazidis in the SDF is high. ISIS and other Islamic radical groups attacked Yazidis and Christians. They were severely persecuted. They joined the SDF to protect themselves. Our people in Shengal were also subjected to persecution due to the attacks in Serakiniye and Afrin. Their villages were plundered and they faced the threat of genocide. Now they are living under pressure in other areas, some of them stay in refugee camps in our region. We know that Yazidi and Christian minorities are on the agenda of democratic organisations. They must protect the struggle of minorities.
You mention that the situation of the Kurds is interconnected. How are your relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (in Iraq)?
We have a close relationship with (Iraqi) Kurdistan, including growing commercial relations. The Kurdistan Regional Government (in Iraq) can provide political and commercial support to Rojava. They have (autonomous) status there and have experience and opportunities. Of course, Rojava needs their support. Some negotiations are happening, we want a stronger relationship. We know that the Turkish state wants Kurds to fight against each other. The Turkish state wants clashes between the forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government and the (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) forces.
Despite this, the fact is that (Iraqi Kurdish) Peshmerga forces do not want to be part of such a game. We want the Kurdistan Regional Government to develop good relations with all parties, especially with Rojava.
How are your relations with the Syrian government? There have been some conflicts recently.
The Baathist regime has not changed its policy yet. They want the region to be same as before 2011 and don’t recognise Kurdish rights or the rights of other minorities. Our people immigrating from Shehba, Afrin, and Aleppo were encircled, placed under embargo, and had civilians arrested. We protected our people and then some problems occurred between us and the regime. We do not want to be at war with the Damascus government. We want to solve our problems through dialogue, for them to accept the rights of Kurds, and recognise our region.
Some criticised you and said you are unable to utilise the friendships of the United States and other great powers. How do you evaluate this criticism?
We get support from our American friends for the SDF and Rojava, and we are grateful for this. The United States has supported us in difficult times. U.S. politicians and soldiers supported our struggle. We are aware of some of our shortcomings. We want to be in close contact with the Unite States more frequently, especially in 2021. We want our political forces to negotiate with U.S. senators and other political forces. There were some bureaucratic obstacles in front of us, and we hope that those obstacles will be cleared.
Last year, the U.S. Congress invited you to visit. If there is an opportunity, do you have any plans to visit Washington?
We were at war at the time and there were some bureaucratic problems. But now is the time to discuss with the Americans. If I have the opportunity to meet with U.S. politicians, and if I can discuss the problems here with them face to face, I would of course be delighted to.
You were in contact with Trump several times. Have you ever had contact with Biden? Or do you expect contact in the coming period?
We talked with the new U.S. administration. I hope we will have a stronger relationship in the coming days and we can start talks at a higher level.
A new book titled”The Daughters of Kobani” was published recently. You also spearheaded the war in Kobani, which was important in letting the world know about Kurds. What would you like to say about these works and Kobani?
Many thanks to the author of the book, Gayle Tzemach Lemmon. She also interviewed me when she came here. I told her my views on Kobani. Friends in the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), and SDF also helped her. She wrote a very important and valuable book. I think it is worthy of the women who resisted in Kobani. We are honoured with these works and wish them to increase.
The New York Times Whitewashes Turkey’s Occupation of Northern Syria: A Reality Check
by Debbie Bookchin
A recent article in the New York Times whitewashes the ethnic cleansing, displacement, and abuse of women that has brought misery to what was once a thriving, largely Kurdish region in Northern Syria. The Times piece was first published online as “Turkey’s Army Invaded Syria. Now, It’s a Lifeline for Millions There,” (February 16, 2021) before undergoing two headline changes and eventually landing on the front page of the print edition on February 17, 2021 as, “A Safe Zone That Can’t Protect Against Misery.” Violating basic principles of journalistic ethics—principles that include interviewing people on the receiving end of a war zone invasion—the article reads like a press release from the Turkish regime of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ignoring the enormous suffering endured by the thousands of original inhabitants of Afrin as a result of the Turkish-led occupation.
Prior to the Turkish invasion in January 2018, Afrin was part of the broader, Kurdish-led area known as Rojava or more formally, the Autonomous Administration of North and east Syria (AANES), whose fighters have been our best allies in the defeat of ISIS. The AANES, a region of about 5 million people, is a pluralist democracy that enshrines the rights of all ethnic minorities and has been especially effective in promoting women’s rights. Practices like forced marriage, polygamy, child marriage, and honor killings are outlawed. Laws mandate autonomous women’s councils, and the inclusion of at least 40 percent female representation in every legislative body, as well as female co-chairs in all administrative positions.
The invasion of Afrin by Turkey in January 2018, caused an estimated 180,000 people, mostly Kurdish, to flee their homes; most of them now live in internally displaced persons camps in other parts of Syria. Today, as Amnesty International has documented about those who remained: “Residents in Afrin are enduring a wide range of violations, mostly at the hands of Syrian armed groups that have been equipped and armed by Turkey (including) arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and confiscation of property and looting to which Turkey’s armed forces have turned a blind eye.” The intentional destruction of Kurdish and Yezidi religious and architectural sites, forced demographic changes including relocation of Arab families to Afrin from other parts of Syria, and compulsory use of Turkish language, even in schools, have been widely documented and signal Turkey’s intent to annex the region permanently.
The most egregious violations by Turkey have been against women. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Syria describes Turkey’s war on women in Afrin as creating a “pervasive climate of fear which [has] in effect confined them to their homes.” The 25-page report adds: “Women and girls have also been detained by [Turkish-backed] Syrian National Army fighters, and subjected to rape and sexual violence – causing severe physical and psychological harm.” To humiliate and demoralize the population, the Turkish-backed militias have engaged in such practices as forcing detained men to watch the gang-rape of a female minor, the report notes, saying it amounted to “torture.” Women’s rights researchers have documented that in 2020 alone, 88 women and girls whose identities are known were kidnapped by Turkish-backed armed groups, a rate of approximately one incident every four days. This included six minor girls of whom five were still missing as of January 1, 2021.
The Turkish invasion of Afrin has been a humanitarian catastrophe. No amount of propaganda from the authoritarian regime of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can erase the evidence on the ground of the grotesque human rights violations being perpetrated by Turkey, and it is shameful that the Times so completely missed the real story.
The AANES has long sought political recognition and autonomy within the borders of Syria. If the U.S. truly stands for human rights—and particularly women’s rights—it is time for the Biden administration to demand the withdrawal of Turkish forces from this area, grant the AANES political recognition, and press for the AANES to have a seat at the negotiating table on the future of Syria.
Debbie Bookchin, a long-time journalist and author, is a member of the steering committee of the Emergency Committee for Rojava. She was in Rojava in March and April 2019.
Medya News speaks to SDF spokesperson and Catholic Assyrian Christian, Gabriel Kino
January 29, 2021
Mark Campbell
Mr Gabriel Kino, spokesperson of the SDF, is a Catholic Assyrian and was a leading representative of the Syriac Military Council (SMC) during the early days of the Syrian Civil War. The SMC was established to protect the Assyrian Christian people from the attacks and persecution from the Islamic State and Jihadist groups that had established themselves in Syria.
He oversaw the formation of the Syrian Democratic Front, which included a wide section of Syrian society, including different Arab tribal and secular groups, Assyrian, Yazidi and Syriac groups, and the YPG and YPJ defence forces.He led military campaigns with the SMC and SDF and was one of the leaders that led the military offensive to liberate the ISIS HQ of Raqqa and went on to accept the defeat of ISIS at Baghouz in Deir Ezzor.
He very kindly agreed to an interview for Medya News.
Kino Gabriel has personally witnessed the sacrifice of his people and forces in the fight against ISIS in Syria and knows, first hand, the consequences of any invasion and attack by Turkey and their affiliated radical Jihadist gangs for the hard-won religious freedoms that the Autonomous Adiministration of North and East Syria (AANES) are respected for by religious rights groups around the world. I began by asking him about the threats to religious freedom following the ISIS attacks near Hasakah.
Following the murders of Hind Latif Al Khadir (Head of the Economy committee of Til Shayir) and Sa’da Faysal Al Hermas (Co-president of Til Shayir People Council) by forces affiliated to ISIS, what threat does Turkey’s continuous attacks on North and East Syria pose to the religious freedoms enjoyed by the people of the SDF-controlled Autonomous Administration of North East Syria (AANES)?
Gabriel Kino: I think the threats that Turkey is making and the military operations that Turkey has launched so far in areas such as: Northern Syria; Afrin; around Manbij; the Northern countryside outside of Aleppo, and the area between Tal Abiyad and Ras al Ayn, has already threatened and reduced the religious freedoms of the peoples in these areas.
This reduction in religous freedoms is something they are already living through. The situation has already deteriorated for several religious groups in those areas occupied by Turkey including the Yazidis and the Christians including other prominent groups living in those areas, especially the Yazidis in the areas around Ras al Ayn and Afrin. And also the other Christian communities and groups based around Ras al Ayn and also other Kurdish Christian groups who were living in Afrin.
Of course, the continous threats made by Turkey are adding to the problem of people’s fears of a new military operation. And yes, I think, those threats is mostly problematic for those groups such as the Kurds, the Christians, the Yazidis the Armenians, and others who live in North and East Syria.
Of course, it also affects the Arab population also, although the other groups are mainly feeling more threatened because the Turkish military threats are directed specifically against them. On the other hand, the groups who are supported by Turkey, which are known for their terrorist and extremist radical mentality, they pose a threat for those groups in particular of North and East Syria in particular, we have witnessed what they have done. We have seen how these groups, including Jabat al Nusra and ISIS have been part of the military operations and attacks launched by Turkey and part of the groups and militias supported by Turkey.
It is widely recognised that the AANES has been able to build a tolerant inclusive society in NE Syria, unparalleled in the Middle East, promoting and enjoying religious freedom, gender equality, and human rights. Do you think that this model could be a positive example for the wider region?
Gabriel Kino: I think the democratic administration is really a unique example and experience in the Middle East. Different groups that previously had problems with each other have been able to come together, work together in order to make this administration work. This is completely unique, and I think we can take this positive example and look for where we can apply it to other parts of the Middle East and other parts of Syria so other groups can benefit.
I think this way of administration could potentially be a solution for the Syrian crisis in general. Of course, I think we need more work and more support in order to be more inclusive and more able to develop our political and administration experience, but again I think the work that has been done is great.
And with the support from democratic countries and Europe I think we can make the administration even better than what we have now.
Despite almost daily attacks by the Turkish state on NE Syria, especially recently around the town of Ain Issa, and the recent indiscriminate bombing of Tel Rifaat with civilian deaths, we do not hear condemnation from any of the anti-ISIS coalition members that the SDF have been fighting with, nor from Russia, which is supposed to be a guarantor of the ceasefire agreed last year. How do you interpret this silence?
Gabriel Kino: I think it is safe to say that it is not just about North and East Syria. I think it is the worst Syrian situation that has been governed so far by complicated relations and complicated intersections of global and regional interests/powers and governments involved in the Syrian crisis.
I think this is one of the main reasons there is so direct condemnations of Turkey for their attacks on North and East Syria.
Lastly, are you able to give us any indication on the progress of any talks with the Syria government on any possible negotiated agreement on autonomy and protections of religious freedoms, hard-won since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War?
Gabriel Kino: I think mainly and have to say that this is not my area of expertise or knowledge. I think it is a question for the political administration, but as far as I have information there isn’t really any progress in the talks.
There have been several attempts to have mutual talks or talks that were to be mediated by Russia but I think so far they have not worked out.
I think in the future we will see more progress and development but again I think this question is better suited for the Syrian Democratic Council or the Executive Council of the Administration of North and East Syria.
Syria: Are water supplies being weaponized by Turkey?
Water outages in Syria’s northeast are often leaving around half a million people without potable water. Is Turkey using the outages as a weapon to destabilize the region, as some claim?
Around 1 million people are suffering from water outages in the Al-Hasakah region
Around 1 million people in the Kurdish-governed region of Al-Hasakah in Syria’s northeast have again had their water supply cut off — as they have around 20 times in the past 12 months.
“This is a humanitarian disaster,” Sara Kayyali, a Syria researcher at Human Rights Watch, told DW. As of this Sunday, some parts of the region are experiencing the eighth straight day without water.
Problems with the supply from the nearest water station, Alouk, have been growing since Turkish forces and their Syrian rebel proxies took charge in October 2019, after the so-called Operation Peace Spring that targeted the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the region. While the water station has been under Turkish control since then, it relies on the SDF-controlled Mabrouka Electricity Station for its power. Turkey’s objective behind Operation Peace Spring was to create a 30-kilometer (19-mile) wide “safe zone” under Turkish control inside Syria.
Water from tanks is not only up to three times more expensive but also of inferior quality, leading to diseases
“Since then, a cornerstone of humanitarian capabilities has been repeatedly cut off, and water outages create ramifications across the entire population,” Kayyali told DW.
Syria claims that Turkey is behind the water outages, and accuses Turkey of having a major interest in destabilizing the region with the (mainly Kurdish-Syrian) population of around 1 million in cities such as Al-Hasakah, more than 45 villages and many official and unofficial refugee camps. Officially, Turkey doesn’t take any responsibility for the repeated outages and claims they are due to technical issues.
“I have to note that Turkey denies the accusation of cutting water to the region and says the Alouk station has merely been under maintenance and faces a lack of electricity from a dam not under Turkish control,” Guney Yildiz, a political analyst and IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, told DW.
“On the other hand, Turkey openly declares its intention [in Turkish media — Editor’s note] to eradicate the administrations set up in northeast Syria and is most probably willing to use various means to accomplish that. Destabilizing the region is part of that strategy,” Yildiz added. Watch video 02:08
Turkey’s public position on the northeastern Syrian administrations remains unclear. DW contacted the head of media and communications for the Turkish presidency, Fahrettin Altun, for clarification, but has received no response so far.
“The threat of an independent Kurdish region near Turkey is an idea that may encourage more uprisings from within Turkey’s sizable Kurdish population, so Erdogan is looking to prevent a Kurdish state in Syria,” Charles Flynn, a researcher at the region’s Rojava Information Center, told DW.
Flynn considers fears of an independent Kurdish state as one of three reasons. “With the creation of Turkish-backed militias that recruit from extremist groups such as ISIS, Erdogan can’t have these militants come home to Turkey and start operating. And economically, war is always good for the economy, and the Turkish economy hasn’t been doing so well with the US sanctions and the COVID-pandemic,” he said.
Humanitarian crisis amid pandemic
The latest overview from the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Syria, dated January 12, reported 12,462 COVID-19 cases. Some 8,227 cases were reported from northeast Syria, as of January 9.
“Access to water is all the more critical in [the] context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The UN continues to advocate to the relevant parties to ensure the provision of water from Alouk in line with international humanitarian law, and across Syria, to ensure that all civilians have access to basic services,” Danielle Moylan, OCHA’s spokesperson, told DW. Watch video 09:44
As early as last March, UNICEF’s representative in Syria, Fran Equiza, warned of the consequences of leaving 1 million people without water and relying on temporary solutions, particularly in times of a pandemic. “The interruption of water supply during the current efforts to curb the spread of the coronavirus disease puts children and families at unacceptable risk. Hand-washing with soap is critical in the fight against COVID-19,” he said.
Temporary responses organized by local authorities and human rights organizations, such as tankers carrying water to surrounding villages, are no real substitute. The water is more expensive, of a lower quality and is not suitable for drinking.
“This issue is difficult to solve without international intervention to end this human suffering for the people in those areas,” Taha Odeh Oglu, a researcher of Turkish affairs and international relations, told DW.
As of Friday afternoon, Alouk’s water station is reported to have started operating again. However, it will take up to three days for the water to arrive to the people in the Al-Hasakah region.
Trump brought chaos to a region already on the brink, and the unintended consequences of his actions will reverberate for years to come.
(U.S. soldiers patrol near an oil production facility in Syria’s northeastern Hasakah Province; Delil Souleiman/AFP/Getty Images)
In September 2020, a Syrian rebel group called the Hamza Division showed up in an unexpected place: the disputed post-Soviet territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, 600 miles from Aleppo. The rebels had been offered $1,500 per month each to fight for Azerbaijan against Armenia in the two countries’ border war over that disputed territory, several different news outlets reported.
Sayf Bulad, commander of the Hamza Division, has an interesting past. He served as a commander in a CIA-backed rebel group, appeared in pro–Islamic State propaganda, trained with the U.S. military, and fought other U.S.-backed rebel groups in Syria on behalf of the Turkish government. Now he was helping two former Soviet republics fight each other for money.
Bulad’s story is a symbol of the chaotic U.S. policy toward Syria and its unintended consequences.
U.S. policy toward Syria was torn between two often-clashing goals during the Obama administration: The CIA and State Department were focused on ending the Assad family’s decadeslong rule, while the U.S. military was trying to crush violent religious extremists such as the Islamic State.
President Donald Trump inherited this awkwardly stitched-together policy and added in an element of chaos. The president himself said he wanted to end “endless wars” and claimed he was ready to pull U.S. forces out of Syria at the first opportunity. But he hired a collection of hawkish advisers who thought of Syria as a battlefield on which to make Iran and Russia bleed.
“He hasn’t been able to bring American troops home, because his own bureaucracy resists him,” says Aaron Stein, director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. “He never set up a bureaucratic process to actually implement what he wants to do.”
The result has been a disaster.
In 2018 and 2019, Trump ordered U.S. forces out of Syria, only to walk back the order both times. The Kurds have been left in a deadly limbo, unable to count on U.S. protection from Turkey but also blocked from looking to outside powers for help. Meanwhile, American troops have found themselves in increasingly dangerous confrontations with their Russian counterparts in the country.
U.S. policy has not only failed to stop the conflict; it has helped prolong it, leaving millions of Syrians at the mercy of White House palace intrigue. President-elect Joe Biden will have to find a way to extract the United States from Syria without reigniting the civil war—or getting sucked back in.
‘The Time Has Come’
The United States began backing Syrian rebels because many in the Obama administration believed that they could help quickly bring down an oppressive tyrant. Instead, the U.S. intervention fed into a bloody, yearslong international conflict.
U.S.-Syrian hostility dates back decades. Syria is a close ally of Russia and Iran and helped support the insurgents during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. But direct U.S. involvement in Syrian internal politics began with the Arab Spring.
As in other Arab countries at the time, Syrian activists rose up in protest against corruption and political repression. Syrian dictator Bashar Assad cracked down with brute force. Part of the Syrian army deserted, and the uprising became a full-blown civil war.
U.S. officials “looked at Bashar al-Assad as a hapless dictator who was not going to survive any of this,” says Frederic Hof, who served as an envoy for Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations at the time. President Barack Obama declared in August 2011 that “the time has come for President Assad to step aside,” although he also made it clear that “the United States cannot and will not impose this transition upon Syria.”
Nevertheless, in an effort to hasten Assad’s end, the Obama administration imposed economic sanctions banning nearly all trade with Syria. The Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush administrations had previously imposed some sanctions on the Syrian government for supporting terrorism, but the new sanctions put the entire country under a blockade.
Other countries lined up more forcefully behind the anti-Assad opposition. Saudi Arabia, seeking to hurt Assad’s ally Iran, sent arms to the rebels. So did Turkey and Qatar, who saw the uprisings of the Arab Spring as a way to increase their own influence.
In 2013, Obama gave the CIA a green light to join in directly arming Syria’s rebels. Many details of the “Timber Sycamore” program remain classified, but it reportedly cost billions of dollars over four years. Assad’s forces lost control of much of the country in this time.
Hof and Robert Ford, the last U.S. envoy in Syria, claim that the U.S. arms program was not a decisive factor. It was “overwhelmed by support provided by regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey,” Hof says. Other experts, including Stein, disagree. In particular, they say, U.S.-made anti-tank rockets played a key role in helping the rebels push back the Syrian military.
But the regime did not fall.
“Rather than Bashar capitulating,” Stein explains, “he said, ‘I’m going to the Russians and the Iranians'” for help. “It was the boomerang of the success of the CIA program.”
Ford had believed early in the conflict that Assad could not win a war of attrition—and that the opposition could convince Assad’s allies in Russia and Iran to stay out of the fight. This prediction turned out to be incorrect. Iran soon began sending military advisers, volunteers, and mercenaries to back Assad. By late 2015, Russian jets and combat troops were also in the country.
“We made a terrible, terrible analytical mistake,” says Ford.
Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime eventually retook most of Syria’s major cities through years of brutal siege warfare. As many as 200,000 civilians died in the process, in addition to the tens of thousands who perished in Assad’s prisons during this period, according to the pro-opposition Syrian Network for Human Rights and the British-funded Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
The chaos also allowed religious fundamentalists to take a prominent role in the Syrian opposition. Syrian nationalist rebels vetted and backed by the United States fought alongside sectarian Islamist groups.
“We effectively created auxiliaries to these hardline groups that were taking territory,” Stein says. “Even though the hardliners were smaller in number, they were more effective.”
These “openly sectarian figures…just scared the hell out of Syrian minorities, who as a result stuck with Assad,” explains Hof, who resigned from the government in 2012 and now teaches at Bard College.
Religious fundamentalists became especially powerful in Eastern Syria, where U.S. military intelligence warned in August 2012 that Al Qaeda in Syria was going to “declare an Islamic state through its union with other terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria,” according to a declassified report.
At the same time, Syria’s long-oppressed Kurdish minority was starting to take up arms. They were led by a left-wing guerrilla group called the People’s Defense Units (YPG).
The YPG began to clash with Al Qaeda, whose Syrian branch broke off to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in early 2014. The Kurdish militants sought autonomy for their region under a secular system of self-rule, while Al Qaeda and later the Islamic State wanted to establish a pan-Islamic theocracy—just as the U.S. military intelligence report had warned.
U.S. diplomats were flying blind when it came to the region, according to Ford, now a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and the Yale Jackson Institute for Global Affairs. American intelligence agencies had not even been able to provide him with “two pages” on the political dynamics of northeastern Syria. But pressure was building on Obama to act, especially as the Islamic State executed journalists on tape and began a genocide against the Yazidi minority in neighboring Iraq.
The administration did not really understand which factions it could work with in Syria, according to Alexander Bick, then the director of Syrian affairs at the White House National Security Council. But eventually, the American military saw that the YPG was drawing Islamic State fighters “like a magnet” to the besieged northern Syrian city of Kobanê in late 2014. The United States opened a line of communication with the Syrian Kurds through intermediaries in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the YPG began helping direct U.S. airstrikes against the Islamic State.
At the same time, the U.S. military was trying to work with other Syrian rebel groups. It spent $500 million on a program to train and equip a new army of pro-America, anti-Assad fighters. The results were disastrous. The first batch of fighters was quickly defeated and robbed by Al Qaeda in July 2015. Other alumni of the program, including the Hamza Division, went on to fight as mercenaries throughout the region—turning up, eventually, in Nagorno-Karabakh.
“We would hear, ‘I have 5,000 men’…and it turned out there would be like 20,” said former Middle East envoy Brett McGurk during a October 2019 speech at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “Or the forces that we wanted to work with were so riddled with extremists that our military repeatedly said, ‘There’s no way we can work with these people.'”
Finally, the U.S. helped the YPG form a coalition with Assyrian Christian and Arab fighters called the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). With minimal U.S. involvement—mostly in the form of military advisers and air support—the coalition sliced the Islamic State into pieces.
SDF fighters found themselves at the gates of Raqqa, the Islamic State’s de facto capital, by October 2016.
Obama had launched two interventions in Syria. The first, a covert attempt to overthrow Assad, failed miserably. The second, the war against the Islamic State—which sought to fix problems partially created by the first—succeeded only when the administration set limited goals, employed modest means, and relied on a campaign led by locals.
‘Orderly Transfer of Power’
Trump may have criticized America’s interventions abroad during the 2016 election, but his administration picked up almost exactly where Obama had left off. McGurk stayed on as the White House’s point man for military operations in Syria and Iraq, and Trump signed off on his roadmap, with a few important adjustments.
The new administration launched airstrikes against pro-Assad forces in April 2017 and April 2018 in response to chemical weapons attacks on civilians. Trump saw himself as reestablishing a “red line” that Obama had muddled.
Trump also started backing the YPG, who were still the most effective fighters in the SDF, more directly. American weapons flowed to the Kurds, while about 400 U.S. Marines joined the front lines in Raqqa, the first-ever conventional U.S. boots on the ground in Syria. “Donald Trump wanted to end the war in Syria as fast as possible,” says Stein. “That’s why he signed off on arming the YPG directly.”
The international coalition declared victory at Raqqa in October 2017 and moved on to hunt down the remnants of the Islamic State in the oil-rich, Arab-majority rural province of Deir al-Zor, Syria. The campaign there, which dragged on for more than a year, was temporarily put on pause when Turkey invaded the Syrian Kurdish enclave of Afrin in January 2018. American officials described the Kurds’ mini-war with Turkey as a “distraction,” but the conflict would later become a major headache for the United States.
Trump then began to talk about withdrawing from Syria—while at the same time escalating against Iran.
In April 2018, the president appointed longtime hawk John Bolton as his national security adviser and promoted CIA Director Mike Pompeo to secretary of state. Both saw Iran rather than the Islamic State as America’s greatest enemy in the Middle East. They began a “maximum pressure” campaign meant to roll back Iranian influence across the region, which included forcing Iranian troops out of Syria.
Pompeo put two hawkish officials in charge of Syria policy: James Jeffrey, a veteran cold warrior who had served as U.S. ambassador to both Turkey and Iraq, and Joel Rayburn, a retired Army officer who had helped advise the U.S. military “surge” in Iraq.
McGurk supported brokering a peace deal between the Syrian Kurds and the Russians, but he met opposition from the new faction of Iran hawks in the administration. Jeffrey even asked the Kurds not to make a deal with Assad, telling them to rely instead on U.S. protection, the Daily Beast later reported. The hawkish faction also saw the U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish forces as a “terrorist group,” as Bolton put it.
The YPG was close to an insurgent group in Turkey called the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Ironically, U.S. diplomats had predicted confidently in November 2007 that the Syrian Kurds would “not rally around the extremist tendencies of the PKK,” according to a cable later published by WikiLeaks. But in fact, both the PKK’s “libertarian socialist” ideology and actual PKK veterans held enormous influence over the Syrian Kurdish rebellion.
By 2018, Turkey was extremely unhappy with the growing power of the SDF, which it saw as an extension of the PKK. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan got Trump on the phone to complain about it in December 2018. Trump, eager to fulfill a campaign promise to bring American troops home, agreed to pull U.S. forces out of Syria, which would leave Turkey free to invade. Photo: The nearly deserted Syrian city of Kafranbel, south of Idlib, during a pro-regime offensive; Omar Haj Kadour/AFP/Getty Images
That decision set off a bomb within the administration. Many officials felt blindsided by the sudden announcement and anxious about “betraying” the SDF to Turkey. McGurk quit in frustration. So did Secretary of Defense James Mattis.
Bolton, Pompeo, Jeffrey, and Rayburn stayed, however. The Iran hawks were now in full control.
The hawks began to work on an agreement called the “safe zone,” a project to let everyone have a cake and eat it, too. The deal would bring Turkish troops into northern Syria as part of an international peacekeeping force, which could push the Kurdish YPG away from the border. American forces would stay in the short term to help implement the plan.
“While we played this string out, or developed a better idea, which might take months, we had a good argument for maintaining U.S. forces,” Bolton later wrote in his memoir. He added that he had hoped an “orderly transfer of power” from U.S. forces to Turkish troops would prevent Assad, Iran, and Russia from retaking northeastern Syria.
Turkey and the United States finally agreed to a deal in August 2019, and the SDF coalition dismantled its fortifications along the border with Turkey.
Trump’s advisers were hoping they could keep U.S. forces in Syria to fight Assad without angering Turkey—all while appearing to bring American troops home. Bolton wrote in his memoir that he was “deliberately vague” to both Trump and the media when it came to the number of Americans that would be necessary to implement the safe zone.
In an interview he gave to DefenseOne shortly after resigning from the State Department following the 2020 election, Jeffrey admitted that he had been “playing shell games to not make clear to our leadership how many troops we had there.” As part of that effort, U.S. military leaders and Bolton pushed to count U.S. forces at Al-Tanf, a remote desert base far from the SDF-controlled zone, separately from the rest of the U.S. deployment to Syria.
Trump wanted out of Syria, but instead of organizing an orderly withdrawal, his advisers tried to take the fight against Assad out of the public eye.
As part of an effort to resurrect the anti-Assad rebellion, Trump administration officials had pushed the SDF to work with Turkish-backed Islamists against Assad. The effort didn’t go well. In one tense September 2019 meeting, according to a report from The National Interest, Rayburn screamed and broke a writing utensil in frustration after Syrian Kurdish officials refused to join forces with the Islamic hardliners.
Erdoğan, meanwhile, was publicly agitating to expand the safe zone. He got his wish and more during an October 6, 2019, call with Trump, when the U.S. president gave him a green light to invade Syria outright. It remains unknown what exactly the two leaders said, but the White House announced immediately afterward that “Turkey will soon be moving forward with its long-planned operation into Northern Syria.”
American forces had dismantled the SDF’s anti-tank fortifications as part of the safe zone deal two months earlier, rendering the Syrian Kurds defenseless. Now the United States was ushering in Turkish tanks and Turkish-backed militants.
Over 100,000 Syrians fled the invasion. They had seen the same forces unleash chaos, mayhem, and ethnic violence on Afrin a year earlier.
“I’ve met numerous people who were displaced when Turkey invaded in October [2019] and personally blame Trump,” writes Amy Austin Holmes, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson -International Center for Scholars, from Syria.
The Trump administration was willing to allow Turkey to invade northern Syria. But the administration did not want the Syrian Kurds to turn to Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime for help, which would undo years of efforts to roll back the influence of Assad and his allies. U.S. policy, in other words, was not only to refuse to protect the Kurds but also to deny them protection from others.
A U.S. diplomat tried to convince SDF leader Mazloum Abdi to hold off on asking Russia to step in. Turkish forces were only going to move 30 kilometers into Syria and the invasion would stop after that, he claimed.
The Kurdish general was not having it. “You will not protect us and you won’t let anyone else protect us. Your presence has turned everyone else in Syria against us,” Abdi responded, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable leaked to CNN. “Either you stop this bombing [by Turkey] on our people now, or move aside so we can let in the Russians.”
The SDF signed a “memorandum of understanding” with the Assad regime soon after, allowing Assad’s troops to join the fight against the Turkish invasion. Russia and Turkey then agreed to a safe zone of their own—along the same lines as the U.S. proposal—and the Syrian Kurds watched as Russian troops moved into their region as protection against the Turkish Army.
The Trump administration had managed to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Instead of planning for an orderly U.S. withdrawal and encouraging the Syrian Kurds to negotiate a peace deal with other factions in the country, Trump’s advisers tried to use the SDF to continue their anti-Assad campaign. Their efforts ended not with a Kurdish-led rebellion against Assad but with the Kurds looking to Assad and his allies to shield them from their archrival Turkey.
‘Take the Oil’
Trump’s pullout of Americans from Syria following his deal with Erdoğan was short-lived. U.S. troops eventually moved back in, including to areas near the Turkish border now guarded by the Russians. Trump repeatedly claimed that their mission was to “take the oil” or guard the “oil region.”
Sen. Lindsey Graham (R–S.C.) and other hawks had used the promise of oil profits to sell Trump on their plans to keep U.S. forces in the region, according to Mouaz Moustafa, executive director of the Syrian Emergency Task Force, which lobbies for the Syrian opposition in Washington.
“If you want to feed the baby medicine, you put the medicine in candy or something. That’s what happened with the oil,” Moustafa told me in November 2019. “It’s like, ‘Oh, you want to take the oil? Yeah, take the oil. We’ve got to take the oil.’ So that ended up becoming the reason that he would keep anyone there.”
The actual oil in the region is not worth much. Syrian petroleum production was falling even before the civil war, and the Islamic State at its peak only made about $1.5 million per day from Deir al-Zor’s wells.
But its location is important. Deir al-Zor lies right along the line of contact between the SDF and the Assad regime. By holding that “oil region” as well as the U.S. base at Al-Tanf, U.S. forces can surround Iran’s military supply lines on two different sides. This makes Iranian forces in Syria vulnerable to an attack by U.S. forces or allies.
Assad is also sensitive about the oil, as his regime has had trouble meeting its people’s fuel needs. Russian mercenaries attacked the SDF on Assad’s behalf in February 2018 to try (unsuccessfully) to take the oil fields in Deir al-Zor.
To make matters more complicated, foreign companies are forbidden from dealing with the oil under European and U.S. economic sanctions. So the Syrian Kurdish oil ministry has been forced to rely on smugglers, whose leaky storage tanks and backyard refineries have become a serious threat to public health.
The situation looked as if it could change in April 2020, when the U.S. Treasury Department issued a special sanctions exemption to a little-known company called Delta Crescent Energy. Jeffrey and Rayburn then met with politicians in neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan to discuss opening a route for Delta Crescent Energy to export the oil, The New Republic later reported.
Graham and Pompeo finally went public with those discussions during a Senate hearing in July 2020. “I talked to General Mazloum yesterday, with the SDF,” Graham said. “Apparently they’ve signed a deal with an American oil company to modernize the oil fields in northeastern Syria. Are you supportive of that?”
“We are,” Pompeo responded. “The deal took a little longer, senator, than we had hoped, and now we’re in implementation.”
Delta Crescent Energy partner James Cain told Politico that the company’s goal was “to get the production back up to where it was before the civil war and sanctions.” But there was a problem: The Syrian Kurds, who control that land, were not completely on board. Ahed Al Hendi, a Syrian-American activist who works with the SDF, called Pompeo’s announcement premature. Abed Hamed al-Mehbash, the Arab co-chairman of the SDF’s civilian administration, told local media only that he planned to “study requests by many Russian and American companies.”
Mazloum Abdi, the Kurdish general, later confirmed to Al-Monitor that Delta Crescent Energy was involved in northeastern Syria but said that talks were “advancing slowly.”
The SDF knew that announcing an oil deal with America—and no one else—would be provocative. Indeed, it has been. Assad’s foreign ministry quickly denounced the agreement as a scheme to “steal Syria’s oil” and “an assault against Syria’s sovereignty.”
In August 2020, an Iranian-backed militia fired rockets at a U.S.-controlled oil field in Syria. That same week, pro-Assad gunmen got into a shootout with U.S. troops at a checkpoint in Qamishli, near the Turkish border.
The week after, a Russian armored truck rammed into a U.S. humvee, injuring at least four Americans. Russian and U.S. troops in Syria had seen tense encounters with each other before, but this was the first violent clash between the two armies.
Russia and Iran did not tie the clashes directly to the oil deal, but the message was clear: A more entrenched U.S. presence in Syria would meet harder resistance.
According to a September 2020 report by Eva Kahan at the Institute for the Study of War, Russia, Iran, and Turkey have also been secretly backing Arab insurgents against the SDF in Deir al-Zor. Russia hopes to use the instability “to compel senior SDF leadership to accept a new deal in Syria that constrains U.S. forces or ejects them,” Kahan wrote. In other words, the continued U.S. presence has induced Russia to play good-cop, bad-cop with the Kurds.
Several local leaders have already died in mysterious shootings. In response to the violence, U.S. forces have beefed up their presence in Syria, deploying Bradley Fighting Vehicles and advanced radar systems in September.
One bad decision after another has led to the current situation. The failed U.S. effort to take out Assad helped open the space for the Islamic State, which was only defeated when the U.S. pivoted to supporting Kurdish forces. Instead of allowing the Kurds to consolidate their gains and negotiate with Assad, the U.S. tried to use them as proxies against Assad and to make a quick buck from their oil. The situation has angered both Turkey and Assad’s allies, causing them to set aside their differences and turn their sights on pushing out the U.S. presence.
National security officials kept pushing grandiose goals even as U.S. leverage crumbled away. “This isn’t a quagmire,” Jeffrey said at a May 2020 event at the Hudson Institute. “My job is to make it a quagmire for the Russians.” He later praised “the stalemate we’ve put together” as “a step forward” in the region.
As Rayburn explained at a June 2020 event hosted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Trump officials think they can use sanctions to “deny the [Assad] regime access to international financial markets until a political solution can be reached.” Pro-Assad and opposition negotiators have been meeting in Geneva to work on a new Syrian constitution, although the SDF and the Kurds have never been included in those talks.
But Ford—the former U.S. envoy who learned the hard way that Iran and Russia were unlikely to abandon their interests in Syria—is skeptical that U.S. economic sanctions will be enough to pressure Assad into accepting anything. “I think we are trying to do something with tools that will not deliver the results we want,” he says. “They can sanction the hell out of the Assad government. He doesn’t give a shit about his people!”
Syrians have faced massive inflation, fuel shortages, and breadlines over the past few months, in addition to a spiralling coronavirus crisis. (A banking crisis in nearby Lebanon is partially to blame for their woes.) But the U.S. is unlikely to lift the economic pressure: Congress passed even more sanctions aimed at deterring foreign reconstruction investment under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019.
The Biden administration may not change other aspects of the strategy, either.
Antony Blinken, the president-elect’s nominee for secretary of state, gave a speech to the Meridian Group in May 2020 outlining his approach toward Syria. “Any of us—and I start with myself—who had any responsibility for our Syria policy in the last administration has to acknowledge that we failed,” he said. “We failed to prevent horrific loss of life. We failed to prevent massive displacement of people, internally in Syria and of course externally as refugees. It’s something that I will take with me for the rest of my days.”
And yet his prescription was more of the same.
Blinken claimed that the United States still has “points of leverage,” including troops on the ground near oil-rich regions and the ability to marshall resources for Syria’s reconstruction, that could lead to better outcomes next time around. He argued that U.S. leaders should demand “some kind of political transition that reflects the desires of the Syrian people” and said that it was “virtually impossible” to imagine normalizing relations with Assad’s government.
Hof, another Obama administration alum, believes that the United States can turn the SDF-held zone into “an attractive alternative to Assad” for all Syrians. U.S. diplomats could push for this new government to take over Syria’s seat at the United Nations while U.S. forces stay to carry out a “stabilization” mission and “keep the Iranians and the regime and the Russians out.” (“We also have the ability to respond militarily to the regime with great effect and force if it resumes a program of mass civilian homicide,” Hof says. “We can do a lot of damage with cruise missiles.”)
But Ford wants America to focus on the “only really useful things we can do” at this point: to help refugees fleeing the civil war and to “negotiate with the Russians some kind of deal” that would allow the Kurds to govern themselves in peace.
Ford has recently taken a liking to the writing of Robert McNamara, the U.S. secretary of defense during the Vietnam War who later became a critic of the war effort. “Vietnam was a problem that ultimately we could not fix,” Ford says. “That’s kind of where I’m at with Syria right now.”
Sinam Sherkany Mohamad is the Co-Chief of the US Mission of the Syrian Democratic Council. She is a Kurdish woman from Afrin, Syria.
During the year 2020, North and East Syria faced a wide variety of challenges — war, occupation, terrorism, and instability, a sharp economic downturn, a global pandemic, and more. However, we have met these challenges with determination and commitment to our people. We have acted not only for our own people, but to protect the world from the global threat of ISIS terrorism, and to act as a beacon of democracy and stability in the Middle East. Our hearts still beat with the desire to bring democracy, peace, stability, equality, and prosperity to the Middle East. We are still standing — it is the strength of the people of North and East Syria that is the rock we stand on.
That’s why 2021 is the year that the people of North and East Syria are calling upon the international community for inclusion in talks on the future of Syria. We ask to be recognized as a key player in the solution to the Syrian crisis. We are one-third of Syria. We call at minimum for the inclusion of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) in the UN peace talks mandated by UNSCR 2254, as well as in the Syrian Constitutional Committee.
We have consistently acted through the Syrian crisis to benefit our people, the Middle East, and the world. We ask now for a seat at the table, a stable place in global coalitions, and acknowledgment as an indispensable part of a democratic Syria.
The challenges that we have overcome this past year in North and East Syria have been brutal. While most of the world faced the pandemic, we have faced the onset of Coronavirus with little to no trained personnel, few medical facilities, and a lack of testing machines and personal protective equipment. Our health infrastructure had been left in disarray following a decade of war and instability. But with an early unified response, including stay-at-home orders, travel restrictions, and public sanitization, we have kept our case numbers much lower than they may have been.
We have endured continued attacks and human rights violations by the Turkish military and Turkish-backed militias, while the rest of the world looked the other way, unable to admit that Turkey might commit these atrocities. The ongoing Turkish occupation of our region — Afrin, Serekaniye, and Gire Spi — has come with theft, murder, kidnapping, and other violations. Although Turkey may be losing favor in the West, it is still able to gain enough currency to continue to wage genocide and territorial expansionism against the Kurds and the people of North and East Syria. The people of North and East Syria have weathered Turkish attacks with the same determination with which we defeated the ISIS “caliphate.”
In 2020, our economy crashed as never before. The Syrian pound remains low. Our people are facing even higher rates of poverty. Hunger and food insecurity are soaring. We are committed to overcoming these challenges, and the administration of North and East Syria is working every day to provide food aid and water, stabilize prices of basic goods and necessities, and secure the medicines and nutrition that our people need.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) is an authority governing about one-third of Syrian territory and five million people. The AANES provides daily services to millions of Syrians including education, electricity, water, sanitation, and security in North and East Syria. Its security forces, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), are a steadfast ally to the United States and a partner to the US State Department’s Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Known in the West for its Kurdish Protection Units and women fighters, the SDF’s defeat of the ISIS “caliphate” was announced by President Trump in March 2019 and celebrated across the world.
So it is time that we were included in talks on our future. Inclusion in talks on the future of Syria will help us build upon our mission for a democratic Syria, receive humanitarian aid, expand the capabilities of our governance, and reduce the harm and suffering many are going through. It will help us rebuild after a decade of war and instability, much of which occurred as we battled the ISIS “caliphate” and kept the rest of the world safe from its violence and oppression. It will help us build momentum to recover our territory from the Turkish occupation, restore human rights and dignity to our region, and allow displaced people and refugees to finally return home.
We wish for our people, at the end of a long and bitter decade of hardship, to have the kind of stability and certainty they need to pick up the pieces of their lives. In many cases, these are pieces that they left scattered in all four corners of the world, as people became refugees elsewhere. They are still our people, whether they still reside in North and East Syria or whether they return there only in their dreams at night. So many long to return. Inclusion in talks on our future will give many the assurance they need to plan their return trip.
We wish to bring true democracy to a unified Syria, a Syria that respects the diverse communities, ethnicities, and religions of its people, a Syria that upholds equality, women’s rights, and human rights. We call for a decentralized Syria that allows communities to have power over their local governance, elected officials, and shared resources.
We are a necessary part of a peaceful resolution to the Syrian conflict, we are a force for democracy that is growing brighter each day, and we are an integral part of the future of Syria.
In the past few days there have been a series of large-scale ISIS attacks in Syria. Is the Islamic State coming back?
ERSİN ÇAKSU
QAMISHLO
Thursday, 14 Jan 2021, 09:51
After the many attacks in Syria and Iraq in the last few days, the question for many is whether these attacks announce a comeback of the Islamic State or whether there are other factors that prompted this increase.
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ended the territorial rule of the so called ‘caliphate’ with the liberation of Baghouz in March 2019. Even if thousands of ISIS jihadists have been arrested, underground, clandestine structures have formed in Iraq and Syria. In provinces such as Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa and Hama in Syria and Kirkuk, Baghdad and Anbar in Iraq, these networks have been carrying out attacks from time to time. The frequency and quality of these attacks has increased significantly in the last few days.
Dozens of attacks since early December
Since December 2020, the Islamic State has carried out eight attacks in Deir ez-Zor, eight in Raqqa, ten in Hama, five in Homs and two in the Aleppo area. Shortly before the end of the year, ISIS bloodiest attack took place, leaving at least 28 Damascus soldiers dead on the road between Deir ez-Zor and Palmyra. The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) speaks of dozens of Syrian government soldiers and militia killed in ISIS attacks in the desert near Hama.
Damascus is not doing anything serious against ISIS
The presence of the Islamic State in the desert to the west of Deir ez-Zor, i.e. in the area under the control of the Assad regime, has never been a secret. However, as it is, the Damascus regime and its supporters have never waged a serious fight against the Islamic State presence there. According to observers, this was because of the plan to put pressure on US-backed groups in the Tanef region on the Jordanian border. It must also be noted that this region is on the route from Bukemal, the main route of Iranian militias to Iraq, something which led to a wide range of speculations.
Turkey’s Role in Reviving ISIS
The biggest factor that led to the resurgence of ISIS, however, was the invasion carried out by the Turkish state in northern Syria. Following this invasion, many ISIS members withdrew to the areas under Turkish rule. Many of them escaped from internment camps and prisons in northern Syria with the help of Turkey. The presence and reorganization of the Islamic State in the areas under Turkish control is an open secret.
SDF operations continued
The SDF carried out targeted operations against the Islamic State networks and were able to discover and neutralise several jihadist cells, especially in the Deir ez-Zor region. In 2020, two large-scale SDF operations and 25 targeted operations against these cells took place in Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa provinces. Hundreds of alleged Islamic State members were arrested and large quantities of weapons were confiscated.
The areas under ISIS control
Siyamend Elî, press officer at the YPG, said in an interview with ANF that ISIS was tolerated by various forces involved in Syria, precisely in the places where the attacks are taking place, and added: “After the neutralisation of ISIS in Baghouz, it continued to exist mainly in al-Bukamal, Deir ez-Zor, Palmyra and Hama. In fact, some forces have allowed ISIS to continue to exist there in order to be able to use it as a tool in the future.”
ISIS used this phase as a time for training and reorganising and also to change its strategy, said the YPG representative adding: “ISIS is now carrying out many more surprise attacks and has increased its forces.”
Russia focused on Northern Syria
Elî recalled that Russia and Iran came to Syria allegedly “to protect Syrian territory”, but that both forces are not concerned with rural areas, but rather focused on “cities that are strategically important for them.”
Elî said: “Russia’s concentration on Til Temir and Ain Issa, and on Northern Syria in general, gave ISIS the opportunity to carry out these attacks.” He underlined that ISIS is not a priority for Russia. Israel’s attacks on Iranian armed forces have led to an increased of attacks by ISIS in these regions, said the press spokesman for the YPG, noting that the regime would not be able to wage war without Iran and Russia.
“Coordination with the SDF necessary”
Elî said: “Russia and the regime should coordinate with the SDF in the fight against ISIS and the small groups that appear under different names. If this does not happen, the situation east of the Euphrates will become very serious. That is why ISIS has been able to act by surprise against Russia and the regime.”
The attacks put a strain on the regional balance of power
Journalist Nazım Daştan is also following developments in the region closely and does not see the increase in ISIS attacks as a coincidental development. To speak about a revival of ISIS is “still a little too early” but, said Dastan: “ISIS is coming to the surface again. Even if I don’t think this will happen on a large scale, it can put a strain on the balance of power in the region. The attacks may increase further in the coming days.”
“The international powers neutralize each other”
Daştan pointed out that the United States and Russia continued to try to define their territories and thus determine the borders in Syria. This results in a space from which ISIS can carry out its attacks. Daştan said: “We can see this as a process in which the international powers and regional powers measure each other anew for the year 2021.”
As for the position of ISIS, Daştan added: “It will be difficult to revive such a discredited force on an earlier scale. However, ISIS can use this process, in which international forces are actually busy weakening each other, as an opportunity for its reorganization and strengthening.”
ISIS increases attacks in Raqqa as Turkish-backed forces shell Ain al-Issa
One expert noted that the Russia and Syrian regime attempts to push the SDF to withdraw from the Ain al-Issa area and shelling by Turkish-backed rebels is “giving ISIS cells greater ability to conduct attacks deep behind the SDF lines.”
On Sunday, a civilian was injured in an improvised explosive device bombing in Raqqa city (Photo: SOHR)
ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – The so-called Islamic State has claimed seven terrorist attacks in Syria’s Raqqa province in the past ten days, amid increased shelling of Kurdish-led security forces by Turkish-backed groups in the town of Ain al-Issa.
The attacks terrorist attacks included improvised explosive device (IEDs) bombings and hit-and-run assaults against the Internal Security forces (ISF), also known as Asayish, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) both inside Raqqa city and the province’s countryside.
The Raqqa Asayish has confirmed at least two of the incidents. According to the ISF, one of the attacks occurred on January 6, in eastern rural of Raqqa, resulting in the deaths of two of their Arab members. Another one took place on January 4, later claimed by the Islamic State inside the city, resulted in the injury of several civilians.
The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) also reported that a civilian was injured in an IED explosion that targeted a vehicle in the al-Malahi area of Raqqa city on Sunday.
“The considerable increase in attacks in Raqqa is a significant indicator of ISIS’s rising capability of conducting attacks beyond its active operating zone of Deir Ez-Zor,” Mohammad Ibrahim, a Syrian researcher and analyst who focuses on northeast Syria, told Kurdistan 24.
“ISIS repeatedly proves its swift resilience and ability to hit various regions whenever it finds security gaps. The ISF and SDF are currently hugely distracted in northern rural Raqqa, in Ain Issa, where there are daily clashes between SDF and Turkey-backed Islamist armed groups,” he added.
Over the past two months, there have been increased Turkish-backed shelling and fighting near the Ain al-Issa town in the Raqqa province.
According to Ibrahim, the increasing pressure by Russia and Syrian regime forces to push the SDF to withdraw from the Ain al-Issa area and shelling by Turkish-backed rebels is “giving ISIS cells more ability to conduct attacks deep behind the SDF lines.”
Raqqa was liberated from the Islamic State in October 2017 by the SDF with support from the US-led coalition.
Despite the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the US-led coalition announcing the defeat of the extremist group’s so-called caliphate on March 23, 2019, Islamic State sleeper cell attacks continue in areas that were liberated from the militants, including in Raqqa.
In 2020, most Islamic State activities took place in Deir al-Zor province, with Raqqa province coming in second place. The terror group’s propaganda outfit, al-Bayan, suggested that it had claimed 389 attacks in Deir al-Zor in 2020 and another 59 in Raqqa.
Charles Flynn, a Syria-based researcher at the Rojava Information Centre(RIC), told Kurdistan 24 that the Islamic State has also increased its attacks in the southern Raqqa countryside, controlled by the Syrian government.
“We’ve seen increasing number of Russian airstrikes against ISIS targets west of the Euphrates, as well as several ambushes conducted by ISIS that have produced large number of casualties against the SAA (Syrian Arab Army).”
The US government claims to be supporting the Syrian Kurds in the fight against ISIS. But it is attempting to bring a more moderate leadership to power in a bid to weaken the Kurds’ revolutionary project in Rojava. Washington will never be a friend of self-determination.
Troops from the Syrian Democratic Forces head to the front line on November 10, 2015 in the autonomous region of Rojava, Syria. (John Moore / Getty Images)
Last September, the United States began sending additional troops into northeast Syria, where hundreds of US soldiers are helping Kurdish forces fight the remnants of ISIS. The move represented a sharp change for the Trump administration, which had pulled US forces from the Turkish border the previous year, facilitating a brutal Turkish attack on the Kurdish homeland of Rojava.
Yet despite predictions that Trump’s betrayal would bring an end to the Kurds’ leftistsocialrevolution in Rojava, the Kurds have been remarkably resilient. Not only have they managed to endure more than a year of ongoing Turkishattacks, but they have continued forging an inspiring experiment in direct democracy, drawing praise from observers who visit the area.
Rojava “has the best religious freedom conditions in the Middle East and has the best conditions for women,” said Nadine Maenza, a US commissioner for religious freedom, when she visited Rojava this past October.
While the Kurds have defied the odds, they are now facing new threats — particularly from the United States. Over the past year, US diplomats have been calling on Kurdish leaders to sharepower with rival politicians who do not hold the same revolutionary views.
Participants portray recent talks as a well-intentioned effort to create Kurdish unity.
But the talks are more accurately seen as a bid by Washington to appease Turkey, maintain a foothold in Syria, and, perhaps most crucially, moderate the Kurds’ revolutionary ambitions.
The Syrian Kurds, Trump’s Betrayal, and the Aftermath
For the past several years, the United States has been working with Kurdish forces in northeast Syria in the war against ISIS. By providing the Kurds with arms, money, training, air cover, and logistics support, the United States has enabled them to wage an effective military campaign that has left the group defeated and largely dismantled.
This partnership has ramped up tensions with Turkey, which has been waging a decades-long war against the Kurdish people. The Turkish government has accused the Syrian Kurds of being part of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant Kurdish resistance group, and portrays both the PKK and Syrian Kurdish fighters as terrorists who must be destroyed.Although Trump has periodically praised the Kurds for their military courage, he has repeatedly enabled Turkish aggression.
The international left has largely supported the Kurds, inspired by their efforts to lead a leftist social revolution in Rojava. As the Syrian state withdrew its forces from northeast Syria during the early stages of the country’s civil war, leftist Kurds began transforming the area into an autonomous region. They empowered women and ethnic minorities to participate in local and regional politics and promoted a vision of “democratic confederalism” rooted in egalitarian economics and political participation.
The Kurds’ vision of democratic confederalism has led them to begin building a revolutionary new society that is democratically administered by small, decentralized self-governing units. Local communities and ethnic groups participate in communes, neighborhood councils, and district councils, where they decide how to run their communities and manage their resources. By adopting the principle of dual leadership, the Kurds have empowered men and women to work alongside each other as equal partners at all levels of society. If Rojava is successful, it could become the basis for a new kind of egalitarian and self-governing society.
Officials in Washington have always harbored serious concerns about their partnership with the revolutionary Kurds. They have refused to recognize Rojava as an autonomous region within Syria and have displayed a reckless disregard for Rojava’s security, looking the other way as Turkey periodically launched attacks like the brutal invasion of Afrinin 2018.
The Trump administration has been one of the greatest threats to Rojava. Although Trump has periodically praised the Kurds for their military courage, he has repeatedly enabled Turkish aggression. When administration officials announced in October 2019 they would begin drawing US troops away from the Turkish border, they cleared the way for Turkey’s right-wing nationalist president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to launch a military operation that killed hundreds of civilians and displaced hundreds of thousands more.
Turkey “had to have it cleaned out,” Trump said, justifying the ethnic cleansing.
But Trump’s decision sparked a backlash, including from many US officials, and he backtracked by keeping a small contingent of US troops in northeast Syria. After Russian and Syrian forces moved into the area, administration officials announced that about five hundred US soldiers would continue working with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to guard the region’s oil and fight the remnants of the Islamic State.
“We’re still partnering with the SDF,” then secretary of defense Mark Esper acknowledged several weeks after Turkey’s invasion. “We’re still providing assistance to them.”
US Support for Leftist Revolutionaries?
Many US officials have commended the Kurds for building a stable political system in a war-torn country.
In recent months, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom has taken the lead within the US government in highlighting the Kurds’ achievements in Rojava. In its annual report, a public hearing, and an op-ed, the commission praised the Kurds for creating an inclusive society that provides religious freedom to its diverse residents.
US commissioner Nadine Maenza, who visited Rojava in October and November, repeatedly extolled the Kurds for creating a system of self-government that empowers the local population.
“They set up all these committees and they start literally meeting the needs of the community,” Maenza said. “They did it in a way that promoted ethnic diversity, religious diversity, acceptance of one another. . . . It created conditions that are unique to the rest of the Middle East.”
Kurdish troops from the Syrian Democratic Forces stand in a forward operating base overlooking the front line on November 10, 2015 in the autonomous region of Rojava, Syria. (John Moore / Getty Images)
More recently, some high-level officials in Washington have offered similar words of praise. “They seem to be somewhat successful in bringing all these pockets of different ethnic backgrounds together under one sort of democracy that actually seems to be working,” Texas representative Michael McCaul, a Republican, said at a congressional hearing earlier this month.
But as the Kurds well know, US officials often have other motives in mind when showering them with praise — namely, their military prowess.
When ISIS forces began rampaging across northern Syria and western Iraq in 2014 and 2015, US officials discovered that Kurdish militias were the only forces that could hold back the onslaught. “They were the only people who could fight effectively against ISIS at the time,” a State Department official told Congress in 2019.
Over the course of the war, Kurdish fighters made great sacrifices, losing more than ten thousand soldiers. “We outsourced the dying to them,” one US official later admitted.
Now, with ISIS mostly vanquished, Washington has presented a new rationale for supporting the Kurds. Because the Kurds control about one-third of Syrian territory, US officials believe they hold significant leverage over Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. As long as the Kurds remain in command of Rojava, US officials wager, Assad will not be able to reestablish control over Syria.
Rojava “is the United States’ greatest single point of leverage in Syria,” the congressionally mandated Syria Study Group (SSG) noted in a major report in 2019.
This was one of the main reasons Turkey’s attack on Rojava in October 2019 upset some US officials. The president’s “approach has ceded U.S. leverage over a future political solution in Syria,” Florida representative Ted Deutch complained. The co-chairs of the Syria Study Group agreed, condemning the Trump administration for “forgoing an important source of leverage.”
With US forces once again working alongside the Kurds, many US officials believe they have salvaged that leverage. Even if Trump’s actions weakened the United States’ foothold in Syria, they remain convinced that Washington can use what remains of Kurdish control of Rojava to pressure Assad into a political agreement that results in him leaving office.
Antony Blinken, who is slated to become secretary of state in the incoming Biden administration, views Rojava as a key element of US strategy. “That’s a point of leverage because the Syrian government would love to have dominion over those resources,” Blinken said last year. “We should not give that up for free.”
US Opposition to Leftist Revolution
Viewing the Kurds as strategically important partners, US officials have been reluctant to criticize them. Only rarely have they revealed their opposition to the Kurds’ revolutionary aspirations.
In December 2017, former US diplomat Stuart Jones sent one signal when he urged Congress to make sure Washington’s partnership with the Kurds “does not create a political monopoly for a political organization that is really hostile to U.S. values and ideology.”Many US officials and establishment thinkers are doing what they can to bring a less revolutionary Kurdish leadership to power.
In 2019, the Syria Study Group provided another sign when it complained that the main revolutionary Kurdish party in Rojava, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), had been using the SDF’s cooperation with the United States to establish a civilian government at odds with US preferences. “The United States never explicitly pledged support for Kurdish autonomy or self-rule in Syria,” the study group insisted.
One of the clearest signs of US opposition came during a congressional hearing in October 2019, when US senator Jeff Merkley repeatedly asked then State Department official James Jeffrey about his views on the revolution.
“There was, to be fair, a widely circulated vision of Rojava,” Merkley explained. The Kurds envisioned a “self-governed autonomous area with a whole philosophy of democratic control.”
Jeffrey responded by agreeing with Merkley’s characterization of the Kurdish vision, even suggesting that the Kurds might achieve their revolutionary goals, but insisted that the United States did not back the revolution. “I want to emphasize that this vision, which is the vision of our partners, was never the American vision,” Jeffrey said.
And US officials are keen on making their own vision come to fruition. Many US officials and establishment thinkers are doing what they can to bring a less revolutionary Kurdish leadership to power.
In a 2018 policy brief, the Brookings Institution argued that the United States should encourage the PYD to share power with the much smaller Kurdish National Council (ENKS), an opposition umbrella group hosted by Turkey. The brief suggested that a power-sharing agreement could prevent the PYD from creating an autonomous region inside Syria. The United States could adopt “a posture that is accommodating of Turkish national security concerns,” the brief noted.
Turkey’s attack on Rojava in October 2019 put significant pressure on Kurdish leaders to take Washington’s concerns into consideration. Shortly after the assault, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi agreed to begin talks with opposition leaders, and US officials urged the two sides to create a unity government that incorporated ENKS leaders.
US diplomat William Roebuck, who played a central role in facilitating the talks, noted in an internal memo that he wanted to see Rojava’s political structure “evolve” by “including Kurds outside the PYD and more empowered, independent Arabs.”
After several rounds of negotiations in early 2020, one of which Roebuck attended, the two Kurdish sides came to an agreement. On June 17, Kurdish leaders announced they had reached a “common political vision” over how to govern Rojava.
Roebuck, who participated in the ceremony, praised both sides for their efforts. “They have shown flexibility and intelligence in the way that they have dealt with this,” he said.
The US Embassy in Syria agreed, issuing a statement that described the agreement as “an important first step towards greater political coordination between Syrian Kurdish political factions with the support of the United States.”
Although it remains unclear whether the deal will create a pathway for ENKS leaders to acquire political power, the accord is a major political victory for the United States — and a blow to the Kurds’ revolutionary ambitions.
The Future of Rojava
Despite the Kurds’ many achievements, the future of Rojava remains in doubt. Even if the revolutionaries find some way to withstand growing US pressure, the Kurds still face an existential threat from Turkey.
Turkey’s invasion in October 2019 expelled hundreds of thousands of people from numerous towns that Ankara’s forces and their allied militias continue to occupy. As part of the military operation, Turkey drove a huge wedge between the western and eastern parts of Rojava.US officials insist that they are trying to create unity among various Kurdish political parties, but what they are really trying to do is create a more moderate Kurdish leadership. They want to appease Turkey, maintain US forces in Syria, and bring the revolution in Rojava to an end.
Turkish leaders continue to back militants that launch periodic attacks on the Kurdish people. The very day that the Kurds in Rojava announced their unity deal, Turkey launched a major offensive against the Kurdish region of Iraq, even receiving encouragement from the Trump administration. Recentreports indicate that Turkey is preparing to mount another attack on Rojava.
The Kurds have also lost much of the leverage they had over the Syrian government. After Turkey invaded Rojava in October 2019, Kurdish leaders had no choice but to invite Syrian and Russian forces into the area for protection. US officials estimate that between four thousand and ten thousand Syrian forces now occupy various parts of northeast Syria.
Russia has also been pressuring the Kurds, despite the fact that Russian military forces initially came to their assistance during the Turkish attack. Russian leaders are intent on bringing Rojava back into the orbit of the Syrian government, which Russia has been backing in the Syrian Civil War. In early 2020, Russia closed an Iraqi border crossing that had been supplying Rojava with about 40 percent of its medical aid.
The coronavirus and economic woes are still another challenge for the Kurds. Reports indicate that the virus is spreading through Rojava; officials have periodically placed cities into total lockdown. On the economic side, rapid inflation has made it difficult for people to purchase basic goods and essentials. Farmers are struggling to find buyers for their crops. US sanctions have worsened the crisis.
“Ordinary people are having trouble buying the basic goods that they need to survive,” US diplomat William Roebuck acknowledged last August.
Through it all, officials in Washington insist they are still supporting the Kurds. They continue paying the Kurds to manage several camps that are holding about ten thousand detained Islamic State fighters and about seventy thousand civilians, many of whom are the wives, children, and family members of ISIS fighters.
Hundreds of US soldiers remain on the ground in Rojava, where they continue working with Kurdish forces to target remaining pockets of jihadists. Although the Trump administration has announced troop drawdowns in Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan, US officials haveindicated that they will maintain a military presence in Rojava.
The incoming Biden administration remains something of a wild card, but president-elect Joe Biden has signaled he intends to keep working with the Kurds. In 2019, Biden said that “it makes a lot of sense” to keep several hundred US troops in Rojava “to protect the Kurds and provide for security in the region.” Other US officials have indicated that there will be no immediate changes in US policy under the Biden administration.
Much more quietly, however, Washington continues meddling in Kurdish politics. US officials insist that they are trying to create unity among various Kurdish political parties, but what they are really trying to do is create a more moderate Kurdish leadership. They want to appease Turkey, maintain US forces in Syria, and bring the revolution in Rojava to an end.
In short, the United States has begun a major new battle for Rojava — and Kurdish liberation is their last concern.
The working class has played an essential part of European countries’ history – through revolutions, wars and social progress. In 4 episodes of a spectacular tale, this show reminds us of what our societies owe to the workers’ movements and its struggles.
The story begins in the 18th century. But their fight carries on today. Much of our current democracies’ institutions and values flow from older working class demands: universal suffrage or social solidarity are some of its most telling examples. Our culture – the way we dress, the songs we listen to, the movies we watch and the mass-media themselves – heavily relies on the workers’ erstwhile popular culture. Finally, all across Asia, Africa and Latin America, millions of women and men experience lives similar to the 18th and 19th centuries’ European working class. We will bring out the present’s ever looming shadow by constantly flowing back and forth between history and current situations. Those contemporary testimonies and photographs will help us gather the threads of memory between yesterday and nowadays together again.
“Communist” history of own prominent family not black and white, says documentarian Stan Neumann
Among the guests at East Doc Platform, a parallel industry event to Prague’s One World festival of human rights documentaries, is director Stan Neumann, a man with a captivating personal history. Born in Prague, he left with his American mother for France in 1959. His father’s family had been prominent to say the least.
Stan’s great-grandfather Stanislav Kostka (S.K.) Neumann was a lauded poet, an anarchist who later co-founded the Czechoslovak Communist Party. His grandfather Stanislav, also a red, was a famous stage and movie actor. But it was the complicated fate of his father, yet another Stanislav, that we first discussed when I sat down with Stan Neumann last week.
“My father was… it’s very difficult to define, because he was supposed to be a writer, in fact. His mother, my grandmother, wanted him to be absolutely a replica of S.K. Neumann.
“In a certain way, I think he was not completely fit for that. I may say that from my point of view, it destroyed his life.
“These things with the generations, when somebody in the family thinks that the next generation must emulate the preceding generation, sometimes leads to catastrophes.”
He was a Communist poet, essentially?
“He had a very moving… path in life. Before the war he was in this kind of bourgeois, intellectual French gymnazium [grammar school], and so on.
“When he was 16, at the end of the war, he was arrested by the Nazis with a group of something like 50 gymnazium students and sent to the Small Fortress in Terezín.
“On May 2 the whole group was shot – it was May 2, the war was over – and he was the only survivor from this group, because he was dying from typhus.
“From then on he had a kind of fidelity pact with the [Communist] Party, from which he didn’t want to deviate. This created a strange situation, because he was very young but when destalinisation came, he behaved like an old Stalinist.
“He was one of the few who didn’t accept destalinisation. It broke his literary career. Then he became a small functionary, a cultural attaché, and finally he broke with the party only after the [1968 Soviet-led] invasion.
“And he committed suicide the day before he had to answer to a special commission and he was about to be expelled from the party. So it’s very sad – a broken life, broken by I would say politics, war, family, thing like that.”
You were telling me your mother [Claudia Ancelot] worked for Radio Prague.
“Yes. My mother came here with my father. They met in Paris in ’47 and she came here at the worst moment possible. Then they started to live in this house in Žižkov with the family.
“Then the political situation became such that my father realised that it was a big political mistake to have married an American Jew from German origins. In these times, it was the worst combination possible.
“So there a quick divorce, and the grounds were the political immaturity of my mother [laughs]. Then she found herself here with two children and had to find a job. She found one at the international section of the Radio.
“She made broadcasts for the States, in the middle of the night calling for American workers to rise and overthrow capitalism [laughs].”
Did you ever visit the Radio in those days?
“Yeah, I loved that. I still have very wonderful memories from the pater noster and the feeling of it and the people there. And the canteen – for a child it was fantastic.
“Later when I was eight or nine, before we left for France, I used to make false Communist programmes. I was supposed to be a young pioneer, coming back from vacation, very glad [laughs].”
I imagine it must have been a difficult experience for your mother, living here in the ‘50s?
“It was very strange, very difficult, very dangerous. At this moment, the head of the international section was Lise London and at the time of the Slánský trials my mother had the perfect profile, coming from the States, so it was very difficult [London was the wife of Artur London, a co-defendant in the anti-Semitic show trial of Rudolf Slánský, who was also found guilty but not executed].
“But my mother was always very curious and she was very happy to see what was going on. She learned Czech. She became one of the best translators from Czech to French. Later when she went to France, she was the translator of Hrabal. She interpreted for Havel, and so on.
“I think the situation was so tense but also so interesting that she enjoyed it [laughs].”
I often get the impression when I hear about women like your mother, who here from the West came after the war, that they were quite isolated. People were perhaps wary of speaking to foreigners.
“Yes. But there was a small group of people with very strange destinies. For example at the American section [at Radio Prague] there was an American soldier who came here after the war because of a love story which collapsed.
“My mother had a very close friend who was a British doctor, a woman, who came for political reasons. So there was a small group. Then there was the French section, where she met her second husband.
“We were isolated because we lived in special places, in hotels or in buildings, under the close watch of janitors and the people around.
“But it was not lonely, at least for her. Because she had experience of emigration. She had left Germany when she was 12 years old in ’33, then she to flee France. Then the States. France again. She was used to a strange life.”
So she left this country, because she met a French man, is that right?
“It was a quite difficult situation. Because my father didn’t want to her to leave with the children, and she didn’t want to leave without the children.
“So it took almost 10 years before she could obtain the permit to leave with us. At this time she met a French journalist who was working in the French section at the Radio [laughs].
“Like many people at this time, it was after Budapest, so he was completely disappointed with communism – but at the same time he loved the country.
“Many people had this story. They came here and in two, three months their eyes were opened, they saw the reality of the society, but they fell in love with Prague, with the Czech people, and so on.
“My stepfather was so much in love with Czechoslovakia that when the Prague Spring happened in 1967 and ’68, he returned here and started to work once again for the international section of the Radio. He preferred the life here to the life in France.”
You left at the end of the 1950s. Did you follow events in Czechoslovakia closely from France?
“Yes. I left on a Czech passport. My grandfather and grandmother were still alive and I was in love with my Czech family, and my aunt and the house.
“So as soon as I could do it, I used to come here. I think I spent all my holidays in Prague. I was very close to it and for a very long time I felt it was my home more than Paris.”
I know you’ve made many films, but I’d like to speak about one of them, A House in Prague. Tell us about that film.
“It was a film I made quite late. After the revolution here, the situation in France was that all the filmmakers suddenly discovered Prague and rushed here and started to make films. I found it a little bit like vultures.
“So I waited till ’95, ’96, when the wave ended, to feel able to return and to make a film about my family story and about the house.
The house is a villa in Žižkov?
“The house is a villa in Žižkov in which my great-great-grandfather created an anarchist commune at the beginning of the 20th century, and which then was the house of my grandfather and my grandmother, but divided between them and the other part of the family.
“My grandfather was red establishment, let’s say a mild Stalinist, and his sister was a kind of bohemian anarchist – and the house was a battleground between the two parts of the family. This is basically the story of the film.
“But it was a very, very moving film for me, and very difficult. I think it’s one of the most difficult things to do, at least for me, to turn the camera in the direction of my own stories.
“Because in all my films I have always the pleasure of discovering something new. And if you are with your own stories, you don’t discover anything, you just tell what you already know.”
Was there nothing you discovered in the making of A House in Prague?
“There was something, which was that when I started to make the film I had a kind of judgmental position: wrong, right, black, white.
“And as I entered into the life of this house and the life of the people in this country, I started to see that the situations were much more complex, much more difficult, much more painful in a certain way.
“But there was also much more life in it than we see when we look at it from today.
“The second thing is I did with this film as I do with all of my major films, which is that I took this part of my history and I put it in the film, so that I can be freed of it, in a certain way.”
SDF are confronting the Turkish army and jihadist mercenaries who have intensified their attacks on northern Syria in recent weeks in violation of so-called ceasefire agreements and international law.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Tuesday, 29 Dec 2020, 14:30
The Press Office of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) released a statement on the attacks of the Turkish state and allied mercenaries on Ain Issa district in northern Syria.
SDF reported intensified attacks on Ain Issa line in recent days, remarking that through these attacks, the Turkish-backed mercenaries seek to increase their dominance on M4 highway and to expand their wave of aggression against the region.
The attacks of the invaders were mostly repelled as result of the response from SDF fighters, the statement said.
SDF stated that the Turkish army and allied mercenaries attacked the villages of Mişêrfa (Al-Mushairfa) and Cehbel (al-Jahbal) in Ain Issa district with UAV support on December 27. Surroundings of both villages were heavily bombarded, the statement noted.
“As a result of the immediate response of our forces resulted in heavy fighting in the area of the two villages on 27-28 December and the attacks of the gangs were repelled.”
SDF reported that 5 of their fighters, 4 of them from the Democratic Brigade al-Shimal (Lîwa El-Şimal El-Demokrat), fell as martyrs during the attacks of the Turkish state and mercenaries.
SDF extended their condolences to the families of the martyrs and to the people and reiterated their promise to defend their lands.
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Commander denies claims of an agreement with Russia on Ain Issa
The Commander-in-Chief of the Military Council of Girê Spî (Tal Abyad) denied that any agreement had been reached with the Russian forces regarding Ain Issa, stressing that their forces were confronting Turkish attempts to control the international road.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Monday, 28 Dec 2020, 20:08
On Monday, Turkish artillery attacks targeted villages on the M4 highway, 3 km east of the Ain Issa town, a day after the killing of 6 mercenaries in a failed infiltration operation to control the villages of Al-Jahbel and Al-Mushairfah, with Turkish support.
The Commander-in-Chief of the Girê Spî (Tal Abyad Military Council), Riad al-Khalaf, spoke to ANHA News Agency and said that this evening, their forces are responding to the Turkish and its mercenaries’ attempts to control the international road.
Al-Khalaf affirmed that all the news about any agreement with the Russian forces is “baseless,” and that the control map is still intact after 6 weeks of the Turkish military build-up and aggression.
This comes as the Syrian government forces’ presence is limited to a number of military points on the lines of engagement, in light of Russian military reinforcements for the back lines.
The Ain Issa town is witnessing daily protests in front of the Russian base, in conjunction with Turkish shelling that targeted the vicinity of the base for weeks without any military or political response from the guarantor Russian state.
Russian forces and the Syrian government forces are deployed in the areas of contact with the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries, following the Sochi agreement on the 22nd of October between Moscow and Ankara, to monitor the ceasefire process. This is indeed what the Russian forces ignore, despite casualties in Turkish shelling targeting the northern neighborhoods of Ain Issa and a number of villages on the international road.
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Ain Issa: “We have always been united and will remain so”
As the fighters keep resisting in Ain Issa, which is under the attack of Turkey and gangs, the people carry out a protest in front of a base of Russian troops, which have remained silent on the invasion attempt.
ANF – BÊRİVAN CİZİRİ
AIN ISSA
Wednesday, 23 Dec 2020, 14:45
Since November, the attacks of the invading Turkish army and gangs of Ain Issa have been going on. These attacks have intensified since the beginning of December. Heavy bombardments on the Seyda and Malikiye villages was followed by artillery attacks on the city centre.
Since December 18, there have been intense attacks on the villages of Misefra and Cebel. YPJ, YPG and SDF forces responded to these attacks in an act of self-defence. In these attacks, 19 members of the invading Turkish army and allied gangs were killed and 9 others injured.
While these attacks resulted in the death and injury of civilians, settlements were also seriously damaged. Against the silence of the Russian and Regime forces, the dirty alliances and the intensifying attacks, the Revolutionary Youth launched an action in a tent set up near a Russian military point. The action was taken over by activists from the women’s umbrella organization Kongreya Star.
When the action started on December 19, the invaders attacked near the Russian points with heavy weapons and fired sound bullets. Despite the attacks, the people displayed heroic resistance chanting slogans one after another.
On December 21, the invading Turkish army and gangs attacked the village of Misefra with heavy weapons at night. Each day a gang group makes a statement on their media outlets. And they circulate a footage which dates back to 4 years ago claiming “it is from Ain Issa”.
The invaders boast about their fake news. They are doing this to wage a psychological warfare against the population, kidnap local people and plunder their homes. The people see the whole truth and express that they will fight against it and they will not leave their land.
Today people from Kobanê and Raqqa have joined the tent protest to defy the lies and attacks of the gangs. The groups, especially women and young girls, who took over the action, displayed their attitude with great enthusiasm and excitement. They also performed a traditional folk dance for freedom.
After four years, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the YPG (Kurdish People’s Protection Units) remain the most effective forces on the ground in Syria to fight ISIS, just as in 2016 – this despite of the loss of significant territory to Turkey and the US-led Coalition pulling out from several towns in northern Syria in October last year. As a result, the SDF-controlled areas in northeast Syria remain the largest opposition-controlled territory.
The SDF and YPG were not able to achieve their main goal in marching further towards Afrin to connect the three Kurdish cantons after the ISIS defeat in August 2016. The US were opposed to the idea and told the SDF they would only support them to liberate the ISIS capital of Raqqa.
Moreover, due to Turkish fears of a Kurdish-led autonomous entity on its border and Ankara’s own territorial ambitions, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan launched Operation Euphrates Shield. This lasted from August 2016 to March 2017, and sought to prevent the SDF from connecting Manbij to Afrin by taking territories between the two (including Bab and Jarabulus). On 20 October 2017, the SDF liberated the town of Raqqa from ISIS. However, this did not stop Turkey from launching further operations against the SDF, despite having already thwarted their plan to unite the cantons.
With Russian backing (with Moscow pulling out troops and opening up airspace to Turkey), Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in January 2018 (lasting until March 2018). The YPG refused a Russian offer to hand over Afrin completely to the Syrian regime and as a result, Russia allowed Turkey to attack. This temporarily disrupted SDF-US cooperation against ISIS, with the SDF redirecting troops to defend Afrin from the Turkish assault. The earlier Operation Euphrates Shield was also coordinated with Russia, as were most Turkish operations against the SDF.
Nevertheless, despite losing Afrin, the SDF continued to work with the US and liberated the last territory from ISIS in Baghouz on 23 March 2019. But this did not stop Turkey from launching another attack, ‘Operation Peace Spring’, in October 2019. The US made attempts in June 2018 – through the Manbij Roadmap and through a safe zone deal in March 2019 involving Turkey and the SDF – to prevent a further Turkish incursion. However, Turkey demanded that this ‘safe zone’ on its border be completely under its control.
As a result, despite the SDF removing fighters and fortifications from Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain (Serekaniye), and joint Turkish-US patrols in SDF-held areas on the border, these deals did not dissuade Turkey from launching a new operation. The US was also not ready to militarily prevent the Turkish army from attacking the SDF. Turkey launched the so-called Operation Peace Spring on 9 October, after a green light from US President Donald Trump during a phone conversation with Turkish President Erdoğan. This major Turkish offensive led to the displacement of nearly 180,000 civilians.
Russia and the US were able to quickly reach separate ceasefire deals with Turkey, which limited Turkish control to an area between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain. This stopped Turkey’s original plan to destroy the Kurdish-led autonomous administration by creating a 32-kilometre-deep ‘safe zone’ stretching along the 460 kilometres of the Turkish-Syrian border. Turkey also wanted to relocate the 3.6 million Turkish-based Syrian refugees to north-eastern Syria, which would have completely changed the demography of the area, and may well have threatened the Kurdish presence in Syria.
The SDF also reached a deal with Damascus in October 2019 to place regime forces on the frontline facing Turkish forces and Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebels. US troops also pulled out from areas near Manbij, Kobani and Raqqa in late 2019, while Russian troops moved into these areas, as well as other borderlands. The US repositioned their forces to Hasakah province and the oil-rich Deir az-Zour. Coalition forces are today tasked with protecting oil infrastructure and continuing the fight against ISIS. As a result, the SDF stayed in control of significant oil resources, which gave them continued independence from Damascus. Moreover, one US oil company, Delta Crescent Energy, also received a waiver to modernise oil fields in SDF-held north-eastern Syria in July 2020 in a deal with a US company. So far, the company has not yet commenced operations.
As a result of the ceasefire deals, and an accord with the Syrian regime, the SDF continues to control significant territory. With a détente holding, they have not handed over territory to the Assad government, and neither has Damascus recognised the SDF or the local Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), despite repeated failed negotiation attempts. The SDF continues to stay in control of all the area’s checkpoints and has suffered only minor defections.
Around 300 Russian military police now operate in the border area and conduct joint patrols with Turkey. Moreover, there are an estimated 4,000 to 10,000 Syrian regime forces that operate in the area. In addition, the SDF continues to control and pay the salaries of over 100,000 forces. There remain 500 Coalition troops present in the areas of Hasakah and Deir az-Zour, which has led to competition and tensions between US and Russian forces in the area due to Moscow’s continued opposition to any American presence in Syria. As such, Russia’s preferred solution is for Damascus to take full control of north-eastern Syria, without any concessions to the SDF.
However, Russia is unable to push out the US forces by military means. This has raised fears in north-eastern Syria that Russia could allow another Turkish intervention to force the SDF to make concessions to Damascus, or even push US forces further out of the area. Erdoğan recently increased his threats to invade the north-east again amidst economic trouble inside Turkey. During a recent interview on Hawar News, a senior Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) official, Hikmat Al-Habib, also expressed fears over a possible Turkish-Russian agreement that could pave the way for an attack, after Turkey withdrew from some observation bases in Idlib. As such, the future of the north-east remains unclear. However, until now the SDF and the local AANES have been successful governing this part of Syria and will look to continue, unless Turkey is allowed to attack again.
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Assad’s statements incongruous with changes in Syria
Latest statements by the Syrian president Bashar Assad are seen by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria as persistence to deepen the Syrian Crisis via the denial and exclusion language incongruous to the religious and cultural variety in Syria.
NEWS13 Dec 2020, Sun – 10:302020-12-13T10:30:00 NEWS DESK
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria has called on Assad, in a statement released today, not to exploit the Arab component for the benefit of policies adopted by the regime.
The statement reads as follows:
After a decade, the Syrian Crisis is still aggravates, real efforts of finding a solution have never been found so far, and what gives permanence to the crisis is the approach adopted to the crisis by some parts in dealing with the crisis, for there still some parts, of which the Syrian Regime is number one, in dealing with the crisis ignoring it’s core.
This vision to the actual reality in Syria impinges unbearably on the situation and the prolongs the crisis, and adds to the already suffering of the Syrian people.
What is astonishing, after all this plights, destruction, murder, deportation, occupation and terror is that there are still some parts who believe that such negligence to the crisis would conduce to a solution, taking into account that the denial language is the reason behind such destruction.
Comments by the Syrian president lately, in his participation in the periodical meeting that was held by the Syrian Endowment Ministry at the Uthman Mosque in Damascus, on December 7th, 2020, on some issues of which his short-sighted discussion of the Syrian situation and denial to the various components of the Syrian society that never pays attention to openness that ought to be adopted by all parties that advocate for the interests of Syria and of it’s people.
His approach to pluralism and variety prevalent in Syria and excluding all that to one colour, that is the pan-Arab one, never conforms to the necessary changes to take place in Syria, and never to efforts exerted to build the new Syria, for this narrow dealing of the Pan- Arab form of the case is a hard proof to denial of all indigenous Syrian components and a bid to melt down all cultures and components of Syria such as Kurds, Syriacs, Armenians, Circassians and others to be melted down
We respect all components and assure that Arabs are a big and indigenous people of the Syrian fabric but this component must never be exploited by a regime that alleges it advocates for Arabs’ cause but it serves it’s mere service, for Arabs as others underwent denial in spite all of speech by Syrian president that stresses the Arab role, this classic speech has never made any progress years ago regarding solution in Syria.
We, in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria are in dire need today of adopting a language by all parts that conforms to the changes taking place and the social variety prevalent in Syria really, denial to any people or the plural components of Syria excludes it’s religious, societal and cultural richness, and such exclusion never serves Syria’s future and it’s integrity, rather it eases all endeavours to segregate it societal unity.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
A dream destroying borders: The book by commander Meryem Kobanê
YPJ commander Meryem Kobanê, one of the commanders of the historical Kobanê resistance and victory, speaks about her book, “Kobanê: Çepera Rûmetê”.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Thursday, 12 Nov 2020, 13:04
Kobane: Charter of Honour
The first volume of the book of Meryem Kobanê, one of the commanders of the historical Kobanê war and victory, about those days, “Kobanê: Çepera Rûmetê” was published by Şilêr Publications.
Translations in different European languages are already underway as this book is not only a beautiful piece of literature but also an important testimony and tribute to the resistance and victory carried out by men and women in Kobanê.
Meryem Kobanê is one of the witnesses of that time when ISIS destroyed cities one by one in 2014 and brought states to their knees. She is a protagonist and witness of the great resistance in Kobanê.
With the book “Kobanê: Çepera Rûmetê”, Meryem Kobanê brings together the will of a handful of revolutionaries who said “Kobanê will not fall”. She did this first by fighting, this time she does it as a story teller.
The book is also a very valuable recent history document.
From a border village of Serxet (North Kurdistan) to Binxet (Rojava Kurdistan), Meryem Kobanê looks at the borders that are dividing Kurdistan with the eyes of a child, pursuing her childhood dreams.
Meryem Kobane’s dream of crossing the borders as a child comes true in Kobanê, where, years later, a people stood hands in hands and destroyed those borders.
Meryem Kobanê, who held a gun in her hand during the Kobanê war, now undertakes the task of transferring that war, resistance, will and heroism to the new generations with a pen in her hand.
She spoke to ANF about the book and its importance.
With this book, you became the narrator of the historical Kobanê victory after being one of those who achieved this victory. What was your aim while writing this book?
Undoubtedly, the expectation to carry over and convey the truth of a war that you witness and fought bears a high responsibility. There are great resistances in the history of the Kurds. But most of them remained only oral. There are many different reasons for this, but since the result remained oral, most of those resistances do not somehow become history.
That is why a person who witnessed a great war like Kobanê, who witnessed many moments and took decisions there, has a responsibility to leave it to history. There was such a responsibility not only for that truth not to be lost but also for it to be passed on to new generations and history. We wanted the truth to be known. Yes, this was also the task of a militant of the freedom struggle. I wanted that the truth of the great war we fought be conveyed and be the legacy of the resistance history of all Kurdistan and other peoples. Every Kurd needs to know this truth. Because if a people does not know its past, it cannot build its future.
Your book starts with the border. You define the border from a child’s perspective. The border is one of the biggest traumas for Kurds…
Borders have always meant pain in human life. The first words and emotions that come to mind when talking about borders is: falling apart, being separated, expatriating, being exiled. Borders, not only in human life, but also in the life of all living things means obstacle. It means stopping the flow. Longing accumulates when there is no flow…
It is the biggest embarrassment of the world that our country is divided by borders. They tried to educate us Kurds with borders. Yes, they did that physically, but mentally and emotionally they could never succeed in making us accepting those boundaries. Because it is impossible to put borders to thoughts and feelings.
This is why every child who has lived close to the border has a border metaphor in his/her eyes. When you come to a border, the first thing you feel is barbed wire. Those borders are never forgotten. But there is something else that those who build those boundaries do not take into account, or try to extend their life by denying them: the fact that borders always bring hatred and anger. This situation is also valid for us Kurds. Kurds have never accepted the borders drawn between Kurdistan. Every Kurd saw those borders as their denial and destruction.
Years later we see that girl on the North side of the border as a revolutionary on the other side, in Rojava. Could you tell us a little bit about your first feelings in the land of revolution?
I tried to express this in the book: What I found the most difficult thing to make sense of even in my childhood and which became an open wound for me in later years were borders. Tens of questions were constantly puzzling me, such as why the border, why these people cannot see each other, why is there a constant obstacle between us, why can’t we play games with our children on the other side, and we can only see them from a distance? There was no escape from these questions. As a child I started looking for answers to these questions. As I learned something, my consciousness of Kurdishness grew stronger and so did my hatred against those who drew those borders between us.
Pursuing the dream of childhood…
I remember well in my childhood I always dreamed of having wings. I dreamed that I could fly over the border, to see our relatives on the other side, to play with my cousins. In fact, our childhood games often were about crossing borders. I can say that the answer to the question of how can I cross that border never abandoned me. I followed my dreams. I saw my dreams indispensable. Sometimes I followed them, sometimes they followed me…
Years later, when I looked at the land where I was born this time from the other side of the border and dreamed of how to eliminate them, my dreams were with me again. But now, I realized that those borders could not be crossed by wings… You have to do something to make the borders disappear.
Because boundaries were the product of an imposition…
Yes, those borders were aimed at sowing genocide, hostility and contradiction among brothers and peoples. For example, my mother used to talk about Assyrians and they were no strangers to me. When I crossed to Binxet (Rojava), I also saw Syriacs there. This means that these borders shattered not only the Kurds, but also other peoples and beliefs. When I was a child, my mother used to tell not only the Kurdish çîrok (stories), but also Assyrian and Armenian çîrok. Then I began to grasp the real meaning of borders sowing hostility. Just as the story of the Assyrian girl Febrûniye which begins in a church in Nusaybin and ends with her death in a church in Qamishlo…
You are also the witnesses, decision makers and survivors of many of the events that you describe in your book. Was it difficult to put them on paper?
This is really a difficult issue. Surely, you experience many emotions at the same time while you are at war. It is a flood of emotions. But the most dominant feeling is ‘how do I win this war’. It is undoubtedly difficult to be in this flood of emotions, but really much harder to write about them. Because you are reliving many events that you have witnessed. You are also worried about not being able to do justice to the heroism experienced. One may be bolder or more assertive than the other, but ultimately there is also the truth that all hearts beat for victory. I made a lot of effort so that no one was left out of the book. Maybe not all of them have names, but they all joined with their skills to ensure that victory. I tried to write down those images that I saw with my eyes and recorded in my mind. When I first decided to write a book, my only goal was to be the language of those heroes. I wanted everyone to know these heroes. I wanted to be fair. I don’t know how much I have achieved it, but that was my goal. I made an effort so that no one is forgotten.
Let’s ask what was the most difficult thing while writing…
You know, as the great philosopher says, you can’t bathe twice in the same river. It is very difficult to live and feel a memory for the second time. Yes, the mind is also the place to record memories. But one should not forget the destruction of time. My biggest concern was not being able to do justice to the resistance and heroism I experienced. It was this anxiety that I struggled most with.
How does it feel to be both a freedom fighter and the narrator of a historical war, a historical period? Because the people you describe in the book are not “fictional heroes”, but the greatest heroes of the 21st century and you know them all…
We see ourselves as truth seekers, truth fighters. We are fighting for justice against injustice. We are fighting for rights against injustice. As the dominant system, capitalism is also waging a war against the memory of human and society daily, in fact every second. Truth seekers or fighters are also fighting against this system that targets the common memory of human and society. Being the narrator of this great war is a completely different, indescribable feeling, of course… When we chatted between us sometimes while at war, we were making a promise to each other: whoever lived would write what happened and make it immortal. Indeed, I saw the greatest people, the most epic heroes in that war.
When I decided to write those historic days that were a source of hope for all the oppressed, I wrote it feeling that there was a great burden on my shoulders. There was a promise I had made. These experiences would not be forgotten, they would be written, left to history, passed on to new generations… Because writing was an order of the martyrs.
No one I am talking about in the book is a fictional novel or movie character. They are all real heroes. Children of this people. Each of them is the living hero of every village, street and city of Kurdistan. They are heroes who walked for a life of dignity, without blinking when faced with an honourable death. My heroes are the ones I saw, gunpowder coming out of the barrel of their gun, and the ones of whom I heard the roar of an empty stomach. They are my heroes …
Did you believe that you could one day tell what happened while fighting in Kobanê?
This book has a story of its own. One day, we were in the first group of friends that went to Kobanê and we were chatting. Kobanê was surrounded from all sides. We had not recorded much of what happened in the early years of the revolution. In that conversation, we said that whoever survived should write what happened. Before that, I had read the book The Unknown Soldier. It was then that I had decided that no fighters or resistance fighters should remain unknown in Kurdistan. Too many people wanted our country to remain unknown. Now, they wanted to silence those who resisted, struggled and fought for that country. As a matter of fact, there have been many fighters left unknown in our history.
While chatting with Heval Cûdî, Dilgeş, Roza, Masîro and Baharîn, we said that the last person left would write the Kobanê’s resistance book. As in the story of the 300 Spartans, we were saying that someone should be saved. That survivor would bring tens of thousands with him. We believed it. Heval Cûdî always told me ‘write down about friends, what happened, the resistance’. He said, ‘You are traveling on all fronts, you know all your friends well. At that time, I was keeping a diary. Because we had a promise made to each other. Fulfilling it was a revolutionary task.
You said “Kobanê will be like Stalingrad” in an interview you gave during the heavier days of the war. Indeed, Kobanê did not fall as someone expected, and it became the 21st century Stalingrad for both Kurds and peoples. Looking back today, what would you say?
The answer to this question is in the second volume of the book. It was the first day of the attacks in September. It was around 1 or 2 pm in the village of Serzûrî in the east of Kobanê. The clashes were heavy. As they say, bullets were pouring like rain. At that time, that scene in the movie Stalingrad came to my mind. With that image in front of my eyes, I said, “This will be the Stalingrad of the Middle East. Just as Stalingrad did not allow fascism to pass, Kobanê will not allow ISIS.” Because there was no hesitation or fear in the voices of any of those 13 friends on the upper floor of the Serzûrî school. One day and night they resisted without hesitation. Their morale and their belief in great war was being renewed once again.
With your resistance in Kobanê, for the first time in Kurdish history, that traumatic borders were hit. The Turkish state initially tried to protect those borders by building walls around it. When this failed, it started invasion operations.
We started talking about borders, let’s end with borders. Instead of those wire fences, they built concrete walls so that we wouldn’t see each other. But these efforts are all futile… This must be said and seen: Kurds are not the old Kurds. The occupiers are still alien to Kurdish history. They said in Ağrı that “the imaginary Kurdistan became forgiven here we poured concrete on it”. But the Kurds shattered that concrete like a plane tree. No matter what they do, those borders are no longer holding. Because the Kurds removed the borders in their minds. If they draw a border around every house, every street, every village, they have no chance to be successful. Just as young women, old people and children will remove their borders, they will shatter their walls. The philosophy of leader Abdullah Ocalan once lifted the borders of the minds and hearts. What power can harm the heroic stories of the Kurds anymore?
Something else you want to add?
Let me state again that in fact, I did not write this book. This book was written by the fighters who destroyed those borders. This book is the work of people of all ages, tribes and beliefs from four parts of Kurdistan, from Europe, the Middle East and different parts of the world, who have joined the resistance and whose hearts beat with the resisters. I offer my infinite respect and love to all of them. Once again, I remember the martyrs with respect and gratitude.
It’s one year since Turkey launched its devastating ‘Peace Spring’ operation, green-lit by Donald Trump and primarily targeting the Kurds in North and East Syria. The invasion displaced an initial wave of 200,000 IDPs, including most of the Kurdish and all of the local Yezidi and Christian minorities, plus large numbers of Arabs.
Since then, Turkey has been installing Sunni Arab militias in this formerly diverse, tolerant and secular region, responsible for a wide range of war crimes and atrocities against the civilian population, according to the UN.
Now, a new Rojava Information Center report reveals the identities of over 40 former ISIS members being sheltered, funded and protected by Turkey in the occupied regions. The report reveals that many ISIS commanders, fighters and emirs are now on the Turkish payroll, using Turkish-issued ID cards and receiving commands from Turkish intelligence as part of the Turkish-controlled ‘Syrian National Army’.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) is generally recognized as providing the highest levels of religious and ethnic tolerance, human rights and respect for rule of law of any actor in Syria. Since their occupation, Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad have moved from a situation of relative peace, secularism and prosperity to one in which Turkish-controlled armed groups commit a wide range of war crimes against the civilian population, including raping women, torture, summary executions, kidnapping for ransom, extortion, forcibly confining women to the home, and in some instances the imposition of a strict interpretation of Sharia law.
Far from acting to combat terror, then, Turkey’s invasions and installation of the SNA in regions formerly controlled by SNA have provided safe havens for globally-wanted terrorists. US airstrikes regularly target top-level militants linked to al-Qaeda or ISIS,
moving freely in Turkish-controlled territory. In 2019, Rojava Information Center published a widely-covered report identifying over 40 former ISIS members now part of Turkish-backed forces in Afrin. They include former emirs, commanders and those responsible for coordinating jihadist fighters with their handlers in the Turkish military intelligence services (MIT).
The present report expands on this work. Applying a more stringent methodology, it identifies over 40 former ISIS members now safely sheltered as part of Turkish-controlled factions in Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad, many for the first time. Along with previous RIC reports addressing the dire humanitarian situation in the occupied areas, it constitutes further evidence that Turkey is acting as a state sponsor of terror. These regions now serve as a launching-pad for Turkey’s regional expansion, transferring fighters from these same militias to represent its interests from the Mediterranean through to the Caucuses.
Download the full report here, and contact Rojava Information Center for further comment, analysis and information.
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Syrian Kurdish commander sees chance to ease tensions with Turkey under Biden
In an exclusive interview with Al-Monitor, Mazlum Kobane said the former vice president’s victory may well spell change in Ankara’s behavior.
Mazlum Kobane, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), speaks with AFP during an interview in the countryside outside the northwestern Syrian city of Hasakah, in the province of the same name, on Jan. 24, 2019.
Photo by DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP via Getty Images.
Amberin Zaman @amberinzaman
Nov 9, 2020
The victory of former Vice President Joe Biden in the US presidential election has raised expectations of renewed and constructive US engagement across the world. Such expectations are acutely felt by the Kurds of northeast Syria. Washington’s top allies in the war against the Islamic State (IS) have suffered an undue share of tumult as a result of President Donald Trump’s erratic policies. His decision to green light Turkey’s October 2019 invasion, which resulted in the loss of a huge chunk of Kurdish-controlled territory and the withdrawal of US troops from the Turkish border, was a huge shock. But in the year that has elapsed since the Turkish assault, the Syrian Kurds — under the stewardship of Mazlum Kobane, the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — have been striving to turn adversity into opportunity.
The universal outcry over Trump’s perceived betrayal of the Kurds led the US president to backtrack and keep several hundred US troops in northeast Syria. Trump said they would remain to protect several oil fields, which hold the bulk of Syria’s reserves.
With US military protection intact, Kobane has embarked upon a series of political and economic initiatives aimed at cementing the Kurds’ hard-won gains. The most critical is the ongoing unity talks between the Democratic Unity Party, which shares power in the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria, and a group of opposition parties gathered under the umbrella of the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which has close ties to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq as well as with Turkey.
The need for intra-Kurdish unity has gained fresh urgency in the wake of the Turkish invasion that displaced tens of thousands of people, adding a new layer of misery to that inflicted by IS. Kobane succeeded in persuading the United States to become co-facilitators of the talks whose strategic objective is to help normalize relations with Turkey. This, in turn, would help Kobane achieve his overarching goal of ensuring that US troops stay put and US diplomatic engagement is sustained until Syria gets a government that respects the will of all of its citizens, including that of its long-repressed Kurds.
In an hour-long interview conducted via Signal just hours after Biden’s victory was announced on Nov. 7, Kobane told Al-Monitor that the former vice president’s election may well spell change in Ankara’s behavior. Squeezed by a mounting economic crisis and potential US sanctions over the acquisition of Russian S-400 missiles, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could prove more amenable to peace with Syria’s Kurds. His wilting poll numbers are another compelling reason to attempt a reset with the Kurds. Whether that will be enough to salvage his 18-year-old administration is a question mark. In any case, Kobane said he is willing to talk peace with Turkey without any pre-conditions and might even consider mediating between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), provided that Ankara acts in good faith. In another first, Kobane also announced his willingness to become a full-time politician provided that the unity talks and other initiatives result in success. Here are the highlights of the interview that was conducted in Turkish and lightly edited for clarity:
Al-Monitor: Joe Biden has been declared the winner of the US presidential elections. Can you share your thoughts about the new US administration? What would you ask of Joe Biden if he were sitting across from you?
Kobane: We are optimistic about the new administration. In fact, they are not so new for us. When we started the fight against the Islamic State together with the United States and the Global Coalition, the same team was pretty much in place. They are in command of the situation here. They grasp its complexities. I believe they will pursue a more realistic policy in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan). As for our expectations, we must successfully conclude the fight against terror that we are conducting together. We continue to view DAESH (IS) as a threat. They have camps in regime-controlled areas. They have camps across the border, in the desert in Iraq. They have no financial problems. They are able to find money. They have no trouble recruiting fighters or with training them. They are able to deploy them everywhere. They have a network of sympathizers.
Therefore, the United States needs to send more troops here.
Al-Monitor: What kind of numbers are we talking about?
Kobane: At least double the existing number. [Following Turkey’s October 2019 invasion], coalition forces pulled out of from certain areas including Raqqa, Kobani and Manbij. But we are continuing our campaign against DAESH in all of those areas. As things currently stand, we can keep DAESH under control, but we cannot finish it off.
Our other expectation from the Biden administration is to maintain coalition troops here until a political solution is reached for Rojava and for the whole of Syria, naturally. Our military ties with the United States are very good, but we consider our political relations to be insufficient. Despite all our efforts, they have not attained the desired level.
Al-Monitor: Since March, the United States has together with the SDF been co-facilitating unity talks between the KNC and the PYD. Negotiations began in earnest in June when you announced that you shared a common vision with regard to what the outcome of the talks should be. The US Embassy in Syria referred to this in a statement that was also published in Kurmanji (the most widely spoken Kurdish dialect). That’s quite some progress, no?
Kobane: Yes. We the Syrian Democratic Forces are together with the United States formally facilitating these talks. And we have established a sound foundation for their successful conclusion. We have forged a common will, and this reflects the will of our people. A lot of effort has been invested. We have made good headway. But more work needs to be done. The negotiations are progressing slowly.
Al-Monitor: Sources tell us the talks keep getting hung up over the issue of the PKK. More precisely, the KNC is demanding that any final agreement must contain a paragraph saying that the PYD is committed to severing its ties with the PKK or for the PKK to be expelled from Rojava, or something along those lines. And you have refused. Is that correct?
Kobane: Everyone here agrees that Rojava must be administered by the Syrian Kurds and that Syria’s territorial integrity needs to be preserved. Its commonly agreed that any administration in Rojava needs to be formed by Syrian Kurds alone, that all decisions made by that administration need to be made by Syrian Kurds alone and that all such decisions need to be made transparently. It is agreed that the Syrian Kurdish identity needs to be nurtured and fortified. On this, we are in agreement. Therefore, if the KNC is truly sincere about this territory being self-administered without any external interference, there is no problem.
Al-Monitor: So what is the problem then?
Kobane: At the moment there are some problems between the Kurds. There are tensions between the PKK and the KDP (the Kurdistan Democratic Party). We do not want to be a party to those tensions. We as the Syrian Kurds, as the Syrian Democratic Forces, as the Autonomous Administration in Rojava — we refuse to take sides. We refuse to make statements either in support of or against the KDP. The same applies to the PKK. That is our fundamental principle. Similarly, we are opposed to any form of external intervention in Rojava. We all agree on this, and when we expressed this view, the [former] US Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Jim Jeffrey, was in the room.
Al-Monitor: But the KNC has been insisting on referencing the PKK in a final agreement. And you are refusing. Right?
Kobane: Yes, that’s right. And it’s not just the PKK. We refuse to name any group in this context. We as the Syrian Democratic Forces sought the help of everyone in our fight against terror, against DAESH. From the KDP, from everybody. Prior to this interview, I held talks with the KNC delegation that arrived from Erbil. I explained this to them once again. I believe that this obstacle will be overcome. Our talks are continuing. If we persevere we will succeed. If good things are desired for Rojava by all sides, then the problem will be solved.
Al-Monitor: What about the Russians? What is their position on the talks?
Kobane: This process developed independently of the Russians. However, nothing negative about the talks was communicated to us by the Russians through their official channels. Though they are not part of the process, they want to be kept informed about it. They are constantly briefed about them by us. In August, Ilham Ahmed, the president of the [SDF-affiliated] Syrian Democratic Council, met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow as you know. Then the KNC sent a delegation to Moscow. The number of Russian forces has expanded in our area in the wake of Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, and when problems arise on the ground, we always manage to solve them. There’s no difficulty on that front either.
Al-Monitor: But the Russians want you to strike a deal with the regime?
Kobane: It’s true that they are pushing us to make peace with the regime. But we expect them to put more pressure on the regime. In any case, overall the regime is not ready for a solution. This applies to the whole of Syria. It lacks confidence. It’s not ready for a democratic solution. It’s been unable in particular to shake the Baath mentality when it comes to the Kurds. However, we remain in constant contact with the regime because we live side by side and we face common security problems.
Al-Monitor: The regime and Iran are seeking to sow discord between you and the Arab tribes.
Kobane: The regime and Iran work in concert in the territory under our control. They are trying to provoke the Arab tribes against us. We made our displeasure known to them. We can say we have stopped their mischief for now. We have good relations with the tribes everywhere, and we wish to make them even better. As you may know, we freed some 600 IS militants who are members of local tribes who were established as not having blood on their hands. We also freed some families. But of course we took maximum security measures. We investigated every detail of their past. We are constantly exchanging information with the coalition forces on these issues. We plan to free more such people over time.
Al-Monitor: One of the main purposes of the unity talks is to improve relations between the Rojava administration and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). If tensions between the PKK and the KDP continue, isn’t this likely to cause harm to the talks?
Kobane: Of course it will cause harm. It will cause a lot of harm. At the end of the day, you have Kurds on both sides. Kurdish forces. A conflict like this will cause harm to Rojava as a whole as it will to the ongoing dialogue between the Syrian Kurds. That is why we are doing our very best to help reduce these tensions. We are in contact with all the different parties. We are talking to officials from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. We are also in touch with Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani. This fight is of a kind that will cause harm not only to Rojava but to all Kurds.
Al-Monitor: What caused this quarrel?
Kobane: There is only one cause: Turkey. Turkish pressure. There is nothing to be gained by either the KDP or the PKK in this fight. Both sides continually say they are against Kurdish infighting. I am well-acquainted with both sides. Listen, they haven’t had any real fight to speak of in the past 21 years. There are no serious differences between them. Therefore, I have difficulty in understanding the current situation. This situation is the result of the intervention of outside forces. It’s the result of Turkey’s military operations against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Al-Monitor: While talks with the KNC are aimed at bolstering relations with the KRG, their overarching strategic logic is to help normalize relations between Rojava and Turkey. This is how the United States views this process.
Kobane: Should these talks succeed, and if all the different Kurdish parties work together, I agree that it will definitely have a positive impact on our ties with Turkey. This would rob Turkey of its excuses for its continued hostility toward us. It would benefit both sides economically. And it’s true that it would make it easier for the Americans to stay here.
Al-Monitor: As of Jan. 21, there will no longer be a leader in the White House Turkey can influence with a single phone call. Would you concur that Biden’s victory presents opportunities for a reset with Turkey?
Kobane: [Under the Trump administration], Erdogan found a vacuum and went to extremes in exploiting that vacuum. He imposed his will [on the United States]. Should Erdogan face resistance to his aggressive policies, he will be forced to climb down. This would not only benefit us but the region as a whole.
I believe that Turkey’s options are shrinking. Conditions no longer favor a continuation of its aggressive stance. While we cannot say that chances of Turkey mounting a new military attack against Rojava are zero, we can say that they have been significantly reduced. At the very minimum, we believe that conditions for the existing [US- and Russian-brokered] cease-fires to hold and for a new dialogue to start are indeed ripe.
Al-Monitor: You posted a very kind message on Twitter to the Turkish people in the wake of the Izmir earthquake. Ankara will have noticed. Are you ready to sit down with Turkey without any preconditions?
Kobane: It depends on their intentions. Our intentions are open and clear. We want peace. We want stability. If Turkey doesn’t espouse a cynical approach, if it is ready to take steps with a real solution in mind, and if that solution is to the benefit of the people of Rojava, and if all outstanding issues are put on the table, why not? There is the matter of the territories occupied by Turkey. There is Afrin. There is Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain). There is Tell Abyad. And there are the hundreds of thousands of our people who were displaced as a result of Turkey’s actions.
On the question of Turkey’s national security concerns and interests, we are very clear. We are ready to accommodate them. But as you know, last year, prior to Turkey’s October assault, we were holding indirect talks with Turkey through the United States. We took many steps. We pulled our forces back from the border, and in return, Turkey occupied our lands.
Al-Monitor: Turkey’s Justice and Development Party government is under mounting pressure. It has big problems, starting with the economy. The decisive role of the Kurdish-friendly Peoples’ Democratic Party in any election is by now well established. There are claims that Turkey’s intelligence chief, Hakan Fidan, met with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan (at his island prison) in September. Erdogan may knock on the Kurds’ door yet again. This time around he may be more flexible as you say. However, he is likely to tell you to end the PKK presence in Rojava as a precondition to improving ties. The PKK will set conditions of its own. Can you act as a mediator between Turkey and the PKK? Could you, for instance, help negotiate an end to the low-intensity war being waged by PKK-linked groups in the territories occupied by Turkey as a confidence-building measure?
Kobane: First of all, it’s important to note that the PKK made big sacrifices in the war against terror in Rojava. Nobody can dispute this. The PKK will always defend the interests of the people of Rojava. It will not create problems for them. On the contrary, it will always look to ease their path. That is what we believe.
However, before talking about mediating between the PKK and Turkey, we first need to solve the problems between ourselves and Turkey. If we can really achieve a dialogue with Turkey that will have a positive effect on Rojava, and if Turkey changes its current policies, this will have a positive effect on Turkey’s problems with the PKK. In such circumstances, we will do our very best to contribute to a solution to the problems between Turkey and the PKK. Why not?
Al-Monitor: Abdullah Ocalan has a long past in Syria and Rojava. He remains the PKK’s sole and undisputed leader. Do you believe he can help with this process?
Kobane: As you know, during his last meeting with his lawyers (May 2019), Ocalan said he could play a constructive role in helping to mend ties between Turkey and Rojava. I believe that he must play a part in any new process that could potentially evolve. He can be very influential.
Al-Monitor: Would it help for you to meet with Ocalan?
Kobane: I would like to meet with Mr. Ocalan if he were free.
Al-Monitor: But he isn’t. Would you want to meet if the Turkish state allowed it?
Kobane: It is too early to answer that question.
Al-Monitor: There’s the chronic problem of Turkey cutting off the water supply to Hasakah from the Alok power station in Serekaniye. What’s the latest?
Kobane: However much this problem occurs within Turkey’s full knowledge, it’s first and foremost a problem caused by the Turkish-backed Sunni opposition armed group there. They keep cutting off the water. They place Turkey in an awkward position. The Russians are mediating to solve the problem but they have failed so far. So we are working on a lasting solution that involves carrying water from the Euphrates River to Hasakah.
Kobane: Oil is an economic issue. It’s not political. Talks between US oil company Delta Crescent and the KRG [for marketing the oil] are continuing. I believe they are advancing slowly because of the terms, because of prices. But I believe these will be overcome.
Al-Monitor: It’s been nine years since you returned to Rojava. Have you changed in those nine years? Has your world view changed?
Kobane: Over these nine years we waged a successful war against a very ferocious enemy. We acted in concert with international forces. We gained experience. At the same time, we gained experience in managing a civilian administration. Our skills in the diplomatic arena are also growing. As such, we feel that the responsibility that we carry for our people is growing as well. Without question, our world view, our vision has expanded. The same applies to the new generation in Rojava. They are more open to the world. They are well-versed in new technology. They are able to keep track of things. Like youth elsewhere in the world, they want freedom and a prosperous and stable life. Should Turkey enter a constructive dialogue with us, I am sure that their views on Turkey will be positively impacted as well.
Al-Monitor: You have become far more occupied by politics than military matters of late. Might we see you one day as a full-time Syrian politician?
Kobane: As you know, politics and military affairs are intertwined here. And I am running both at the moment. If we achieve progress in our political work, I will devote most of my time to politics.
Today’s topic of International Action Week for Kobane is Women’s Liberation! We want to bring to light the achievements of the women’s revolution in Rojava and remind everyone why we say “No to occupation! No to genocide We defend women and life!”.
Women in Rojava have organized on all levels – communal, economical, institutional, militarily and so many more. Through autonomous organizing, women have created systems meant for the freedom and liberation of everyone. Women’s structures means diversity. Here are some examples:
Within the field of education, the women’s revolution in Kurdistan developed Jineolojî. The science of women. A revolutionary approach to the nature of women, women’s history and sociology, politics, defense, health, ecology, demography, and so on.
In the field of military and self-defense, Rojava is partly protected by the all-women forces called the YPJ, the Women’s Protection Units. Women are also included in many other forces under the SDF such as Asayiş, HPC, Syriac forces, and more.
Mala Jin “Women’s House” is a community institution under the Women’s Justice Committee. Their role is to support women in solving the problems that affect them in their daily lives and to take part through the Consensus Committees in the management of gender-based conflicts.
On the political level, women in Rojava have established a co-chair system where women have political equality. Women represent themselves in every single political institution and participate in all political decision-making, ensuring justice and diversity within that structure.
Jinwar, also known as the Free Women’s Village, is an ecological women’s village in Rojava. A peaceful place for the co-existence and self-sustainability of women, free of any and all violence where women have the opportunity to provide for their own basic needs.
️These are the achievements of the Women’s revolution that we need to rise up to protect. From the heart of the revolution in Rojava – to all of Kurdistan – to the whole world – we encourage everyone to join us and say: “No to occupation! No to genocide! We will defend women and life!”
Afrin: 116 Persons Arrested and Disappeared in September 2020, despite UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria’s Demands for Halting Violations
The arrests were chiefly carried out by the Military Police Service, the Sham Legion, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, al-Jabha al-Shamiya, al-Waqqas Brigade, Northern Democratic Brigade, Sultan Murad Division, 113th Division, and 114th Division
A photo shared to social media by the Ahrar al-Sharqiya/Free men of the East group of the SNA -operates under the opposition’ Syrian Interim Government – shows a recruited child among the group’s fighters participating in Turkey’s Olive Branch military operations.
In September 2020, arbitrary arrests/detentions and enforced disappearances spiked dramatically in the Syrian Kurdish-majority region of Afrin, slamming the demands of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, aka UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, to cease violations. In mid-September, the commission laid down several recommendations, including the immediate cessation of all forms of incommunicado detention and release of all persons arbitrarily detained, calling Turkey to exert more efforts to ensure public order and safety in the areas under its control to prevent such violations by the Syrian National Army (SNA). These recommendations were made on the heels of the commission’s latest report, in which it documented that members of the SNA have committed hostage taking, cruel treatment, torture and rape in Afrin and surrounding areas.[1]
In this report, Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ), through its network of field researchers that operate across Afrin region, documents the arrest/detention and disappearance of no fewer than 116 persons, including 5 woman and a teenage girl, in September 2020. The reported figures indicate a marked increase compared to the arrests documented in earlier months, as 40 in June,[2] and 101 in July and August 2020.[3]
Furthermore, STJ managed to document the release of 56 persons, detained in September, including two women. In exchange for their release, the detainees and/or their families paid fines/bails of varying sums, either in Turkish Lira (TL) or in Syrian Pound (SYP), STJ’s field researcher reported, adding that the fate of 60 persons, a teenage girl and four women included, was still unknown at the end of the reporting time, on 15 October 2020.
Carried out in seven districts, the arrests were perpetrated by the SNA-affiliated Military Police Service, along with other armed groups— namely, Sham Legion/Failaq al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sharqiya/ Free Men of the East, al-Jabha al-Shamiya/Levant Front, al-Waqqas Brigade, Northern Democratic Brigade, Sultan Murad Division, 113th Division, and 114th Division.
It is noteworthy that the reported arrests were basically documented by STJ’s field researchers, who are based in the target districts, in addition to local sources, family members or relatives of the detainees, as well as inside sources affiliated with the opposition armed groups, who reported or commented on a number of arrest incidents.
It is also important to mention that a commander of the Military Police has in a former testimony reported to STJ that Turkey ordered opposition armed groups, positioned in Afrin, “not to harass or arrest civilians”, as it tasked the Military Police with carrying out arrests/detentions. However, against the Turkish government’s instructions, several armed groups appear to continue perpetrating arbitrary arrests, while detaining dozens of persons without disclosing their whereabouts or bringing them before the courts operating in the region.
Arrests Carried out at Different Intervals in September
From inside sources, affiliated to armed groups, STJ obtained information that indicates the arrest of six persons in September 2020, perpetrated mainly by SNA armed groups. However, the detention facilities, and/or the number of people from Afrin who got arrested outside the region, were not exactly identified. One detainee was released, but the fate of the other five continues to be unknown, STJ’s field researcher reported, adding that no contact could be established with any of the disappeared detainees’ families. The reported arrests were carried out thus:
On 3 September, Ahmad Ali Omar and Muhammad Hassan were arrested by an armed group operating under the command of Abu Juma’a al-Farouk, an affiliate of the 2nd Battalion of the SNA’s 1st Legion. The reasons for the arrest were unknown.
On 5 September, Jabal Hassan Dairo was also arrested by the armed group operating under the command of Abu Juma’a al-Farouk.
On 9 September, Issam al-Bakrow was arrested by members of the Military Police in Termanin town, near Azaz. Al-Bakrow was arrested for reasons related to the corruption charges laid against the head of the local council in Jindires district.
On 20 September, Rashid Hussain Baker, 42, disappeared. Baker is a merchant from the Qrmitlq village, in Shaykh al-Hadid district, a local source reported, adding that he went missing after passing a checkpoint of the Suleiman Shah Brigade/al-Amshat while on his way back from Azaz city.
On 29 September, Ahmad Omar Krinbeh was arrested by members of the Military Police for insulting the Police’s personnel. He was released on the same day.
Arrests in Afrin District
In the district of Afrin, seven persons were arrested in September. The fate of all the detainees is still unknown. The arrests took place thus:
On 1 September, the Military Police arrested Basel Muhammad, 30, who is a resident of the al-Ashrafieh neighborhood. He was still detained at the time of reporting.
On 17 September, a patrol of the Military Police arrested Hussain Sheihko. He was still detained at the time of reporting.
On 19 September, members of Ahrar al-Sharqiya arrested the brothers Idris Hajji, 33, and Nabi Hajji, 34, on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration and performing the mandatory duty of self-defense, when the latter was in control of the area. The fate of the two detainees is still unknown.
On 20 September, Jankeen Osman was arrested at a Civil Police checkpoint, set up at the entrance to Afrin city. Osman was transferred to one of the Military Police’s centers in the city, as he was charged for dealing with the Autonomous Administration. Commenting on the arrest, a source close to the detainee said that he was arrested for “not paying due taxes,” imposed by the armed groups on the area’s indigenous population.
On 21 September, members of the Military Police arrested Muhammad Hajji Hussain at the center of Afrin city on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration in the past a few years.
On 21 September, Zainap, the wife of Khalil Attar, was arrested by members of the al-Jabha al-Shamiya/Levant Front. She was arrested in the al-Ashrafieh neighborhood, Afrin city.
Arrests in Jindires District
In the district of Jindires, the Military Police arrested 22 persons, including three women. While 10 detainees, one women included, were released, the fate of the remaining others continues to be unknown. The arrests took place thus:
On 3 September, a patrol of the Military Police arrested a number of people in the center of Jindires district. They are all linked to the head of the district’s local council, Subhi Rizq, who himself was arrested on 9 September. On this note, a source informed of the bill of indictment said that Rizq was arrested on several charges, including dealing with the Autonomous Administration, receiving funds from it, and being involved in planning some of the blasts that shock the area, in addition to corruption and embezzlement.
On 9 September, Dilkash Hamou, the owner of a money exchange office, and his brother Jameel Hamou, were arrested on the charge of transferring money to the Haftaro for Money Transfer Company, also implicated in the corruption charges laid against of the head of the Jindires local council.
On the same day, the media officer of the Jindires local council was arrested, with a number of his relatives. The officer is from Junaid family, and his arrested relatives are Mustafa Rizqi, Muhammad Rizqi, Hannan, the wife of Muhammad Rizqi, and Muhammad Hannou, owner of an Internet Café. They were all released a few hours later.
On the same day, the brothers Rushdi and Shadi Khoursheed, the owners of a money exchange office, were arrested on charges related to the corruption case. They were released two days later.
On the same day, Muhammad Baker was arrested on the charge of performing guard services on behalf of the Autonomous Administration when it was in control of the area. He was still detained at the time of reporting.
On the same day, Khadija Siri, a pharmacist, was arrested on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration by members of the Military Police, which for its part, denied the arrest and stated that the woman was a victim of ransom kidnapping. Her fate continues to be unknown.
On 17 September, members of the Military Police arrested Muhammad Bazo, officer of the Healthcare Department at the Jindires local council, also for reasons related to the above-mentioned corruption case. Bazo was still detained at the time of reporting.
On 17 September, a resident of the Yalanqo village reported that a patrol of the Military Police arrested and deposited Murad Hajji Rashid Agha in the Jindires Prison, charging him and his family for dealing with the Autonomous Administration. Furthermore, the patrol confiscated several vehicles he had, a motorbike, a car and a tractor. Agha was released on 26 September after paying a fine, but he was not given the vehicles back.
Commenting on the incident, a source affiliated with the Military Police stated that Murad Rashid Agha was kidnapped by unidentified persons and his fate is still unknown.
On 19 September, a resident of the Kora village reported that a patrol of the Military Police arrested a woman and two men on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration. They are Rashid Khoursheed, 32, Daydar Khoursheed, 34, and Aufa Sido, a resident of al-Mahmoudiyah neighborhood, Afrin city. Sido was arrested while on a visit to her son. The fate of the three detainees is still unknown.
Commenting on the arrest of Aufa Sido, a source affiliated with the Military police said that she was kidnapped by unidentified persons and the police has no further information on the incident.
On 30 September, a patrol of the Military Police arrested two men in the center of Jindires district. They are Hussain Za’azou, 33, from the al-Hamam village, administratively affiliated to Jindires district, and Ziyad Mahroum, 39, from Ḩājj Iskandar village and the owner of household utensils and electronic devices store in the city of Jidires. Both men were arrested on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration and are still detained by the Military Police.
STJ also verified an arrest incident in Celemê village on 27 August, which was not added to the August arrest lists. In this regard, a local of the village reported that the Civil Police arrested Muhammad Hassan Zouri, Ali Hassan Zouri, Kanjo Subhi Kanjo and Fahed Ali. They were all transferred to the police center in Jindires district and were released in September after they paid a fine of 1000 to 2000 TL each.
Arrests in Shaykh al-Hadid District
In the district of Shaykh al-Hadid, six persons were arrested, while four were released, the fate of the other two continues to be unknown. The arrests were carried out by Ahrar al-Sharqiya, al-Waqqas Brigade, and the Military Police.
On 1 September, members of the Ahrar al-Sharqiya arrested Qazikli Jameel Hamou, 23, a resident of Jindires city, in Ĥêkiçê village, his birthplace. He was arrested on the charge of performing the duty of self-defense when the Autonomous Administration was in control of the area. His fate is still unknown.
On 9 September, members of the al-Waqqas Brigade arrested Muhammad Sabri, Fawzi Sabri, and Hassan Sabri in Ĥêkiçê village on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration. They were released after paying a fine.
On 21 September, members of the al-Waqqas Brigade arrested Abdulrahamn Nizameddin Sheikh Mustafa, 23, on the charge of performing the duty of self-defense. He was released on 27 September after paying a fine of 150.000 SYP.
On 20 September, the Military Police arrested Mustafa Baker Klouteh, 53, in the Shkouta village, a resident of the village reported, adding that he was arrested on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration. Klouteh was transferred to the police center in Afrin city, where he is still detained.
On 22 September, members of the al-Waqqas Brigade arrested Ammar Hassan Adham and Khamiss bin Hamdan al-Saloum in the Ĥêkiçê village, Shaykh al-Hadid district.
On 24 September, both Muhammad Rashid Jameel Habash, 18, and Muhammad Jameel Habash disappeared in the center of Shaykh al-Hadid district. They were kidnapped by unidentified persons, a local source said, adding that no further information was reported on the incident.
Arrests in Raju District
In the district of Raju, 11 persons, including a teenage girl, were arrested. Five were released, while the fate of the teenage girl and the other five continues to be unknown. The arrests were carried out by the military and the civil police, as well as the Ahrar al-Sharqiya. The arrests were carried out thus:
On 1 September, a patrol of the Military Police arrested Nazmi Rashid Akash, born in the Musakou village, from his home in Afrin city, on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration. At the time of reporting, Akash was still detained.
On 2 September, STJ’s field researcher reported that a patrol of the Civil Police arrested Mustafa Rashid Zalfou in the Be’dino village and transferred him to the Police center in Raju district. Zalfou’s fate is still unknown. Commenting on the arrest incident, a source affiliated with the Military Police stated that the man was kidnapped on 8 September—that is, six days after he was arrested. It appears that the detainee was kidnapped after he was released.
On 7 September, a source affiliated with the Military Police stated that members of the Sham Legion/Failaq al-Sham arrested Rashid Fawzi Tobal in the Bilêlko village, who was not handed over to the Military Police. Commenting on this, a resident of the village reported that the detainee was released 10 days later after he paid a sum of money.
On 7 September, members of the Ahrar al-Sharqiya arrested Ali Jamil Muhammad Rashkilo in the village of Hajj Khalil. His fate is still unknown.
On 9 September, a patrol of the Free Police arrested Akid Sheikho and Jalal Muhammad Sheikho in the Qasim village on the charge of performing the duty of self-defense when the Autonomous Administration was in control of the area. They were transferred to the Police center in Raju district to be brought before the court.
On 10 September, members of the Ahrar al-Sharqiya, along with a patrol of the Civil Police arrested Maraym Afdik Sheikho, 17, on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration. The teenage girl was detained by the armed group till 5 October 2020, a source affiliated with the Military Police stated.
On 6 September, a patrol of the Military Police arrested Msalam Baker Mousa, 78, Sheihkmous Mustafa Khalil, 50, Raiber Ibrahim Khalil Dawood, 31, and Mahmoud Khalil, 25, in the Koso village on the charge of receiving aid from the Autonomous Administration. They were all released, however, at intervals.
On 16 September, members of Sultan Murad Division arrested Murad Abdulrahamn Rashid in the Qasim village. On the same day, Murad Khalil Murad, born in the Yalanqoze village, Jindires district, was kidnapped.
Commenting on the incident, a local source said that the kidnapping was perpetrated by unidentified persons and no further information was reported on the matter.
Arrests in Maabatli/Mabeta District
In the district of Maabatli, 41 persons were arrested, mainly by the Military Police, Northern Democratic Brigade, and the al-Jabha al-Shamiya/Levant Front. Having paid fines, 32 persons, including a woman, were released. The fate of the other nine, including a woman, is still unknown. The arrests were carried out thus:
On 21 September, the Military Police arrested Aref Qazikli Hamou, Nashaat Khalil Hannan, As’ad Ibrahim Murad, Muhammad Ibrahim Murad and Muhammad Khalil Hannan in the Brîmce village on the charge of “not paying due taxes”. They were all released on the same day, after paying a fine of 800 TL each, an official of the Military Police reported.
On 15 September, the Military Police, an inside source reported, arrested Khalil Muhammad Osman, Walid Mustafa Mousa, Faek Sabri Mousa, Muhammad Hannan Mousa and Mustafa Muhammad Sido on the charges of “unlawful possession of weapons and for carrying out unlicensed night guard services”. They were offered a settlement, whereby they could pay a fine of 500 TL or serve three months in prison. Ultimately, the five detainees were released, however, at intervals.
On 6 September, the Military Police arrested seven local council employees in Maabatli district on the charges of dealing with the Autonomous Administration and receiving funds from it. The detainees are Rashid Murad Qasim, 43, Toulin Rashid, Midya Ibrahim Khanjar, 22, Muhammad Mannan, 40, Jalal Hussain Qrouky, 55, Farhad Shafi’ Bilal, 50, and Mustafa Hameed Mamesh. They were all transferred to the detention center of the Military Police.
Midya Ibrahim and Mustafa Hameed Mamesh were released after they paid a 1000 TL each, a source affiliated with the Military Police said, adding that the other five detainees are still held by the Military Police.
On 11 September, members of the Military Police arrested three persons on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration. The detainees are Ibrahim Khanjar, Issmat Khouja and Ahmad Meshko. They were all released a few hours later after paying fines.
On 13 September, the Military Police arrested four other local council employees. They are Izat Hameed Muhammad, a local of Kamiran village and the deputy director of the Directorate of Education in the district, Shukri Hassan Humoutto, an employee at the Directorate of Transportation, Imad Hussain Khanjar and Ibrahim Sidki, an employee at the district’s municipality. Only Izat Hameed Muhammad was released. The fate of the other three detainees, however, is still unknown.
On 15 September, members of the Military Police arrested Ahmad Kousa, Muhammad Sido, Abdo Abass, Najemeddin Battal, Aref Kaku, As’ad Khalil, Issmat Na’sou and Muhammad Basheer Ibrahim in the Braimjeh village, Maabatli district, on the charges of “unlawful possession of weapons and for carrying out unlicensed night guard services”. They were offered a settlement, whereby they could pay a fine of 500 TL or serve three months in prison.
On 21 September, a patrol of the Military Police arrested Muhammad Hajji Hassan, 35, on the charge of working for the Autonomous Administration. Hassan was deposited at the Maabatli Central Prison where he is still detained.
On 25 and 26 September, unknown persons kidnapped Muhammad Hameed Zaino, 70, and his sons Kamal, 40, Walid, 35, and Abdo, 34, in the Shiteka village, Maabatli district. The kidnappers released the captives after a ransom of 1.600.000 SYP was paid for the entire family.
On 27 September, al-Jabha al-Shamiya/Levant Front arrested four persons in Maabatli district’s center on charges of carrying out guard services for the Autonomous Administration while it was in control of the area. They are Farhan Qalandar, Shukri Jojo, Hanan Baker, and Ali Kelo. They were released two days later, after paying varying sums of money. Commenting on the incident, a source of the Military Police reported that the four were actually kidnapped, and the police obtained no further information in their regard.
On 30 September, a patrol of the Military Police embarked on a large-scale arrest drive, capturing persons for allegedly performing the night guard service, which the Autonomous Administration mandated when it was in control of the area. The arrested persons are Luqman Azab Sha’abo, 50, Subhi Ali Mamesh, 60, Walat Muhammad Oskilo, 61, Aref Rashid Qarbouz, 75, Muhammad Rashid Qarbouz, 80, Sidki Mustafa Hambasho, 51, Muhammad Ali Yousef, 54, Ali Hassan Yousef, 57, and Adnan Muhammad Ali, 60.
According to a source affiliated with the Military Police, they were arrested on the charge of “unlawful possession of weapons” and released after they paid a bail of 600 TL each.
On 16 September, members of the Northern Democratic Brigade arrested Adham Hamou, Basil Abdulrahman Mustafa, and Muhammad Rasoul Mustafa in Kobke village on the charges of dealing with the Autonomous Administration and performing night guard services. They were deposited at a private detention facility, run exclusively by the armed group, and were not brought before the court. However, they were released after paying a fine of 300 TL each.
Arrests in Sharran District
In the district of Sharran, STJ documented two arrests in September, carried out by the military and the civil police. None of the detainees was released so far.
In early September, a patrol of the Military Police arrested Muhammad Nabi, 31, in the Dayr Şawwān village, on the charge of performing the duty of self-defense when the Autonomous Administration was in control of the area. He was transferred to the police center in Sharran district to be brought before the court.
On 20 September, Jamil Osman was arrested in the Kafr Janneh village at a checkpoint of the Civil Police, set up ate the entrance to Afrin city, on the side of Azaz, on the charge of performing the duty of self-defense when the Autonomous Administration was in control of the area. He was transferred to the Maratah Central Prison, where he is still detained.
Arrests in Bulbul District
In the district of Bulbul, the Civil Police arrested and transferred three persons to the police center in the district. Their fate is still unknown. The Sham Legion/Failaq al-Sham took part in the arrests, a source affiliated with the Military Police reported to STJ, adding that the detainees were not handed over to the Military Police.
On 21 September, a patrol of the Civil Police arrested Muhammad Mustafa Sheikh Hassan in Dodo village on the charge of dealing with the Autonomous Administration, and headed next to the Qaza Midono village, where it arrested Sha’ban Hameed Sheikho, and then moved to the Gewenda village, where it arrested the third person, Muhammad Sheikho Hassan.
[1] “UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria: No clean hands – behind the frontlines and the headlines, armed actors continue to subject civilians to horrific and increasingly targeted abuse”, OHCHR, 15 September 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=26237&LangID=E (last visit: 23 October 2020), paras. 52-58.
The sixth symposium featured bold interventions and criticism of the Self- Administration institutions
In the second dialogue symposium in Raqqa and the sixth at the level of north and east Syria, within a series of seminars held by the Syrian Democratic Council, it was witnessed a lot of criticism about the performance of the Self- Administration institutions and those in charge of them, in a step through which the Syrian Democratic Council seeks to develop self-administration and enhance community participation within the administration structure.
Participants doubt the usefulness of these seminars
The invitation directed by the Syrian Democratic Council to societal and political activities, sheikhs and dignitaries of Arab and Kurdish tribes and intellectuals; raised doubts among the former elites and the participation in the symposium about the usefulness and seriousness of SDC and the Self- Administration in the transformation that they are about to take at political and administrative levels.
In light of this, “Ilham Ahmed”, the president of the executive committee of the Syrian Democratic Council, said that they are in SDC and the Self- Administration are in the process of developing the Self- Administration and enhancing community participation within the administration structure and its institutions. Therefore, we need all opinions, proposals and criticisms and they will be as recommendations for the conference of the people of al-Jazeera and al-Forat that will produce committees to follow up on these recommendations and implement them on the ground in accordance with a clear roadmap.
The administration’s need for expertise and technocrats
Among the interventions that have been repeated is the need of the Self- Administration for expertise and competencies and providing it with technocrats with specialization and professions, and to move away from favoritism and quota system, which has proven unsuccessful in the experiences of neighboring countries.
Laila Mustafa, the co-chair of the Civil Administration in Raqqa, added that Self-Administration is not an ideal situation and we are working to avoid mistakes and choose the right person, adding that the doors of the Self-Administration are always open to all experiences, competencies and certificates, and certainly your proposals for a mechanism to choose the right person in the right place will be presented in the conference and their implementation is going to be followed up.
The duality of poverty and corruption and the standard of transparency in the administration
The participants’ interventions intersected about the spread of corruption cases in the body of the Self- Administration, pointing to specific cases issued by some persons in the Self- Administration using their position to gain personal interests and others working to waste public money.
This was recorded by the office of the seminar to be investigated and submitted to the monitoring body, which was recently created for this purpose, and those who misuse the position and responsibility will be held accountable.
One of the participants pointed out the lack of transparency in the joints of the Self- Administration of north and east Syria and that the resources and revenues of the Self-Administration, as well as the budget and disbursements of the administration are not exposed, and all of this, is done from one person to another in the absence of real institutions.
Al-Mahbash clarified the details of the financial administration, its resources and local sources of funding, as well as the number of its employees, the figures of disbursements, the cost of infrastructure restoration and construction projects. He added that the administration deals with complete transparency in regard to financial aspect and the budget was exposed to media.
In addition to observations and criticism directed to service, educational, security and health side, in which proposals and recommendations were made by the organizers of the symposium in order to be presented at the National Conference for the People of al-Jazeera and al-Forat.
The Syrian Democratic Council continues to follow up holding its seminars with societal, political and cultural activities, as six seminars have been held so far, and others are scheduled to be held in the regions of north and east Syria to come up with recommendations and proposals that contribute to strengthening the participation in the Self- Administration and preparing for a new phase.
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Ilham Ahmed: We Seek to Make the Self- Administration an Effective Experiment And a Model to Be Followed in Syria
“It is a mistake to claim that all political and social activities and formations in north and east regions of Syria participate in the Self- Administration, at a time when we seek to involve them and expand the administration to include everyone and be a model for the new Syria.” Thus, “Ilham Ahmed”, the president of the executive committee of the Syrian Democratic Council, opened her speech at the fifth seminar, held by SDC in north and east regions of the country.
“Ahmed” stated that the reason for the Syrian Democratic Council’s intention to hold dialogue seminars in the regions of north and east Syria; is to give space for events that have not yet participated, to express their opinion, direct criticism to the administration’s performance, submit proposals and recommendations in order to develop them, as well as supplement the Syrian-Syrian dialogue path with opinions and proposals that would contribute to crystallizing the political process in the country.
The Self-Administration is an objective necessity
Abed Hamed Al-Mahbash, the co-chair of the Executive Council in the Self- Administration, spoke about the objective reasons that prompted the people of north and east Syria to organize themselves and manage their affairs, as he attributed this to the withdrawal of the regime’s authorities from the regions of north and east Syria and their evacuation in order to preserve the authority of the center, that followed a state of discrimination for the regions of north and east Syria.
The Self-Administration is a societal and necessary need and an advanced model in the Syrian case, adding that despite this, we seek to develop the administration and involve those outside it so far.
He added that there are local parties such as the Syrian government and regional bodies such as the Turkish state and Iran, and the Syrian opposition parties that are affiliated with Turkey, seeking to destabilize and spread discord among the components of the region in order to weaken the administration and distorting it by inciting the Syrian public opinion. But according to Al-Mahbash, the Self-Administration, in spite of shortcomings remains the best model of administration on the Syrian geography so far
. Serious steps to develop the Self-Administration
The participants presented the fifth symposium in Raqqa, as they did in the rest of the previous seminars; lot of criticism about the performance of the administration and its institutions in north and east Syria, both in terms of service and providing facilities to citizens, and this aspect received a lot of interventions by the participants, as well as the educational aspect and teaching curricula adopted by the Self- Administration, received notes and criticism on its content and its observance of the composition of society and also in the security aspect and the rights of individuals in the administrative areas.
For his part, the Vice President of the Executive Committee of SDC “Hikmat Habib” stressed the importance of these observations and recommendations that will enrich the administration, provide it with expertise and contribute to the participation of technocrats in the Administration structure and its institutions.
Habib added that the Self- Administration is not an ideal situation, and the surrounding circumstances together contribute to the delay of its progress and development, in addition to the huge amount of deliberate distortion by media institutions linked to the parties that seek to thwart the administration and bring it down. He indicated that there are activities and personalities who adopt gray attitudes towards the administration as a result of their insufficient knowledge of the functioning of its work and the difficulties it faces, adding that these seminars aim to address everyone in order to involve them at the political and administrative level.
Corruption and transparency in the Administration
The participants’ interventions focused on cases of corruption in the Self- Administration and its institutions, which limits prosperity and actual development in society and obstruct the wheel of construction, which is considered the most important part of the emerging administration.
In his response and clarification to the opinions of the participants on the co-chair of the Executive Council in the Self- Administration, “Abed Hamed Al-Mahbash,” he said: “There is no doubt that the administration is working, through strict oversight agencies, to eliminate all forms of corruption and to hold accountable“ climbers ”and opportunists”.
Adding that the process of eliminating corruption and the corrupt people will continue, and there will be no complacency in dealing with everyone who seeks to waste public money and misuse of responsibility.
Regarding the sources of the self- Administration, Al-Mahbash mentioned in numbers the administration’s expenditures on service projects and restoration of crumbling infrastructure in the regions of north and east Syria, and that the budget of the Self- Administration was presented to the media and it was not hidden from anyone, the source of the administration’s funding and revenues.
The South Kurdistan’s ruling party KDP is reinforcing its troops on the border to Rojava. Military positions are being established and heavy weapons are being stationed at the Sêmalka border crossing.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Saturday, 19 Sep 2020, 14:17
ANHA reports that South Kurdistan’s ruling KDP government, which collaborates closely with Turkey, has begun to station heavy weapons on the slopes at Peşxabûr across the Sêmalka border crossing to Rojava/Northern Syria and is setting up new control and support bases. The KDP’s military deployment at the border raises concerns about a possible joint attack by Turkey and the KDP on Rojava. At the moment, however, it appears that the militarization of the border region serves primarily to place the region again under an embargo in coordination with Turkey.
As early as 2014, the KDP had deep trenches dug on the inner-Kurdish border between Syria and Iraq and imposed a sharp embargo on the self-governing areas. In this way the KDP, together with Turkey, provided de facto support to ISIS. At the time, the population protested vehemently against the embargo and thousands fought in actions of civil disobedience to fill in the trenches again. The KDP’s Peshmerga forces then opened fire on the people and shot 32-year-old Mevlit Hadji Yunis in the night of April 14-15 when he tried to cross the border at Sêmalka to South Kurdistan. Many people were injured by shots during the protests at that time.
The cordoning off by the KDP was coordinated with Turkey, which also dug trenches on the border to Northern Kurdistan. Afterwards, a meter-high wall, hundreds of kilometers long, was built to separate Northern Kurdistan from Rojava. The armament of the border from Rojava to South Kurdistan reminds many of the coordinated action between KDP and Turkey in 2014 and raises the question of a new invasion.
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UN say war crimes carried out in Afrin and Serêkaniyê
The UN Syrian Commission of Inquiry said that the FSA carries out war crimes under Turkish control, including abductions, disappearances, gender-based violence in Afrin and Serêkaniyê.
ANF
GENEVA
16 SEPTEMBER 2020
The UN Syrian Commission of Inquiry released a 25-page report in which it documents continuing violations and abuses by nearly every conflict actor controlling territory in Syria.
The report also highlights an increase in patterns of targeted abuses such as assassinations, sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls, and looting or appropriation of private property, with sectarian undertones. Civilian suffering is a constant and personal feature of this crisis.
In Afrin and surrounding area, the report documents how the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army may have committed the war crimes of hostage-taking, cruel treatment and torture, and rape. In the same region scores of civilians were killed and maimed by large improvised explosive devices, as well as during shelling and rocket attacks.
In particular the report said: “Since 2019, Kurdish women throughout the Afrin and Ra’s al-Ayn [Serêkaniyê] regions have faced acts of intimidation by Syrian National Army brigade members, engendering a pervasive climate of fear which in effect confined them to their homes. Women and girls have also been detained by Syrian National Army fighters, and subjected to rape and sexual violence – causing severe physical and psychological harm at the individual level, as well as at the community level, owing to stigma and cultural norms related to ideations of “female honour”. During the period under review, cases of sexual violence against women and men at one detention facility in Afrin were documented.
The Commission also received reports of forced marriage and the abduction of Kurdish women in Afrin and Ra’s al-Ayn [Serêkaniyê], which primarily involved members of Division 24 (the Sultan Murad Brigade) of the Syrian National Army.”
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Female YPJ fighter in Syria allegedly murdered by relatives in ‘honor’ killing
Female fighters of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) played a significant role in the fight against the Islamic State. (Photo: Reuters)
ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) on Monday reported that a member of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) was killed by her brother in the Syrian town of Darbasiyyah, located near the Turkish border.
One source claimed that her brother said he killed her because she “brought shame and dishonour upon the family.”
In the region, there is a history of men being accused of killing women or girls perceived to have brought shame to a family or tribe being given token sentences, or in other cases, escaping justice entirely.
Even though such acts are technically illegal in Syria, Iraq, and other nearby countries, their prosecution, in practice, is sometimes dealt with as a “family” matter and kept out of the courts.
In other cases, the murders are made to look like suicides.
A source from Kongra-Star in Darbasiyyah, a confederation of women’s organizations, told Kurdistan 24 that the woman was known as Beritan, had lived with her family in the town until she told them she had joined the YPJ. According to the source, her father and step-siblings were not pleased with her decision. After her two stepbrothers tried to force her to go with them to go to Hasakah instead and she refused, one of them allegedly shot and killed her.
The source added that the family members are ethnic Arabs, remarking, “As you know, joining YPJ is not something uncommon among the Arab community.”
An official Kongra-Star statement read, “Violence against women is one of the most common violations of human rights, but most of these violations are not reported because of the absence of penalty.”
“We, as women’s movement, call on all the women, civil rights institutions and the civic society institutions to take a rapid initiative to stop these crimes and not to be slow in holding the criminal accountable and applying the heaviest penalty so we can see that justice is done.”
Thomas McClure, a Syria-based researcher at the Rojava Information Center, told Kurdistan 24 that the YPJ, established in 2013, is known the world over for their efforts to establish a new form of autonomous, female-led democracy in northeastern Syria.
“But this week’s honor killing underscores a reality many miss – that many parts of society in NES (Northeast Syria) remain deeply patriarchal, conservative and religious,” he said.
“Northeast Syria’s population is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim – both Kurds and Arabs. Though ISIS have been defeated and driven out of their strongholds in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, ISIS’ mentality and sleeper-cells still enjoy strong support in these regions,” he continued, “while Turkish-controlled groups continue to abuse, abduct and murder women and in some instances impose sharia law in regions under their occupation.”
Moreover, he added that, although the local Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) promotes and enshrines women’s rights into their laws, females living in areas under their control “continue to face major violence and oppression in the family home.”
“Bodies like Mala Jin (Women’s House) and the women’s movement Kongra-Star work tirelessly to provide routes for women to escape abusive or dangerous situations, while YPJ, too, has provided a route for thousands of women to leave the family home and achieve newfound autonomy,” said McClure. “But profound entrenched misogyny is not changed overnight, and this latest honor killing underscores how much work remains to be done in Northeast Syria.”
On Aug. 21, Kongra-Star and other women’s rights institutions westward in the city of Kobani also started a campaign entitled “She did not commit suicide, you killed her,” reported the Hawar News Agency. The campaign was launched after an increase in murders of females there, plus other deaths that were officially ruled suicide, but where so-called honor killing is strongly suspected.
Editing by John J. Catherine
UpdatedSeptember 03-2020
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Afrin women call to act against violence
The Afrin Region Young Women’s Union made a statement regarding the violence and oppression against women.
ANF
SHEHBA
Sunday, 30 Aug 2020, 07:49
Dozens of women gathered in Serdem Camp in the Shehba canton carrying Young Women’s Union flags, photographs of Kurdish people’s leader Abdullah Öcalan and banners saying ‘The young woman revolt is revenge’.
The statement was read in Arabic by Gulê Cimo, co-chair of the Afrin Region Youth and Sports Committee, who said: “Women have fought for the sake of society in all areas of life throughout history. Tens of women activists and feminist movements have chosen resistance. Women, who have imposed many things on the state and international societies with their struggles, have increased the resistance.”
The statement underlined: “As the struggle of women increases, the hatred of the male mentality that dominates the world politically and militarily also increased.”
The statement added: “This mentality has used women for their own interests through power, the state and the economy. Violence has increased all over the world and can no longer be hidden.” During the coronavirus pandemic, said the statement, “direct and indirect violence, murder, rape, suicide, kidnapping and migration have increased. Afrin has witnessed first hand all these crimes. Here these crimes against women are being committed by the AKP-affiliated mercenaries.”
The statement also reminded that “suicide and murder incidents in the regions of North and East Syria have increased and so did our organizational responsibilities, our resistance and our struggle against this dirty mentality.”
The women of Afrin “call on the international community, human rights organizations, feminist movements to take action against the crimes committed. Because only a few agreements, laws and articles are not enough to save women from their suffering.”
Three-stage plan for the Turkification of North-East Syria
The Turkish state is pursuing a three-stage plan in northern and eastern Syria. First the Kurdish population is displaced, then the region is Arabized and finally Turkified.
ERSİN ÇAKSU
QAMISHLO
Thursday, 13 Aug 2020, 15:48
The Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (AKP) could not have put it more clearly during his visit to Lebanon: “Anyone who says of himself ‘I am a Turk’ or ‘I am Turkmen’ is granted Turkish citizenship. The AKP politician thus named one of the core principles of Turkey’s Middle East policy. Not long ago, the “Muslim Brotherhood” was used as an argument for the Turkish state’s interventionism in Syria. But this slogan changed into a policy of Turkishness when it was put into practice. The best example of this is the development of the Turkish strategy for Syria. In the occupied territories from Idlib to Afrin, Jarablus, Bab, Girê Spî (Tal Abyad) and Serêkaniyê (Ras al-Ain), the AKP/MHP regime is pursuing a massive policy of Turkification.
Steps of the Turkification process
Turkification is taking place step by step. For example, the names of territories are being Turkified, Turkish post offices are being set up, district governors and administrative staff are being appointed, the Turkish lira is being made compulsory and faculties affiliated to Turkish universities are being opened. Agents of Turkification are so-called “Turkmen” militias such as the Sultan Murad Brigade, the Sultan Süleyman Shah Brigade, the Sultan Mehmed Fatih Brigade, the Muntasir Billallah Brigade and the Samarkand Brigade.
A plan of MIT and the Ministry of the Interior
The establishment of a “Turkmen crescent” in northern Syria and the annexation of the region are not new projects. The Turkish secret service MIT and the Ministry of the Interior have been working on the implementation of such a plan since 2018. The first mainstay is the people who have fled to Turkey from various parts of Syria and are being kept away from the EU there. The second mainstay is the people who have migrated to Turkey from so-called “Turk states”. The Turkish secret service and the migration office of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior are working closely together to settle the refugees from Syria in northern Syria.
Dekurdification of Rojava is the goal
For this reason, the Turkish migration authority declared refugees from many regions of Syria to be people from Northern Syria. For this reason, the identity cards for a temporary stay of people in the refugee camps in Turkey often state Dêrik, Qamişlo, Dirbesiyê, Amûdê, Serêkaniyê, Til Hemîs, Til Temir, Girê Spî and Kobanê as the place of origin, although the families come from completely different regions.
People are transported to Syria from “Turkic countries”
The second pillar of the plan is the settlement of people from so-called “Turkic countries”. According to the plan, people from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Turkestan, Tajikistan from the Caucasus and Central Asia, such as Uighurs, are settled in Northern Syria.
Dekurdification is followed by the expulsion of the Arab population
Now the Turkish state is trying to reap the fruits of its policy of demographic change in northern Syria. The declaration of Çavuşoğlu to make everyone who calls himself “Turk or Turkmen” a Turkish citizen on the “order of our Republic’s President” shows which steps will follow. The Turkish state plans to both dekurdify and de-Arabicize Northeast Syria and wants to annex the region as in the past Iskenderun.
Similar policy in Iraq
Even if this policy in Iraq has not reached the same extent as in Syria, Turkey has been trying to implement a similar policy since the US invasion in 2003, especially in the Kirkuk and Mosul regions and in Southern Kurdistan. After the invasion, the Turkish state distributed money to people who registered as “Turkmen”. Turkey argued that under Saddam, Turkmen have been Kurdified (!) and Arabized so Turkey advocated that the number of Turkmen should be as large as it was before. Because of the economic advantages, many Arabs and Kurds were registered as “Turkmen” during this period.
Erdoğan: “Will not leave”
Today, the same policy is to be implemented in Northern and Eastern Syria using weapons. The Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has already announced that they will not withdraw from Syria.
The Civil Defense Forces (HPC) is a voluntary, community-based organisation which carries out community policing functions in NES.
Following the recent unrest in the USA, the HPC has been held up by some commentators as an alternative model to a traditional, professional, state-controlled police force. Less often mentioned is the fact that HPC works alongside the Asayish (internal security), a professional force which conducts anti-terror operations and is responsible for day-to-day security and policing functions across NES.
In this interview, two female commanders in HPC explain how and why their organisation was established; how it works alongside, relates to and differs from the Asayish; which roles they fill in their community; and how they aim to construct a new model of policing in a region which suffered for decades under the security apparatus of the Assad regime, and which faces a critical security situation to this day.
Zibeda Eli commands the Civil Defense Forces in Qamishlo and the Jazira region, while Samira Mihemed is the commander of the all-female Women’s Civil Defense Forces (HPC-Jin) in Qamishlo.
Could you explain more about the history of the HPC?
Zibeda Eli: It all started in 2014 when ISIS attacked Sere Kaniye and the surrounding villages. The fighting was very heavy and we saw that there was a need for a different organization to be responsible for the security inside the cities and villages as the other military structures were busy fighting on the front lines.
Back then, the war was extremely difficult and there was a huge need for people to learn how to defend themselves and their societies. At first it was very important for everyone to learn how to handle the weapons so as to be able to protect themselves, their land and loved ones. In the beginning we were very focused on the military aspect of self-defense. After the fighting subsided we were able to give our attention to the other parts of self-defense, such as education.
So the HPC were originally founded in Qamishlo and later spread all over Rojava, and step by step more and more people started to step up to protect their neighborhoods and cities. Many who had become refugees during the war were able to return to their homes with the help of the YPG, and then protected by the HPC.
How are you organized today?
ZE: Now, our members total between 13,000-15,000. The HPC have a presence in all cities and in almost all of the villages in the Jazira region. We work via the communes in the civil society.
In the beginning when the organization was founded there was a lot of criminality and drug use by the young people here, but that has since become significantly less.
Samira Mihemed: it is very important for us that we have a presence in all places so as to keep our young people from making bad decisions and helping them choose a good path in life. We live a communal life here, we are all responsible for each other and it is our duty to look out for and help each other.
North and East Syria also has a professional military force – the Syrian Democratic Forces – and a professional internal security force, the Asayish. What’s the difference between HPC and these bodies?
SM: HPC is tied to Asayish, but the women’s branch is independent because we organize ourselves and the men cannot give us orders or intervene in our work. If a problem occurs we try to solve it ourselves first. If this fails we will bring the issue to the women’s branch of the Asayish.
During the war in Sere Kaniye [Turkey’s 2019 invasion of North and East Syria], other institutions joined the combat – Asayish, The Syrian Democratic Forces and other military forces. But our role is different. Our job is to keep the society whole, to defend the society from within. We protect the society from everything from espionage to preventing drugs and forbidden substances from entering.
ZE: We organise together with other institutions, for example with the women from the Asayish. We are a civilian organisation but we have some military responsibilities. For example we have the right to arrest people who have broken the law but we are obligated to hand them over to the Asayish, who will take over the case from there. So we ourselves are civilians but our work includes some military responsibilities. Our job is to support and help the Asayish with civilian matters.
Besides providing neighborhood security, what are HPC’s other duties?
SM: We want to help those women who are being oppressed and who are experiencing difficulties to improve their quality of life. As HPC-Jin we have the right to get involved in anything that concerns women. For example, if a women is being beaten or mistreated by her husband, or if she is being oppressed, we have a right to step in to end the mistreatment of the woman. We also go visit people in civil society and listen to what they have to say and they can tell us what they are struggling with.
We also give seminars on women’s rights. For example we don’t accept for a man to marry two women, or for underage girls to get married. Usually when a man marries a girl so young they end up divorcing them one or two years later which causes the girl a lot of pain. So this is where we put our foot down. Our duty is to protect the society.
ZE: The first step is education. Home by home, neighborhood by neighborhood, all the way up to the cities and villages. The people are always very happy and excited when we come to visit them, because it gives them a chance to better get to know us and our ideology.
One of our main goals is to educate people about women’s rights and to empower women. The people in the society look up to and admire the women who have joined the movement and fought the enemy on the front lines.
Could you explain the difference between the HPC and the police of the Syrian regime, how do they differ from each other?
ZE: The differences are huge. When the police of the Syrian regime arrests someone they can abuse them and deny them food and water and their basic rights. We, on the other hand, would never do that.
Why? Because the people who volunteer with us volunteer out of their own free will, because they want to help protect their societies and the people living in it. Some of our volunteers are 18 years old while others are 70 years old, and no one volunteers with us for money. The people with the regime are not like that. They all work for money and don’t have the best interest of the people in mind.
Why do you have an autonomous women’s structure, HPC-Jin? What role do women play in the organisation?
SM: It is very important for us to help women empower and defend themselves. Women should be involved in and play a role in all structures of society. For a long time the women here have been looked down upon and only been considered good for marriage. This is something we want to change.
That is why we give educations and seminars for women on women’s rights and women’s history, so that they can get to know themselves and their rights and through that empower themselves. And we also give educations that are more militarily focused because self-defence is a big part of empowering women. All women should know how to defend themselves.
Now, if someone tries to force a girl or woman to do something she does not want to do, she won’t accept it because she has the option to join the military forces or any other institution which will protect her. In the system we have now there are women in all institutions and leadership positions. Men and women are now working together. Women in civil society get a lot of morale and inspiration from us, and we get many girls and women wanting to join us.
What are your thoughts on the uprising that the police in the USA are facing after the killing of George Floyd? And how do you think that your organisation differs from police forces around the world?
ZE: The HPC differ in that we are supported and made up by the local people. We have all races working together to protect and keep their societies safe. There is no one who is considered to be better or worse than anyone, we are all equal. For example, the Turkish attacks were against us Kurds, but we Kurds had Arabs fighting with us side by side.
The Rojava revolution is for democracy and is for everyone, not only Kurds. We want everyone, Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians and Turkmen to unit and help each other to protect our societies together.
The pictures featured in this article were taken during a HPC-Jin training session.
“In July 2020, as war continues in Syria, we celebrate the eighth anniversary of the revolution, remembering the 19th of July 2012 when autonomy was declared in the city of Kobanê,” said Têkoşîna Anarşîst (Anarchist Struggle), an internationalist anarchist collective in Rojava, in an interview. “Rojava (West Kurdistan, or North-East Syria) is a small player in a game of powers full of resentment and strife. Its brief history has always been threatened by the war and conflict that surrounds it, as its very existence challenges the plans and agendas of the powers that battle in Syria. Despite tactical alliances, it is clear that no state has an interest in allowing this revolutionary project to prosper and expand. Now that the Daesh (Islamic State, or ISIS) Caliphate has been defeated, other forces and powers continue to harass Rojava, mainly through the Turkish State and its proxies. Rojava exists thanks to the commitment and collective effort of thousands of militants, and we must always bear in mind that, without their sacrifice, nothing we are experiencing here today would be possible. The attacks we have suffered have led to painful losses, and we have had to move forward and rebuild the ruins the war has left behind. As militants, these experiences have forced us to appreciate the fundamental need for self-defence, and to appreciate life and moments of happiness with more gratitude than we have ever experienced before…
To this day, Rojava remains an inspiring model for revolutionary movements around the world, a space for debate and political practice demonstrating that another world is possible. Rojava is not an anarchist society, but it is a society where anarchists from all over the world can nurture our ideas through praxis. We cannot allow this beacon of hope to be extinguished, and even though it is a struggle we will continue to build, defend and develop the world we dream of living in. The attacks to come will cause more pain and destruction, but we are not afraid of the ruins because we carry a new world in our hearts…
The authoritarian drift of the Turkish state in recent decades has been accompanied by a purge of military commanders, especially after the so-called attempted coup in 2016, as well as heavy investment in military spending. Erdogan recently acquired a second shipment of S-400 anti-aircraft systems from Russia, while closing a deal to acquire Patriot missiles from the United States. We see him arming himself to the teeth, seeking to maintain his position in NATO, while leaning into a pact with Russia, trying to reorganise the geopolitical chessboard of the Middle East by evoking an Imperial Ottoman past. These expansionist dreams, the usual narrative of fascism, always need an internal enemy to blame. In 1915, the world witnessed the Armenian genocide on which the Turkish state was founded, where not only Armenians and other Christian minorities were massacred and forced to leave their homes, but an example was set that would later be referenced in perpetrating the holocaust (‘After all, who today speaks of the annihilation of the Armenians?’ said Hitler, invading Poland). Now it is the Kurdish population that is suffering from these genocidal policies, and no doubt Rojava is in Turkey’s sights…
On the one hand, Erdogan continues to threaten the occupation of the region, with particular risk to Tal Rifaat and the Şehba camps, as well as Manbij and Kobanê. As we have seen with other operations, it is not a question of whether Turkey will attack again, but when it will do so. Recently, Erdogan announced a new operation in Başûr, Iraqi Kurdistan, which began with over 80 bombings by the Turkish Air Force. Among the targets were the Mexmûr camp, a hospital in Şengal, guerrilla positions and civilian villages in mountains bordering Turkey and Iran, where the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) has its bases. In late June, a drone bombed a village outside Kobanê, where a meeting of the Kongreya Star (the women’s movement in Rojava) was being held, killing four women, including the head of the Kobanê area. All these attacks are carried out while Turkey maintains its front in Idlib, supporting HTS (Islamist coalition led by the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda), its military operations in Libya, its aggressive international policy in the Mediterranean and a brutal internal repression against the Kurdish population within Turkey’s own borders…
Without a doubt, the biggest threat is a new invasion by the Turkish state, probably in Kobanê, as it is their resistance against Daesh that captivated international attention. The symbolic power of this city is very important, and that is why the Turkish state wants to occupy it, because it knows it will be very difficult to sustain faith in the revolution without the city that managed to break the advance of Daesh. It is possible that Ain Issa and Manbij would be attacked first, since they are nearby cities and essential when it comes to providing logistical support in case Kobanê is besieged again.
To launch such an attack, Erdogan knows he needs a green light from the international and regional powers. The war of influence between Russia and the US in the Middle East can play a significant role, and depending on how the balance of power and objectives of both imperialist powers change, the effects will be felt not only in Syria, but across the Middle East and the world. In the past few months, we have seen a steady withdrawal of US troops from Syria, though never a definitive one, as one of its priorities remains preventing other powers from gaining influence, especially Russia and Iran. Putin is racing to fill this vacuum, reinforcing his hegemony on Syrian soil and ensuring his access to the Mediterranean Sea.
Other regional powers may also influence Syria’s future, such as the State of Israel, which continues to maintain its occupation of the Golan Heights, and carry out attacks and bombings against different targets on Syrian soil. Iran’s presence in Syria is no secret; in fact, most of Israel’s attacks are usually against Hezbollah targets or other forces close to Iran’s theocratic regime. The Zionist government of Netanyahu takes advantage of Iran’s enmity with the US to attack with impunity and thus weaken the powers that surround Israel. The Egyptian state now makes threats to intervene in the conflict in Libya to stop the spread of Turkish influence. For now, Egypt is off the Syrian board, but al-Sisi’s government sees Erdogan as a threat, given his neo-Ottomanist rhetoric and his strong relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition to al-Sisi’s government…
Since the beginning of the Rojava revolution, especially following the resistance in Kobanê in 2015, international volunteers have come to confront Daesh and defend the revolution. In the early years, most of the international volunteers came in coordination with YPG (People’s Defence Units) and YPJ (Women’s Defence Units), the Kurdish self-defence militias. Given the anti-state character of the political project of Rojava, anarchists from different continents joined the struggle in defence of the revolution, often arriving in a disparate and disorganised way.
In 2015, in addition to internationalists in YPG and YPJ, the IFB (International Freedom Battalion) was organised, uniting international militants and Turkish revolutionary organisations in a common organisation. Within the IFB, the first anarchist brigade was formed under the name of IRPGF (International Revolutionary People’s Guerrilla Forces), which operated for approximately one year during the Tabqa and Raqqa operations.
Têkoşîna Anarşîst was created at the end of 2017 after the liberation of Raqqa. We seek to not only participate in the struggle against Daesh, but to learn from the Kurdistan freedom movement while building bridges with libertarian movements around the world. As anarchists, we see the importance of taking up arms against the theocratic despotism of the Islamic State, but also against the fascistic oppression of the Turkish State, the Syrian State, the various imperialist powers and the myriad Islamic fundamentalist groups fighting in Syria.
The reality of the war is very complex, and sometimes it plunges us into a sea of contradictions about our role here. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts converge with a proxy war of regional and geopolitical powers, where imperialist and colonial influences set the pace of a Middle East bathed in blood and oil. But the Kurdish resistance is an emblematic example of revolutionary organisation, and Rojava’s social and political project is certainly inspiring. After some years working here, we saw good sides and also bad sides of the revolution, and our commitment to it is based in a frame of internationalism and critical solidarity.
The implementation of democratic confederalism, a stateless society based on women’s liberation, ecology and direct democracy, is an example for those of us who believe in a world free from capitalism and patriarchy.
This is what led us to Rojava, but what now? A large number of internationalists who come to Rojava participate in defending the revolution for a few months and then return home to their previous lives. Is that what we want? Is this our idea of internationalist solidarity? No, we want something else.
To better understood what we are looking for, we studied the history of internationalism, but instead of looking at the centralised structure of the Third International, we choose to find inspiration in the anti-colonial struggle of the Tricontinental Conference. Revolutionaries like Almícar Cabral from Guinea-Bissau, Ben Barka from Morocco and Che Guevara from Argentina came together to, in the words of Franz Fanon, ‘stand with the wretched of the earth to create a world of human beings’. Their perspectives on international solidarity were very clear: ‘It is not a question of wishing success to the attacked, but of running his own luck; accompanying them to death or victory.’ They were talking about creating ‘two, three, many Vietnams’; we talk about creating two, three, many Rojavas, many Barbachas, many Chiapas.
Tekoşîna Anarşîst is not only an anarchist group in Syria or Kurdistan; our existence is conditioned by the struggle and the revolutionary process of Rojava. The oppression suffered by the Kurdish people is another example of the colonial dynamics suffered by indigenous peoples, peoples with ancestral cultures and roots who are threatened by capitalist hegemony. As internationalists, it is also our duty to study and understand the ways imperial powers exert oppression over countries of the Global South. We struggled against oppression at home and now we continue the struggle here. We came to Rojava responding to the call for international solidarity, and so our priority is to understand the needs of the people and the dynamics of the local revolutionary movement. In the past, we had been working in coordination with the IFB, but today we are an autonomous organisation integrated in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), alongside Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and other internationals, fighting for a democratic and ecological Syria free of patriarchal oppression.
The PKK is a revolutionary party created in response to the oppression suffered by the Kurdish people. Tekoşîna Anarşîst is a collective created to support and learn from the revolution of Rojava. This reality engenders a great number of differences in relation to the size of the organisation, objectives, internal dynamics, future projection, tactics and strategies.
The PKK was founded more than 40 years ago as a national liberation movement with an internationalist outlook, forming an anti-colonial movement in the Middle East. Through its struggle for national liberation, the PKK, which started with a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist orientation, evaluated its achievements and shortcomings. Abdullah Öcalan proposed a new paradigm, nourished by libertarian perspectives, positioning itself against the nation-state model, patriarchy, and the ecocide produced by capitalism and the techno-industrial system. Instead, the new paradigm creates models of direct democracy, with communes and cooperatives as the social base. It prioritises women’s liberation as the basis of social transformation through women organising themselves autonomously. It is committed to an ecological perspective and a reconnection with nature, reconstructing a model of life in accordance with the other living beings on this planet.
Its perspectives on violence also differ from those of its Maoist origins, where revolutionary violence was conceived of as an objective in itself. The change of paradigm, largely motivated by the Kurdish women’s movement, refocused the analysis around the concept of self-defence. The patriarchal and colonial dynamics of states, which base their existence on domination through war, genocide and slavery, have always met with resistance from those they seek to subdue. Societies that have lived a free life cannot accept the domination of centralised systems, and that is why every society, every living being, needs to ensure its systems of self-defence.
As anarchists, as revolutionaries, we agree with this political and social vision. Ecology, feminism, communalism or confederalism are not unknown to anarchism; quite the contrary. In Rojava, we have had to defend ourselves with all the means at our disposal against the theocratic despotism of the Islamic state and the invasion of the Turkish fascist state. In times of war, we have fought side by side with YPG, YPJ, guerrillas of the PKK, members of other Turkish revolutionary parties, other internationalists of different ideologies, Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians. When the enemy fires, when the bombs fall, the one on our side of the trench is compa, is heval, and the ideological differences do not weigh as much as the passion to defend the revolution, the passion to build a free society.
But, certainly, there are ideological differences that, when bullets and mortars do not rain down, lead to debates and reflections that influence our way of thinking about revolution and understanding anarchism. The differences that Marx and Bakunin, among many others, discussed at the congresses of the first workers’ international are still a source of conflict today. But it is precisely this conflict that helps us to reflect, to learn, to continue to grow…
The main differences we have found are, on the one hand, organisational, and on the other, ideological. At the organisational level, we prioritise decentralisation and the distribution of tasks, responsibilities and leadership, deliberately avoiding the creation of a central committee or an authoritarian institution. We know military structures are always conditioned by hierarchical organisation and a chain of command, and, in some aspects, we have had to adapt our structure to military needs. But, unlike other forces, we pay special attention to operating in an inclusive and horizontal manner, encouraging rotating responsibilities and leadership. Collective learning, trust and mutual support, but, above all, the desire for a free life, are the basis of our work and political project.
At the ideological level, the differences may be more complex. The most relevant is perhaps our strong support for LGBT+ struggles, which in the Kurdish liberation movement do not have such determined support. There is, however, a current in the Kurdish women’s movement, and in jineolojî in particular, with whom we share a perspective on these issues. They themselves are questioning and reflecting on the apparent essentialism of this movement, opening the door to a more extended understanding of woman closer to queer theories, although still in a minority.
Also, the pragmatism of this movement sometimes leads to ideological contradictions, especially in aspects related to property. In Rojava, there are communal initiatives and incentives for collective ownership, but private property is still the norm in society, without much effort to change this reality. Within revolutionary movements, property is largely collective, and the communal life has a clear socialist orientation, but it is sometimes difficult for these ideas to reach the majority of the population.
To bring a wider perspective, if we think not only of our organisation, but of anarchism more broadly we see great contradictions with the individualistic tendency of anti-authoritarian movements in recent decades. Têkoşîna Anarşîst is committed to a collective struggle that transcends individual logic and liberal thinking, in tune with the values of social anarchism, but without ceasing to reflect on the role of the individual in society. We are very aware that with orders imposed from the top down, without respecting collective decisions or listening to minority voices, coercion is imposed on the individual. In turn, when the individual does not act in accordance with the common aims of a movement, he or she delegitimises the organisation and the collective struggle.
Another important debate between traditional anarchism and the ideas of democratic confederalism is the approach to society and the relation with positivism and rationalism. Anarchism has often seen science and reason, which were resignified by the so-called enlightenment, as the only way to achieve a free society. In the new paradigma, this premise is questioned, with special attention to other ways of understanding the world and society that elude European colonial thought, especially looking at mythology and ancestral knowledge. These perspectives are important when it comes to learning from indigenous movements, rethinking our relationship with nature, with civilisation and with life itself.
Evaluating these ideas, the similarities and differences that we have found with our movements and the reality of Rojava, have led us to prioritise two objectives. First, the development of militant personalities, working to deconstruct the patriarchal and capitalist influence that we have internalised. Second, the need to agree on organisational standards based on commitment and responsibility, according to our will as revolutionaries, but also to the needs of our organisation.
And even though these objectives are developed in a different way from the PKK, the methods we learn here are of great help to us. The practice of tekmil, platform, criticism and self-criticism, guide us in our growth and development as revolutionaries, but we also recognise the need to study and learn from the history of anarchist and revolutionary movements around the world.
The construction of democratic confederalism is certainly more visible in Rojava, but it cannot be disconnected from the rest of Kurdistan. In recent years, the ideas of this political paradigm have been put into practice on a large scale in Rojava, but we must also take into account other territories such as Mexmûr camp or the more recently autonomous zone of Şengal in Başûr (Iraqi Kurdistan). There are also political developments in Rojhilat (Iranian Kurdistan), but, above all, in Bakûr, within the borders of the Turkish State. It is necessary to take into account the four parts into which Kurdistan is divided today to understand why the Kurdish movement is oriented towards an anti-state solution.
When analysing its construction, it is essential to refer to the ideological work of Abdullah Öcalan and his ‘Manifesto for a Democratic Civilisation’. Unlike other political proposals, democratic confederalism does not limit itself to describing a utopian society free of oppression, but opens a dialogue of questions and answers on how to transform society and realise this utopia. How we want to live, how we want to relate to each other and how we want to fight are important questions in building a revolutionary society. The answers Öcalan outlines are not easily summarised in a few paragraphs, but it is important to understand some of the concepts he identifies.
This democratic modernity is based on the liberation of women, ecology and democracy without the State. This ideological progression shows similarities with other revolutionary processes such as the Zapatista movement, an insurgent movement in the mountains of southern Mexico. Both movements are born with a Maoist framework, but are reoriented towards libertarian socialism; both have grown and found refuge in the mountains; both are heirs to a people with ancient origins; both have a strong autonomous women’s movements; both are examples for anti-capitalist movements worldwide.
Democratic confederalism is not a new ideology; it is a way of understanding society and civilisation that inspires us to develop as revolutionary movements, to make a commitment to our ideas and to move forward with determined steps towards a more just society. In bringing these ideas into practice in Rojava, the process has been vastly influenced by the war in Syria. In turn, it has been the war that made the revolution possible, enabling the radical social transformation needed to lay the foundations of such political developments.
In 2012, the YPG/YPJ, then poorly armed people’s militias, expelled the soldiers and bureaucrats of the Syrian state with hardly a few bullets fired. This was followed by bitter fighting against Islamist groups like al-Nusra and later Daesh. After breaking Daesh’s seige of Kobanê in 2015, the YPG/YPJ expanded to lead the military coalition of the SDF. By the time Raqqa was liberated in 2017, the SDF had become a regular military force, trained and equipped to a semi-professional level.
These military developments were accompanied by a process of social transformation based on the ideas of democratic confederalism, with the creation of communes, cooperatives, women’s centres, justice committees, academies, school programmes in Kurdish, cultural centres and so on. Social institutions such as TEV-DEM (Tevgera Civaka Demokratîk, or Movement for a Democratic Society), together with the PYD (Partiya Yekineyen Democratic, or Democratic Unity Party) and other political parties, came together to establish the Autonomous Administration, initially organised in three cantons (Afrîn, Kobanê and Cizîre). We see the clear aim to manage the territory on the basis of local organisation, based on a municipal model, without seeking the centralisation of a state system.
No revolution is an easy process and, despite the criticisms we may have about certain decisions, the process that Rojava is going through in these eight years of revolution is admirable. Once again, it is difficult to summarise everything in a few paragraphs, but among the most important steps we want to mention the development of the situation that women are experiencing, and the role that the YPJ is playing in this process.
Women in Syria, like women all over the world, suffer from the violence and oppression of patriarchal systems, but from 2014 they were especially threatened by the theocratic despotism of the Islamic State. Daesh is undoubtedly a more brutal and bloody example of patriarchy, with thousands of women captured and sold into sexual slavery. In the words of YPJ fighter Amara from Kobane, ‘Our philosophical views made us women conscious of the fact that we can only live by resisting’, giving perspectives on why many women choose to take up arms to free themselves from such a threat, why they choose self-defence and direct action against threats to their lives.
After the military victories against Daesh, the enormous courage and sacrifice women have brought to the revolution was proven beyond doubt. The Kurdish movement says no society can be free if women are not free, and in Rojava this slogan becomes the heart of the revolutionary process.
Our involvement in this whole process is relatively modest, as we have been working for only three years in Rojava. In the beginning, the most important thing was to understand the local reality, the Kurdish language and culture, the political project and the functioning of the organisations and structures. This brought some ideological contradictions along with new methods of organising.
Despite our ideological similarities and Öcalan’s references to different anarchist thinkers like Bakunin, Kropotkin or Foucault, anarchism remains a great unknown for the Kurdish movement. In the third volume of the ‘Manifesto for a Democratic Civilisation’, Öcalan reflects on the importance of anarchism as a key ally in the development of democratic modernity, sharing his critique and perspectives for anarchist movements. In the ideological field, our work has focused on reflecting on these ideas and contradictions, translating them and making them more accessible to a wide audience. We have also spent time debating and sharing our ideas among us, as we are an international group of anarchists from various countries, often with different prespectives and backgrounds. This work has given us a better understanding of the libertarian movements in different parts of the world and how to put them in context with the revolutionary process we are going through.
In the practical field, our work has focused on defending the revolution. After taking part in different military campaigns against Islamic State, we pushed to develop our capacities as combat medics, since health care in the first minutes can be crucial for survival. Tekoşîna Anarşîst worked as a combat medical team in the Baghouz campaign, the last bastion of Islamic State, and has since been our main task whenever there has been an active front in Rojava. Operating as a combat medical team also means being able to train new members in these disciplines, so we have put a lot of effort into compiling what we have learned to share with new comrades who came to join the revolution…
The Islamic State has been defeated after the battle of Baghouz in 2019, but there are still cells and operational groups that continue to carry out attacks. Many of its former members have also joined the Turkish-backed Islamist groups, which have occupied the canton of Afrîn since early 2018. It is less than a year since Turkey and its Islamist mercenaries occupied the cities and villages alongside the border in between the cities of Tel Abyad and Serêkaniyê. People fleeing these conflicts are found in refugee camps, such as the Şehba camps where people from Afrîn fled, or the Waşokanî camp where people of Serêkaniyê fled for refuge from Turkish bombs.
The al-Hol camp is also difficult to run, where tens of thousands of women and children who lived under the Islamic caliphate are held. This includes some women who maintain their Islamic fundamentalist ideas, often organising riots and statements in support of Daesh, attacking the security forces of the camp and also other women, stabbing, throwing acid or setting tents in fire. The special prisons for Daesh fighters add to the difficulties faced by the Autonomous Administration in stabilising the region, needing an international tribunal to find solutions and bring Daesh members to justice. But the international community does not seem very interested in supporting this kind of judicial process, and few countries have repatriated the international fighters who left to join the ranks of Islamic State. In these prisons too, there are often riots and escape attempts.
The refugee camps are also hotbeds of health emergencies, with outbreaks of salmonella or other diseases such as leishmaniasis in the Şehba camps. So far, Rojava didn’t suffer an outbreak of Covid-19, but the self-administration has been working to prevent future risks. Our work on health issues has also allowed us to learn and support in these fields and to better understand the situation, as well as to collaborate in the development of training and preparations for preventive measures in case the pandemic begins to spread here. The hospital in Serêkaniyê – now occupied by Turkey and its proxies – was the only one equipped to carry out PCR tests, and it is known that Turkey is sending a large number of Covid-infected people there. In Afrîn, the epidemic is spreading, given the direct connection of the Turkish army with the Islamist groups occupying the area, possibly in an attempt by the Erdogan administration to spread the virus to Rojava. The virus has spread in the parts of Syria still under the control of the Syrian regime, so we do not know how long Rojava will be free from the effects of the pandemic.
The military situation is not easy either… The economic situation in Rojava is also very complex, with enormous difficulties ahead. The Syrian pound has fallen to historical lows, in recent months it has lost more than 300% of its value on the domestic market. To this, we must add the new sanctions against Syria imposed by the Trump administration, a form of economic warfare, which, despite being directed against the government of al-Assad, has a profound effect on all of Syria. Trump promised that the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria would be exempt from these sanctions, but so far this promise has not materialised, and they must be added to the embargo Rojava has suffered since the beginning of the revolution.
In terms of resources, Rojava has an abundance of only wheat and oil, which are suffering from economic turmoil. The Covid-19 crisis has caused a fall in the price of crude oil, which has had a huge impact on the income of Autonomous Administration. In addition, the sanctions mentioned against the Assad government make it difficult to sell the oil, which needs the refineries in the areas under the control of the Syrian state to be able to process it. As for the wheat, the Autonomous Administration has decided to begin the harvest earlier to avoid what happened last year, when insurgent groups burned large swathes of cultivated land. Advancing the harvest has ensured that the wheat is not burnt, but at the same time it has been harvested still green and the price at which it can be sold is lower. In addition, wheat was stolen from silos in the Turkish-occupied area, such as the important silos in Tel Abyad.
A last point we want to mention is also related to the global effects of the pandemic, and is the closing of borders that has limited the mobility of internationalists. During the past four months, no internationalist has been able to enter or leave Rojava. A number of new people who want to travel to Rojava have no way of doing so. With all this, it is difficult to foresee what will happen. The situation is highly unstable; there are so many variables and so many interests at stake that things change quickly from one day to the next…
Another possible scenario in the near future is a full-scale attack by the Turkish state on Qandil in Iraqi Kurdistan, where PKK bases are located. Erdogan has been besieging the mountains, the heart of the Kurdish insurgent movement, for years and hopes to have the support of NATO and its media and technological network to carry out such an operation. But to lay siege to the mountains, Erdogan needs the collaboration not only of the Iraqi state, but also of Iran, since Qandil is on the border between them. It would be a very costly operation and, given Turkey’s unstable economic situation and its many fronts, it is not very clear whether Erdogan will be able to launch such a large-scale campaign. Such an attack would be highly provocative across all parts of Kurdistan and revolutionary Rojava would not stand idly by in the face of this aggression…” #JinJiyanAzadi#SehidNamirin#RiseUp4Rojava#WomenDefendRojava#RiseUp4TheRevolution#RiseUp4TheMountains#FreeAfrin#FreeOcalan#SmashFascism
(https://anarchistsworldwide.noblogs.org/…/interview-with-t…/)
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Arabs Across Syria Join the Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces
A Profile of Arab Recruits from Aleppo, Al-Hasakah, Deir Ezzor, Homs, Ras al-Ayn and Raqqa
[Forthcoming in MER issue 295 “Kurdistan, One and Many”]
In 2012, as the so-called Arab Spring protests in Damascus and elsewhere in Syria descended into a brutal civil war, President Bashar al-Asad withdrew his forces from northern Syria to turn their guns on rebels in the south. Into the vacuum stepped the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, or PYD) and their armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or YPG)—which set up a rudimentary Autonomous Administration in three cantons: Afrin, Kobane and Jazira. Surrounded by enemies, the three cantons that declared self-rule were not even connected to each other. As non-contiguous regions abutting the Turkish border, it was difficult and at times impossible to travel from one to the other or share vital resources. Their chances of survival were slim.
Then in 2014 militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) surged across both the Turkish and Iraqi borders into Syria, declared Raqqa as the capital of their Caliphate and proceeded to establish a government that, among other egregious practices, sanctioned slave markets where Yezidi women and children were traded. In 2016, 2018 and 2019, Turkish military incursions into Syria—with help from what is now known as the Syrian National Army—aimed to dislodge the YPG from areas near the border, resulting in mass displacement of civilians including Kurds, Yezidis, Arabs and Assyrian-Syriac Christians.[1]
Led by Kurds, the YPG evolved over time into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF): a multi-ethnic, multi-religious force in which all the indigenous peoples of the region are represented. Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians, Yezidis, Circassians and Turkmen have fought alongside Kurds to defend their homeland. By 2019, when the SDF had liberated all of Syrian territory from ISIS control, there were some 100,000 fighters (including SDF and Internal Security Forces) under the leadership of SDF commander-in-chief Mazlum Abdi, a Syrian Kurd and former Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) cadre.[2] The majority of his rank-and-file fighters, however, were Arabs. While conscription can account for some of this growth, it does not tell the whole story. Until today, the rules on mandatory conscription have never been implemented in several Arab-majority regions; in previous years there was even less enforcement. Furthermore, conscription is limited to one year and only applies to men. How was a sister militia of the PKK—an organization founded in Turkey that historically fought for an independent Kurdistan—able to successfully recruit and retain tens of thousands of Syrian Arabs for multiple years? What sort of political project did they create and endorse that retained the loyalty of an ethnically diverse coalition?
My field survey of over 300 SDF members reveals that there are three main reasons for the SDF’s success in recruiting and retaining Arabs: First, the SDF offered material incentives such as salaries and training opportunities.[3] Second, the existence of a common threat—first ISIS and now Turkey—solidified bonds between Kurds and Arabs and also prompted many to enlist. Third, the survey shows that many Arab members of the SDF support at least some, if not all, of the basic political principles upon which the SDF and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) are based.
The YPG Evolves Into the SDF
Throughout the course of the Syrian civil war, the Kurdish-led YPG cooperated with Arab-majority armed groups. The YPG began to actively recruit Arabs just months after regime forces withdrew from the north, or at least since late 2012. The Shammar tribe’s Al-Sanadid Forces led by Bandar al-Humaydi was one of the first to cooperate with the YPG, starting in 2013. Active recruitment was underway during a series of battles along the Syrian-Turkish border centered around the city of Ras al-Ayn, which has a mixed Arab-Kurdish population (the city is known as Serekaniye in Kurdish and Ras al-Ayn in Arabic). Later in the war, virtually all of the Arab tribes had members in the SDF, including major tribal confederations and prominent tribes including the Al-Jabbur, Ageedat, Baggara, Busha’ban, Tay and others.
In September 2014, a joint operations room was established between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the YPG, known as Burkan al-Firat (Euphrates Volcano).[4] The ISIS siege of Kobane and ensuing US military support cemented the alliance between the YPG and a number of Arab units within the FSA, which led to the emergence of the SDF in October 2015. The United States had shifted its efforts to the YPG/SDF after previous attempts to train and equip other Syrian armed groups had been deemed unsuccessful—in part because some of those groups had links to extremist factions or were more interested in fighting Asad than ISIS. Henceforth, the SDF became the main partner force for the United States on the ground in Syria. In order to defeat ISIS, it was necessary to further expand the geographical reach of the SDF to Arab-majority cities such as Manbij, Raqqa, Tabqa and Deir Ezzor. In the course of this expansion, some Arab women were recruited as well. In July 2017, the YPJ (the women’s branch of the YPG) announced the creation of the first battalion of Arab women, the “Brigade of the Martyr Amara.”[5]
When the SDF began to expand beyond the Kurdish heartland into Arab-majority areas, Western analysts observing from afar rang the alarm bells. Some academics and think tanks claimed this move would mean the imposition of “Kurdish rule” over Arabs. Others predicted it was doomed to fail because self-respecting Arabs would never concede to being part of a Kurdish militia with links to the PKK. Yet others suggested that conservative Arab tribes viewed the secular-egalitarian ideas promoted by Kurds as an “alien ideology.”[6] One think tank analyst was so troubled that he recommended the United States should work to “control the YPG’s provocative behaviors and limit its ideological indoctrination of northeastern Syria’s communities.”[7] And yet, despite these predictions of impending failure, the SDF continued, year after year, to incorporate more and more Arabs into its ranks.
Despite predictions of impending failure, the SDF continued, year after year, to incorporate more and more Arabs into its ranks.
To be sure, the expansion of the SDF and self-administration across north and east Syria was not always welcomed by Arab communities. The increase in Arab rank-and-file fighters has not yet been accompanied by an equally significant increase of Arabs in leadership positions, although Arabs have been promoted within both the military and civilian structures of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. The secular and gender-egalitarian ideology is not embraced by some more conservative members of society. In the spring of 2019, I attended a meeting at the Tribal Reconciliation Center near Tabqa, where more than 50 representatives from the various Arab tribes in the region were in attendance.[8] These tribes had been cooperating with the Autonomous Administration for several years and seemed to be on friendly terms. Yet none of the tribes had sent female delegates to represent them. In the far eastern part of Syria, I met with the head of a major tribe who referred to the YPG as “our friend.” But he also indicated some displeasure because his traditional title of “sheikh” was less frequently used than in the past: In an attempt to undo tribal hierarchies, administration officials are encouraging people to use the term al-raey, which means shepherd.[9] Over the course of more than six hours, I toured the expansive grounds and met several dozen people, again without encountering a single woman. But during my visits to ramshackle YPJ outposts in Manbij, Raqqa, Al-Sheddadi, Tabqa, Ain Issa, Al-Hasakah and elsewhere, I met many Arab women. They had all enlisted in the YPJ voluntarily, as there is no conscription for women. Many of them were eager to tell their stories.
Kurdish officials are taking various measures to ease Arab concerns over Kurdish domination. The very name of the governing entity was changed to the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Kurdish term Rojava was dropped in December 2016.[10] Although this decision angered some Kurdish nationalists, it was justified by the expansion of the territory beyond Kurdish-majority areas. The official logo recognizes the linguistic diversity of the region, and is in four languages: Arabic, Kurdish, Syriac-Aramaic and Turkish. Furthermore, in 2018 the de-facto capital or administrative center of the region was moved from Qamishli to Ain Issa, an Arab town.
By 2019, the SDF was in de-facto control of approximately one-third of Syria. The territory they defend from incursions by ISIS, the Turkish government and Syrian government forces is an ethnically and religiously diverse region. These six regions—Jazira, Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Tabqa, Manbij and Euphrates—are governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, which operates semi-independently of Damascus. The Arabs who inhabit these six regions are not a homogenous group. While some Arabs have protested the policies of the Autonomous Administration, others openly endorse the new political project.
Arab Apocis?
The ideology espoused by the Autonomous Administration is inspired by the writings of Abdullah Öcalan, one of the founding members of the PKK. Fleeing persecution in Turkey, he spent some 20 years in Syria. During this time, he cultivated ties to the Syrian regime under President Hafez al-Asad and to a number of leading Arab figures, in addition to the Kurdish minority. After he was forced to leave Syria and was captured and imprisoned by Turkey in a maximum-security prison on the island of İmralı, he turned to writing and formulating a new paradigm for the Kurdish struggle. Inspired by an eclectic assortment of scholars, ranging from Murray Bookchin to Immanuel Wallerstein, the ideology that emerged is referred to as Democratic Confederalism. The nation-state is no longer a prize to be obtained but is now seen as part of the problem that led to the subjugation of Kurds in the first place, along with that of women and other minorities, and therefore to be avoided.
Instead of an independent Kurdistan, Öcalan urged the Kurdish movement to work toward attaining a stateless democracy.[11] The political entity he envisions is to be premised on secularism and full equality between all people, regardless of gender, religious or ethnic identity. Those who support these ideas are often referred to as Apocu or Apocis, meaning the followers of Öcalan, whose nickname is Apo. Historically his supporters were Kurds, but some of his newer ideas have also been embraced by Arabs. The emergence of Arab Apocis may be one of the many unexpected twists of the Syrian conflict, signifying the appeal of the Rojava revolution beyond Rojava.
As soon as the Autonomous Administration assumed de-facto control over parts of north and east Syria, officials lost no time in putting these ideas into practice. A co-chair system was established where all leadership positions—from the most powerful institutions down to neighborhood communes—are held jointly by a man and a woman. The current co-president of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) is Ilham Ahmad, who represents the Autonomous Administration during high-level diplomatic visits outside of Syria. The SDC was created in 2015 as the assembly of political parties and organizations that represents north and east Syria. The liberation of Raqqa was led by Rojda Felat, a female commander of the SDF/YPJ. Arab women and men have also benefited from this system. Layla Hassan and Ghassan Al Youssef act as co-chairs of the Deir Ezzor Civil Council, the largest governorate under SDF control and home to oil resources.
Surveying a Non-State Actor in a War Zone
Between 2015 and 2019, I conducted the first field survey of the YPG/SDF in all six regions of north and east Syria under the control of the SDF. Although my sample included members of each ethnic and religious group in the region including Arabs, Kurds, Syriacs, Assyrians, Armenians, Yezidis and Turkmen, here I focus on Arabs since they now constitute the majority of rank-and-file fighters and yet are frequently omitted from analyses of the SDF. Scholars, journalists, think tank analysts and government officials still incorrectly refer to the SDF as a Kurdish force.
In order to allow the voices of Arab members of the SDF to be heard, I provide brief profiles of six Arabs from six different cities across Syria. Two of these cities were taken over by ISIS militants: Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Two other cities had at one time been under the partial or full control of other armed opposition groups, referred to for the sake of simplicity as the FSA: Ras al-Ayn and Al Hasakah. In the spring and summer of 2019, at the time of my survey, these four cities were under the control of the SDF. Finally, two of the six Arab SDF members I discuss here are from Aleppo and Homs, cities that were never under the control of the SDF. A number of additional respondents come from yet other cities outside SDF control, including Idlib, which seems to indicate that the SDF holds a broader appeal. My survey data also shows that Arabs from virtually all the major and minor tribes in Syria have been incorporated into the SDF (the respondents self-identified as belonging to 46 different tribes or sub-tribes). The six individuals I cite here are from different geographical regions of Syria, different class backgrounds and have different modalities of engagement with the SDF. Some of them became leaders of military units and fought in numerous battles against ISIS, while others did not take part in combat operations. Finally, I have also selected both male and female members of the SDF. To protect their identities their real names are not used.
For all six individuals, the timing of their decision to join the SDF indicates that they did not do so out of opportunism. On the contrary, joining the SDF entailed risks, especially for women.
Five of the six respondents I cite here were selected precisely because they enlisted in the SDF between May 2015 and March 2017, during a very chaotic and uncertain period of the war when the SDF had neither yet emerged as the clear victor against ISIS nor was the only game in town. The last person to join of the six individuals I discuss here is Rania from Deir Ezzor. She enlisted in 2018, at a time when ISIS still controlled territory in Deir Ezzor. Hence, for all six individuals, the timing of their decision to join the SDF indicates that they did not do so out of opportunism. On the contrary, joining the SDF entailed risks, especially for women. Anyone who joined the SDF from a city that was under the control of ISIS, or who joined from territory never controlled by the SDF, did so at great personal risk. Because these Arab men and women remained within the SDF for as long as they did, also suggests a continuing commitment to the organization.
Rejecting Centralized Government
Ahmed was born in 1992 in Ras al-Ayn, a mixed Arab-Kurdish town along the border with Turkey. He belongs to the Tay tribe, which was used by the regime in Damascus to suppress the Kurdish uprising in Qamishli in 2004, when he was about 12 years old. His parents were farmers and his father had been conscripted into the Syrian Arab Army. Ahmed attended university for a year and claimed no prior political affiliation. In June 2016, when he was 24 years old, he joined the SDF. He was later promoted to become a leader of a unit, and fought in battles in Manbij, Raqqa, Shaddadi, Tabqa and Deir Ezzor. Among his reasons for joining the SDF, Ahmed wrote: “To fight for my nation and defeat all forms of terrorism and because of the Turkish threat, and fight for our land.” He also wrote, “All members of SDF do not want a centralized government. We don’t want Turkey to get anywhere near our land or our revolution.” The fact that Ahmed belongs to a tribe that was used to suppress the Kurdish uprising in 2004 and yet was still recruited and then promoted within the ranks of the SDF suggests that either the SDF has been able to overcome historical grievances and establish trust between ethnic communities or that Arab opposition to the Turkish occupation of Syria now overrides other concerns, or perhaps both.
Liberating Syria from ISIS Oppression
Mohammed was born in Raqqa in 1995 as a member of the Abu Ragab tribe. His father was a trader and had been conscripted into the country’s military, the Syrian Arab Army. Mohamed listed no prior political affiliation and had not finished high school, perhaps due to the conflict. In March 2013, Raqqa was captured by the armed opposition groups and held by various FSA brigades until ISIS took full control of the city in January 2014. Mohammed joined the SDF in January 2016 from the city of Raqqa when he was 21 years old. He took part in the liberation of his own city, as well as battles in Tabqa and Deir Ezzor. As the capital of the Islamic State in Syria, Raqqa was enormously important both in terms of its symbolism and strategic importance. Public executions were being staged on the city’s main square and Yezidis were traded in slave markets. Mohammed’s decision to join the SDF at that time was enormously risky: It would be another one and a half years before Raqqa was liberated from ISIS. He said: “I am a citizen who used to be oppressed before joining the SDF. I saw suffering at the hands of ISIS, but I have seen a bright light from the SDF. And I see that all the countries of the world have to come together to eliminate terrorism.”
Establishing a “Long Lasting Democracy”
Mona was born in Homs to a middle-class family in the year 2000. As the third largest city in Syria, Homs became a key battleground between the forces of the Asad regime and the armed opposition. She was about 11 years old when the regime began the siege of the city in May 2011. Three years later, the opposition left and the regime reclaimed it. Mona attended high school but never finished. In March 2017, when she was 17 years old, she joined the YPJ.[12] She fought in the battle to liberate Raqqa. In the margins of the survey questionnaire, she wanted to convey an additional message: “I want the Coalition to stay and protect the area and establish a long-lasting democracy.”
Ending Turkey’s Colonization of Syrian Lands
Farid was born in the northeastern city of Al Hasakah in 1988. His family belonged to the Tufaehy tribe. Farid had finished high school and listed no prior political affiliation. His father was a public sector employee. In May 2015, Farid joined the YPG, even before the creation of the SDF. At this time, just a few months after Kobane had been recaptured from ISIS, the YPG was still a Kurdish-majority force. Farid was then 27 years old. He fought in battles in Al Hasakah, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor and Al Sheddadi. On the back page of the survey Farid advocated for the creation of a security zone between Syria and Turkey “so we can achieve stability in the region.” He also demanded “the returning of all lands that have been colonized by the Turkish occupation.” In contrast to other cities closer to the Turkish border including Afrin and Ras al-Ayn, Al Hasakah has not been occupied by Turkey or its proxy forces. And yet, as comments by Farid and others make clear, Syrians of both Kurdish and Arab ethnicities viewed the Turkish encroachment on sovereign Syrian territory as a form of colonization.
The SDF Should “Manage Syria in the Next Stage”
Hassan was born in Aleppo in 1999 to a middle-class family. His father was a businessman and his mother a nurse. Hassan finished high school and then joined the SDF from his hometown of Aleppo, although the city had never been under its control. As a teenager he would have witnessed how Aleppo was ruled by both the regime and by armed rebel groups. In January 2017, just one month after the Russian-backed Syrian army had recaptured Aleppo, Hassan joined the SDF. He was 18 years old at the time. The mere fact that someone from Aleppo would join the SDF suggests that the SDF has some appeal even in areas it does not control. In the case of Hassan, it would seem to indicate that he, as an Arab from Aleppo, preferred to leave his family and live under the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration than under Asad. Furthermore, his comments indicate that he views the SDF not just as a military force to defeat ISIS, but as a form of governance. He wrote, “I propose to the alliance to strengthen the support to the SDF because it is the only force that confronted and was able to end the terrorism represented by ISIS and it is trusted. And as you have seen there is freedom in the areas they control. The opinion of the community in the SDF is that it is an active force and able to manage Syria in the next stage.”
YPJ Must “Continue Fighting Until Women are Freed”
Rania was born in 1999 in Deir Ezzor, an eastern governorate along the border with Iraq. Her family belongs to the Ageedat tribe, one of the largest tribes in the area, which also has members living in Iraq. This region is commonly referred to in Syria as the “remote provinces” and is distinctly “tribal, rural, and marginalized.”[13] It is also where ISIS had its last stronghold, in Baghouz. Rania never attended school. As a teenage girl she lived under the sway of ISIS for at least two years. She reported that one member of her family had been killed by ISIS. In 2018, when Rania was just 19 years old, she decided to join the YPJ. At the time, this was an exceedingly brave decision for anyone, given that ISIS still controlled Baghouz. But as a teenage Arab woman from Deir Ezzor, she would have likely had to convince members of her family and tribe to allow her to enlist. As an additional comment on the survey, she wrote: “We want the YPJ to continue fighting until women are freed.”
Overcoming Sectarianism
The Syrian Democratic Forces is the only armed group in Syria that has a policy of not discriminating on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or gender, which has allowed the SDF to develop into a truly multi-ethnic and multi-religious force. This radical egalitarianism clearly appealed to non-Arab minorities who suffered under decades of pan-Arabism promoted by the Baathist regime of the Asad family. Kurds from the far corners of Kurdistan were galvanized by the promise of the Rojava revolution. What is less well appreciated is that Arabs have also embraced these ideals and practices.
The Syrian Democratic Forces is the only armed group in Syria that has a policy of not discriminating on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or gender, which has allowed the SDF to develop into a truly multi-ethnic and multi-religious force.
The Arab men and women discussed here have diverse class and educational backgrounds. They come from territory controlled by the SDF as well as territory controlled by the Asad regime. What they have in common is that they all joined the Kurdish-led SDF—rather than other armed opposition groups, most led by Arabs—and they joined the SDF at considerable risk to themselves. Why? One reason is because they all appear to support at least one or more of the key ideas inherent in Democratic Confederalism, which guides the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration and the SDF. These key principles include decentralization instead of rule by the central government in Damascus, a sense of brother or sisterhood among ethnic groups instead of sectarianism, gender equality and rejection of ISIS and other forms of religious extremism. Finally, I found that a large number of Arab respondents rejected the Turkish occupation of Syria and demanded that the land be returned to Syria. Contrary to analysts who portray the conflict as one solely between Turkey and the Kurds, my survey shows that Arab SDF members also view the Turkish incursions and expanding Turkish presence as an illegitimate foreign occupation of Syrian land.
The future remains uncertain. Much depends on whether Russia and Iran will continue to back Asad in his quest to retake all Syrian territory and whether the US-led Coalition will maintain its presence in the northeast. The SDF faces ongoing threats from the Asad regime, Turkey and ISIS cells. The Turkish intervention in October 2019, however, did not lead to a disintegration of the SDF, or even to any serious defections, as some had predicted.[14]
Analysts have thus far tended to ignore those Arabs who support the political project in north and east Syria. Several observers have amplified the voices of those Arabs who are critical of it, perhaps because that narrative fits more easily into the simple trope of sectarianism. When the SDF’s policy of non-discrimination is seen in the context of the ideological transformation of the PYD-aligned movement from one that promoted Kurdish nationalism and separatism to one based on the notions of co-existence and decentralization, it should come as no surprise that the PYD’s political project would appeal to non-Kurds—or at least appear as more compatible with their own views. Understanding the dynamics that undermine sectarianism in the Autonomous Administration—or perhaps how it is being overcome—is a crucial analytical task and political challenge.
[Amy Austin Holmes is a fellow at the Wilson Center and former associate professor at the American University in Cairo and visiting scholar at Harvard University.]
[7] Written Testimony of Charles R. Lister, Senior Fellow and Director of Countering Extremism and Terrorism, Middle East Institute to the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs Middle East and North Africa Sub-Committee, February 6, 2018, p. 5.
[9] Interview with the head of a large Arab tribe in eastern Syria, July 2019.
[10] The word Rojava is derived from the word “roj” which means “sun” in Kurmanci. Rojava means Western Kurdistan, or the land where the sun sets. Kurds refer to the other three parts of Kurdistan as Rojhelat, or Eastern Kurdistan (in Iran), Bakur or Northern Kurdistan (in Turkey), and Başûr or Southern Kurdistan (in Iraq).
Amy Austin Holmes “Arabs Across Syria Join the Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces,” Middle East Report Online, July 28, 2020.
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Major damage inflicted to Girê Spî farmers due to fires mostly caused by Turkey
The Agriculture Directorate of Girê Spî canton revealed the damage caused to farmers as a result of deliberate and unintentional fires broken out during the current year, noting that 70% of them were caused by the attacks of the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries.
23 Jul 2020, Thu – 07:022020-07-23T07:02:00 AIN ISSA
Large areas of farmers’ crops in Girê Spî / Tel Abyad canton were subjected to fires before and during the harvest season this year, especially in villages along the lines of contact with the Turkish enemy.
Girê Spî Canton Council formed committees specialized in cooperation and coordination with the Directorate of Agriculture to uncover and document the damage caused to farmers by these fires.
The committees of the Agriculture Directorate based in Ain Issa counted the burnt trees; 615 dunums of wheat, 9,042 dunums of barley, 10 dunums of coriander, while the number of fruit trees burnt reached 3,184 trees, the majority of which were “olive”. In addition, the burning of 1,315 meters of hoses that are used for the purpose of agriculture was documented.
The Co-chair of the Directorate of Agriculture, Abdullah al-Khalil, told Hawar news agency that the burned areas are in al-Jarn town, Selok district, Ain Issa district and its towns.
Moreover, the committees that inspected the farmers’ affected land areas were unable during their work to reach areas of contact lines with the Turkish enemy, of which large areas were burned as a result of the deliberate arson by the mercenaries of the Turkish occupation.
In this regard, Abdullah al-Khalil indicated that they relied on counting these areas (located on the seam lines) based on books certified by the commune in those areas or the adoption of last year tables. He explained that they counted in Ain Issa only through this method 77,463 dunums in the villages of Moallaq, Saida, al-Loubeida, and al-Jehbal.”
He revealed that their estimates show that 70% of the burned areas are the result of the Turkish attacks, “burning directly or through artillery shells that they launch on these villages on an almost daily basis.”
He concluded his speech by saying that the results of the statements their committees concluded with their statistics have been submitted to the Economic and Agriculture Body in the Euphrates region for the purpose of consideration and evaluation.
It should be noted that the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries have intensified targeting and burning farmers’ crops in the countryside of Girê Spî to damage the farmers’ crops in order to starve them and hit the economy of the region.
Çiçek Kobane’s mother: “Our daughter is detained in Turkish prison under inhuman conditions”
updated on
During the offensive launched on October 9th, 2019, in NE Syria, by the Turkish state, the Jihadist group under the flag of the Syrian National Army ( SNA), invaded Serêkaniyê and Tel Abyad (Girê Spî) regions.
The city of Serêkaniyê which was liberated by the YPG forces and taken from Jabhat al-Nusra terrorist in 2013, has been occupied and is now under control Turkish state and so-called SNA.
Local journalist Diyar Ahmed, affirms that: “[The SNA factions] don’t have a well-organized structure. There are 20 armed groups in the city, and they fight against each other. The only system which is there has been imposed by Turkey.”
The humanitarian impact of the war has been severe. There have been 250,000 people displaced from their homes, dozens of neighborhoods and crucial infrastructure destroyed by shelling and airstrikes, and the irretrievable loss of human life.
Attacks in Serêkaniyê on October 2019
On the 17th October, the so-called “ceasefire agreement” was signed and announced following the USA and Turkish negotiations. Five days later another agreement between Turkey and Russia was announced and the so-called “security zone” was put under their control.
Never the less the Turkish attacks on NE Syria haven’t stopped. Crimes and atrocities are constantly committed against the population.
On a daily basis, villages are bombed and thousands of hectares of fields are burned. Many civilians have been hurt and killed, including numerous children. In this occupied region, houses of people have been plundered and women kidnaped, raped and killed.
The Turkish state and its Jihadist proxies, through this barbaric ethnic cleansing practice, are forcing demographic changes in the region and opening space to all kinds of terrorist groups in this area.
During this occupation, Çiçek Kobane, was in Rojava, her homeland, when the Turkish invaded and occupied Gire Spî. She was wounded and captured on the 21st of November by one of the allied jihadist groups and sent to a Turkish prison.
This fact also proves the direct connection between the Turkish state and Jihadist groups. Video of her being captured was sent directly to her family and also spread through social media.
Çiçek Kobane before being captured
We have conducted an interview with her mother who after 7 years living in Turkey, has come back to NE Syria:
What can you tell us about the current situation of your daughter and how she ended up in a Turkish prison?
“In the beginning, we didn’t have have any information for 4 days and when she disappeared, we thought she must have been killed. After four days a video was sen to my husband’s phone of her being captured. We immediately also informed everyone we knew in Rojava and started looking for her.
At this time we were living in Turkey, however, we were able to find a Kurdish lawyer and went to a government establishment with her picture. We were afraid of also getting arrested but wanted to find out where she was and confirm if she was alive.”
In the time of corona, many prisoners were released but she and other political prisoners were not. She was wounded and because of this, she should’ve been released.
There is constant oppression on the Kurdish population and their rights within the Turkish state. The Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East and one of the most persecuted minorities of our time. Nowhere is their future more threatened than in Turkey where Kurds are one-quarter of the population.
After some days in the hospital and another week Urfa prison Çiçek was brought to Hilwan prison without any medical care and still with metal in her leg.
How are her health and psychology could you communicate with her?
“Her leg is in a really bad state. She can’t move around properly, walk, or change her clothes. She’s really worried about her health. We’ve been struggling to get her medical treatment for her leg but for 6 months, but she still hasn’t received any. She’s unable to be self-sufficient and this is affecting her psychology. The biggest priority is for her leg to be treated.
In the time of corona, many prisoners were released but she and other political prisoners were not. She was wounded and because of this, she should’ve been released.
All visitations were suspended and no precautions against the virus were taken; not even medical checks.”
We received threats and have been humiliated. My husband and two sons were arrested and tortured. They even broke my husband’s fingers.
Turkey has also been implementing various measures to fight COVID-19 within prisons across the country, including a highly contested special amnesty law that enabled the release of some 90 thousand convicts.
According to reports by human rights and prison monitoring organizations, the conditions of prisons have worsened with the pandemic¹.
Turkish authorities do not follow principles and guidelines specified by the World Health Organization, the Committee for Prevention of Torture (CPT), or the human rights commissioners of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. The lives of prisoners are highly at risk.
How often were you able to see Çiçek? How your family was treated?
“We could visit her once a month and speak on the phone once a week for 10 minutes. We’ve lived with the constant pressure of the Turkish police being in our house every month. We received threats and have been humiliated. My husband and two sons were arrested and tortured. They even broke my husband’s fingers.
Our lawyer was also arrested and received the same treatment.
Because of this constant pressure and threat, three months ago we decided to leave Turkey and come to Rojava, where we’re originally from. We haven’t seen our daughter since.”
The Turkish government has not suspended it’s anti-Kurdish policies even under the conditions of a global pandemic. On the contrary, the government is using the pandemic as an opportunity to further repress Kurdish democratic institutions; their municipalities in particular.
Do you want to send any message to the international population?
“ Human rights organisations should not remain silent, because Turkey is violating international law. Cicek was not arrested in Turkey. She was wounded and kidnapped in her country. She was kidnapped in front of the world by jihadist mercenaries and handed over to Turkey. This makes it obvious that Turkey cooperates with jihaddist groups and supports them.
The trial of our daughter has been set for July 28, 2020. We want the human rights organisations to be aware of her situation and intervene to help her to come back home to her family.”
A commander of the jihadist militia “Faylaq al-Sham” was killed in an explosion in Afrin, Northern Syria. At least ten people were injured.
ANF
AFRIN
Sunday, 19 Jul 2020, 15:13
A militia leader was killed on Sunday in an explosion in the Turkish occupation zone Afrin in northwest Syria. At least ten other people, including several Islamists, were injured. The explosion was caused by a mine laid by previously unknown persons on the road to Jindires district. The explosive device detonated during the passage of the vehicle of Hossein Bedra, a leading member of the jihadist militia “Faylaq al-Sham” and commander of the so-called SNA (Syrian National Army), the proxy invasion troops of Turkey.
The Afrin region has been occupied by Turkey since March 2018. Since the beginning of the occupation, human rights violations and war crimes have been on the agenda in what was once the safest region of all Syria. In addition to a classic colonial policy, Turkey continues to practice a policy of ethnic cleansing, which has driven hundreds of thousands of people from their ancestral settlements. The demographic change in favour of Turkey and its Islamist invasion troops, crimes such as kidnapping, torture, extortion and murder are happening with the de facto approval of the international community.
It is still unclear whether today’s attack in Afrin was an act of retaliation or should be seen as the result of conflicts within the SNA militias. After the Turkish invasion, two groups, the Afrin Liberation Forces (HRE) and “Operation Wrath of Olives” formed in 2018, which carry out actions on the Turkish Jihadist occupation forces and have set themselves the goal of liberating Afrin from occupation. In recent weeks, however, there have also been repeated tensions between the individual occupying militias.
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Turkey detains niece of Syrian Kurdish official Salih Muslim:
BEIRUT,— Turkey has detained the niece of an influential Syrian Kurdish politician, himself wanted by Ankara, the family said Sunday.
Dalia Mahmoud Muslim is a niece of Salih Muslim, who is close to the semi-autonomous Kurdish administration in Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava).
She was “handed over to the Turkish authorities and their intelligence services” after travelling to neighbouring Iraq’s Kurdish region six months ago for medical treatment, her father Mahmoud Muslim said.
Writing on Facebook, he said his daughter had been preparing to return to Syria and that her apparent transfer to Turkish custody had “surprised” the family.
The Iraqi Kurdish authorities shoulder “responsibility for her kidnapping or handing her over to Turkish intelligence”, he said, adding that any words attributed to her were “false” and obtained “under pressure”.
Official Turkish Anadolu had on Saturday reported a different version of her detention. Citing security sources, it said that she had “handed herself in” to Turkish security forces on July 15 in a southern province of Turkey.
Salih Muslim was himself brieflydetained in Prague in 2018 and Turkey demanded he be extradited, on the basis of an arrest warrant Ankara issued two years earlier in connection with an attack in Ankara that killed 29 people in February 2016.
He denied any link to the attack, and was released.
The Kurds established their semi-autonomous administration region in northeastern Syria, the vast stretches of northeastern Syria, that border Turkey during the ongoing civil war.
The administration is viewed with hostility by Turkey, which sees the main Syrian Kurdish militia, the YPG, as “terrorists” and an offshoot of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Dalia Muslim’s father says she belongs to the YPG’s female contingent.
Salih Muslim was long co-chair of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the YPG’s political arm.
The worldwide-respected PYD-led Autonomous Administration in Syrian Kurdistan has a secular decentralized self-rule, where equality between men and women, direct democracy, and environmental responsibility are emphasized.
In 2013, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party PYD — the political branch of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) — has established three autonomous Cantons of Jazeera, Kobani and Afrin and a Kurdish government across Syrian Kurdistan in 2013. On March 17, 2016, Kurdish and Arab authorities announced the creation of a “federal region” made up of those semi-autonomous regions in Syrian Kurdistan.
The Kurdish Democratic Union Party PYD and its powerful military wing YPG/YPJ, considered the most effective fighting force against IS in Syria and U.S. has provided them with arms. The YPG, which is the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces SDF forces, the de facto army of the autonomous Kurdish region, has seized swathes of Syria from Islamic State.
The Syrian Kurdish forces expelled the Islamic State from its last patch of territory in the eastern Syrian village of Baghouz in March 2019.
11,000 Kurdish male and female fighters had been killed in five years of war to eliminate the Islamic State “caliphate” that once covered an area the size of Great Britain in Syria and Iraq.
‘The Rojava Revolution is also the revolution of the Armenians’
The Rojava Revolution has left its 8th year behind. Those who live in the region and witness the revolution say that they were reborn on 19 July.
MUSTAFA ÇOBAN
DIRBESIYÊ
Sunday, 19 Jul 2020, 12:34
One of the witnesses of the Rojava Revolution since the beginning is Şexmus Ehmed Fetah, an Armenian living in Dirbêsiyê.
Fetah, also known as Bavê Zana in the region where he lives, is originally from Bitlis in North Kurdistan. Fetah’s family was forced to emigrate to the Rojava region to flee massacre during the 1915 Armenian Genocide.
Fetah said that he participated in the revolution with his children and family and added: “We joined the revolution since the beginning. We found ourselves in this revolution. This is our revolution, the revolution towards freedom. This revolution is not the revolution of one people, but of all the oppressed people. As Armenians, we saw it as our own revolution. When the revolution started, we saw that this was the revolution of all peoples and beliefs: Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, Yazidi, Arabs and Alevi. So it belongs to all the peoples living in this region. If it had been a revolution involving only one people, maybe we would not get involved. We owe this revolution, which embraces all peoples.”
Describing the Rojava Revolution as “the historical revenge of the Armenians”, Fetah said: “The Rojava Revolution is my family’s and our history’s revenge. It marks a new century for us. It was as if we entered a new world with this revolution.”
Commemorating the thousands of martyrs that sacrificed their lives for this cause, Fetah said that they owe it to the martyrs to protect the gains of the revolution.
Reminding that the Turkish state has plundered and destroyed all the religious sites in the region, Fetah added: “The occupying Turkish state burned down the Armenian settlements in Serêkaniyê and Til Temir. Some Armenian women were kidnapped and their families were asked to pay a ransom. They were killed by mercenaries saying ‘Allah-u Akbar’. These mercenaries deceived many people under the name of religion. The Turkish state was let groups such as ISIS and al Nusra to enter this region every day. Erdogan is representing ISIS; he is the sultan himself. If this revolution is crashed, we’ll all be crashed.”
Şexmus Ehmed reminded the SIHA attacks against Dirbêsiyê on 16 July 2020 and said: “The people are afraid to go out on the streets. They [Turkey] want to empty the city by targeting civilians. They want to confuse the people using the differences of faith, trying to put Muslims against Christians. All this comes from the history of the Ottomans. They carried out dozens of massacres.”
Addressing the Armenian people, Şexmus Ehmed Fetah said: “Know who you are and be with each other. See yourself as the owners of this revolution. Those who are far from this revolution are far from Armenia. Because this revolution is our revenge.”
The imprisoned leader of the Kurdish freedom movementAbdullah Öcalan writes that capitalist modernity prevents us from asking a fundamental question: “how to live?” Under the “ideological monopoly” of liberalism, we are sneered at, ostracised or violently put back in our place any time we try to resist the “universal rules” which hegemonise our lives.
As militants of the Rojava revolution – which began eight years ago today – we have the opportunity to transgress these rules, and seek new ways to live. But before we can begin to seek an answer to Öcalan’s question, we must ask ourselves another: “how do I feel?”
The freedom of checkpoints.
Towards the end of my time in the West, this question was easy for me to answer. I woke up feeling quite bad; then at some point I had a drink; then another; then I started to feel good; then very good; then at some point – bliss – I felt nothing any more.
Alcohol dependency is one blunt example of a broader set of cultural, social, economic and – especially – patriarchal practices which limit the emotions we are able or permitted to feel. Love between a man and a woman must be lust; we must feel happy when with our family; we must be greedy with our time and resources if we are to pay the rent. We must drink to feel good: we must feel good, we’re drunk.
Of course, the same state-capitalist global hegemony affects our mood here too in North and East Syria (the formal name for the autonomous regions still better-known by the Kurdish synecdoche Rojava). It still surrounds us, still stands tall in the public consciousness and stalks through the cities here, still fuels the nightmares and daydreams of local people and international militants alike. But here, I and others have found new space to feel.
Jineology, the easy-to-grasp but hard-to-practice “science of women” founded by Öcalan and studied and practiced in academies across Rojava, places great value on subjective experience, irreducible to objective assessment. Practicing criticism and self-criticism, we learn to criticise our comrades not just for failing to do the washing up, but for their mood as they do the dishes; for the atmosphere they create as they walk in a room; for their failure to articulate their own emotions to their comrades. We consider emotion not as localised in the individual, but as something shared between us in our communal life.
For me, this process has sometimes been as simple as noting the impact of other factors on my mood which I was numbed to in the West. There, I mocked the idea that diet could make any real impact on my mood, one good meal not making any real dent in the amphetamine onslaught that invariably followed. Here I have learned, among other revelations, what a difference is made by an unlooked-for egg in the morning.
Other emotions are harder to grasp, easier to fumble. As militants of this revolution, we are encouraged to ‘give meaning’ to the minutiae of life, to remind ourselves that tens of thousands of our comrades died to make our life here possible. We should grant revolutionary significance to our life in its smallest details, from the morning egg to cleaning the toilet to the way we use our free time.
Such an emotional response is not to be achieved through effort of will alone. If the word ‘martyr’ is too quickly invoked, as it sometimes is here, it ends up feeling cheap. This is an error many new international militants make, which I made, striving to imbue our toothpaste with the mystical value of the blood of ten thousand martyrs.
Our toothpaste, like all our groceries, is delivered by a logistics truck, making weekly rounds of the civil institutions to bring us our daily essentials, just as it would if we were on the frontline in Deir ez-Zor. This system does away with some of the stress attendant to the wage-relation in the West – fuck, I’ll never make it to the supermarket before it closes; fuck, my card’s declined; fuck, I forgot to buy toothpaste – time-consuming, psychologically taxing, above all boring. It is an alteration to the baseline reality of experience, opening new space in which to think, share and feel.
So the toothpaste does have special meaning: but only in relation to our comrades driving the logistic truck and keeping the supply-lines into Rojava open despite the Turkish-enforced embargo, sometimes, yes, at the cost of their lives.
Likewise, it is easy here to indulge in grandiose moments of emotional grandstanding – the manful sniff of the air on the earthwork berm overlooking a pile of dead Isis fighters, the pose struck in the mirror late at night in borrowed combat trousers, the whole People’s Protection Units/Women’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) fantasy as indulged in by movie-producers and Western anarchists who know nothing of what these things cost.
Such emotions – freedom, pride, honour – are indeed in the air here, but they are not to be found so cheaply, on such an individual basis.
Take freedom, for example. Rather than the sports car on the open road of American fantasy, here one feels free because one knows there will always be a lift, because if I need to travel from Qamishlo to Kobane for my work I can present myself at the nearest checkpoint and hitch rides from comrade to comrade until I reach my destination, with smiles and small-talk and cups of chai all the way, because our comrades are everywhere, manning all the checkpoints.
It is not the solipsistic moments snatched from some imagined future biopic which are important, I want to say, but those where one feels part of a great network of solidarity expanding out in time and space.
On the abstract level, I have never managed to give the same ‘meaning’ to a cup of chai tea here as I would to my first beer of the day in England: my failing, perhaps. But then I think of the chai shared with old friends as our paths crossed unexpectedly in a house near the border, with the Turkish invasion expected to break upon us any day; of the stories we swapped like gifts, each not expecting to see the other whole again; of the extra hour we snatched together as the beans proved slow to come to the boil on the hob, and how precious those moments were.
Statehood and sensibility.
Such moments are not only the result of changes in the fabric of society instigated by the Kurdish freedom movement under the umbrella of the Rojava revolution. They also emerge from the local culture of warmth, camaraderie and hospitality. Such characteristics are assigned to almost every culture outside the imperial core by travel-agents and travel-writers: pace Öcalan, the backpackers’ cliché has its truth.
5,000 years ago, Öcalan writes, people lived communally in small egalitarian communities not yet torn apart by the masculine ego which finds its greatest expression in the nation-state. Öcalan sees remnants of this ‘jiyana komînal’ – communal life – in the villages of Kurdistan and rural regions of the Global South more generally, and argues for its restoration into our desiccated society.
These values structure the work being done to restructure society in Rojava, not only as basis and aspiration, but also as necessary condition. You cannot ask for directions without someone clambering into the car to see you to your destination, nor stop off at someone’s house without being press-ganged into staying the night.
Here we arrive at an important question. North and East Syria is full of international militants feeling complicated feelings – and writing about them online. But what about the ordinary local people? How do they feel? How does state capitalism – and the attempts to shake it off now underway here – mitigate their emotions?
It’s not a question which can be answered in a few words. Broadly speaking, the public mood here is sentimental, in all the contrariness of the term: sickly sweets, oversized plush toys, bad phone graphics of hearts and roses, impassioned bouts of tears over matters trivial and life-altering alike (fingers fluttering at the breast and tongue ululating in the throat), fierce and overweening love of one’s land, courtship, blood feuds, veneration of martyrs, the elasticisation of the term ‘martyr’ to cover those dead by disease or road accidents, attachment to causes larger than oneself, militarism (pure sentimentality), idolisation of the family, swift empathy with strangers, shame, dignity. Lives spent swimming in a warm bath of emotions, like organs bathing in interstitial fluid.
An abundance of feeling is more present in society here than in the West, but constrained, mitigated and distorted by deep-rooted patriarchy (the blood feuds), the steady creep of capitalism (the plush toys), and war. The weddings here used to last three days and the funerals a week, grandmothers have told me as we chain-smoke together on the sidelines of such festivities: now, the funerals last three days, the weddings just one.
Such observations are in line with Öcalan’s analysis, and applicable to many other societies outside of North and East Syria. But here, the general lessening of shared emotion was abrogated by the outbreak of the Rojava revolution.
Exiting the state of exception.
There were few bullets fired on the night of 19 July 2012, as Syrian Arab Army units withdrew and the YPG entered Kobane. The price would be paid later, in running battles against the regime, the bitter campaign against Isis and other jihadist groups, and the ongoing struggle against Turkish occupation: but in those first hours, the major cities were seized without a fight. All that changed were the people manning the checkpoints, the flags over the squares, and the names of the cities.
Local people have told me of being moved to tears as they approached a checkpoint flying YPG colours for the first time, never having thought this day would come: ask any Kurd here how it feels to call their city by its Kurdish name. The emotional weight of that day is still felt here, even if it is forgotten in the West, with the people of Rojava constantly asked to prove anew their ‘right’ to dignity, freedom and self-determination, the hoops held out for them to jump through by liberal governments, anarchists and communists impossibly far apart.
Rojava’s would-be supporters may have forgotten this day: its enemies have not.
The philosopher Giorgio Agamben argues the capitalist nation-state achieves hegemony through the necessary and permanent exclusion of certain populations, voiding them of political agency and leaving them to live what he calls the “barren life” – Kurds in Turkey, migrants in Europe, women everywhere. The liberal state proscribes certain limits to its violence, only to suspend them in these ‘exceptional’ cases, which then become the new ordinary. “The rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception,” and whole populations are left to suffer under a permanent and increasingly global ‘state of emergency’.
Gassed in Iraq, executed in Iran, tortured in Syria, driven from burning villages in Turkey, the Kurdish people have learned the lesson of state violence. In many ways, Rojava prior to the revolution could have been a case study for Agamben – in Syria, the Kurdish people were written out of state politics to the point that hundreds of thousands of them were literally denied identity papers. Like Agamben, Öcalan came to believe that any state – however revolutionary in intention – would inevitably bring cruelty and oppression against the excluded minorities within its borders.
But what happens when the state takes the logical next step and literally withdraws from the unwanted border cities filled with easily-expendable Kurds? The Syrian Arab Republic spilled incredible amounts of blood to keep Arab-majority cities in its grasp: that it withdrew before a ragtag militia like the YPG perversely shows how little value it placed on the lives of its nominal citizens in the Kurdish regions. What happens when the state of exception consumes itself, and passes into statelessness altogether?
This question was answered by the Kurdish liberation movement in its Syrian manifestation, lean, hard and organised from long years of struggle, deeply-rooted in the villages and working-class neighbourhoods of Rojava. Following Öcalan’s thought on the nation-state, they refused the two obvious paths before them: neither bloody smash-and-grab expropriations of land in pursuit of centralised socialism, nor the establishment of an oil-rich client state like that across the border in the devolved Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Kurdish-nationalist in name, boot-licking in practice.
From the outset, the Autonomous Administration here has vocally expressed its desire to organise society in a different way, in a commune-based federation with as little top-down control as possible and guaranteed representation of minority communities. From the outset, the imperialist powers which variously besiege, invade, threaten, form alliances and negotiate with the autonomous region have refused to recognise it as such.
The people of North and East Syria, their political representatives in the Autonomous Administration and Syrian Democratic Council and their military representatives in the Syrian Democratic Forces are still typically referred to as ‘the Kurds’. This lazy shorthand elides the distinction between the KRI Peshmerga forces who fled and left the Yazidis to be slaughtered by Isis on Mount Sinjar, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and YPG units which liberated the Yazidi people from ongoing genocide.
More importantly, the synecdoche indicates how hegemonic global powers are constantly seeking to press North and East Syria into ethno-nationalist form. The ‘Kurds’ are famous: they are good; they are secular; their men are brave and their women sexy; they are like us.
With millions of Arabs centered in cities like Raqqa, Manbij and Tabqa, sizeable Assyrian, Armenian and Chaldean minorities and small Turkmen and Chechen populations too, it is likely that Kurds do not even make up a majority of the population in the autonomous regions of North and East Syria. (Many would doubtless be shocked to realise that ‘the Kurds’, like the Arabs, are Sunni Muslims). But the world wants Rojava to be the new Kurdish state – it cannot understand what is happening here otherwise.
Likewise, the liberal press insists on understanding North and East Syria through a primarily-military lens. Following the bloody Turkish occupation of two border cities in October 2019, a tentative deal was reached with Damascus to bring Syrian Arab Army and Russian troops into position on the border to head off further Turkish attacks. Foreign correspondents fled overnight, pausing only to publish weepy op-eds about the “end of the revolution.”
They ignored what they were told by the authorities here, that the region retains its political, administrative and security autonomy: that every single checkpoint remains in our hands, that a change-over of flags along the border does not mean the undoing of all that has been won here in the last eight years. This misconception, repeated by radicals as well as the mainstream press, is borne of a wilful failure to understand the revolution here in its richness and fullness.
To this day, the US is pressuring the Kurds of North and East Syria to forge a union with the KRI, even as the KRI aids and abets Turkish war-crimes, even as the Syrian regime likewise attempts to buy the Kurds off with the promise of guaranteed language and cultural rights. Washington and Damascus alike want the Kurds to give up on their aim of multi-ethnic confederation, to reduce Rojava to just another ethno-nationalist project.
Through their refusal of the state form, the people of North and East Syria defiantly place themselves outside the biopolitical consensus, choosing to continue living bare lives without protection under international law. 11,000 dead in the defeat of Isis and the YPG, YPJ and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are not invited to the negotiating table by the great powers, not even named, UN spokespeople instead alluding glibly to “our partners in the Middle East”. Like the Kurds under the regime, the people are denied identification.
Here, their names and photos are emblazoned on every wall: as far as the world is concerned, all those 11,000 sons and daughters are buried in the tomb of the unknown soldier.
YPG iPhone cases and Isis amnesties.
No wonder people here experience lack, craving the security and comfort which statehood would bring. Those who do not engage with the structures of the Autonomous Administration keep their distance because participation leaves them feeling bare, exposed, outside the law. I have spoken to scores of people here who still chose to send their children to regime-backed universities, as opposed to the exam-free spaces of cooperative learning opened by the Autonomous Administration. Despite the slaughter of the last eight years, a qualification from the regime has infinitely more international legitimacy than those signed off by the Autonomous Administration, effectively worthless outside the autonomous regions.
The pressure to conform to statehood operates on all levels, from the concerned mother wanting what’s best for her children to the geopolitical decisions taken by the Autonomous Administration. In defending itself and its people, the revolutionary movement is necessarily forced to compromise, to take on state form. Such actions are often described with the Turkish loan word mêcbur – the same word you would use to describe the situation in a chess game where there is only one possible move to make.
Given the embargo, the smugglers and border traders must be allowed to continue their work so that medicine, cooking oil, sugar and other vital supplies can reach the people of Rojava: mêcbur. As such the economy remains capitalised, prices driven up by black-market Turkish goods. A friend has documented some of these knock-off efforts on Twitter, the ‘brands of Rojava’ bathetic in their failure to match up to the real thing.
The YPG-liveried iPhone cases and bootleg Starbucks in Kobane city center illustrate a larger point. This revolution is at its weakest in its moments of dewletbûn, or becoming-a-state, when conditions compel it to take on the form of the state it can never be. Instances of dewletbûn range from the bathetic (the short-lived cooperative which tried in vain to introduce ‘Rojava Cola’ as an alternative to the omnipresent Pepsi) to the troubling (training courses on how to run detention centers delivered by the American intelligence services.) These efforts, too, leave one with a sense of lack, an unfulfillable desire for the security and power of statehood.
Conversely, the revolution is at its most vital when it does not try to recoup these qualities, but goes its own way, achieving affects more vital and profound, more difficult to articulate to the West.
The defeat of Isis necessitated a highly-disciplined, centrally-commanded fighting force: mêcbur. The emotion which unites ordinary Arabs, Kurds and others in the autonomous regions more than any other is hatred of the shared enemy Isis, and delight in their defeat. Here lurks that inevitable danger which Agamben and Öcalan both describe: the people inevitably coalescing against an enemy who admittedly did everything possible to put themselves outside the law.
Yet there is another form of pride present here also, in how well captured Isis fighters are treated, in distinction to both Isis’ own practices and those of the nation-states who spent billions to bomb the caliphate into ruins only to cut off all support as the bombs stopped falling. It is in these moments, when you meet the 20-year-old Kurdish woman responsible for a camp of Isis detainees, loved by them and loving them though three of her family were slaughtered in Kobane, that you can see a way forward out of the mêcbur mess we are in.
Such efforts to do things differently, the education programs for Isis prisoners and women’s houses in the refugee camps and managed releases of convicted Isis members back to their tribes, have largely been ignored in the West. It is the Western pundits who clamour bloodthirstily for Isis fighters to be executed or left to fester in desert camps, and the Autonomous Administration here which waives its hard-won right to revenge.
In their refusal to exercise violence against captured Isis members, the autonomous regions step back from statehood as it is inevitably understood in this region. Rojava can never be a state – if it were to start trying and sentencing international Isis members, its judgements would be not recognised by international law anyway – and nor should it try to be.
Choosing without a choice.
By articulating the unavoidable mêcbur move as though it were a choice, the people here have found a way to fill this lack. More than a defence mechanism, this constitutes a reclamation of selfhood. When Isis closed in on Kobane and Turkey lined its tanks on the border to block the only way out, there was no option save a seemingly-hopeless resistance: but our comrades fought as though there was a choice, proudly, freely, in a resistance which won them global support and turned the tide of the war.
Or, as political leader Saleh Muslim said last year when Trump first announced his intention to withdraw from North and East Syria, flinging the door wide open to a Turkish invasion: “We did not call the Americans here, and we are not sending them away […] We won’t beg anyone not to attack us, or beg to be protected. We are here. We can handle our own defence.” A total lack of control over the capitalist and material forces pressing in on all sides becomes itself a point of pride, the people greeting their barren status with arms spread wide – and at this point zero, paradoxically, a space of resistance is opened in which humanity may be reclaimed.
Agamben typifies the last-ditch resistance of the barren life on the most individual scale possible, localised in the mortified bodies of Guantanamo Bay hunger strikers kept in permanent isolation. Members of the Kurdish freedom movement recently used the same method in Turkey, to win visitation rights for Öcalan following years of isolation. Their victory was achieved through what Agamben takes little account of, the international solidarity which saw hunger strikers from Canada to Wales to the villages of Rojava join Leyla Guven in her desperate death-struggle. Through their sympathetic participation, bodies spread far through space – and time – enabled the barren body in revolt to reclaim power outside itself.
More broadly, North and East Syria’s insistent presence outside the state – and specifically outside the Turkish state – is in itself an act of resistance. Per Agamben, the barren life is “at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death.” Here in North and East Syria, the people willingly put their bodies on the line, flooding in their thousands to ‘human shield’ protest camps on the border. It is easy for international observers to understand the crisis over North and East Syria as a matter of international horse-trading between imperialist powers, Turkey, America, Russia – but it is precisely the four million lives being lived here in Rojava which mean they can find no shareholder-pleasing accord, bringing NATO’s two largest armies to the brink of conflict.
In recent days, SDF forces have literally mediated between Russian and American patrols when they clashed on border roads in North and East Syria, in a striking image of the precarious dance in the space between imperialist powers which enables this region to retain its power. Rojava is playing Turkey against the US, the US against Russia, playing and being played, of course, but playing as best it can.
By excluding those four million lives from their power-plays for so long, the imperialist powers have granted them a power of their own. It was in their fragility that the people of Rojava found their strength. It was precisely because they lacked the apparent might of a state, devoid of heavy weapons, fighting without salaries or uniforms with rusty Kalashnikovs, fighting without a choice as though there was a choice, that the YPG and YPJ won international sympathy and support.
Driven outside of state structures, that old excess of emotion wells up through the gaps, reanimating dormant forms of kinship and solidarity all but written into myth back in the West – and drawing internationalist militants here to sacrifice their lives.
On a material level, those 60 international volunteers who lost their lives in the YPG and YPJ made no impact on the outcome of the war. The liberal press has been at a loss to understand why anyone from the comfortable West would throw their life away so lightly, lacking even the vocabulary to grasp such an act. ‘Volunteer fighters,’ they said, as though each of these militants did not feel in their separate ways an overwhelming need to travel here and join this revolution – as though it was not absolutely mêcbur. Speak to anyone here in Rojava who knew Anna Campbell, however, and you will understand that their sacrifice was worth everything.
To take another example, a friend of mine who worked in a film commune in the now-occupied border city of Sere Kaniye observed that for his young colleagues it is difficult to create new ideas, to dream, to hope – how can you start to really picture another world when the one around you might be wiped out tomorrow? At the same time, he said, many of these young women had to fight their families for months or years to be allowed out of the home to join the project. Their attendance at the commune, in a city right on the Turkish border, was in itself a victory. To turn up and do their work, to be alive, free and Kurdish, was itself an act of resistance.
The safe-zone where nothing is safe.
Following the military agreement between Damascus and the SDF and the temporary cessation of the Turkish advance, the same dialectic must be leveraged by Rojava’s political leadership. It remains to be seen if a real, political settlement with Damascus can be reached before Turkey continues its assault. With talks deadlocked, this sometimes seems impossible, and the civilians fear a third Turkish invasion will soon come.
But what Damascus values is military sovereignty and a photo of Bashar al-Assad on every wall, whereas what truly gives this revolution its value is not the photos of Öcalan but the great network of solidarity built on the basis of his ideas, the reconciliation committees and women’s houses and communes. The regime underestimates these structures at its peril – but it is in this disjuncture between how states understand power and how power is experienced here in Rojava that the space for continued resistance may be found, even within the context of a deal with Assad.
The principles of this revolution are most fully enacted in precisely those contexts where they are placed under most stress. In all my travels throughout North and East Syria, the most successful communes I have visited were those in the Kurdish refugee camps in Shebha, isolated and under embargo – because it is in such circumstances where principles of mutual aid are needed most.
So let Erdogan drive us south into the desert, as he has threatened – he will only strengthen the communal will to resist. Whether a settlement with Damascus is reached or not, what is certain is that what has been achieved here cannot be wiped away with the changing of a flag.
It is true that the people here are very tired, tired of war, tired of death, tired of not knowing when the next attack will come. Yet the last round of bombings and field executions and forcible demographic change made clear, once again, that Turkey will accept nothing less than the eradication of this project and this people in their entirety. As such, each life in Rojava is not merely “barren” but existentially, verdantly politicised. Ask any grandmother in Qamishlo – she will tell you they don’t know anything about politics, then talk about politics for hours. She will tell you that resistance was the milk on which they raised their children.
The fragile protest camps along the border were temporary, willed articulations of a permanent and unavoidable state of affairs. This remaining-in-one-place which itself constitutes an attack on the neo-Ottoman power to our north illustrates the ineluctable animating tensions of life in Rojava.
“We are here,” as Saleh Muslim said – depending on who is listening, it is both a war cry and a cry for peace. “Resistance is life,” runs the Kurdish slogan graffitied all over the border regions. This runs both ways as well: for the people of Rojava, life is necessarily resistance.
Here, in the safe-zone where nothing is safe; in the deconfliction zone where war is a constant reality; in Qamishlo souq where international militants cross paths with regime soldiers, each ignoring the other (unless you photograph their checkpoint, collapsing the fantasy of security, they and you becoming horribly present in the same place in one instant); here we can answer the riddling question posed by Öcalan, an obscure run-of-the-mill guerrilla when free, growing daily in strength and influence now he is captured and isolated on the prison island Imrali, for years kept in what one observer has called a “deafening silence.” It is only in this constant state of emergency that we know how to live, how to feel.
And so perhaps Rojava would have faced a more existential threat if things had been easier here, if Trump had not blundered into withdrawal and Turkey and their jihadist proxies had not soaked the cornfields of Sere Kaniye with blood. Perhaps the ill-defined ‘political status’ Rojava is seeking from indifferent Western powers would not be such a panacea after all, international capital rushing in before the ideas being rooted in the jineology academies truly have time to grow. It is at once harder and better to live in the permanent state of exception, where strong, clear emotions – love for the people, hate for their enemies – are easy to find.
Matt Broomfield is a journalist, poet and activist who has been living and working in Rojava for the last two years.
Published 17 July 2020
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Foza Yûsif: The Rojava Revolution is a milestone for women
On the occasion of the 8th anniversary of the 19 July Rojava Revolution, PYD Co-Presidency Council member Foza Yûsif talked to ANF.
NESRIN DENIZ
QAMISHLO
Sunday, 19 Jul 2020, 10:32
We publish the second part of the interview with PYD Co-Presidency Council member Foza Yûsif.
The Rojava Revolution has been a woman-led revolution since its inception. However, how do you evaluate the impact of this democratic system, which has grown within the framework of the democratic nation and is embodied in North-East Syria, on the Middle East, the peoples of the world and the women of the world?
A peculiar feature of this revolution was that many women took part in it. This was one of its biggest peculiarities. In this revolution women left their traditional supporting position. They played a big role in political, defense and cultural fields. In some areas, women were up to 50 percent. For example, in the political field, the co-presidency system came to life in Rojava Kurdistan for the first time and went on to acquire an international dimension being established around the world. It is also present in Northern and Eastern Syria. This co-presidency system has been a revolutionary step and model for women organizations all over the world.
Currently, there is a co-chair system in all communes and assemblies in North and East Syria. The Women Justice Council was also a first in the world and allows women to be involved in cases concerning them, and on this basis, women can be effective in making decisions. Again, women played a historical role in the defense fields by joining the YPJ, Asayiş and HPC. Women played a major role in all resistance areas to ensure the end of ISIS.
A social revolution was lived in parallel to the Rojava Revolution
Another effect of the revolution has been the great changes and transformations as to relations within the family. We can say that a social perception, thought and male dominant mentality had taken advantage of the chaos in which our society had been left. In parallel to the political revolution, a social revolution took place. And both were very important for our society. They had a big impact on the democratization of the family. Changes in the cultural and political sphere have had a major impact on the women-men- -family relations. The women’s revolution can form the basis of political and social revolutions. It also paves the way to the women’s revolution in political and social revolutions. They have happened together.
There are also positive changes in the man himself. Men made a revolution with women and tried to organize a free society. I see this as a positive development. Just saying that doesn’t mean we end the revolution and do everything we need for freedom. Freedom is something that develops day by day, needs to be strengthened and organized. However, the gains achieved have been considerable. As women, we have to protect the revolution and its gains.
We have seen that the women’s gains in the occupied regions has been eroded. Laws are implemented which remind of the dark years in the history of humanity. The woman’s head and brains have been covered again. The women were buried alive. What happened in Afrin, Gİrê Spî and Serêkaniyê show this reality. We can say that ISIS and its partners target the freedom of women most.
We are organizing day by day
The Rojava women’s revolution did not start in 2011. The Kurdish women’s struggle has 30-40 years. Objective and subjective conditions led to more concrete emergences. Favourable conditions were prepared for the revolution to happen with a greater effect. The gains achieved in these years played a major role in the feminist movements in the world as to intellectual work, women’s science, and in the development of a free society. At the same time, there was a big change experienced by men.
A women’s council in the North and East Syria has been established. The general Syrian Women’s Council was formed. In other words, women’s organizations under the roof of the revolution are getting stronger and bigger. In order to endure the women’s revolution, all women must claim the gains of the revolution. At the same time, the woman needs to increase and strengthen her own organization. Because there are huge threats upon the women’s revolution. We see these threats in the daily attacks on women. For this reason, we women have to work and defend the achievements day and night to make the changes and transformations for freedom permanent. Women play a big role in this matter.
After the defeat of ISIS, the Turkish state attacked the region and occupied some areas. The occupation attacks still continue. What can be done to protect and make the gains achieved with the price and struggle of the people of North-East Syria?
As we mentioned, there have been great changes and transformations in this decade. Again, great achievements and successes were achieved. But the war is still going on in Syria, and there are major dangers undermining the July 19 revolution. There are many forces that don’t want the revolution to develop, to be permanent. They are against change and transformation. These forces want to strangle the revolution. The people of Northern and Eastern Syria, especially the Kurdish people, need to understand the value of these achievements very well. The situations in Jerablus, Idlib, Afrin, Girê Spî and Serêkaniyê show us very well that the enemy does not want brotherhood among the peoples.
They don’t want stability and democratic system in the region. Their aim is to overwhelm us through nationalism, religion extremism and sectarianism. They want to turn this place into a bloodbath. Then they want to protect their interests. All hegemonic powers, especially the Turkish state, want to protect their interests in the region. To do this, they can sacrifice all peoples. We must protect our unity and solidarity as a people under all conditions and difficulties. Let us embrace, grow and organize more and more our brotherhood of the peoples and our democratic nation strategy day by day.
Again, self-defense, in terms of the region, is also essential in the process we live in. Therefore, it is not a remedy to escape from the war or to go in different directions. The important thing is to be one by combining our strength and energy together. We must protect our achievements by providing unity in our thoughts and ideas.
As we mentioned, the revolution started in Dera, but it produced results in Qamishlo, Raqqa, Dêir Ez-zor, Manbij and Kobanê. The 19 July Rojava Revolution was also a guarantee for the democratization of Syria. All Syrian people should protect the democratic autonomous system. Because it is a way of liberation and solution for all Syria’s problems. The democratic nation is a solution not only for Northern and Eastern Syria, but for the entire Syria. The more this revolution is defended, the more Syria’s future and the union of Syria are defended. It would be more accurate if everyone moves with this thought and idea in mind.
I congratulate all the Kurdish people, Syrian peoples and free people living in the four parts of Kurdistan on the occasion of the anniversary of the 19 July Rojava Revolution. I congratulate all the families of martyrs. At the same time, I bow with respect to all martyrs of revolution and freedom. Up to now, we have accomplished so much with our resistance and cooperation. Peoples’ unity, women’s freedom and democratic forces can overcome all obstacles. With this belief, happy 19 July revolution to everyone.
The mixed Kurdish-Arab zone could buckle under any number of security, health, and economic threats, especially if the United States surrenders to Russian and Turkish interests by withdrawing its remaining forces.
Since the Turkish offensive of October 2019, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has found itself in a precarious position. Potential new attacks by the Turkish army are the main sword of Damocles hanging over its head. Yet the AANES and its main local authorities—the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—also face numerous other threats to their autonomy, including weighty humanitarian issues, a resurgent Islamic State, and repeated Syrian regime demands that they return to the fold unconditionally. Although Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Moscow lack the means or desire to open a military confrontation with the SDF, they are readily playing on local weaknesses accentuated by the Turkish offensive and the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops, which they hope to see completed in the coming months.
SDF WILL REMAIN UNITED IF U.S. TROOPS STAY
The Turkish offensive seriously injured the SDF because the umbrella group’s Kurdish units were left to weather the battle on their own—Arab SDF units largely abstained from the fighting because they do not consider themselves part of the dispute with Ankara. Based on the author’s trips to the region and conversations with local officials, however, none of the Arab militias appear to be defecting from the SDF, despite the regime’s urgent calls for Arab tribes to join the Syrian army. As long as U.S. troops are present in the east and fighters’ wages are paid, the SDF has a good chance of remaining united and controlling most of the territory in question.
Yet the presence of Syrian and Russian forces complicates the picture. Their troops occupy some bases inside the AANES as well as all boundary areas with the Turkish army. Russia’s positioning is likely intended as much to temporarily delay a new Turkish offensive as to control the strategic axes of the AANES. In any case, SDF units and local civilians can no longer freely use the section of the M4 highway between Ain Issa and Tal Tamer. The road was closed from October 2019 to this May, and traffic is now limited to convoys with Russian military escort. To reach Raqqa or Kobane from Qamishli, other travelers must therefore take a much longer and more dangerous route that is regularly threatened by Islamic State raids. Russian and Syrian troops could easily cut this narrow alternative road if they wanted to separate the western part of the AANES from the Kurdish stronghold of Qamishli-Hasaka.
Click on map for larger version
Some American troops have remained in Rmelan, al-Shadadi, and the oil fields southeast of Deir al-Zour. They patrol roads in these areas intensively, preventing Russian and Syrian forces from using routes outside their immediate area of influence. The strategic crossroads between the M4 highway and the Amuda-Hasaka road is strongly under U.S. control—Russian troops are not allowed to use it to reach their bases in Amuda and Qamishli. The road between Rmelan and the Peshkhabur crossing with Iraq is likewise forbidden to Russian and Syrian forces, which regularly provoke incidents with U.S. patrols. Moscow wants to control this crossing because it is the only breach in the encirclement belt that Turkey, Russia, Iran, and Assad have built around the AANES. Indeed, with Ankara’s cooperation, the Kremlin appears to be pursuing a strategy of progressive control through strategic points and economic asphyxiation.
TURKEY’S WATER WAR
Before the civil war, the Baath regime had long pushed the region currently controlled by the AANES to specialize in the production of raw materials such as wheat, cotton, and oil, which were then processed in west Syria. This had the advantage of keeping the region dependent on Damascus and limiting autonomist tendencies, whether among the Kurds or Arab tribes.
These arrangements pose a serious challenge to the zone’s autonomy today, since it is still heavily dependent on imports in the agricultural field and other sectors (e.g., the AANES does not produce its own fertilizers or pesticides for export crops). Yields have been plummeting since 2011, greatly decreasing farmers’ income. Widespread fires in 2019 also discouraged many locals from cultivating their fields.
Click on map for larger version
Above all, farmers in the AANES lack sufficient water due to the destruction of the large Euphrates River irrigation systems during the war against the Islamic State. Rehabilitating these systems will be slow and costly, requiring substantial help from Western NGOs whose work is currently handicapped because of security risks.
In addition, Turkey has been using water as a weapon against the AANES, reducing the flow of the Euphrates and tapping into groundwater around the border, thereby reducing the amounts available downstream. With the capture of Ras al-Ain, Turkish forces now control the main source of drinking water in Hasaka province, the Aluk pumping station, where supplies are sent to the provincial capital via Tal Tamer and other localities. Voluntary cuts are increasing despite Russian mediation, and it is very difficult to find new sources of water for Hasaka’s large population, which swelled to 450,000 after new refugees arrived from Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain. The local groundwater is salty, and the construction of a pipe from al-Malikiyah, a more favorable source, would be long and expensive. Another costly solution is to extend al-Suwar canal further north than al-Shadadi, but Kurdish authorities are afraid to be dependent on “Arab water.”
For now, the water shortage is exasperating the population and creating additional tensions between Arabs and Kurds. Arab tribes in the southern part of Hasaka province have accused AANES authorities of hoarding local water supplies for Kurdish communities to the north, reviving rumors of ethnic cleansing.
BLOCKING HUMANITARIAN AID
In all, around three million inhabitants live under SDF control, including the Shahba enclave north of Aleppo and the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood in Aleppo. The majority of these people are in great need of humanitarian help, especially the estimated 700,000 internally displaced persons. Kurds expelled from Afrin, Tal Abyad, and Ras al-Ain during the Turkish offensives of winter 2018 and autumn 2019 have little hope of returning to those areas. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the latter offensive displaced 222,000 people, and all of the 117,000 who have since returned home were Arab.
This situation makes Western aid to the AANES even more essential. Yet Moscow has repeatedly tried to block this aid, both at the UN Security Council and through its actions on the ground. In December, it vetoed the council’s proposal to use al-Yarubiya in the northeast as a border crossing for UN supplies via Iraq. Aid can now only come through regime-controlled territory. The European Union and the United States have strongly supported deliveries by humanitarian NGOs to compensate for the resultant UN shortfall, but such groups have been hampered by Russian patrol activity along the Peshkhabur-Qamishli axis.
Meanwhile, Assad has tried to use the coronavirus pandemic to discredit the AANES, claiming that only the Syrian state can fight the disease. Due to UN inertia and Russian pressure, the World Health Organization still works primarily with the official Syrian government, so all of the main laboratories capable of testing COVID-19 patients are located in Damascus, Latakia, and Aleppo. The AANES refuses to send tests to these labs because it does not want the regime to spread potentially destabilizing disinformation about infection rates in the northeast. In mid-April, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq set up two laboratories in the AANES, but medical equipment remains scarce, forcing Syrian Kurdish authorities to close the Peshkhabur crossing throughout March-April and institute draconian restrictions on internal movement in order to prevent wider spread of the virus. These efforts were effective in terms of containing the pandemic, but they have impaired foreign aid and the fragile local economy.
THE NEED FOR WESTERN POLITICAL DETERMINATION
Russia’s apparent goal is to suffocate the AANES, force its dissolution, and convince the SDF to integrate into the Syrian army’s 5th Corps. For the time being, the presence of U.S. troops and substantial aid has defeated this strategy. Yet Moscow and its allies have not lost hope that the Trump administration will change the game by ordering further withdrawals. Russia is also counting on a new Turkish offensive against the Kurds, which might make the American presence untenable if it occurs in the vicinity of Rmelan. Since 2016, Moscow has regularly offered Turkey a piece of Syrian Kurdistan in exchange for standing aside while the Assad axis continues to retake the northwest part of the country. After the recent Syrian army advance in Idlib, Ankara may now have the Russian green light for a new offensive in the northeast.
As for last month’s dialogue between rival Syrian Kurdish political parties, the United States and Europe welcomed the diplomatic progress, since a united Kurdish front would strengthen the AANES. Realistically, however, this dialogue will not remove any of the above threats to the zone’s autonomy. What is required instead is Western political determination against Russia and Turkey’s strategies, supported by a sufficient military presence to dissuade external coup efforts and a Marshall Plan-style humanitarian and economic campaign to reduce internal tensions. The contrast between improvements in the AANES economy and financial deterioration within regime-held areas (e.g., because of new U.S. sanctions arising from the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act) could give a particularly potent boost to local authorities.
Fabrice Balanche is an associate professor at the University of Lyon 2 and an adjunct fellow with The Washington Institute.
SDF launches second stage of operation against ISIS
SDF launched second stage of “Deterrent of Terrorism” Operation.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Friday, 17 Jul 2020, 16:11
The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have launched, this morning, Friday, (17th July, 2020), the second stage of “Deterrent of Terrorism” campaign to track down and pursue the cells of ISIS terrorist organization in the areas of Deir ez-Zor. According to the statement published by SDF Media Center, this stage targets ISIS hideouts and their cells that threaten stability and civil peace in the areas of Deir ez-Zor and came at the request of the people, chieftains, and elderlies of the tribes of the region, especially after ISIS attacks on civilians increased and posed a direct threat to their lives. The campaign involving the Special Anti-Terrorism Units (YAT) and in coordination with the international coalition and air support forces will continue until the goal set by the General Command is achieved.
SDF: First phase of the offensive completed
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SDF affirms commitment to protect children and schools
Affirmation of SDF policy towards the military use of schools and educational facilities and the protection of children.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Wednesday, 15 Jul 2020, 15:49
In accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1998 (2011) and 2143 (2014), regarding the military use of schools by military forces and its implications for the safety of children and education personnel, the SDF stresses the right to education during armed conflicts, as well as reducing the impact of the conflict on the safety of children and those who work in the educational field, and the provision of the necessary facilities to protect them from the dangers of military operations in areas under their security and military control. Accordingly, the SDF affirms its commitment to the following:
1- As part of our efforts in the SDF to protect children, schools, and educational personnel from the effects of armed conflict and military operations, and to ensure the civilian nature of schools as safe learning environments for children, the SDF is obligated to refrain from using schools for military purposes and from placing equipment or weapons near them, except in cases of extreme military necessity, when schools are exposed to aggression from other military parties and need protection. However, this action is carried out in full coordination with the civil authorities, including the Education Authority of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (EAAANES), as the civil authority vested in regulating schools, the educational process and facilities.
2- All members of the SDF are in full compliance with the Principle of Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives and the Principle of Precautions against the Effects of Attacks, as stipulated in the Law of Armed Conflict. Therefore, the SDF refrains from military use of schools in a manner that does not contradict its above commitment No. 1.
3- The SDF is obliged to take precautions while attacking schools where military targets are identified to avoid direct or incidental damage, and to resort to legal advisers accompanying military operations to assist commanders in making decisions.
4- All military leaders of the SDF in headquarters, as well as field officers and military personnel under their command, must be fully aware of these instructions and include this document in all training programs in schools and military academies of the SDF.
5- These instructions are included in the Rules of Military Engagement, related military policies, and in the overall military planning, preparation, and implementation of military operations by the SDF.
6- The SDF allows civil authorities and humanitarian actors, following coordination with and approval by the EAAANES, to access the sites, review the state of schools and make efforts to assess the damage to schools and remove military risks, which allows schools to be restored to their civilian nature.
7- The SDF is committed to cooperating fully with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and the United Nations Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting, including the exchange of appropriate information on violations and abuses against children.
8- As of the date of issuance of these instructions, the SDF shall proceed with the evacuation process of sites, which the EAAANES, as the official and duly constituted authority responsible for education, classifies as schools to complete the teaching process.
9- The SDF will abide by what is stated in this document. All SDF leaders and officers face penalties if they do not adhere to the above-mentioned instructions properly.
People of Til Berak protest against Turkish invasion
Demonstrations continue across North-East Syria against the genocidal campaign of the Turkish state seeking to invade the region as part of its expansionist policies.
ANF TIL BERAK Wednesday, 15 Jul 2020, 15:15
People took to the streets in the town of Til Berak, in the northern Syrian city of Qamishlo, in protest at the Turkish occupation attacks. The residents staged a protest march with banners reading “No to Ottoman invasion” and “We will frustrate all conspiracies”. The march was followed by a rally in the town center where Rusil Hesen from the women’s umbrella organization Kongreya Star addressed the crowd. Hesen denounced the inhuman crimes committed by the Turkish state in order to realize its Ottoman dreams. Hesen stressed that resistance was the only way out against occupation.
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Rojava University calls on academic world for support
The Rojava University called on the academic community for support as it continues its preparations for the new academic year.
NESRIN DENIZ
QAMISHLO
Monday, 13 Jul 2020, 11:04
The Rojava University has begun operating in 2016. It continues preparations for the new academic year.
With more than 20 departments, 210 lecturers and more than a thousand students, the Rojava University continues its preparations for the new academic year and calls on academics and friendly circles to support the Kurdish education institution.
Rojava University co-chair, Dr. Ebdulah Mistefa and Rojava University Foreign Relations officer Gulistan Sîdo talked to ANF.
Mistefa said that the university was forced to switch to online education due to the coronavirus threat and that many academics from different universities around the world supported them, making important contributions to the university despite the difficulties of the online education system.
Mistefa underlined that the academics who gave lectures online provided them with interesting experiences and added: “We have benefited a lot despite all the difficulties. In addition, we realized that we should look at the current situation from a wider window. On this basis, we needed to begin relations with places outside our region.”
Mistefa continued: “The opportunity to join the education system of our Rojava University through the online system to anywhere in the world has emerged.”
Mistefa said that they will open new departments after the training of the necessary academic staff and confirmed that they invited volunteer academics to Rojava. Likewise, Mistefa invited those who could not go to Rojava to help through online education and call on academics, especially Kurdish ones, to help them using the tools provided by internet.
Call to be launched on 19 July
Gulistan Sîdo, the Rojava University Foreign Relations officer, said that they contacted many academics from different universities around the world during the pandemic process and these academics have responded positively and helped by providing online education.
“We can improve the online education system and benefit from the educational experience of universities in other countries,” said Gulistan Sîdo.
Sîdo also announced that on 19 July they will launch a campaign for academic support through the publication of a call on behalf of the Rojava University.
Fighting ISIS in eastern Syria: Arab tribes in Deir ez-Zor seek military support from Kurdish-led SDF
Kurdish-led SDF commander Mazloum Abdi holds urgent meeting with Arab tribal leaders in Syria’s eastern Deir Ezzor province for fighting Islamic State (ISIS) remnants
HASAKAH, Syria (North Press) – Dozens of Arab tribes in Syria’s eastern Deir ez-Zor called on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for more military support to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) sleeper cells in the region, tribal leaders said in a meeting with SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi on Wednesday.
The SDF commander held an urgent meeting with the tribal leaders, who asked for the tightening of security procedures in the country’s east, near the border with Iraq, where ISIS sleeper cells have been very active the past few months, military sources told North Press.
The tribal leaders stressed intensifying the military support in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, especially Al-Shuhayl town near the border with Iraq.
Abdi has been holding meetings with Arab tribal leaders in several areas in northern and eastern Syria, including a meeting with Raqqa tribes and another with Tabqa tribes during the last month.
In all meetings between the SDF commanders and Arab tribes in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, the latter expressed their concern over the growing attacks of ISIS against civilians and a potential resurgence of the radical groups in the region.
The SDF, spearheaded by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and backed by the US-led Global Coalition, was the leading force responsible for ISIS’ fall in Syria, sacrificing over 13,000 fighters in the battles to regain territory from the terror group until the latter’s final loss in al-Baghouz on March 23, 2019.
ISIS sleeper cells have been active in the region since their defeat, but recent events, mainly the US troop withdrawal in January 2019 and subsequent Turkish invasion of the Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad regions in October of the same year, led to a security vacuum which emboldened the group.
Last year, former Special Envoy to the Global Coalition Against ISIS Brett McGurk stated that “the Islamic State and other extremist groups will fill the void opened by [the US] departure.”
Northeastern Syria has witnessed ISIS activity tied to sleeper cells in the region, including a series of attacks which resulted in the death of an SDF fighter on May 17 in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.
In addition, a major ISIS prison in Hasakah has witnessed repeated unrest as ISIS detainees attempted to take control of the prison, though anti-terror security forces associated with the SDF quickly controlled these uprisings.
On May 16, ISIS media accounts shared a nearly fifty-minute video which declared their loyalty to new leader Abu Ibraim al-Hashemi al-Quraishi, showed ISIS militants executing civilians, and threatened to attack security forces in Iraq.
(Reporting by Zana Ali and Hisham Arafat; editing by Lucas Chapman)
SERE KANIYE, Syria (North Press) – Even though Turkish forces and their affiliated opposition groups invaded the northern Syrian city of Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) in October 2019, Walid Mostafa stayed in his city in order to secure his house and possessions. He never expected to face such extreme violations, carried out in the light of day, with no one held accountable.
In a voice recording, he told a North Press correspondent that “the city’s sights have changed; strange flags flap over our heads, and strangers hang out in our city. We are being stolen publicly.”
Families in Sere Kaniye live in fear of the ongoing violations of Turkish-backed opposition groups in light of Turkey’s domination of the city, just as families in the currently Turkish-occupied Syrian city of Afrin.
Turkification policy
Walid said with a trembling voice, that “the city has turned into a Turkish province, where there are portraits of Kemal Ataturk (founding father of the Republic of Turkey), Turkish flags, in addition to teaching the Turkish language with Arabic in schools and forbidding the Kurdish language.”
Photos that Turkish-backed armed opposition groups posted on media websites showed the changes that took place in the city: hanging identification signs for organizations in Turkish and Arabic languages, as well as hanging the portrait of Turkish president Erdogan next to the founder of the Turkish Republic Ataturk inside the organizations.
Walid added that “they stole everything inside and outside the city, including livestock, houses…everything.”
“They arrest those who oppose them under the pretext of dealing with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),” he said.
Walid sent special photos to North Press that showed looted and burnt houses by Turkish-backed opposition groups in Sere Kaniye, under the pretext of dealing with SDF.
In June, the governor of the Turkish province of Urfa, Abdullah Areen, inaugurated a house belonging to a Kurdish family who had been displaced from the city of Sere Kaniye (Ras al-Ain) as an institute for the memorization of the Quran.
Al-Khabour Network published footage showing the governor of Urfa opening the institute. Muhyiddin Essu, a human rights activist residing in Germany, wrote on his personal account on Facebook that the house belongs to his family, and that “the governor committed systematic looting on the pretext of the opening of the institute.”
“Teaching the Holy Qur’an in stolen homes is immoral and contrary to Islamic principles,” Essu added.
During the Turkish operation in Sere Kaniye, Human Rights Watch published a report in which they accused Turkish-held armed opposition groups of murdering civilians who tried to return to their homes, as well as stealing and converting houses into headquarters, where they arrest and displace hundreds of people.
Disputes over spoils
Walid said that “three clashes took place in June and the beginning of July between Turkish-backed opposition groups over the sharing the spoils, shops, and houses.”
In July, North Press Agency wrote about clashes that took place between Turkish-backed armed opposition groups in Sere Kaniye, which resulted in the killing and wounding of dozens of members of the groups, amid civilians’ fears from the ongoing fighting between these groups.
Bad living conditions
Another source from Sere Kaniye said that the living situation is very bad, and the local councils in the city and its countryside have set the price of one ampere for generators at eight thousand Syrian pounds per week, while a gas tank is sold for 30,000 Syrian pounds. High prices include all basic foodstuffs inside the city.
He added, “If we do not die from a stray bullet from their clashes, we will die because of the deteriorating living situation.”
The same source pointed out that the local council imposed financial dealings in Turkish lira, but they retracted the decision after a popular protest.
Turkey imposed their own identification cards on residents of the area, taking shops by force from their owners and handing them to settlers coming from outside the city, the source added.
(Reporting by Delsoz Yossef, editing by Lucas Chapman)
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Syrian Kurds Alarmed Over UN Security Council Vote on Aid
BySirwan Kajjo
July 12, 2020 07:36 PM
FILE – A Syrian Kurdish woman chants slogans during a rally in the countryside of the Hasakah province, Syria, June 27, 2020, to protest deadly Turkish offensives in northeastern areas of the country.
WASHINGTON – Kurdish officials in northeast Syria are expressing disappointment following a vote by the United Nations Security Council that failed to address “the deteriorating humanitarian situation” in that part of the war-torn country.
The U.N. Security Council on Saturday approved a resolution authorizing an international program that will deliver aid to the rebel-held northwest Syrian province of Idlib through one border crossing.
However, the majority of the council, including the U.S., wanted to reopen another border crossing with Turkey and a third on Syria’s northeast border with Iraq in order to get aid to an estimated 1.3 million Syrians in need of medical supplies.
The Bab al-Hawa border crossing between Turkey and Idlib province will remain open to humanitarian aid for one year. The other two crossings, Bab al-Salama between Turkey and Syria’s Aleppo province, and al-Yaroubia, between northeast Syria and Iraq, will not be reopened.
The Security Council vote Saturday came after previous efforts to reauthorize the opening of Bab al-Hawa and al-Yaroubia failed by vetoes from Russia and China.
‘Unfolding catastrophe’
Local officials in northeast Syria say blocking aid through al-Yaroubia crossing would throw the already-volatile region into further uncertainty.
“With this decision, we are literally left alone to deal with an unfolding catastrophe,” said Luqman Ehmi, spokesman for the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in North and East of Syria.
“The Security Council failed to address what our region has been experiencing for a long time, and this is a very negative move against us,” he told VOA.
FILE – Members of a displaced Kurdish family sit at a public school they use as a temporary shelter, in Hasakah, Syria, Oct. 22, 2019.
The semiautonomous region is under the control of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a major U.S. partner in the fight against the Islamic State terror group. The partnership was key to liberate much of eastern Syria from IS militants.
Kelly Craft, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., said the U.S. “cannot disguise our disappointment at the loss of the Bab al-Salama and al-Yaroubia border crossings, which puts millions of Syrian women, children and men at risk.”
“To them, I say we will never back down. We will always have hope for your future and will continue to stand with you,” she said in a tweet after the Saturday vote.
Monopolizing aid
Russia, a major backer of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, has insisted that all international aid go through Damascus.
Humanitarian groups and officials, however, say the Syrian government monopolizes aid for political purposes.
They add that the decade-long conflict in Syria and the recent outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic have created a major humanitarian crisis in the country, including the northeast.
“The Syrian regime continues to impose high tariffs on anything that enters our region, including medical supplies,” said Kurdish spokesman Ehmi.
FILE – A displaced Syrian Kurdish woman, who fled violence with her family after a Turkish offensive in northeastern Syria, gives one of her children a shower at a public school they use as a temporary shelter, in Hasakah, Syria, Oct. 22, 2019.
Kemal Derbas of the Kurdish Red Crescent, one of the largest humanitarian groups that provides medical care to refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDP) in northeast Syria, says relying on Damascus for receiving international aid has proved futile.
“The Syrian regime doesn’t recognize most of the humanitarian groups that operate in northern Syria,” Derbas told VOA.
“This forces the World Health Organization (WHO), for example, to redirect its support to regime-held areas. The WHO used to deliver some aid and funding to us through al-Yaroubia border crossing, but after this Security Council voting it is no longer an option,” he said.
Some medical aid groups have shut down their operations because of a lack of funding, Derbas said, noting that about 300,000 IDP and refugees in northeast Syria will have no adequate access to medical services.
‘De facto embargo’
Some observers say the recent U.N. decision represents a de facto embargo on those Syrian regions that don’t have access to aid.
“People in SDF-held areas in northeast Syria will be deprived from much needed international aid” at a critical time, said Siruan Hadsch Hossein, a journalist at the local radio station Arta FM.
He told VOA that millions of civilians in northeast Syria, including hundreds of thousands in refugee camps, will immediately suffer the consequences of the U.N. move.
“This voting proves that the international community is not ready to find a resolution for the Syrian conflict,” Hossein said. “It is disgraceful that certain members of the Security Council such as Russia use humanitarian aid to score political points.”
KOBANI, Syria (North Press) – The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in northeast Syria announced on Thursday the inauguration of the first foodstuff factory in the country’s northern town of Kobani.
The Syrian government, under complete control of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, banned factories and universities in the country’s predominantly Kurdish north since 1960, until the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and the establishment of the Kurdish-led administration.
The Autonomous Administration’s Economic Authority opened a foodstuff factory called Khairat Al-Furat in the Qena Village west of Kobani.
North Press toured the factory, observing about 60 workers, most of whom are women, operating the factory.
The factory, which belongs to the public sector, manufactures jam, molasses, tomatoes, and peppers, in addition to spices, workers told North Press.
Factory director Kameran Omar told North Press that establishing the factory came as a response to the economic crisis and the tremendous rise in food prices in the region, especially after collapse of the local currency.
“We opened this factory to ease the burden on residents, who find it difficult to buy expensive products from the market,” he said.
“Despite the short period that has passed since the opening of the factory, it became clear to us that it has a great benefit to the workers in the factory and the population,” he continued.
He added that the goal of factory is not to make profit, but to benefit from the region’s resources and achieve self-sufficiency.
Most workers said they were happy to have a spirit of cooperation with their work, and a sense of responsibility in their human duty to contribute to and support to the region’s economy.
Amina Ali, a worker in the factory, said she joined the work to provide foodstuffs that the people of the region need.
“We work with all our efforts to achieve progress in an economic field to find a balance between supply and demand, and we seek with time to export foodstuffs out of the region.”
Young worker Fatima Bouzan expressed her joy over the factory’s opening.
“This project is a step towards progress and prosperity, as it has great benefit to workers here who were in urgent need of work,” she said.
For about five decades, northern Syria lacked economic projects that met the needs of the population. Currently, the Autonomous Administration is working on security and stability projects to clear the region from ISIS cells and terror groups, meaning that economic projects can sometimes be a second-tier priority.
(Reporting by Victor Mustafa, editing by Hisham Arafat and Lucas Chapman)
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YPG Martyr Omer Şêxo laid to rest in Hesekê
YPG fighter Omer Şêxo was laid to rest with a ceremony held at Martyr Dijwar graveyard in Hesekê.
ANF
HESEKÊ
Saturday, 11 Jul 2020, 11:32
YPG fighter Omer Şêxo, who fell martyr in Hesekê as a result of his illness on 5 July, was laid to rest with a ceremony held at Martyr Dijwar graveyard in the village of Dawidiyê.
Speaking at the military ceremony organized by the YPG, YPJ and SDF fighters, Martyrs’ Families Council member Sultan Ehmed said that they would continue their struggle on the path of the martyrs.
Speaking at the ceremony, PYD co-chair Ayşe Hiso paid tribute to all the martyrs of freedom and said: “Let’s stand against the invading Turkish state, which wants to destroy our values and the achievements of our people.”
Stressing that the fight against all crimes committed by the Turkish state will continue with determination, Ayşe Hiso added: “We will build a free and democratic Syria with our people’s will.”
After the speeches, the identity information of SDF fighter Amar Osman (Birusk) and HPG guerrilla Rüstem Cudi was also announced by the Martyrs’ Families Council.
The martyrdom paper of Martyr Omer Şexo was delivered to his family.
At the end of the ceremony, Martyr Omer’s body was buried, accompanied by slogans.
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Turkey weaponizes water and electricity against Syria’s Autonomous Administration areas
ISTANBUL, Turkey (North Press) – A state of dissatisfaction exists among activists and politicians concerned with Turkish affairs due to Turkey’s foreign policy, the latest of which is the restriction on the population of northeastern Syria, especially in Hasakah, by reducing the water level of the Euphrates River.
Turkey did not justify this measure, and observers believe that it aims to pressure the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria, ignoring the humanitarian situation and civilian need for water.
Observers added that this issue decreased electricity production, and interrupted a large number of water pumps needed to provide water to agricultural land, amid fears of the consequences if this situation continues.
Turkish activist Aisha Kaya, who is concerned with Syrian affairs, said in an interview with North Press that “Turkey may take this step in defiance of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Hasakah, Raqqa and parts of Deir ez-Zor, especially since Turkey accuses the SDF of reducing the electricity amount to the Operation Peace Spring area, which is a Turkish-held area, and this matter disturbed Turkey.”
Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish-backed armed opposition groups took control of the cities of Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad and their surrounding countrysides as part of Operation Peace Spring in October 2019. Since this time, residents in the region have reported many human rights abuses, including theft, looting, assault, kidnapping and murder.
Kaya added that “there is an agreement between the SDF and Turkey, under Russian auspices, in which SDF provides 15 megawatts of electricity to Turkish-held areas in northeastern Syria, and that the opposition’s Syrian National Army and local councils operate Alouk water station to supply Hasakah with water.”
“Alouk station is under Turkey’s control; it provides Hasakah governorate with water. Hence, Turkey’s pressure on the SDF may lower the water level of the Euphrates,” according to Kaya.
Kaya pointed out that “the sharp fall in Euphrates’ [water] level will affect the electricity that feeds Syria’s northeastern areas.”
Media sources said that co-chair of Executive Council of the Autonomous Administration Ilham Ahmad accused Turkey of attempting to control residents of Autonomous Administration areas, and that Turkey cut off drinking water flow from Alouk’s station to more than half a million people in Hasakah.
“Turkey cut off the Euphrates’ water after it built dams on it; by doing this it exposes the lives of about five million Syrians to risk,” Ahmed added.
According to an agreement signed between Syria and Turkey in 1987, Turkey must provide 500 cubic meters of water per second to Syria, though Turkey has thus far ignored the stipulations of this agreement.
Political motives
Mustafa Bazerkan, an Iraqi petrol and electricity expert, told North Press that “the Turkish step may have political aims: to put the Syrian government under pressure, or a means to discuss the amount of water…the third reason may be technical, keeping in mind that a year ago, there was also a problem with Iraq in releasing or reducing water, because Turkey filled the dam’s large reservoirs that have been established recently.”
In 2019, the Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources accused Turkey of causing a water shortage in Iraq, stating that the Tigris River’s supply of water at the Turkish border would decrease from 20.93 billion cubic meters annually to 9.7 billion cubic meters after the opening of the Turkish Ilisu Dam on the river.
According to observers, Turkey is weaponizing water and electricity against residents of Autonomous Administration areas to force them to accept its terms in the absence of international moves to stop Turkey, repeating the Iraqi scenario.
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SDF Spokesperson: Turkey prepares further attacks
Kino Gabriel, spokesman for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), warns of new attacks by Turkish invasion forces.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Wednesday, 8 Jul 2020, 13:11
Turkey seems to be preparing for another major attack on Rojava. The Turkish army is drawing together further troops in the areas it has occupied in north-east Syria. ANHA news agency interviewed SDF spokesman Kino Gabriel about the current developments and said: “The Turkish state is intensifying its attacks and constantly committing new crimes. Therefore, we are on alert and we are expecting a new large-scale attack at any moment. Recently, Turkey has been spreading the rumour that the SDF is breaking the ceasefire of 2019. This is a pretext for a new invasion. A new invasion is not unlikely. Preparations are being made for it.”
“We are coordinating with the US and Russia”
Gabriel explains that they are coordinating with the forces that brought about the ceasefire in October 2019: “These forces are the international coordination, the US and Russia. Our aim with this coordination is to prevent a possible attack by Turkey.”
Turkey is committing crimes”
As SDF, we are responding to the calls for a global ceasefire due to the Coronavirus pandemic and have fulfilled our responsibilities. But the Turkish state continues to commit crimes with its drone attacks and artillery fire.”
Gabriel warns that a new attack is dangerous. The destruction and flight that an attack will attempt will negatively affect the fight against the pandemic worldwide, he said.
Germany admits Turkish presence in Rojava “not legitimate”
For the first time, two years after the invasion of Northern and Eastern Syria carried out by Turkey, the German Federal Government admitted that the “occupation is not justified under international law.”
ANF
BERLIN
Monday, 6 Jul 2020, 09:58
The Federal Government replied to a question from Evrim Sommer (Die Linke) about the invasion of north-east Syria carried out by Turkey: “From the Federal Government’s perspective, the Turkish argument is not beyond doubt. With regard to the “Operation Peace Spring”, the Federal Government has announced that it cannot identify any reasons that would legitimize the operation under international law.”
With this reasoning, the Federal Government is following the findings of the Bundestag’s scientific services that the invasion of northern Syria is not covered by international law.
In October 2019, they had determined: “In the absence of a self-defense situation, the establishment of a Turkish ‘security zone’ in northern Syria does not constitute an act of self-defense permitted under international law. Even in the (hypothetical) case of self-defense, there is no doubt about the inappropriateness of the Turkish military operation.”
In addition, the Federal Government pledged the support of several health non-governmental organizations in Rojava with one million euros for measures against the Covid-19 pandemic. So far, the Federal Government had only financially supported forces that actively oppose the self-government of the region.
Commenting on the Federal Goevrnment’s reply, deputy Evrim Sommer said: “We welcome that the Federal Government is officially announcing for the first time that it recognizes no reasons that legitimize Turkey’s attacks against the democratic self-government in Northeast Syria under international law. It is a diplomatically wrapped but resounding slap in the face for the regime of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.”
The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) is a political assembly representing political parties and organizations in North and East Syria. The SDC creates a political framework for the governance of Syria along a decentralized, federal model. It is the political body to which the SDF reports. It is also the political counterpart to the Autonomous Administration, which takes on more administrative and executive functions. Negotiations with the Syrian government, as well as diplomatic relations with international powers, are generally conducted through the SDC.
Origins of the SDC
In its founding declaration, the Council set itself the task of “leading the Syrian revolutionary democratic movement along the right course, and ending the present fragmentation, bloodshed and darkness the country is being dragged through.”
The SDC, was created in 2015. 103 high-profile individual members and representatives of Syrian political parties and organizations were present at the congress which founded the SDC. In its founding declaration, the Council set itself the task of “leading the Syrian revolutionary democratic movement along the right course, and ending the present fragmentation, bloodshed and darkness the country is being dragged through.”
Participants in the founding congress of the SDC came from a range of political backgrounds and engaged in negotiations concerning key issues and principles behind the establishment of this new political body. One point of discussion which generated internal controversy was the continued use of the term “Syrian Arab Republic,” seen by many as part of the heritage of the oppressive Ba’ath regime. The congress eventually reached consensus on the term Democratic Syrian Republic, and agreed on a strategy of working towards a federal model for Syria rather than the top-down centralistic model of the Assad regime.
The SDC supported the development of the democratic administration of Manbij, Tabqa, Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor after they were liberated from ISIS by the SDF. At a congress of the SDC in July 2018, the decision was taken to create the Autonomous Administration to carry out the work of establishing communes, councils and confederalism in each region. This enabled SDC to focus on its role as a political body, rather than an administrative one.
How the SDC is organized
The SDC contains three main bodies: the Executive Council, the Political Council and the General Conference. In many ways the Executive Council takes a leadership function because it is smallest and meets most often. For instance, Executive Council chair Ilham Ahmed led a delegation to the United States Congress to discuss the Turkish invasion in October 2019. However, both the Political Council and the General Conference are larger and more representative and so are considered to be higher bodies. The General Conference meets only once a year, acting as a more direct form of democratic input but without much executive power. The Political Council meets on a monthly basis. The SDC organizes its work through several offices: the Organizational Office, Women’s Office, Foreign Relations Office, Media Office, Youth Office, Finance Office and Archive Office.
The SDC contains a mix of political parties, civil society organizations and individuals. The membership of the SDC represents all the components of society in North and East Syria; Arabs, Kurds, Syriac-Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians, Chechen and Turkmen. People who want to join the SDC as individuals must make a written submission outlining their goal in joining the assembly, and the relevant group within the SDC conducts research on that person and whether they are suitable for membership. To be considered for membership, the individual needs to accept the principles of the SDC, such as the co-chair system, be making a genuine effort to resolve the Syrian crisis, and be of Syrian nationality. The person does not need to be resident in Syria, as they can join the meetings via a digital platform.
Roles and responsibilities
We will not accept a situation like before, that the Ba’ath party making laws, dividing and destroying. We want the constitution to be changed, we want formal acceptance of the Kurds and Syriacs and Assyrians…so we can take our place in a diverse nation. We don’t accept Syrian politics without a place for all the people of Syria.
Jihat Omar, co-chair of the External Relations Office of the Syrian Democratic Council
The purpose of the SDC is to work towards a democratic confederal Syria through conversations, consensus building and diplomacy. The SDC poses itself as an alternative to the Syrian National Council, which has been criticized for being under the influence of Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as of the government of Turkey, where it is based. Like the Syrian National Council, the SDC is in opposition to the Assad regime. The SDC states its aim as bringing together a coalition of democratic forces within Syria to build the movement towards a democratic political solution for the country. The Council has a stated focus on ‘Syrian – Syrian dialogue’ to envision a future for Syria, rejecting the dominant framework of international powers such as Russia, Turkey or the USA determining the fate of the region. Three conferences have already been held as part of this process.
This ‘Syrian – Syrian dialogue’ process also includes meetings with opposition parties and personalities who are not engaging in the SDC system, both within Syria and in the diaspora. Through these meetings, Council members say they aim to understand the criticisms and reservations of those who do not participate in the system, and to build understanding and unity. There have also been meetings organized within Syria with different sectors of society. For instance, a meeting was organized in Ayn Issa in May 2019 which brought together members of the SDC and 5,000 Arab tribe leaders. The Council is planning a mass conference, aiming to bring together 2,000 intellectuals to develop ideas and solutions for the challenges facing Syria. The SDC also aims to bring together organizations in a ‘National Conference of Syria’ to build a unified political vision for Syria, strengthen the movement for a democratic, federal Syria, and further the case for participation in the Geneva talks to write a new constitution for Syria. However, the official process for writing a new Syrian constitution has recently started with no representation from the confederal structures of North and East Syria and only nominal inclusion of Kurdish minorities through ENKS. There is also no inclusion of women’s organizations from North and East Syria.
The diplomatic role of the SDC
The Council plays a diplomatic role both within Syria and internationally. In October 2019, following the Turkish invasion, a delegation headed by Ilham Ahmed, chair of the Executive Council, traveled to the USA. The delegation met with members of the US Congress on the 22nd October to discuss the future of North and East Syria. Delegations of the SDC have also met with government representatives across Europe, and members of the Council have attended meetings in countries around the world, including Australia, Lebanon and Tunisia.
The SDC is the political entity engaged in negotiations with the Syrian regime about the future of North and East Syria’s relationship with the Syrian government. The stance of the Council up to now has been that they want to be integrated within the Syrian state, but in a federal system with a degree of autonomy, and with guarantees of respect for all the ethnic and religious groups living in Syria.
The incorporation of the SDF into the Syrian Army has been a contested issue between the SDC and the Syrian government in discussions about possible integration of the political systems. For a long time maintaining the SDF as a separate military force was presented as a non-negotiable by the SDC, because “without defense forces, how should we be able to protect our people and our political vision?” (Jihat Omar, co-chair of the Foreign Relations Office of the SDC). Although the SDC lost a significant amount of bargaining power due to the Turkish invasion, they continue to affirm that “the autonomy of the SDF in the region protected by it” (General Command of the SDF, 30 October 2019) must be maintained, although they may concede some degree of integration.
ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – More than a dozen organizations have signed a letter to European human rights officials detailing abuses committed by Turkey and Turkish- backed groups in northern Syria.
“Since the start of Turkish military operations on the areas of Kurdish origin in northern Syria, the region has turned into a hotspot full of all forms of human rights violations,” reads the letter addressed to Marija Pejčinović Burić, Secretary General of the Council of Europe and Robert Ragnar Spano, President of the European Court of Human Rights.
The 18 signatories have unanimously accused Ankara and its Syrian proxies of committing “war crimes, crimes against humanity, as well as crimes of ethnic cleansing and genocide.”
Turkey and its Syrian proxies launched a military operation against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northern Syria in October 2019, seizing control of a stretch of northern Syria, known to Kurds as Rojava, including Sari Kani (Ras al-Ain) Gire Spi (Tal Abyad). Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced in the offensive.
The military offensive, dubbed “Operation Peace Spring”, followed the March 2018 invasion of Afrin, in Aleppo province, which came under control of Turkish forces and their Syrian militia proxies following two months of intense fighting with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). Since then, human rights monitors have accused these groups of serious violations against locals.
“The opposition prevented the displaced civilians from returning to their homes, practiced theft, robbery, plunder, armed robbery, confiscated property and crops, burned them, burned forests, abducted civilians, and arbitrarily arrested them. Cemeteries and cultural symbols were destroyed,” the letter added.
Violations have been “confirmed by reports of governmental organisations, and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the reports of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry for Syria.”
According to numerous organizations, Turkish-backed armed groups in northwestern Syria have committed repeated violations against the local population with impunity, including killing, kidnapping, and sexual violence.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in a late November report that pro-Turkish militiamen prevented Syrian Kurds from returning to their homes. Instead, they “looted and unlawfully appropriated or occupied their property.”
“Executing individuals, pillaging property, and blocking displaced people from returning to their homes is damning evidence of why Turkey’s proposed ‘safe zones’ will not be safe,” said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East director at HRW.
Prominent war monitor the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) confirmed to Rudaw English that it had signed the petition.
Other signatories include the Kurdish Committee for Human Rights, Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Austria, The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Syria (MAF) and Kurdish Civil Society Organization in Europe.
Turkey blocked the water supply from the Euphrates into Kurdish-held areas in northeast Syria last week, according to local officials.
Ilham Ahmed, president of the Executive Committee of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) said that Ankara “intentionally” withheld the water to induce “a real drought in Syria.”
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Vocational training center for women opens in Kobani, north Syria
Kobani – Opening a vocational training center for women – North Press
KOBANI, Syria (North Press) – The Free Women’s Foundation in the Euphrates region opened a center for training women in the city of Kobani on Sunday which aims to assist women and empower them economically and educationally.
“Women started training on first aid, sewing, hairdressing, literacy in both Arabic and Kurdish, and computer literacy in the Ari Center for Training, said Amina Muhammad, an official in the Foundation.
“About 70 women joined the training courses, and the number is expanding.”
The duration of the courses ranges between one to three months, Muhmmad stated.
She added that the goal of the courses is to empower the women economically by teaching them professions and providing them job opportunities to achieve economic independence and help their families.
The Free Women’s Foundation in the Euphrates region opened a center for training women in the town of Sirrin, south of Kobani, on February 26 this year.
(Reporting by Fattah Issa, editing by Lucas Chapman)
NORTHEASTERN SYRIA – (North Press) – Ilham Ahmad, the executive president of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) accused Turkish authorities of trying to create a drought in Syria by cutting off Syria’s share of the Euphrates River.
“The Euphrates River has been a life source for the people of the region since the beginning of human civilization; Turkey, through a number of dams, deliberately reduced the water level to create drought in Syria,” Ahmad tweeted.
Ahmad attached a video showing a marked drop in the water level in the Euphrates River basin, and a large area of the river basin being transformed into dry land that was previously submerged in water.
The video shows a person speaking from behind the camera, who says nowadays the Turks have cut off the waters of the Euphrates River, confirming that he is walking in the middle of the river on foot, and only a small part of the river remains.
On Saturday, the General Administration of Dams in the Euphrates Region announced the reduction of power supply hours for areas in northeastern Syria due to the significant drop in the water level of the dams, accusing Turkey of cutting off water.
An agreement concluded between Syria and Turkey in 1987 stipulates a commitment Turkey to provide a flow of water at a rate of 500 cubic meters per second to Syria, and in 1994 Syria registered the agreement signed with Turkey at the United Nations to ensure the minimum amount of water.
Engineer Jihad Bayram, head of the Operations Room in Tishreen Dam, told North Press earlier that the water supply that crosses the Euphrates River does not exceed 200 cubic meters of water, although the agreements stipulate that the water intake should be 500 cubic meters per second.
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Syrian Kurds say Turkish charity dwarfed by stolen produce
As Turkey touts its humanitarian aid deliveries to Syria’s Idlib, critics weigh the six truckloads of supplies against its thousands of tons of allegedly looted Syrian grain.
A woman pushes a cart loaded with a sack of wheat in Qamishli, Syria, Sept. 18, 2017. Photo by REUTERS/Rodi Said.
Amberin Zaman @amberinzaman
Jun 22, 2020
Turkey’s state-run Anadolu news agency reported that on Monday, two Turkish charities had sent six trucks carrying humanitarian aid to the rebel-held province of Idlib in northwest Syria.
“Truckloads of supplies including flour, clothing and dry food [donated] by the Adana Dosteller and Eskisehir Gunisigi charities entered Idlib through the Yayladagi border crossing in Turkey’s southern Hatay province. The aid will be distributed among families living in tents in Idlib,” Anadolu reported.
Turkey’s generosity to millions of displaced Syrians inside Syria and Turkey alike has been well documented. But critics of Ankara’s Syria policy charge that it’s giving with one hand and stealing with the other.
A report released today by Syrians for Truth and Justice, a non-partisan nonprofit documenting human rights violations in Syria, lays out in exhaustive detail how the Turkish government has facilitated commerce conducted by its Syrian National Army allies in looting grain. The grain is from eight silos that were confiscated in October during Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, which resulted in Turkey’s occupation of a large swath of territory between the towns of Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ain formerly controlled by the United States’ Syrian Kurdish allies.
Based on interviews with a range of actors including National Army commanders as well as employees at the grain silos, Syrians for Truth and Justice unveiled a network of grain dealings conducted by a Turkish government company — the Turkish Grain Board, known as TMO for short — and “armed groups’ commanders who personally seized amounts of the grain storage” and “then sold them to either local or Turkish merchants” and kept the proceeds for themselves. The theft is documented by satellite imagery showing transportation trucks taking the grain away from the silos.
The allegations will further blot Turkey and the National Army’s image in northeast Syria. Ankara is accused of overseeing or directly participating in a panoply of abuses, including summary executions, abductions, looting, crop burning and weaponizing water against the Kurds.
The Kurdish-led administration in northeastern Syria told the authors of the report that it had left behind about 730,000 tons of wheat, barley, fertilizers, cotton and seed as it withdrew in the face of advancing Turkish forces. “This stock is the strategic reserve for the next three years and constitutes 11% of the total stock of Raqqa and Hasakah provinces,” said Salman Baroudo, the co-chair of the commerce committee of the autonomous administration.
A ton of wheat produces around 850 kilograms of flour, and a ton of flour produces 1.2 tons of bread, explained an autonomous administration official to illustrate the scale of the loss.
The Syrian National Army denied that it was engaged in any looting from grain silos but officials from the Istanbul-based Syrian Interim Government and employees of the local councils claimed the opposite.
Syrians for Truth and Justice executive director Bassam al-Ahmad told Al-Monitor in a telephone interview that the looting “fits a broader pattern of abuses as were perpetrated in Turkish-occupied Afrin. Turkey is buying looted wheat.” Afrin is the Kurdish-majority enclave that was occupied by Turkey in 2018. Crimes committed by Turkey’s Sunni rebel allies have been well documented. They include rape, arbitrary detentions and industrial-scale extortion of local olive farmers, with much of their oil finding its way to Turkey and exported to foreign markets under Turkish labels, Germany’s Deutsche Welle reported.
The TMO insists that it only imports surplus barley but no wheat from Syria. But the trade is driving up prices, noted Elizabeth Tsurkov, a Syria expert and fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. She told Al-Monitor, “It’s absolutely true that wheat and grain is being looted. I’ve confirmed it with the factions. They are stealing the wheat and barley that is cultivated in large swaths of land between Ras al-Ain and Tell Abyad and selling it to Turkey.”
Tsurkov added that Turkey was offering more money for the commodities “than any other actor in Syria is offering to farmers. Therefore there is a clear incentive to sell to Turkey.”
But even as Turkey engages in such transactions, it continues to prevent any flow of humanitarian aid from its borders to the Kurdish-held areas. The COVID-19 pandemic has not softened Turkey’s stance while the collapse of the Syrian currency has compounded people’s misery across the country.
Protests erupted today in Tell Abyad and the town of Suluk, also under Turkish control, over deteriorating living conditions and rising food prices, especially that of bread.
In Suluk, a crowed gathered outside the local Turkish-appointed council and called for its removal, reported the Violation Documentation Centre in North Syria in a tweet. It said in a separate call for action yesterday that Turkish soldiers were targeting farmers on the Turkish-Syrian border. Syrian Kurdish farmer Muhayuddin Abdurazak died after allegedly being shot by a Turkish border guard on May 17.
Thomas McClure, a researcher at the Rojava Information Center, which publishes reports on the Kurdish-controlled region for international audiences, told Al-Monitor that the area affected by Operation Peace Spring encompasses 440,000 hectares of arable land producing up to 763,000 tons of wheat. “Turkey’s instillation of proxy militias ın this once productive region has severely impacted the remainder of northeast Syria and those civilians who have remained in the zone of occupation. The loss of vital arable land places further pressure on the remainder of the northeast, where per UN figures 1.94 million people are in need of humanitarian aid,” he noted.
McClure backed up Syrians for Truth and Justice, saying, “Grain silos were rapidly looted, with tens of thousands of tons of wheat transferred to Turkey for sale or sold to local merchants at extortionate prices. Bread, the local staple, doubled in price in the months following the invasion, while other local essentials like cooking gas are now five times as expensive as elsewhere in northeast Syria.”
The governor of Turkey’s Sanliurfa province, where the occupation is administered from, told Anadolu last week that Turkey would be opening a new gate between Ras al-Ain and the Turkish border town of Ceylanpinar. Abdullah Erin said the gate would be “for both Ras al-Ain and Ceylanpinar,” much as the opening of a gate from Turkey’s nearby border town of Akcakale had been for Tell Abyad. The pro-government Daily Sabah reported, “Citizens frequently voice that daily life is getting better as a result of the reconstruction of infrastructure” in Tell Abyad and in Ras al-Ain. Today’s protest paints a different picture.
KOBANI, Syria (North Press) – The General Administration of Dams in the Euphrates Region announced on Saturday the reduction of electricity hours for the Jazira region due to the massive decrease in the level of the dam’s water. The Administration accused the Turkish state of cutting water to the regions of North and East Syria.
The General Administration of Dams in the Euphrates Region declared in a statement that was read at Tishreen Dam that “the water supply of the Euphrates River from the Turkish state reached less than a quarter of the internationally agreed-upon quantity.”
Engineer Jihad Bayram, head of the operations room at Tishreen Dam, told North Press that, “according to international agreements, the water intake should be 500m3 per second, whereas now it is 200m3 per second.”
“Turkey besieges [northeast Syria] by controlling the water supply of the region,” he added.
“The General Administration of Dams announced that it will adopt a electricity supplying program for ten hours, from 2 p.m. until 12 a.m., until further notice while monitoring the low reservoir levels. A new program will be approved if the water level falls more than that, so the lakes do not reach the “dead zone”, where the lakes cannot generate electric power,” according to the statement.
“The supplying period will be ten hours, from 2 p.m. until 12 a.m., is for the Euphrates region by the Euphrates Dam and Tishreen. As for the Jazira region, it will be supplied from 8 p.m. until 6 a.m. by the Swedeya Dam in the Derik countryside, which works on oil energy.”
The statement concluded that reducing water to northern Syria will directly affect environmental wealth and agricultural products, and will affect the community’s economy and the general food security of the average citizen.
(reporting by Fattah Issa, editing by Lucas Chapman)
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Turkish drone strike kills 3 women in north Syria’s Kurdish city of Kobani
Three women reportedly killed in a Turkish drone strike that targeted a civilian residence in the northern Syrian city of Kobani. (Photo: Social Media)
ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – A Turkish drone strike on Tuesday evening killed three civilian females at a residence in the village of Helincê, located outside the northern Syrian city of Kobani, according to local security forces.
The General Command of the Kurdish-led Internal Security Forces (ISF), also known as the Asayesh, in an official statement said blamed the “Turkish occupation” for the attack.
“We in the General Command of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) for Northeast Syria condemn the crimes of the Turkish occupation against our people and we also call on the International Coalition and the Russian Federation to do their duty.”
The ISF demanded that the United States and Russia hold Turkey to its stated commitment to the “ceasefire agreement between the two states of Russia and Turkey.”
After Turkey intervened in northeastern Syria in October 2019, Russia and the US reached separate ceasefire deals with Ankara, which allowed Turkish troops to control the area between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain (Serikaniye).
Despite the agreements, Turkish-backed groups and Turkish army continue to occasionally target areas held by the SDF. In some cases, villagers living in the Syrian-Turkish border areas were killed in attacks by the Turkish army and Turkish-backed rebel forces.
The aftermath of the deadly Turkish drone strike on a civilian residence in the northern Syrian city of Kobani, June 23, 2020. (Photo: Hawar News Agency)
“Zehra Berkel is one of the women who died during the Turkish attacks. She is a coordinating member of the Kongra Star women’s movement,” read the official Twitter account of the women’s rights organization, based in Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava).
“She was struggling or women’s rights. The attack… targeted women. This is another example of Turkey showing its patriarchal face,” the organization said.
According to the local Hawar News Agency (ANHA) the other two victims were Mizgin Xelil and the owner of the house, Amina Waysi.
This was not the first Turkish drone attack in Kobani. On April 28, a previous one targeted a checkpoint of the ISF, though resulted in no casualties or significant damage.
Local officials and Kurdish civilians fear Kobani could still be a target for a possible Turkish attack in the future because the city was a global symbol in the fight against the Islamic State.
“All of the cities at the border are under threats, but particularly when it comes to Kobani, even the Russians tell us from time to time that there is the danger that the Turks will attack you again,” Ilham Ahmed, President of the Executive Committee of the Syrian Democratic Council, said during a May 29 online event organized by the Kurdistan Solidarity Campaign.
“So this is something that the Russians inform us of. So, of course there is a fear that Kobani will be attacked.”
QAMISHLI, Syria (North Press) – Syriac, Assyrian and Arab prominent figures on Wednesday applauded the intra-Kurdish dialogue in Syria stating it would not exclude other communities from ruling the country’s northeast.
“The agreement between the Kurdish National Council in Syria (ENKS) and the [PYD-led]Kurdish National Unity parties is in the interest of the region and solves their political disputes,” Gabriel Moushe, a senior official at the Christian Assyrian Democratic Organization told North Press.
He pointed out that the agreement will not exclude other communities in the area, but rather it solves internal Kurdish political issues.
Moushe also noted that any agreement between the Kurdish factions should take the other communities of northeastern Syria into consideration.
Last week, ENKS and the [PYD-led] Kurdish National Unity parties announced they reached an initial understanding on a political vision for Syria stemming from the 2014 Duhok agreement.
This understanding came after a long-term intensive dialogue on the initiative of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi and with direct American support and sponsorship.
The dispute between the two Kurdish factions, ENKS which is a group of Kurdish political parties affiliated with the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition, and PYD, the main Kurdish party in northeast Syria began after the breakout of the Syrian civil war in 2012.
Arab Communities’ position
Amer Sheikh Halosh, an Arab community leader and lawyer, told North Press, “Kurdish participation in the Syrian political scene is important.”
“The intra-Kurdish talk plays a significant role in founding a future with no conflicts and crises,” he added.
But he further pointed out that the agreement of two Kurdish blocks didn’t contain all Kurdish parties in Syria.
“The Kurdish Democratic Progressive parties, Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria (Yekiti) and many other Kurdish parties,” he said.
Halosh also rejected the accusation that the main Kurdish parties would exclude the other communities from ruling the area.
“Talks that accuse the two parties that their agreement and understanding on specific percentage is at the expense of other communities in the region, are incorrect, and this dialogue is the right policy which Syria needs,” he said. Christian Communities’ stance
Hana Somi, a senior member of the Syriac Union Party, said the talks among the Kurdish political parties would have positive influences on the region.
“[Kurdish talks] are not against Arabs, Syriac or other communities and what is rumoured about power sharing at the expense of the communities are incorrect,” he said.
He added that the intra-Kurdish dialogue will strengthen cooperation and understanding between parties and other Syriac institutions.
Dohuk agreement in 2014 was signed between ENKS and the PYD-led Council, known as TEV-DEM, in the city of Duhok in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. It provided for the formation of a Kurdish political authority in Syria, but it failed due to mutual accusations between the two parties.
(Reporting by Reem Shamoun; Editing by Hisham Arafat)
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80-year-old Kurdish man tortured to death in Afrin
The Turkish state and mercenaries continue to target civilians in Afrin. Hardly a day passes without reports of crimes in the occupied territories of North and East Syria.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Thursday, 11 Jun 2020, 16:04
Human Rights Organization- Afrin reported that the dead body of an 80-year-old Kurdish man called Aref Abdo Khalil, alias Aref Khatouneh, was found thrown near Lake Maidanki.
According to reliable local sources the victim had been kidnapped from his home village of Qezilbash, in Afrin’s Bilbile district on June 9. The area is under the sway of notorious Sultan Murad Turkmeni militias of Jaish al Nukhba.
The dead body of the disabled old man, who used to sit in a wheelchair, was found naked bearing traces of torture yesterday morning.
Local sources said that the victim had been kidnapped by Jaish al-Nukhba militiamen who broke into his home and stole his money.
The Turkish state has established a “terror regime” in all the areas it has occupied in North-East Syria. On April 23, the invaders kidnapped Sheikh Inezan, a prominent figure from the Neim tribe, which is among the most important tribes of the region.
On April 4, three civilians were kidnapped and then executed in the area between the villages of Kopirlik and Evdokoy. On the very dame day, a civilian named Sileman Bekre was kidnapped by the invaders in Afrin.
Two days ago, on June 9, eight civilians were kidnapped in the village of Raco, in Mabata by Jabhat al-Shamiya mercenaries who asked for ransom to release those detained.
16-year-old Malak Nabih Khalil was kidnapped by the Sultan Murad Brigade mercenaries on May 23. Her lifeless body has been found near the village of Firiziya in Azaz region on June 5.
Afrin has been under the occupation of the Turkish state and its mercenary allies for over two years now. The attacks of the Turkish state against Afrin began on 20 January 2018 and the invasion of the city was carried out on 18 March 2018. Since the invasion, war crimes have been systematically committed in the region. Almost every day, crimes such as the confiscation of property belonging to local people, kidnapping of civilians for ransom, torture or executions are carried out.
The occupation forces controlled by Ankara use the abductions to extort ransoms. This method has become a lucrative source of income. At least 500 cases of ransom handovers have been reported so far. Turkish-backed militias demand an equivalent of between 3,000 and 100,000 euros, depending on the ability of the victims’ relatives to pay.
Videos circulated on social media in late May showed the evacuation of abducted and imprisoned women prisoners found in an internment camp of the pro-Turkish militia Furqat al-Hamza. A number of Kurdish women, many of them Yazidis, were abducted after the invasion of the city by the Turkish army in spring 2018, and many are still in the prisons of the militias commanded by Turkey, being tortured and sexually abused. Protests against violent attacks on defenceless civilians, especially women, have been ongoing since, demanding urgent action by the international authorities which have remained silent on the Turkish occupation and resulting crimes in the region.
Turkey-linked mercenaries kidnap 11 civilians in Afrin
The Turkish state and mercenaries continue to target civilians in Afrin. Hardly a day passes without reports of crimes in the occupied territories of North and East Syria.
ANF
SHEHBA
Tuesday, 9 Jun 2020, 11:48
According to local sources 8 civilians have been kidnapped in the village of Raco, in Mabata by Jabhat al-Shamiya mercenaries. The mercenaries said they will release the kidnapped civilians if a ransom is paid. The kidnapped people have been named locally as Elî Hemo, Husên Şêxo, Ezîz Şêxo, Betal Mihemed Şêxo, Heysem Remzî Hecî Hemo, Henîf Arif Şerê, Mihemed Birîm and Henîf Henan.
Sources in the region also told ANHA that eventually two of the kidnapped civilians, Henîf Henan and Mihemed Birîm, were released after ransom was paid while there is no information about the fate of the others.
In addition, a source from the village of Meimila in Mabata, said that many more civilians were abducted by the mercenaries.
Only some of the names of the kidnapped people could be learned: Lawend Umer Simo (20), Mihemed Menan Birîm (32) and Ciwan Şukrî Umer (20).
The occupation forces kidnapped 16-year-old Malak Nabih Khalil by the Sultan Murad Brigade mercenaries on May 23. Her lifeless body has been found near the village of Firiziya in Azaz region two days ago.
According to reports revealed in late May, 11 women who had been abducted in 2018 were subject to brutal torture for two years. The women were hidden from their familes during the mentioned period of time.
The Turkish state has established a “terror regime” in all the areas it has occupied in North-East Syria. On April 23, the invaders kidnapped Sheikh Inezan, a prominent figure from the Neim tribe, which is among the most important tribes of the region.
On April 4, three civilians were kidnapped and then executed in the area between the villages of Kopirlik and Evdokoy. On the very dame day, a civilian named Sileman Bekre was kidnapped by the invaders in Afrin.
Afrin has been under the occupation of the Turkish state and its mercenary allies for over two years now. The attacks of the Turkish state against Afrin began on 20 January 2018 and the invasion of the city was carried out on 18 March 2018. Since the invasion, war crimes have been systematically committed in the region. Almost every day, crimes such as the confiscation of property belonging to local people, kidnapping of civilians for ransom, torture or executions are carried out.
The occupation forces controlled by Ankara use the abductions to extort ransoms. This method has become a lucrative source of income. At least 500 cases of ransom handovers have been reported so far. Turkish-backed militias demand an equivalent of between 3,000 and 100,000 euros, depending on the ability of the victims’ relatives to pay.
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Water as a weapon of war
2 June 2020
Turkey is restricting access to a vital life source for thousands of people in northeast Syria. A new crowdfunder is raising money for water infrastructure in the region, writes Jo Taylor from the campaign.
In an area of northern Syria, already struck by desertification which has been dramatically intensified by the global climate crisis, water is being used as a weapon of war.
For the past eight years the region commonly known by its Kurdish name of Rojava has been experimenting with building up an ecological and feminist system of self-governance. In this system, ordinary people make decisions about how their towns and neighbourhoods are run and women’s freedom is considered fundamental.
Turkey invaded Rojava in October 2019 after Trump announced US military withdrawal from the region. Turkish forces bombed the main water station on the first day of the invasion of Serekaniye (a city whose name, in Kurdish, means ‘fountainhead’, or ‘water source’) and surrounding towns and villages. Since then, the water has been shut-off on five further occasions, denying more than 650,000 people of access to water, just as the Covid-19 pandemic hit.
Since the subsequent invasion and occupation of Serekaniye and Tel Abyad in late 2019, water is now being weaponized and water infrastructure targeted as never before
In addition to this, Turkey has dammed the rivers which flow from Turkey into Syria and Iraq, detaining water inside its own borders, causing a big reduction in the flow of water to the wider region – by an estimated 80 per cent to Iraq and by around 40 per cent to Syria.
In response to the ongoing crisis, UK-based co-operative the Solidarity Economy Association (SEA) has come together with a number of other international organizations and women’s structures in Rojava to launch a big crowdfunding campaign for water infrastructure and women’s co-operatives in the region. It aims to raise £100,000 ($123,463).
The #Water4Rojava crowdfunding campaign launched on 16 May and reached £25,000 ($30,865) in the first week. The campaign is also being match funded up to the first £50,000 and is being supported by well-known figures, including British actress Maxine Peak, David Graeber, Debbie Bookchin, Janet Biehl and world-renowned photographer Joey Lawrence.
‘Most of the water sources in the region were in Serekaniye and we lost them with the invasion,’ explains Heval Armanc from Aborîya Jin (Women’s Economy) – an autonomous women’s economic body in northeast Syria.
‘We have been struggling a lot more since we lost access to the water resources. We have some women’s economy projects, like our project in Derîk (another city in Rojava), where we are digging wells, planting trees and building houses. With all that we do, we are mindful about nature and not to cause any harm.’
Aborîya Jin’s main role is to help women set up and run projects like agriculture and textile co-operatives, and communal living projects with collective livelihoods. ‘If we are working alone, those projects will move very slowly, but with support the project can be very successful, that’s why the Water for Rojava campaign is very important. Access to water is even more vital now with the global pandemic – you need water to be clean and safe,’ says Armanc.
Turkey controls 90 per cent of the waterflow of the Euphrates, and around 44 per cent of the Tigris, the two main rivers of the region. Since 1992, the government has built 22 major dams which hold back the headwaters of these two great rivers.
Within Turkey’s borders, hundreds of towns and villages have been submerged and (mostly Kurdish) residents forced into cities and away from traditional ways of life. Downstream in Iraq, regions such as the ecologically and culturally unique Mesopotamian Marshes and the Marsh Arabs who depend on them for subsistence are also at threat of extinction.
In Syria, Turkey has been directly at war with the predominantly Kurdish population of the northern regions since its invasion and continued occupation of Afrin in early 2018. This is now escalating since the subsequent invasion and occupation of Serekaniye and Tel Abyad in late 2019, and water is now being weaponized and water infrastructure targeted as never before.
The local Directorate of Water, the citizen-led municipalities, the Women’s Economy, local charities and NGOs, all have plans for alternative measures to provide water, but pressures such as an economic embargo on the region and food insecurity caused by the depleted water supply, climate change and the ongoing conflict, mean that there are not enough funds to go ahead with all the projects. That’s where #Water4Rojava can help.
SOHR: ISIS battalion from Iraq works for Turkish intelligence
SOHR reported that an Iraqi battalion of ISIS members working for “Ahrar Al-Sharqiayyah” and Turkish intelligence.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Monday, 8 Jun 2020, 08:51
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that a battalion which comprises tens of ISIS members operates under the banner of “Ahrar Al-Sharqiyyah” and consists of nearly 40 Iraqi fighters, works for the Turkish intelligence.
According to SOHR sources, the battalion works in northern Syria with a task of carrying out executions and detonations. In addition, they are tasked with spy on ISIS foreign members who try to flee to the Turkish territory and the undercover members in Aleppo countryside, so that the battalion can arrest them. Some of those arrested ISIS members were imprisoned or executed, while others were taken to Turkey in return for large sums of money. Reliable SOHR sources confirmed that those members in prisons have been compromised in order to be sent to fight in Libya.
The Observatory said: “The headquarters of the battalion, which is led by a person known as (Abu Waqqas Al-Iraqi), is in Al-Bab city in north-eastern Aleppo. A notorious prison belonging to the battalion is also located in the area. It is worth noting that Al-Iraqi used to travel comfortably between Turkey and Aleppo countryside. Al-Iraqi appeared in a picture taken in the Turkish state of Urfah documenting his meeting with Abu Osama Al-Tayanah, an ISIS commander.”
Reliable sources have informed SOHR that Abu Waqqas has been laying low for nearly two months, while it is not known whether he has been involved in military operations in Libya on the side of the “Government of National Accord”, or travelled to Egypt with large sums of money in his possession, like Abu Hudhayfah Al-Hamawi did. Abu Hudhayfah, a former commander in “Ahrar Al-Sham”, fled to Egypt after stealing large sums of money from “Ahrar Al-Sharqiyah” when the formation was established and joined “Ahrar Al-Sham movement” at that time.
“The Iraqi battalion recently transported prisoners from its prison in Al-Bab to Idlib city, where a commander in Hayyaat Tahrir Al-Sham known as (Abu Ali Al-Iraqi) has received them. It is worth noting that (Belal Al-Shawashi Al-Tunsi, Abu Al-Waleed Al-Tunsi and Abu Osama Al-Iraqi) as well as other Egyptians were among the prisoners who have been transported to Idlib. All of these prisoners who have been taken to Idlib are ISIS commanders. The battalion also established another headquarters recently in Al-Bab city,” SOHR sources added.
“Moreover, the Iraqi battalion used to bury people it killed in a mass grave on the outskirts of Susanbat village on the road between Al-Bab and Al-Ra’i in the north-eastern countryside of Aleppo. SOHR has obtained information about the fact that this battalion has killed nearly 300 civilians, combatants and ISIS members buried in the battalion’s mass grave in Aleppo.”
SOHR state that, on January 16, 2020, Thabet Al-Hwaysh, a security official in Ahrar Al-Sharqiyyah, was killed in a car-bomb explosion in Siluk town in northern Al-Raqqah. Al-Hwaysh was the one responsible for transferring money to Abu Waqqas Al-Iraqi from Al-Bab city to Turkey, during the period when Abu Waqqas was in Turkey.
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Assyrian villages in the Khabur valley under constant attack
Of the 20,000 Assyrians who were living in the Khabur valley in northeast Syria before the war began in 2011, only about 1,000 remain today. Madeleine Khamis, commander of the “Khabur Guards”, fears that even the last Assyrians will be forced into exile.
ANF
HESEKÊ
Tuesday, 26 May 2020, 13:36
According to Madeleine Khamis, commander of the Assyrian combat unit “Khabur Guards”, the Christian inhabitants of the Khabur valley cannot return to their homeland in the long run. As long as their settlement areas in northeast Syria are threatened by the Turkish army and its Islamist allies, the last members of the Assyrian community will probably be forced into exile, Khamis fears.
Programmes and projects to promote the return of displaced persons and their reintegration had to be put on hold due to the war of aggression launched last October by NATO member Turkey and its proxy invasion troops, the so-called “Syrian National Army” (SNA) – an association of extremist FSA militias, members of the “Al-Nusra Front”, Turkmen groups and other jihadist factions from the largely Turkish-held Idlib province.
After the liberation of Til Temir (Tal Tamr), the Khabur guards, together with Christian organizations, had succeeded in bringing exiled Assyrians back into the country. Now that the Khabur valley is in Turkey’s sights, no one believes that the return projects will be resumed soon. Time and again, the region is at the centre of invasion attacks to integrate it into the illegal occupation zone.
20,000 Christian population before the war in Til Temir
The Khabur river extends along the Khabur valley in the northeast of Syria. Here, where the town of Til Temir (Kurdish name: Girê Xurma), a reflection of the population mosaic of Syria, is located, the Nestorians – Assyrians from (Hakkari – who had fled to northern Iraq during the genocide of Christians in the Ottoman Empire between 1914 and 1918, settled in 1933. The League of Nations in Geneva awarded them the settlement area. Their second exodus was preceded by the Simele massacre: some 9000 Assyrians, mainly men and young people, were murdered in various villages in the Duhok region. The village of Simele, which was particularly affected, gave its name to this genocide. There, under the leadership of the Iraqi military, some 350 people died.
Madeleine Khamis
The Assyrians from Hakkari founded 33 villages in the flat valley of the Khabur, while Chaldean Christians settled in another three villages. Before the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, about 20,000 Assyrian Christians were still living here, in almost every village there was a church. Now there are not even 1,000 people left. Because of the jihadists almost all inhabitants fled abroad, most went to Canada, Australia or the US. Some of the villages are completely empty, those who stayed are mostly elderly people. Also, several hundred internally displaced persons from other regions of the country now live in Til Temir.
Most of the inhabitants of Til Temir had already fled towards the end of 2012, when mercenaries of the “Free Syrian Army” (FSA) shifted their attacks on Christians in the west and east to the northern regions and threatened to invade the city. Throughout the year there were repeated massacres, attacks and kidnappings in Homs, Damascus and Deir ez-Zor. Tn time the circle of perpetrators expanded to almost all armed jihadist militias, above all the “Al-Nusra Front”. Churches were desecrated and bombed, Christian villages systematically attacked and depopulated, religious dignitaries kidnapped and murdered. Starting in the second half of 2013, the name “Islamic State” (IS) was used more often in connection with crimes against Syrian Christians, especially around the Khabur valley. When the IS took control over more and more roads in the immediate vicinity of Til Temir, migration increased again.
In 2015, the escalation of terror in the Khabur Valley reached a new level when, in the early morning of February 23, the IS overran the western bank with 40 SUVs, took 12 Assyrian villages on the west side of the river and set fire to the churches. Some 4,000 people who wanted to seek shelter in Tur Abdin – the “Mountain of God’s servants” and heartland of the Syriacs – but were not allowed through by Turkey, managed to escape to Qamishlo and Hesekê. Others went abroad. Those who did not make it in time fell into the hands of the IS. According to various reports, the number of those kidnapped ranged from 262 to 373 and a ransom in the tens of millions was demanded for their release. In June 2015, Til Temir, the nearby Mount Kizwan (Abdulaziz) and the surrounding area were liberated by the YPG/YPJ and Christian fighting groups that had been formed after the outbreak of the Syrian war. Among the martyrs of the city was Ivana Hoffmann from Duisburg. She died on 7 March 2015 bearing the name of “Avaşîn Têkoşin Güneş” in the ranks of struggle and is considered the first internationalist to die in the armed struggle against the IS.
Assyrian Church in Til Temir
Khamis: Turkey is a colonial state
“There are absolutely no differences in the mentality of the Islamists and the Turkish state. When the jihadists invaded the Khabur valley a few years ago, our churches and other holy sites were the first target. This scenario has been repeated during the recent invasion. So far, six of our churches have been razed to the ground by Turkish combat drones. Others were largely damaged,” says Madeleine Khamis.
The commander, who is also a member of the Military Council of the Khabur Guards, calls Turkey a “colonial state”, which, according to the principle of divide et impera – divide and rule- has pursued and is constantly refining its old strategy of dividing territories, dividing the population and confusing the social structure. The same scenario as in Hatay 1938 is wanted to be implemented in the entire border strip as part of the neo-Ottoman expansion plans, says Khamis.
“Turkey wants to expand its borders by dividing and annexing parts of Northern Syria. The Assyrians accept the Turkish state neither in their settlement area nor in other parts of north-eastern Syria. Because the Turkish threat is an existential threat,” Khamis continues.
Genocidal violence against Assyrians and other Christian and ethnic groups is a common thread running through the history of the Turkish state and the Ottoman Empire, of which Turkey is the successor. When more than 1.5 million Armenians became victims of genocide under the responsibility of the young Turkish government during the First World War, pogroms, deportations and massacres also killed about 500,000 Syriacs, 300,000 of them Assyrians, and members of other ethnic groups who did not fit into the nation understanding of the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis”. The historian Joseph Yacoub, who was born in Hesekê, describes the genocide of the Syriacs as “hidden genocide”, since science has paid little attention to this event.
Church damaged during attacks
We are the descendants of survivors
“We in the Khabur Valley are the descendants of survivors of these events. Turkey, on the other hand, has always been an aggressor, destroying the civilizing heritage of the Christian settlement areas,” says Khamis. The Turkish state has not contributed to anything apart from its own ethnic nationalism and the resulting destruction, she says and adds: “Even today, it is attacking our regions and exporting Islamist terror to northeast Syria to wipe us out. As long as silence continues to reign, as long as the Turkish government’s actions are approved by the international community, as long as the outcry continues to fail, even the last Assyrian will leave the region. No one will be able to return home.”
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Turkish forces and opposition groups destroy nine Yazidi shrines in Afrin
Destruction of the dome of Sheikh Ali shrine in the village of Basoufan, southern Afrin
On Sunday, co-chair of the Legislative Council of Afrin region, Suleiman Jaafar, said that the number of Yazidi shrines that have been destroyed by Turkish forces and their affiliated armed opposition groups has reached nine so far.
Jaafar, a Yazidi from the village of Basoufan in the Sherawa district, southern Afrin, said to North Press that members of the Turkish-backed armed opposition groups destroyed the dome of Sheikh Ali shrine in the village of Basoufan two days ago, making the number of the shrines destroyed by them nine.
He noted that members of the Turkish-backed armed opposition groups “dug up the shrine, which dates back to the first century AD, and opened the tomb of Sheikh Ali in search of gold and treasures, and now, the dome is destroyed.”
Human Rights Organization – Afrin, in the northern countryside of Aleppo, confirmed on Saturday that militants of the Failaq al-Sham group, along with settlers residing in Basoufan village, destroyed parts of the dome of Sheikh Ali shrine using a bulldozer amid high voices shouting “Allah Akbar”, describing the shrine as a place for atheists and infidels.
Jaafar indicated that the shrines, which were destroyed by Turkish forces and their affiliated armed opposition groups in Afrin region are Sheikh Barakat shrine on top of the Sheikh Mount southern Simeon Castle, Sheikh Hamid and Parsa Khatoun in Qastal-Jendo village in Sharra district, the shrine of Sinka village and Qara-Jorn shrine near Midanki in Sharra district, Malak-Adi shrine in Qibar village, Sheikh Jneid shrine in Faqira village in Jinderis district, Seikh Rakab shrine in Shadeiry village, and Sheikh Ali shrine in Basoufan.
For his part, Zinar Jaafar, a journalist from the village of Basoufan, said: “The Turkish army and its affiliated armed groups are taking up position in the village of Basoufan, which means that they are aware of what is happening, as there are plans to eliminate Yazidis in Afrin.”
Yazidis in Afrin are distributed in 22 villages, but there are no accurate statistics about their number in Syria, while according to a previous report issued by the Human Rights Organization – Afrin, the number of the Yazidis is about 25,000.
The number of Yazidi shrines in Afrin exceeds 18, most of which have been subjected to destruction and demolition in addition to the theft of their property.
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Coronavirus in Rojava: Facing a Pandemic Without a State
by Thomas McClure
Across the world, states are coming under pressure for their response to the coronavirus crisis. Some fail to adequately protect their citizens, some use Covid-19 as an excuse for authoritarian power-grabs, and some do both simultaneously.
Here in North and East Syria, the autonomous region more commonly known as Rojava, 4m Syrians – Kurds, Arabs, Christians – live outside the limited protection and authoritarian control of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Their stated aim is to build a new form of communal politics, outside the state. Consequently, the autonomous region faces isolation, embargo and the severing of aid on behalf of state powers unwilling to see their project succeed, leaving it searching for solutions outside those the United Nations and World Health Organization can offer.
Nine years of war, systematic targeting of health and water infrastructure by occupying Turkish forces, a lack of international recognition, and January’s closure of the only UN aid crossing into North and East Syria have left the region at extreme risk from coronavirus. With the WHO refusing to support it directly, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) is reliant on its own meagre resources and aid routed via the Assad government, little of which ever arrives to the north-east.
Pre-existing crisis.
The humanitarian situation is dire across Syria, and the north-east is no exception. 1.6m people are in need of humanitarian assistance, including 600,000 internally displaced people. Local doctors are modelling a 10% death-rate in both the detention centers containing Isis fighters and the refugee camps – some containing Isis-linked families, others housing hundreds of thousands of Kurds displaced by successive Turkish invasions, as well as Arabs who have fled to the relative security of the north-east throughout the nine-year conflict.
The region’s 4m residents are reliant on a total capacity of just 40 ventilators and 35 ICU beds. Nine of the 11 public hospitals in North and East Syria have been damaged during the war, while a recent London School of Economics study found the regions under the AANES have the capability to handle just 460 coronavirus cases before being overrun.
WHO support.
The only way to accurately test for coronavirus is with polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test machines. The only PCR machines in North and East Syria were lost in October 2019, when Turkey invaded the Kurdish-majority city of Serê Kaniyê. The hospital was shelled and then seized as part of the operation, leaving it inaccessible and inoperable.
The WHO had required North and East Syria to send all test samples to the Syrian capital, Damascus, but neither the WHO nor the Syrian government were facilitating the process. On 2 April, testing in Damascus confirmed a case of Covid-19 that, the same day, gave the North and East Syria its first coronavirus death, yet both the Syrian government and WHO failed to communicate this information to the AANES until two weeks had elapsed, putting medical staff in danger and meaning health officials in the region could not take adequate precautions.
Via Turkey, the WHO has now provided test kits to Idlib, a city controlled by al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir-al-Sham (HTS), from where samples can be sent to Turkey for testing. It has also provided 1200 testing kits to regime-controlled areas. Due to its lack of recognised status, however, North and East Syria has no access to WHO-provided testing kits. With support from the Kurdistan regional government in Iraq, the AANES was finally able to privately acquire five PCR machines, and together with front-line tests like white blood cell tests and temperature checks, the AANES is now able to run a basic testing programme rather than relying solely on Damascus.
UN aid severed.
The WHO’s parent organisation, the UN, is beholden to the powerful states sitting on its security council. In January 2020, Russia – whose support for the Damascus regime means it refuses to countenance autonomy in the north-east – exercised its security council veto to close the only UN aid crossing into North and East Syria
This means all UN aid into Syria is now sent either into areas controlled by HTS, to factions under the control of the Turkish intelligence service, or directly to the Assad regime. The AANES is forced to try to access UN aid via Damascus, but the reality is that most aid sent to Damascus remains in areas loyal to the regime. Little to nothing ever arrives in the north-east.
One sole 20-tonne aid delivery via Damascus did make it to North and East Syria – but per WHO guidance, 89% of the delivery remained in a regime-controlled pocket in Qamishlo. The limited aid supplied to the AANES was made up of infant incubators and other supplies not related to coronavirus, with one doctor telling the Rojava Information Center that the supplies were “essentially useless”. Similarly, under Turkish pressure the Iraqi Kurdish regional government has also been preventing the purchase and transfer of coronavirus supplies into North and East Syria.
A recent report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicated this decision will seriously reduce North and East Syria’s ability to combat coronavirus. Seven health centres in Raqqa are facing severe shortages of medicines and supplies as a direct result of the decision, with one soon to close, while the health centre in the Hol camp is also severely affected.
Turkish attacks on water.
While the regime obstructs aid from the south, Turkey applies pressure from the north. Turkey’s 2019 invasion of Serê Kaniyê and Tell Abyad was marked by shelling and airstrikes targeting health points and clinics, resulting in the loss of two key hospitals as Turkey seized control of AANES territory.
It also allowed Turkey to take control of the Allouk water station. Allouk is a critical piece of infrastructure, providing drinking water to between 650,000 and 1m+ people, including 65,000 internally displaced people and Isis-linked individuals in the Hol camp; internally displaced people in the Washokani and Aresha camps and ad-hoc settlements, including 80 schools in Hasekah; the largest detention facility for captured Isis fighters in the world, housing some 5000 combatants and the scene of a recent uprising; and the AANES’s main quarantine hospital.
Turkey launched an airstrike against Allouk on day one of its invasion, putting it out of service. Now Turkey is in control of the water station, and although it has since been fixed under international mediation, Turkey has nonetheless cut the water flow to AANES areas five times in the last month, each time demanding the AANES send more and more electricity into (and pay for repairs in) the areas Turkey occupied in 2019. As the occupying power, Turkey is responsible for electricity provision in Serê Kaniyê under international law, and moreover it is demanding far more power than is proportional to its needs. Most recently, on 2 April Turkish forces shelled the water pipe from Allouk to Hasekah, cutting off water for the fifth time.
Solutions outside the state.
With Russia, Turkey and the Damascus government all piling pressure on the autonomous regions, aided and abetted by the WHO and UN, the north-east is forced to pursue alternative solutions. On the one hand, its political demands are clear: direct provision of WHO test kits and other supplies, re-opening of Yaroubiah aid crossing, an end to Turkey’s manipulation of the water flow, and in the long term recognition of the north-east’s autonomy as part of a federal, democratic Syria.
In the short term, however, the region is once again forced to rely on its own strained resources. Multiple medical projects are underway to develop DIY, locally-produced ventilators as a solution to the chronic shortages in this field; aid is being distributed on a family-by-family basis via the local communes which form the building blocks of the grassroots democratic system.
If the AANES’s vision of a federal Syria is realised, it will be a chance to spread these ideas in a world newly awakened to the need for local, communal living. For now, the administration must rely on these war-tested ideals as its best hope of keeping the population alive through the pandemic crisis.
Thomas McClure is a researcher at the Rojava Information Center.
This article is part two of a two-part feature on the current situation in North and East Syria. Read part one here.
Published 4th May 2020
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UN, WHO work with Assad to starve eastern Syria of aid during pandemic
The World Health Organization has also stopped supporting eastern Syria, an area of millions of people who are recovering from ISIS atrocities.
Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, wearing face masks as protection against the spread of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19), meet in Damascus, Syria, in this handout released by SANA on April 20, 2020
(photo credit: SANA/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)
International organizations partnering with the Syrian regime are cutting off aid to the poorest and most vulnerable people in Syria during the global pandemic.
A recent report at Foreign Policy noted that the “United Nations informed its relief agencies several weeks ago that they were permitted to fund private charities operating in northeastern Syria only if they were registered in Damascus and authorized to work there by the Syrian government, which has proved unwilling, or unable, to meet the region’s health needs.”
This gives the Syrian regime a veto over aid to eastern Syria and a way to use it as a weapon. Turkey and Russia collaborated in the effort, as Turkey turns off water to 460,000 people in eastern Syria, and Russia supports the Syrian regime. The report indicates how dictatorships and regimes that abuse human rights come first at controlling UN and international aid, enabling them to use it only for charities linked to them and using it to empower loyalists and sideline others.
The World Health Organization has also stopped supporting eastern Syria, an area of millions of people who are recovering from ISIS atrocities, as the WHO also works through the Syrian regime rather than providing equal access to people on the ground in a Syria divided by conflict. It now turns out that people of eastern Syria are being increasingly isolated by great powers who want them to stop working with the US and either be controlled by Turkey or by the Russian-backed Assad regime.
The report notes that the UN Security Council, “acting under pressure from Russia, shut down a UN-sanctioned humanitarian aid hub on January 10 at the Yaroubia crossing on the Iraqi-Syrian border. That deprived the UN of an explicit legal mandate to serve in the region.” The crossing was used by the WHO and private groups, “delivering medical assistance into northeastern Syria.”
THE LARGER context is that Russia, Iran and Turkey want the US to leave eastern Syria. the people in eastern Syria are the victims because the local authorities were supported by America to fight ISIS. The local authorities are called the Syrian Democratic Forces and various civilian autonomous councils linked to them. The Syrian regime wants the SDF to be disbanded and become part of the Syrian regime’s forces.
Russia and Iran want the US to leave eastern Syria. Turkey, which works closely with Russia and Iran, also wants the US-backed SDF to leave; it invaded part of eastern Syria last year, sending extremist groups to attack civilians.
The pandemic has made matters worse. Desperate for medical support, the local authorities have complained that the WHO didn’t even inform them that a man who became sick in March in Qamishli had COVID-19. The organization reportedly informed the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), but it took another week to even tell the local authorities, because the UN only speaks to the Syrian regime in Damascus. Local authorities in Qamishli and Hasakah complained in a Voice of America report that the regime is concealing the number of coronavirus cases in eastern Syria and also allowing travel, despite attempts at lockdowns.
On May 7, Turkey and the extremists it backs in northern Syria cut off water to 460,000 people in eastern Syria. Turkey and the Syrian regime agree on trying to impose suffering on locals, isolate them and make sure they receive no aid.
THE WAY the UN works makes it so that no one who is not loyal to the Syrian regime receives aid in Syria. For instance, the UN’s World Food Programme conducted air drops to the Syrian-regime-run city off Deir Ezzor when it was under siege by ISIS between 2015 and 2017. The program conducted 309 airdrops at a cost of $37 million a year, according to its website. The assistance helped 200,000 people. But there were no UN-supported air drops for people in Raqqa, Qamishli, Kobane or Idlib, or in refugee camps or areas outside Syrian regime control.
The recent Foreign Policy report indicates that OCHA did ask the UN Office of Legal Affairs to look into the legality of providing relief to people who the Syrian regime didn’t want relief to go to. The experts “concluded that the UN could only fund agencies registered and approved by the Syrian government.” This means the government of Syria can decide who gets aid and can discriminate against those it doesn’t like, including for political, ethnic or religious reasons. That would appear to run contrary to all the lip service the UN and its various organizations pay to human rights and access to health care.
But the reality as it plays out in eastern Syria shows that even during a global pandemic, authoritarian regimes always come first, even if they can’t provide for their own people or don’t control most of their country. For similar reasons, people in Libya, Yemen and parts of Somalia receive no support during the pandemic.
THE SYRIAN regime has blocked aid going to eastern Syria unless local authorities will make sure it only goes to areas the regime wants. That has included blocking delivery of supplies by road from Damascus and making sure any aid flights to the regime-run airport in Qamishli are managed by the regime. The cut-off of aid is designed to isolate areas in eastern Syria and bring them to the bargaining table. The US had already walked away from some of these areas in October 2019, enabling a Turkish invasion and the rapid movement of Russia and Syrian regime forces to parts of northeast Syria.
US envoy James Jeffrey indicated in December 2018 that the SDF would need to work with Damascus and the regime, saying the US has no permanent relationship with non-state actors like the SDF. The US view of the SDF is temporary, tactical and transactional. The transaction today includes the SDF continuing to fight ISIS while the US secures oil fields near the Euphrates River to block Iran’s presence. The US calls this the Eastern Syria Stabilization Area.
As part of the transaction, US anti-ISIS envoy Jeffrey wants the SDF to continue to be subcontractors holding thousands of ISIS detainees. There was even some talk of having the UN support a coronavirus facility at Al-Hol camp where some families of ISIS detainees live, alongside other internally displaces Syrians. But that plan was also scuttled. Civilians who suffered under or even fought ISIS in eastern Syria will get no aid from the WHO or UN.
The US anti-ISIS coalition has tried to do what it can to help in eastern Syria. Under CENTCOM’s leadership, which is sympathetic to the people of eastern Syria and helping them in stabilization efforts after ISIS, some limited support has been delivered, including a multi-year electricity infrastructure effort. Had the area of Raqqa and other towns that once suffered under ISIS waited for the UN, they would still be in darkness.
Turkish-controlled faction Ahrar al-Sharqiya claimed sleeper cell attacks in North and East Syria for the first time this month
April saw a 16% decrease in ISIS sleeper-cell attacks (48 to 40), whereas joint SDF and Coalition raids increased 100% this month (11 up to 22). Despite this increase, the rate of raids has consistently remained lower than the rates we were seeing prior to the war
Cells continue to specifically target individuals connected to the Autonomous Administration or SDF. Fatalities in general increased 21% this month, with 41% of these deaths being assassinations
In a new development, two attacks were claimed by Ahrar-al-Sharqiya, a Turkish-backed faction forming part of the Syrian National Army (SNA). Both of the attacks took place in Ain Issa
The 30km-deep ‘safe zone’ along the border with Turkey has remained untouched by sleeper-cell attacks
40 confirmed attacks took place in April, a 16% decrease from May (48 down to 40). 73% or 29 attacks were claimed by ISIS, leaving nine unclaimed and two attacks claimed by the SNA, as mentioned above.
RIC documented a total of 29 deaths in April, a 21% increase from March (24 up to 29). 41% of these deaths were assassinations specifically targeting village elders (Muhktars), or people claimed to be associated with the Autonomous Administration or SDF. In total 12 assassinations took place. This occurred after ISIS pamphlets were seen distributed throughout Deir-ez-Zor, threatening individuals connected to the Administration. At least 20 people were also documented as have being wounded, but not fatally, in April.
The rate of raids doubled this month (11 up to 22), but still remain lower than the rates we were seeing prior to the latest Turkish operation. 52 arrests have been documented, and three individuals operating with sleeper-cells were killed.
As throughout 2020, sleeper-cells have not targeted cities along the border with Turkey in the 30km-deep ‘safe zone’ (from Derik through to Dirbesiye and around Kobane). 75% of attacks occurred in Deir-ez-Zor, 15% in Heseke, 8% in Raqqa and 2.5% in Manbij.
In keeping with previous months’ trends sleeper-cell groups have continued to focus their energy on IEDs, attacks using small arms, and occasionally grenades – mostly with the purpose of direct elimination of an individual connected to the Autonomous Administration or SDF. There was also one instance of ISIS exploding an oil pipeline in the Heseke region.
Comment from Robin Fleming, a researcher with the Rojava Information Center:
“Unusually, two attacks this April were claimed by the Syrian National Army, specifically the Turkish proxy group Ahrar-al-Sharqiya. This group fought under Turkish command and control during operation Peace Spring, and infamously took the life of Hevrin Khalef, Secretary-General of the Syria’s Future Party and leading female Kurdish politician. These attacks show that following the Turkish invasion, these proxy groups still have a presence in NES outside of the occupied zones, and are still endangering the stability of the region.
Following a recent ISIS campaign distributing pamphlets throughout Deir-ez-Zor, threatening the lives of all those who associate themselves with the Autonomous Administration in any capacity, we saw the rate of both overall fatalities and specific assassinations rise. All of this indicates an ongoing evolution in ISIS’ tactics. It is no longer attempting merely to wreak havoc and claim as many lives as possible. Now instead ISIS is surgically targeting individuals connected to the Administration and SDF, using whatever
The water level of the Euphrates river has decreased by 60% in the past two weeks. This was due to the Turkish state reducing the flow of the river.
ANF
KOBANÊ
Wednesday, 13 May 2020, 12:05
Closing the part of the river that flows into the Syrian side, the Turkish state has greatly reduced the amount of water entering the country thus causing serious problems to both agriculture in the north of the country and electric supply to vital areas and facilities.
Under a prior agreement between Syria and Turkey, Syria was receiving 500 cubic meters of water per second. But Turkey is now using water as a threat and pressure way. In the summer of 2017, it decreased the flow to 100 cubic meters per second, and this year the flow of the river did not exceed 200 cubic meters per second.
In order to produce electricity, the flow rate of the river must be at least 300 cubic meters per second. A 300-cubic meter flow can operate a 105-megawatt turbine.
There are 3 dams on the Euphrates River, which run for about 600 km in Syrian territory. Rojava (Tişrîn) Dam located in Manbij is the biggest dam in Syria.
There are six dams in the Turkish side of the Euphrates river, with Ataturk Dam being the second biggest dam of its kind in the Middle East. This dam has the capacity to store approximately 48 billion cubic meters of water.
Reducing the water level of the Euphrates River is a threat for millions of Syrians in the northeast of the country. It affects drinking water as well as electricity supply. Indeed in the past week there has been repeated interruption of electricity in northeast Syria. In addition, reduction in water is a problem for agriculture
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51 bodies recovered from a mass grave in Raqqa
Bodies of 51 people murdered by ISIS have been unearthed from a mass grave in Raqqa.
ANF
RAQQA
Monday, 4 May 2020, 18:51
51 corpses have been recovered from a mass grave in the region of Til Zedan east of Raqqa city.
Yasır Hamis from Raqqa Emergency Response Teams said that the mass grave in Til Zedan area, located between al-Samra and Hamrat villages, contains at least 200 corpses. He told that remains of 51 people have been recovered so far and their work continues.
Hamis pointed out that this mass grave was more sensitive in comparison to the mass graves in other parts of Raqqa as victims were piled up over each other in this one. He noted that they were working with utmost sensitivity to make sure that bones are not mingled.
According to Hamis, the digging might take a long time as three corpses are exhumed each day.
He added that the remains in the mass grave belong to civilians aged between 25 and 35 who were murdered by ISIS mercenaries during their bloody reign in the city.
Raqqa was the city ISIS jihadists proclaimed the capital of their so-called caliphate. It is also one of the cities which suffered most and witnessed inhuman massacres, beheading, violence difficult to express with words.
The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces liberated the Raqqa city on 20 October 2017. Since then the city has begun to rebuild itself. Some 85% of the city and its infrastructures had been destroyed by ISIS, yet the deepest destruction had to do with life itself. Some of the survivors of the dark years of the Caliphate say that life stopped during those times.
Yet, life prevailed. And the newly declared Autonomous Administration has been working since the liberation of the city to rebuild it.
Within the scope of the coordinated activities of the Raqqa Civil Assembly and the People’s Municipality, roads were re-opened, houses and water were started to be supplied to the neighborhoods and the war debris removed.
With the reconstruction of the city and the development of a free and common way of living, 700,000 people who had fled ISIS have returned to their homes.
With the increase of the population, the reconstruction works accelerated. The People’s Municipality of Raqqa announced an amnesty for those who had repaired their destroyed houses without permission and offered assistance to put the houses at norm.
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Attacks on northern Syria continue unabated
The Turkish and Jihadist occupation forces continue their attacks against northern Syria enjoying a worldwide silence on their ongoing offensive seeking to invade the region in violation of international law.
ANF NEWS DESK
Sunday, 3 May 2020, 11:49
The Turkish state is systematically bombing civilian settlements in North-East Syria/Rojava on daily basis. Hundreds of thousands of people have been forced to leave their homes, while hundreds of civilians have lost their lives since the invasion attacks that began on 9 October 2019.
The occupant Turkish army and allied mercenaries have launched a wave of attacks on villages in Afrin’s Shera and Sherawa districts Sunday morning.
The attacks with heavy weapons have targeted the villages of Malikiya, Shiwarxa, Meranaz, Kafr Antun and Irshadiya in Shera, and the villages of Bene, Darjimal and Soxaneke in Sherawa.
On Saturday evening the occupation forces shelled the village of Xirbitbeqir near Gire Spi (Tal Abyad). No information was immediately available about the results of the attacks on the inhabited villages.
The attacks by Turkey and its jihadist aid troops in northern Syria have not abated, even in times of the coronavirus pandemic, and are mainly directed at residential areas and civil infrastructure. While civilian population suffers casualties, the power and water supply has collapsed in large parts of north-east Syria due to the targeted artillery attacks.
As part of worldwide measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called for a global ceasefire on 23 March and called on the parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, saying; “End the sickness of war and fight the disease that is ravaging our world. It is time to put armed conflict on lockdown and focus together on the true fight of our lives. Silence the guns; stop the artillery; end the airstrikes. This is crucial.”
In Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) responded by declaring that they would follow the UN appeal in the autonomous region and calling on all other parties to the conflict to immediately observe a humanitarian ceasefire. But so far the other warring parties have ignored this outstretched hand.
Turkey is using the Corona pandemic to expand its zone of occupation in the midst of the crisis. Despite warnings that a Covid-19 outbreak in Syria would pose a deadly threat to 6.5 million internally displaced persons suffering the effects of nine years of war, and a renewed appeal by the UN that a cessation of fighting could help create the conditions for the provision of life-saving aid, Northern and Syria continue to be under attack.
In the cities of Serêkaniyê (Ras al-Ain) and Girê Spî (Tal Abyad), which have been included in the Turkish occupation zone in North-East Syria since October 2019, and in the self-governing areas along the Turkish-Syrian border, significant military activities of Turkey’s jihadist proxy army (“Syrian National Army”, SNA) are taking place.
Afrin has been under the occupation of the Turkish state and its mercenary allies for over two years now. The attacks of the Turkish state against Afrin began on 20 January 2018 and the invasion of the city was carried out on 18 March 2018. Since the invasion, war crimes have been systematically committed in the region. Almost every day, crimes such as the confiscation of property belonging to local people, kidnapping of civilians for ransom, torture or executions are carried out.
The occupation forces controlled by Ankara use the abductions to extort ransoms. This method has become a lucrative source of income. At least 500 cases of ransom handovers have been reported so far. Turkish-backed militias demand an equivalent of between 3,000 and 100,000 euros, depending on the ability of the victims’ relatives to pay.
UN: War crimes and torture in Afrin
Last autumn, the UN Human Rights Council published a report on the situation in Syria, which also describes the devastating human rights situation in Afrin. The Council documented that the overall security conditions in Afrin and adjacent districts remained dire with armed factions having carved up the province into geographic zones of influence.
“As a result there is a general absence of rule of law and repeated incidents of kidnappings, torture, extortion and assassination. Victims were often of Kurdish origin as well as civilians perceived as being prosperous, including doctors, businessmen and merchants,” said the report
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Syrian Kurdish parties resume talks, in secret
Rival Kurdish parties in northeastern Syria have began US-sponsored reconciliation talks after repeated delays in the past and in the hope of joining the UN-sponsored peace process to resolve the Syrian conflict.
Fighters of the Manbij military council, allied to Syria Democratic Forces (SDF), take an overwatch position in the southern rural area of Manbij, in Aleppo Governorate, Syria June 1, 2016. Photo by REUTERS/Rodi Said/File Photo.
Ivan Hassib
Ivan Hassib is a Kurdish journalist who has worked as a correspondent and photographer for Kurdish and Arabic news channels, as well as international outlets. He is based in northeast Syria and currently works as a researcher for Information Management and Mine Action Programs, or IMMAP. On Twitter: @Ivan_Hassib
May 1, 2020
For the first time since Oct. 28, 2019, when Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazlum Abdi announced an initiative to resolve inter-Kurdish differences, the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) kick-started secret, direct talks. The initiative is seemingly designed to include all the Kurdish parties in the PYD-ruled autonomous administration in northeast Syria, paving the way for the autonomous administration to join the UN-sponsored negotiations in Geneva to end the Syrian conflict.
Despite the stakes involved, success is not guaranteed given the tense political relations between the two negotiating parties following years of political conflict and media spats. The KNC is an official part of the Istanbul-based Syrian opposition in exile, while Turkey views the PYD, which espouses the ideology of the Abdullah Ocalan-led Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), as its top foe in Syria. Meanwhile, the PYD is also part of the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the political arm of the Kurdish-led SDF fighting alongside the US-led international coalition.
Speaking to Al-Monitor on the condition of anonymity, an informed official source revealed the origins of the negotiations process. “The first direct negotiating round between the KNC and PYD was held in early April at a US military base on the periphery of Hasakah, in the presence of the US special adviser to the global coalition forces in Syria, William Roebuck, and SDF commander Mazlum Abdi.”
The attempted détente is reportedly taking place under US supervision. Roebuck has had multiple meetings with the KNC in the past three months to discuss developments in the Syrian arena and to support the initiative to unify Kurdish ranks in Syria.
At an April 25 press conference in Qamishli, Abdi said, “Remarkable progress is being made in the process to unify the Kurdish ranks. The parties, the PYD and the rest of the political parties are being responsive to the initiative.”
Commenting on the agenda for the negotiations, the source told Al-Monitor, “The two sides are discussing the adoption of a unified political vision for Syrian’s future based on discussion of a draft presented by the US side. After holding at least four meetings as part of the negotiations, the two sides agreed on the following: Syria will be a federal, democratic and pluralistic state; the current regime is an authoritarian and dictatorial regime that uses violence against its opponents; the Kurdish areas consist of an integrated political and geographical unit.”
He also said that the parties agree on building positive relations with neighboring countries and resolving the Syrian crisis in accordance with UN Resolution 2254. Both sides seek to include recognition of Kurdish national, cultural and political rights in the Syrian constitution as well secure constitutional recognition that Syrian Kurds are an indigenous people. They also agree to advocate for the return of refugees and other displaced persons to their homes and for a democratic opposition.
In Qamishli, SDC spokesman Amjad Othman told Al-Monitor, “The motives behind the agreement are much stronger than reasons preventing its conclusion. The parties to the dialogue have the single option of coming to an agreement despite the considerable challenges and difficulties which will only be resolved if the parties are serious.”
Othman said the negotiations can only succeed if the parties remain independent. “The regional influences and agendas need to be ignored, and priority needs to be given to the public interest and a joint vision to address the situations in Afrin, Ras al-Ain/Sari Kani and Gire Spi/Tell Abyad. The Kurdistan parties agreeing to and supporting the initiative would improve the odds of success.”
The KNC is allied with the Kurdish nationalist project led by Massoud Barzani and his Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq, having been formed in 2011 with the KDP’s support. As noted, the PYD bases its political and organizational projects on the PKK’s ideology.
Tensions between the PYD and KNC took a turn for the worse when the PYD became the most influential player in northeast Syria in 2012. The KNC viewed the PYD-led autonomous administration as a fait accompli and has refused to apply for a permit to engage in political activity there. The autonomous administration responded by exiling the KNC president, shuttering its offices and arresting dozens of its leaders and members during 2016-17.
Meanwhile, the KNC’s affiliation with the Istanbul-based Syrian opposition has served to exacerbate tensions between the two sides following multiple Turkish military operations launched against the Kurds in Syria. In fact, the PYD has accused the KNC of subordination to the Turkish state at the expense of the Kurdish people.
Kamiran Hajo, chairman of the KNC’s Foreign Relations Committee told Al-Monitor by phone from Sweden, where he resides, “We have always called for the unification of Kurdish ranks. The current circumstances seem to be right for practical steps to be taken in this direction. Following the relatively longstanding feud, the two sides are in need of an agreement that lays the foundations for the Kurds’ future in Syria.”
Hajo fears, however, that any new agreement with the PYD will suffer the same fate as previously ones reached by the two sides under Barzani’s auspices: collapse at the implementation stage. “Negotiations are not going to be easy, and there will be multiple challenges before an agreement is reached,” Hajo said. “The agreement’s implementation phase could be harder than the dialogue and agreement phase in itself. That’s what happened with the previous deals.”
Commenting on the US role in the negotiations, Ahed al-Hindi, a Washington, DC-based political analyst, told Al-Monitor by phone, “I believe that the US efforts to unify the Kurdish ranks in northeastern Syria are a part of [a broader] project designed to unify the entire Syrian north, namely the northwest controlled by the Turkish-backed [opposition] and the northeast controlled by the US-backed [Kurdish-led forces]. This project aims to build a strong position against the [Bashar] al-Assad regime and deny it the areas’ wealth, which could be used to revive the regime.”
Hindi believes the United States is determined to unify the ranks of the Syrian Kurds. He asserted, “The repeated visits Roebuck and his team made lately and his long stays in the region confirm that the US is serious in resolving inter-Kurdish differences and subsequently have the autonomous administration taking part in the Geneva talks to resolve the Syrian crisis and be represented in the opposition delegation.”
Over the course of the nine-year Syrian civil war, the Kurds in Syria have paid exorbitant prices in military and social terms. In 2018 and 2019, they lost the regions of Afrin, Ras al-Ain/Sari Kani and Gire Spi/Tell Abyad to Turkey and Turkish-backed militias, resulting in the displacement of most Kurdish residents in these areas. In addition, in the fight against Islamic State, the SDF, whose backbone is the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, lost 11,000 fighters and saw 22,000 wounded.
Despite controlling nearly 20% of Syrian territory, the SDF does not have political representation in the Geneva talks because of Turkish opposition to their presence. With Ankara continuing to reject any project that would lead to Kurdish autonomous rule in Syria, unifying to jointly pursue Kurdish interests is the only option the Kurds have left.
Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria condemn ‘cowardly’ Afrin bombing
ERBIL, Kurdistan Region — Kurdish authorities in northeast Syria have condemned the “cowardly” Tuesday car bombing which killed at least 40 civilians in the northern city of Afrin.
A fuel tanker laced with explosives detonated in the city center on Tuesday evening, killing at least 40 civilians and injuring 47 others, according to Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency (AA).
General Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi took to Twitter on Wednesday to condemn the attack.
“What happened in Afrin yesterday was a condemned terrorist act which claimed the lives of innocent people. This criminal act is the outcome of destructive policy pursued by the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries in the city of peace and olives,” Abdi wrote.
A statement released by the Syrian Democratic Council, the SDF’s political wing, accused Turkish-backed forces for the explosion.
“We condemn this cowardly terrorist act which targeted innocent civilians and threatens the remaining sons of Afrin to displace and leave their villages and cities,” read the statement.
“[The] Turkish invasion, relying on [military] fractions with terrorist ideology, has opened the door wide to terrorist forces to reorganize their ranks and carry out cowardly acts under Turkish protection,” it added.
Hours later, Abdulkarim Omar, co-chair of the Department of Foreign Relations for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES) called on the international community to “pressure Turkey to leave Afrin and all other occupied areas.”
Afrin was invaded by the Turkish army and its Syrian proxies during Operation Olive Branch in March 2018 on the grounds that the YPG threatened Turkish national security.
Turkish authorities, including the country’s defense ministry and vice president, accused the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), the backbone of the multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), of being behind the attack.
Several bombings have rocked Afrin since the Turkish invasion, which Ankara insists are the work of the YPG. However, SDF officials have said that they do not intend to target civilians.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also condemned the attack.
“The United States renews its call for support and implementation of a nationwide ceasefire in Syria following today’s cowardly act of terror carried out on innocent victims in Afrin. Such acts of evil are unacceptable from any side in this conflict,” he wrote on Twitter.
Black smoke rises from the site of Tuesday’s blast in Afrin. Photo: submitted
ERBIL, Kurdistan Region — An explosion in the rebel-controlled city of Afrin in northwest Syria on Tuesday killed 42 people and wounded at least 50 others, local officials tell Rudaw English.
Witnesses told Rudaw English that the attack took place just before four p.m. on a crowded street in Afrin’s city center, near the entrance to its main market referred to by locals as the Political Junction, when fully loaded fuel tanker detonated in the middle of midday traffic.
“The bodies have been charred beyond recognition, but they appear to be civilians who were just passing by,” Azad Othman, a member of the Afrin Local Council, told Rudaw English.
Shops and vehicles burned for nearly an hour as fire and rescue vehicles rushed to the scene from nearby Azaz to assist in put out flames caused by the blast.
“It was a popular market that was targeted, so most of the dead are civilians, Raed Saleh, director of the Syrian Civil Defense told Rudaw English via telephone. “Our teams are still searching and rescuing. There could be more,” he added.
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo took to Twitter to condemn the bombing.
“The United States renews its call for support and implementation of a nationwide ceasefire in Syria following today’s cowardly act of terror carried out on innocent victims in Afrin. Such acts of evil are unacceptable from any side in this conflict,” he wrote.
No group has claimed responsibility for the blast, but the Turkish defense ministry has accused the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), which were ousted from the region by Turkey and its proxy Syrian rebel factions in March 2018. Since then, there has been a series of attacks on Turkish targets in the area, as well as reports of violations by local human rights monitors.
Similar blasts in areas controlled by Turkey-backed rebel fighters have targeted the area in recent months.
A statement by the YPG-affiliated Afrin Liberation Forces claimed to have killed two Turkish soldiers and three Syrian fighters in two separate attacks earlier this week.
“There have been three explosions targeting the city just this month, but this one is definitely the biggest and most deadly,” Afrin resident Milad al-Shehabi told Rudaw English.
Originally from Aleppo, Shehabi was displaced to Afrin two years ago. Recent fighting has displaced more that one million Syrians from rural Aleppo and Idlib, some of which still lies outside of the control of forces loyal to Bashar Assad.
Turkey supports the Syrian opposition in the war against President Bashar Assad but has joined with Russia to secure and monitor local ceasefires.
By evening, local authorities had compiled a list of names for relatives searching to check on their missing loved ones and collect their disfigured remains.
Updated at 8.51am on 29/4/2020
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Kino Gabriel refutes Turkish allegations, calls on them to respect agreements signed
The spokesperson for the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) has denied the news that the media of the Turkish occupation is promoting about the developments in the occupied Serekaniye and Girê Spi / Tal Abyad, and affirmed their full commitment to their duty towards their people and partners.
The areas occupied by Turkey and mercenaries are witnessing what is called the “Syrian National Army”, and there is a great security chaos, and there are clashes between mercenaries almost daily.
The Turkish occupation has been working for a while to falsify the facts taking place in the occupied areas, and to spread false news and statements about the operations of the Syrian Democratic Forces.
On what the media machine of the Turkish occupation is trying to publish and which will falsify the lived reality in those areas, the spokesperson for the Syrian Democratic Forces, Kino Gabriel, issued a written statement >
“Recently, several fabricated news and statements by a number of official accounts of the Turkish Ministry of Defense appeared on the Internet, including the official account of the Turkish National Security Council, which publishes false news and information about the military situation and developments in the occupied areas of Ras Al-Ain, Tal Abyad and the Tal Rifaat region.
We in the Syrian Democratic Forces assure that all this information and news is unfounded, and a miserable attempt to distort the reality of what is happening on the ground in terms of the full commitment of our forces to their obligations towards the agreements signed in this regard, and any military presence of our forces do not exist in the aforementioned areas, while the reality is the continuation of the forces Turkish and its mercenary groups bombed villages surrounding the areas of operations, which resulted in various civilian casualties and sabotage to the infrastructure in those areas.
We reaffirm once again our full commitment to our duties towards our people and partners, our rejection of such propaganda methods, and our call for Turkey to respect the agreements signed with our partners in the region. ”
J.O ANHA
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SDF’s Abdi calls for support for national unity initiative
Abdi said that talks have produced positive results which will be announced in the coming days.
ANF
QAMISHLO
Saturday, 25 Apr 2020, 20:09
SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) Commander General Mazloum Abdi spoke to the press after a meeting with a delegation from the Euphrates Region about national unity.
Abdi said there were new developments in the efforts for the achievement of Kurdish national unity, noting that political circles bore a positive approach toward the initiative.
Remarking that talks have produced positive results which will be announced in the coming days, Abdi called on all political parties to support the established initiative and act according to the national unity of the Kurds.
HUSÊN: KURDISH NATIONAL UNITY IS AN URGENT NEED
Dr. Bextiyar Husên from the delegation that met Abdi, remarked that all those that support the establishment of Kurdish national unity have united around the initiative that has been founded to this end.
Defining Kurdish national unity as an urgent need, Husên added that they would meet and talk with the PYD (Democratic Union Party) and ENKS (Syrian Kurdish National Council) on the subject.
Recalling the previous attempts for national unity, Husên said; “The Autonomous Administration and ENKS signed the Hewlêr 1, Hewlêr 2 and Duhok agreements. However, these agreements have unfortunately produced no results. There is a different atmosphere and circumstance today. It is now essential to make a decision for the benefit of the Kurdish people.”
The delegation is expected to meet ENKS and PYD tomorrow.
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Turkish-backed militias beat man to death in Afrin
Members of the Sultan Murad Brigade set up and organized by the Turkish secret service MIT have beaten a 74-year-old man to death in Afrin.
ANF
AFRIN
Thursday, 23 Apr 2020, 17:13
Reports of further attacks by the occupation forces against inhabitants of the occupied region of Afrin come through almost daily.
On Wednesday, 74-year-old Ali Ehmed died of his injuries. When he was grazing his sheep near his hometown Meydankê, he was severely maltreated by mercenaries of the Sultan Murad Brigade and subsequently died in the hospital of Afrin.
Ali Ehmed is the second civilian who was murdered this week by the occupation forces in Afrin. Two days earlier, Fatme Kene, also 74 years old, had been killed in an attack by Pro-Turkish mercenaries.
The Sultan Murad Brigade consists of Turkish right-wing extremists and Islamists and was set up under the direction of the Turkish secret service MIT.
HRE units continue inflicting blows on the occupation forces in North-East Syria.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Afrin Liberation Forces (HRE) released a statement announcing the results of their latest operations against occupation forces in North-East Syria.
According to the statement, the HRE operations on April 21 and 23 left 10 Turkish-backed mercenaries dead, 14 others wounded and a vehicle destroyed.
On April 21, HRE fighters targeted the mercenary groups between the villages of Kîmarê and Beradê in Afrin’s Sherawa district. Two mercenaries were killed and three others wounded as a result.
On April 23, HRE units carried out three separate sabotage operations against occupation forces in Jarablus and Rai. Eight mercenaries were killed, at least 11 others wounded and a vehicle destroyed in these operations.
HRE fighters also hit the mercenaries at the Maratê junction in Afrin city center but the results of the action couldn’t be clarified.
Kongra Star commemorates victims of the Armenian genocide
“In the name of Kongra Star, we remember the victims of these massacres and express our condolences to them and their families. May the existing struggle and resistance be successful.”
ANF
NEWS DESK
Friday, 24 Apr 2020, 14:52
Women’s umbrella organization in North and East Syria, Kongra Star, released a statement marking the 105th anniversary of the Armenian genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire.
The statement by Kongra Star includes the following:
“Today, April 24th is the commemoration day of the Armenian genocide, which took place in 1915, 105 years ago. This massacre was carried out by the Ottomans against the Armenian, Syriac, Chaldean and Greek populations.
This was a continuation of the massacre that began in 1904 against the Armenian people. The Ottoman Empire, with its brutality and the massacre it committed, tried to exterminate and destroy the indigenous peoples of the region through rape, kidnapping and murder. Only a few were able to flee and find safety in the surrounding villages. These people wanted to be the voice to demand justice for these massacres and their victims. Until today there are no efforts to ensure that the Armenian genocide is recognized as such in the world. Only few international states have officially recognized this genocide so far. The Turkish state denies this genocide until today.
The current Turkish occupation and invasion in North and East Syria, as we can see in the present Turkish occupied regions of Afrin, Girê Spî or Serêkaniyê, are no less violent in their brutality than a century ago.
When one considers the brutality of their actions, one can see parallels with the ISIS. The Ottoman violence and oppression, which began with the massacres against the Armenians and Syriacs, is now directed against the people in North and East Syria and has the same form as well as the same goal. But the resistance of the peoples continues until today, as we can see in the resistance and struggle against the state oppression of Turkey.
The indigenous peoples today organise themselves in the form of a common administration, which includes all Kurdish and Arabic as well as Syriac, Assyrian and Armenian components, and live together here. This can be a model for the whole world. In the name of Kongra Star, we remember the victims of these massacres and express our condolences to them and their families. May the existing struggle and resistance be successful.
President Trump has said of Syria, “Let the other people take care of it now.” His repudiation of responsibility is striking, given that during his Administration the U.S. military, in its zeal to destroy ISIS, has reduced huge swaths of the country to wasteland.Photograph by Ivor Prickett / Panos
Many Syrians thought that the U.S. cared about them. Now they know better.
President Trump has said of Syria, “Let the other people take care of it now.” His repudiation of responsibility is striking, given that during his Administration the U.S. military, in its zeal to destroy ISIS, has reduced huge swaths of the country to wasteland.Photograph by Ivor Prickett / Panos
By the time Turkey invaded northern Syria, in October, the Ain Issa refugee camp—twenty miles south of the Turkish border—resembled a small city. In recent years, some fourteen thousand people had moved there, displaced by ISIS, Russian and American air strikes, or the repressive regime of President Bashar al-Assad. The camp had evolved from a few tents in a muddy field into a sprawling grid complete with shops, cafeterias, falafel stands, schools, clinics, mosques, a full-time administration, and offices of more than two dozen local and international N.G.O.s. As news spread of the Turkish offensive, Nashat Khairi, a camp mukhtar, or selected representative, urged the roughly thirty families in his section to remain calm. A fruit vender before the war, Khairi had fled his village, in the eastern province of Deir Ezzour, with his wife and seven children, after ISIS captured it, in 2014. They reached Ain Issa three years later. Since then, the camp had come to feel like home. Khairi knew everyone in his section, oversaw the distribution of food rations, registered every birth, and seldom missed a wedding or a funeral. His children received an education and had access to health care. His wife earned a salary as a cleaner. They never went hungry. In cold weather, the camp provided kerosene for their stove, and during the summer they kept their tent cool with a fan powered by a generator. Outside their entryway, Khairi tended a small garden, with neat rows of radishes and bell peppers.
Most important, they were safe. The camp stood on a strategic intersection of the M4 highway, which traverses Syria from the Mediterranean Sea to its border with Iraq. The town of Ain Issa, less than a mile away, was the headquarters of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-led army that had vanquished ISIS in northern and eastern Syria. Also nearby were two large U.S. military bases, which housed hundreds of American troops, contractors, and Foreign Service workers, who had supported the S.D.F. throughout its anti-ISIS campaign. One of the bases, at the former Lafarge Cement Factory, served as the joint-operations center for Kurdish and American commanders.
Khairi assured his fellow-refugees that someone surely had a plan to protect them. A fenced-off part of the camp held more than eight hundred wives and children of killed or captured ISIS militants: if nothing else, Khairi reasoned, the U.S. forces down the road would never let so many high-value detainees escape.
As the Turkish forces approached, however, an alarming development inside the camp deepened the communal panic. Without informing anyone, the management staff, armed guards, and aid workers had all disappeared.
In town, meanwhile, about fifteen hundred S.D.F. members had been frantically organizing a defense. One of the commanders was a twenty-eight-year-old Kurd from Aleppo Province who went by the nom de guerre Brousque—Lightning, in Kurdish. Brousque had been fighting ISIS alongside American troops for six years; his four siblings, including his twenty-one-year-old sister, also served in the S.D.F. In 2017, when the S.D.F. conducted a gruelling urban assault on Raqqa, ISIS’s global capital, U.S. Special Forces provided Brousque and other Kurdish commanders with tactical guidance while keeping a safe distance from the combat. Two months into the battle, an S.D.F. fighter a few yards in front of Brousque stepped on a mine and was killed, as was a fighter behind them. The blast knocked Brousque unconscious. He woke up in a hospital, blind, his chest, neck, and face burned and lacerated by shrapnel. By the time he recovered and regained his vision, at the end of 2017, ISIS had been defeated in Raqqa. Brousque was deployed to Tell Abyad, in the far north, where he was assigned five hundred fighters to secure a fifty-mile stretch of the border with Turkey.
Tensions on the border were already high. The S.D.F. had grown out of the P.K.K., a Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey that had waged a decades-long insurgency. The U.S. military’s collaboration with the S.D.F. enraged Turkey’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “A country we call an ally is insisting on forming a terror army on our border,” Erdoğan declared, shortly after Brousque arrived in Tell Abyad. “Our mission is to strangle it before it is even born.” Turkey had twice carried out major cross-border operations to seize Kurdish towns and cities in Syria, and further attacks seemed inevitable.
Then, last August, the U.S. brokered a deal between Turkey and the S.D.F. A demilitarized buffer zone along the Syrian side of the border required Brousque to dismantle all his fortifications, seal a tunnel system that his fighters had constructed, pull out of Tell Abyad, and move ten miles deeper into S.D.F. territory. In exchange, Erdoğan pledged not to invade. Brousque was skeptical of this promise, but he had faith in the Americans, who, according to the agreement, would act as guarantors. “We’d become good friends,” he told me, during a visit I made to Syria this winter. “I assumed that the advice they were giving us was in our interest.”
After the S.D.F. withdrew from the border, Turkish and American forces began conducting patrols and aerial surveillance together. Though no Kurds crossed into Turkey, Erdoğan soon dismissed the buffer zone as inadequate, and insisted on expanding it. In September, before the United Nations General Assembly, in New York, he announced his intention to annex more than five thousand square miles of Kurdish land, creating a “peace corridor” where two million Syrian refugees living in Turkey could be resettled. The refugees would be overwhelmingly Arab and from other parts of Syria. The southern edge of the corridor would encompass Ain Issa, Khairi’s refugee camp, and the Lafarge Cement Factory. International observers denounced the scheme as a flagrant attempt at demographic engineering that was certain to produce conflict and humanitarian disaster.
Two weeks later, the White House issued a press release stating that President Donald Trump and Erdoğan had spoken on the phone. While the details of the conversation have not been made public, it was a triumph for Erdoğan. “Turkey will soon be moving forward with its long-planned operation into northern Syria,” the press release explained, adding that American troops “will no longer be in the immediate area.”
After the U.S. vacated the buffer zone, Turkish jets, drones, and artillery pummelled Tell Abyad and other border cities. The S.D.F., which has no air assets, petitioned the U.S. to impose a no-fly zone, but the Americans refused. Turkey’s ground forces consisted mostly of Syrian Arab mercenaries, many of whom had previously belonged to jihadist groups with a profound animosity toward the Kurds. As these militias pushed south, in armored vehicles, nearly two hundred thousand civilians fled from their path. Reports of war crimes, such as summary executions, followed the advance. Later, the senior American diplomat in Syria, William V. Roeback, wrote an internal memo lamenting that U.S. personnel had “stood by and watched” an “intention-laced effort at ethnic cleansing.”
On October 12th, a Turkish-backed militia reached the M4, where it intercepted an S.U.V. carrying Hevrin Khalaf, a prominent female Kurdish politician. She was beaten to death. Videos posted on Twitter show the militants murdering a second unarmed passenger as well. “Another fleeing pig has been liquidated,” one of the assailants proclaims.
The next day, Turkish forces in the open desert north of the highway began shelling Ain Issa, where Brousque was told to hold the line.
“The only thing between us was the camp,” he recalled.
In Nashat Khairi’s section, a troubling rumor had begun to circulate. The Kurds were said to have turned in desperation to the Assad regime, which was now sending reinforcements to Ain Issa. For many of the refugees, who’d come to the camp seeking asylum from the regime, this was as distressing as the Turkish offensive. Still, most people were reluctant to leave without their I.D.s, which were locked in the camp’s administrative offices.
As the sound of shelling and machine-gun fire neared, another danger materialized. The ISIS-affiliated detainees had somehow got out. The S.D.F. later blamed the breach on a riot provoked by Turkish air strikes. But I met multiple witnesses who claimed to have seen S.D.F. fighters arrive in a pickup and release the detainees. This seems plausible. Much of the Western criticism of the Turkish invasion focussed on the possibility that tens of thousands of ISIS militants and relatives might escape Kurdish custody. The S.D.F., realizing that the world cared more about the spectre of terrorists on the loose than about the killing of Kurds, promoted false accounts about Kurdish prison guards being sent to the Turkish border. Although these stories were untrue, an S.D.F. spokesman told me, they “made the international community pay attention.”
From Ain Issa, most of the detainees ran north, toward the Turks. Others stayed in the camp, infiltrating the regular population and adding to its paranoia and confusion. Several people told me that some of the fleeing ISIS wives cried out, “The night is coming!”
Not long after this, a convoy of armored vehicles flying American flags approached on the highway, from the Lafarge Cement Factory. When the convoy stopped in front of the camp, relief washed over Khairi. “We were so happy,” he remembered. “We thought they were coming to save us.” Khairi told his children that everything was going to be O.K. Then the convoy started moving again.
Khairi and the other refugees did not know that Trump had ordered an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Syria, and that the convoy now receding out of sight was headed for Iraq. But they understood that it wasn’t coming back. “Everyone went crazy,” Khairi said. “It was total anarchy.” People swarmed the administrative offices, shattering the windows, breaking down the doors, and lighting them on fire. Fighting persisted between the Turks and the S.D.F., and at some point Khairi’s eight-year-old niece, Amal, was struck by a stray bullet. Her older brother, Ali Mohammad, took her to the hospital in town. The incident aggravated the hysteria, and soon nearly everyone poured out through the camp’s main gate. Unlike the detainees, most of the refugees went south—some in cars, others on foot—unsure where they were going or what they would do. When Ali Mohammad returned to the camp with Amal, she was dead.
Khairi and his relatives stayed to bury her. In a clearing outside a mosque, they dug a grave and marked it with a stone on either end. The sun was setting. No one had eaten in several days. Khairi set out to scavenge for food. It looked as if a tornado had descended on the camp. He marvelled at how quickly everything had changed.
The next day, he hired a truck. “It was very difficult for me to leave,” he told me. “It was the same as when we left our village, in Deir Ezzour.” As the truck headed south—in the same direction from which, five years earlier, they had fled—Khairi and his family found themselves, once again, homeless and running from the war.
The departing Americans, after their brief pause outside the camp, proceeded east on the M4, through the middle of the battle, with Turkish forces on their left and the S.D.F. on their right. Both sides stopped fighting to let them pass, then resumed.
In the end, Brousque and the S.D.F. held on to Ain Issa, preventing the Turks from crossing the highway. It took the Americans three days to transport all their equipment and heavy weaponry out of Syria. Locals hurled rocks at them and called them traitors. After the Lafarge Cement Factory was abandoned, two American F-15s launched missiles at it. A U.S. Army spokesman explained that the purpose of the strike was “to reduce the facility’s military usefulness”—a stunning conclusion to what had arguably been America’s most successful military partnership in the post-9/11 era.
That partnership had begun in 2014, when ISIS stormed across northern Syria and the only meaningful armed resistance it encountered was a small band of Kurdish men and women who called themselves the People’s Protection Units, or Y.P.G. (The Syrian government had pulled most of its troops out of the region two years earlier, to quell uprisings elsewhere in the country.) Thousands of ISIS militants eventually besieged Kobani, the home town of the Y.P.G.’s commander, Ferhat Abdi Sahin, better known as Mazloum. A massacre appeared at hand. When I met Mazloum, in February, he recalled telling his fighters that under no circumstances were they to let ISIS advance beyond the street where he grew up. ISIS captured his house twice, and, according to Mazloum, both times the Y.P.G. took it back. By then, the U.S. had begun providing air support to the embattled Kurds; Mazloum said that American commanders advised him to surrender Kobani, and offered to cover his retreat. He refused. When ISIS seized his house a third time, he radioed its coördinates to the Americans and asked them to destroy it. “That was when the momentum changed,” Mazloum said. “After they bombed my house, we retook the neighborhood, and from there we kept advancing.” The Kurds eventually pushed ISIS out of Kobani, at which point the U.S. proposed to continue backing them from the air, as long as they pursued ISIS on the ground.
This must have been a strange moment for Mazloum, because the U.S. had once considered him a terrorist. He was born in 1967, shortly after the creation of the Syrian Arab Republic, which institutionalized the repression of Kurds. At the age of thirteen, he was imprisoned for reading a book in Kurdish, and as a student at Aleppo University he was arrested four times, for “political activities.” Meanwhile, in Turkey, whose government had enacted severe anti-Kurd policies of its own, the P.K.K. had launched a guerrilla war against the state. The group’s founder, Abdullah Ocalan, was forced to flee to Syria, where Mazloum’s father, a physician, befriended him. Some Turks now refer to Mazloum, derisively, as Ocalan’s “spiritual son.”
After graduating with a degree in architecture, Mazloum joined the P.K.K. He rose through its ranks during the eighties and nineties, while the group carried out kidnappings, assassinations, bombings, and suicide attacks in Turkey. The U.S. officially designated the P.K.K. a terrorist organization in 1997, and a year and a half later the C.I.A. helped Turkey capture Ocalan. He was imprisoned on a small island in the Sea of Marmara, where he remains today.
In 2011, at the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, Mazloum founded the Y.P.G. as a Syrian branch of the P.K.K. Three years later, when American officials offered to support the Y.P.G., they insisted that it break ties with its parent group. Mazloum says that his organization is not connected to the P.K.K. That is preposterous; what is debatable is the nature of the connection. As the Y.P.G. recaptured more territory from ISIS, it absorbed tens of thousands of non-Kurdish fighters—Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, and Turkmen—and, in 2015, it rebranded itself as the Syrian Democratic Forces. Recruits were still indoctrinated in Ocalan’s anti-Turkish ideology, however, and P.K.K. leaders quietly installed themselves in Syria, consolidating a shadow authority in both the S.D.F. and the emerging bureaucracy responsible for liberated areas. This bureaucracy—the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria—now governs about a third of the country, garnering considerable revenue, from taxes and trade, which, many experts believe, directly finances the P.K.K.
For the Americans, the S.D.F.’s proficiency against ISIS eclipsed concerns about antagonizing Turkey, a NATO ally. As the war against ISIS progressed, the Kurds, despite their fidelity to a designated terrorist organization, developed an extraordinarily copacetic relationship with U.S. troops and personnel. At the command level, this symbiosis seems to have been largely thanks to General Mazloum, whose competence and reliability permitted American officials to overlook his political associations. Brett McGurk, a former special Presidential envoy for the coalition fighting ISIS, told me, “Mazloum proved himself to be incredibly effective militarily—and diplomatically, bringing tens of thousands of Arabs into the force. The results spoke for themselves.” Notwithstanding a lifelong devotion to Kurdish rights, Mazloum was crucial in uniting the S.D.F.’s diverse non-Kurdish factions, especially rivalrous Arab tribes. “He’s pragmatic and subtle,” McGurk said. “He became a trusted interlocutor.”
Today, Mazloum commands more than a hundred thousand fighters, fewer than half of whom are Kurds. His astonishing trajectory, from the leader of a fledgling militia to the general of a multiethnic army controlling a large swath of Syria, has endowed him with an almost mythical stature. “People see him as a kind of prophet,” a Kurdish friend of mine said. Some Americans express a similar awe. “Mazloum is the George Washington of the Kurds,” a U.S. Army major told me.
Erdoğan, for his part, has issued a warrant for Mazloum’s arrest through Interpol, and placed a bounty on his head. For my meeting with General Mazloum, I was instructed to show up at an S.D.F. base; I was then escorted to a remote compound on a hill overlooking wetlands. Guards paced the terraces of a luxurious residence with patios and an expansive swimming pool—the Hollywood version of a narco mansion, except that everyone was nice. Mazloum, the only person on the property in uniform, received me in a small, austere room with a few couches and coffee tables. Soft-spoken and clean-shaven, with graying black hair and an open face, he radiated the guileless enthusiasm of an idealist and the imperturbability of a veteran commander.
It is a sign of the insular and secretive culture of the P.K.K. that, until last year, few people outside Syria had ever heard of Mazloum. Throughout the Raqqa offensive, he avoided the press and remained sequestered with his American counterparts inside the Lafarge Cement Factory. His first public appearance came last March, after the S.D.F. captured Deir Ezzour, ISIS’s last redoubt in Syria, erasing from the map a caliphate that once encompassed more than thirty thousand square miles. At a choreographed ceremony, Mazloum briefly addressed international media outlets that had covered the battle. When we spoke, he explained to me that it would have been inappropriate for a subordinate of his to have declared such a momentous victory. But his decision to step into the spotlight was also tactical: in addition to declaring victory, he implored the U.S. not to abandon Syria prematurely. Warning that ISIS and Al Qaeda still posed a danger to the “whole world,” he asked for continued military support, “in order to begin a new phase in the fight against terrorism.”
His worry was understandable. Three months earlier, in December, 2018, while the S.D.F. was still engaged in brutal daily combat in Deir Ezzour, Trump had declared, on Twitter, “We have won against ISIS.” Praising the “soldiers who have been killed fighting for our country,” he directed the Pentagon to withdraw all its forces from Syria within thirty days. (Two U.S. service members had been killed in Syria, compared with more than ten thousand men and women in the S.D.F.) Defense Secretary James Mattis resigned in protest, as did Brett McGurk. After Republican senators joined the backlash, Trump relented on his timetable. But he never rescinded his order to withdraw.
When I asked Mazloum if U.S. military and civilian leaders had begun preparing him for their departure after Trump’s announcement, he said absolutely not. “Basically, they told us it wasn’t going to happen,” Mazloum said. The first official warning he received to the contrary came in October, when the ranking U.S. general for the Middle East called to inform him—on the same day the rest of the world found out—that a Turkish incursion was imminent and that the U.S. would do nothing to impede it. (A U.S. Army spokesman said, “We decline specific comment on prior conversations between senior leaders.”)
The disaster that subsequently befell northern Syria has been widely attributed to Trump’s capitulation to Erdoğan, which many people view as a gross betrayal of the Kurds. Senator Mitt Romney, raising the prospect of a congressional investigation into Trump’s decision, called it “a bloodstain on the annals of American history.” Such criticism hinges on the seemingly self-evident notion that the Kurds, after defeating ISIS at great cost, had earned a debt of loyalty from the U.S. Certainly, this was Mazloum’s understanding. Trump, however, never suggested that it was his understanding. Rather, it appears that U.S. commanders and diplomats made commitments that contradicted his explicit statements—imparting a false sense of security to the Kurds that ultimately harmed them. Mazloum told me that last summer, when he agreed to pull back his forces from the Turkish border, the Americans on the ground in Syria assured him, “As long as we’re here, Turkey will not attack you.”
By all accounts, these Americans genuinely believed in their partnership with the Kurds and were anguished by the way it ended. The question is whether they did the Kurds a disservice by not adequately explaining to them that the collective will of U.S. institutions could be instantly abrogated by a Presidential tweet—and that the posting of such a tweet was likely. In Syria, perhaps more than anywhere else, the unprecedented friction between the White House and its foreign-policy apparatus is on stark display. Almost every Kurd I met, including Mazloum, distinguished between the U.S. military and its Commander-in-Chief. “After all the fighting we did together, we had lots of trust in the Americans,” Mazloum said. “We never imagined everything could change in just two days.” After a pause, he qualified the criticism: “We know this was a political decision. We still have confidence in our American brothers-in-arms.”
In 2015, when Bashar al-Assad appeared to be losing his grip on the country, Vladimir Putin came to his aid. A prodigious Russian air campaign turned the tide of the civil war. In addition to enabling regime atrocities, Russia has killed thousands of Syrian civilians. Russian security contractors have also committed horrific crimes. A 2017 video showed Russians murdering a Syrian with a sledgehammer, then decapitating him and lighting his corpse on fire. However problematic the U.S. intervention in Syria has been, it would be specious to equate Russian and American conduct in the country.
Assad and the Russians have made it clear that their long-term goal is the return of “total state control” in Syria, including in the territory captured from ISIS by the S.D.F. Nevertheless, the day before Turkey attacked Brousque’s forces in Ain Issa and U.S. troops began leaving the Lafarge Cement Factory, Mazloum met with representatives from Russia and the Assad regime. The next afternoon, government military units returned to parts of northern Syria for the first time in seven years. In an editorial in Foreign Policy, Mazloum described his choice as one between “painful compromises” and “the genocide of our people.”
During the next week, a cascade of events upended the strategic balance in Syria and, by extension, throughout the Middle East. Putin invited Erdoğan to Sochi, where the two leaders signed a treaty that halted the Turkish offensive while implicitly ceding to Turkey the land it had already taken—nearly a thousand square miles. (An earlier ceasefire, negotiated by Vice-President Mike Pence, had been neither respected by Turkey nor enforced by the U.S.) Mazloum agreed to relinquish his remaining border positions, and Russia replaced the U.S. as the neutral mediator of the buffer zone. Russian troops also joined regime forces on the S.D.F.’s new front line along the territory annexed by Turkey. Near Ain Issa, Russian soldiers commandeered the largest U.S. airbase in Syria. Russian state television broadcast video footage of American medical supplies, empty bunkhouses, and shipping containers marked “PROPERTY OF U.S. ARMY.”
When I visited Ain Issa, in February, Russian military vehicles entered and exited a former U.S. outpost on the edge of town. A large Russian flag waved on the roof of a former U.S. guard tower. It was visible from the building where I met with Brousque, who now coördinates with Russian soldiers instead of with U.S. Special Forces. It wasn’t the same, Brousque said: “We fought alongside the Americans. They ate with us. They laughed and joked with us. We had the feeling that we belonged to the same team. It’s not like that with the Russians.” Brousque recalled a celebration at the end of a training exercise, during which American troops sang and danced to traditional Kurdish music with their S.D.F. comrades. Smiling at the memory, he said, “The Russians would never do that.”
Earthen berms and trenches lined the north side of the M4. A few hundred feet beyond them were the Turkish-backed militias. Before October, downtown Ain Issa had been a bustling souk. Now it was deserted. Regime soldiers walked by shuttered stores, garages, barbershops, and restaurants. When I introduced myself and tried to ask them questions, they nervously hurried off. They wore mismatched uniforms and tattered sneakers, and several of them looked underfed. Of the handful of soldiers I managed to interview, all but one had been conscripted. None was armed, and I later learned that the S.D.F. had prohibited them from carrying weapons in town.
The regime forces that Mazloum allowed back into Kurdish territory are restricted to the frontiers and pose little danger to the S.D.F. By stopping the Turkish offensive, securing Russian protection, and limiting the deployment of regime troops, Mazloum prevented northern Syria from descending into chaos. But this emergency diplomacy grants only a temporary reprieve. The longer the Kurds must contend with an existential threat from Turkey in the north, the less able they will be to defend their Arab satellites in the south—Deir Ezzour and Raqqa—from Russia and Assad. This secondary effect of the U.S. withdrawal has the potential to become yet another catastrophe, for yet another population.
To the extent that Trump has articulated a coherent policy in Syria, it reflects his view that the country is irredeemably doomed and therefore no longer our concern. “Syria was lost long ago,” he said last year. “We’re talking about sand and death.” Trump is not the first President to cite the scale and the complexity of the Syrian war as a justification for American inconstancy. In 2013, when the regime killed more than a thousand civilians with sarin gas, Barack Obama, leery of being drawn into the conflict, backed away from punitive strikes, despite having declared a “red line” on the use of chemical weapons. The regime, uninhibited by a fear of American repercussions, has since conducted additional gas attacks and wantonly slaughtered tens of thousands of its citizens by other means. One could argue that Obama’s painstakingly considered inaction enabled more violence and misery than any of Trump’s carelessly impulsive actions. At the same time, Trump’s repudiation of American responsibility to Syria is harder to rationalize, given that during his time in office the U.S., in its zeal to exterminate ISIS, has reduced parts of the country to wasteland. Nowhere is this more true than in the city of Raqqa.
The truck that Nashat Khairi hired to take his family away from Ain Issa stopped ten miles north of Raqqa. Khairi, his wife, and their seven children unloaded their belongings on the roadside: mattresses, blankets, pots and pans, their fan and stove. All around them, thousands of refugees from the camp had pitched tents in empty fields, amid grazing livestock. Khairi told his family that they would not be staying there. After a night under the stars, he hitched a ride to Raqqa to look for someplace with a roof.
He discovered a city whose utter decimation might be unique in this century. As a candidate, Trump had vowed to “bomb the shit out of” ISIS, and, almost as soon as he entered the Oval Office, Raqqa afforded him the opportunity. By the summer of 2017, the S.D.F. had encircled the city, which ISIS militants prepared to defend with suicide bombers, an elaborate tunnel system, and ubiquitous I.E.D.s. Because the S.D.F. lacked heavy weaponry and armored vehicles, the offensive relied on U.S. air strikes. For four months, the U.S. deployed thousands of munitions, ranging from laser-guided Hellfire missiles to one-ton unguided bombs. U.S. artillery battalions complemented the barrage with more than thirty thousand shells. An adviser to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff later told the Marine Corps Times, “Every minute of every hour, we were putting some kind of fire on ISIS in Raqqa.” I was shocked, while covering the battle, by what seemed to be a strategy of physical annihilation applied against a city that still harbored a significant civilian population. One front-line S.D.F. commander told me that he called in U.S. air strikes on solitary gunmen.
When the last ISIS holdouts surrendered, the layout of the city was unrecognizable. Months of labor were required just to uncover the streets. The effort was overseen by the Raqqa Civil Council, a municipal authority established by the Kurds which currently operates under the Autonomous Administration. The U.S. supplied excavators and paid the salaries of more than six hundred local workers. Large rig-mounted jackhammers smashed the vast mountains of concrete into manageable pieces, which were then used to fill in craters, seal ISIS tunnels, and reinforce levees on the Euphrates River. Smaller slabs were pulverized and repurposed as cement. Thousands of bodies were extracted, as were tens of thousands of mines. Once the main arteries were passable, water stations and basic plumbing were installed. People started moving back.
“It changed from a dead city to a city with a pulse,” Ibrahim Ibn Khalil, the former director of the Civil Council’s reconstruction committee, told me this winter. We met in a small café in downtown Raqqa, near the central roundabout where ISIS once performed public beheadings and crucifixions. Ibn Khalil, in a wheelchair, held a hookah pipe in his left hand and a cappuccino in his right. In January, 2018, an assassin had entered his house and shot him six times in the chest; ISIS claimed responsibility. Doctors saved Ibn Khalil’s life, but three bullets remain lodged in his back, and no hospital in Syria is equipped to take them out. Ibn Khalil told me that the American officials who had encouraged the development of the Civil Council had promised to secure him a visa so that he could undergo surgery in the U.S. But they never followed through. “It’s very disappointing for me,” he said. “This happened because I was working with the Americans.”
His personal disappointment echoes a larger one. Because the U.N. respects the sovereignty of the Syrian regime, and the regime does not authorize aid delivery to areas controlled by the S.D.F., the U.S. initially assumed the financial burden for Raqqa’s recovery. But, seven months after Ibn Khalil was shot, Trump suspended the Syria budgets of the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development. “Let the other people take care of it now,” he had said. “We’re going to get back to our country, where we belong.” Although Gulf states and European nations made up for the shortfall, which totalled around two hundred and thirty million dollars—about a quarter of what’s been raised to repair Notre-Dame, in Paris—the disruption hampered progress, and many locals lost their jobs. Five months later, when Trump first threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria, the Americans advising Ibn Khalil’s team—public-health, water-sanitation, and demining experts—were evacuated from the country. Those who eventually returned were confined to U.S. military bases far from Raqqa, and in October they left Syria for good. Rubble, bombs, and bodies still litter the city—unexploded ordnance continues to kill and maim people every week, typically children—and no government has offered any support for the monumental undertaking of fixing damaged buildings and erecting new ones. In Ibn Khalil’s opinion, “The world has betrayed the people of Raqqa.”
The comprehensiveness of the destruction can be visually disorienting. It’s as if the cumulative energy of the American bombardment had scrambled the normal order of things, leaving behind an Escher-like reality to which the mind needs time to adjust. Concrete staircases dangle vertically from twisted rebar; cars lie upside down; roofs jut at weird angles; slabs of concrete undulate like rumpled cloth; trees cower from old blasts. On every surface, projectiles have gouged holes of different shapes and sizes; entire blocks are sheared off at the top. Some buildings appear to defy physics, frozen mid-fall. Others have been trucked away, the only trace of them a square of dirt.
And yet, remarkably, the obliterated city abounds with activity. Because most of Raqqa was wrecked from above, the ground levels of taller structures often survived more or less intact. Many streets are lined with shops and restaurants that have reopened under multiple gutted floors. Less obvious is where everybody lives. For several days, I couldn’t figure it out. Then one evening, while we were driving around, my translator—a friend from Iraq who’d never been to Raqqa before—said, “Look at all the people.” Although solar-powered L.E.D. lamps illuminate a few main boulevards, and commercial enterprises run diesel generators, Raqqa is eerily dark at night. But now I saw what he was talking about: scattered throughout the city, dim points of light.
One of these belonged to Nashat Khairi. Three days after his family left Ain Issa, he found a cinder-block room on Raqqa’s northern outskirts, near train tracks whose rails had been removed by scavengers, and rusty freight cars converted into shelters. The room was too small for his seven children, so Khairi installed the family’s tent outside, and linked the two entrances with a tarp, thereby doubling the square footage. Between the stakes, he planted another garden with radishes and bell peppers. “This tent is dear to my heart,” he told me when I visited.
As we discussed what had happened in October, Khairi kept referring to a compact agenda that he kept in his pocket. The agenda, so old and weathered that most of its pages had detached, contained copious notes from his years as a mukhtar at the Ain Issa camp: the names, ages, and phone numbers of everyone in his section; the rations to which each family was entitled; the locations of tents with infants needing formula; dates of marriages and deaths. Between the pages were battered business cards—contact information for N.G.O.s and aid workers who had long since quit the region. Picking up a card that had fallen out, Khairi told me it belonged to a doctor who used to perform circumcisions for newborns in the camp. He carefully returned the card to its place.
Khairi had found a job helping a Raqqa merchant sell secondhand blankets, and earned around three dollars a week. (I had first met him, by chance, while he was unfolding his wares on the sidewalk one morning.) Although he often had to choose between food and kerosene—winter temperatures frequently dropped below freezing—he considered himself lucky. Thousands of refugees who had fled Ain Issa were still living in the fields north of Raqqa. The former manager of the camp told me that there is no plan to help them. When my translator and I visited the makeshift settlement, a crowd of women swarmed our car, shouting, “We’re dying of hunger!” and “Why isn’t anyone coming?” We had to drive away when they tried to force open our doors. A villager who lived nearby later told me, “They don’t even have water. Their husbands are in Raqqa looking for work.” He added, “When it rains, these fields will all be flooded.”
The reason none of these people had moved into Raqqa was that the city was already full. Around a hundred thousand people are thought to live there. In addition to former residents returning home, and people fleeing the Turkish invasion, the city has been inundated with Syrians displaced by the regime—from Aleppo, Hama, Deir Ezzour, and elsewhere. Every habitable niche has been claimed. After a week or so, I learned to identify signs of human life within the ruins: drying laundry, bricked-up holes, plastic-covered windows, and small gray satellite dishes affixed to half-collapsing walls. (The Civil Council sells generator-powered electricity for about two dollars a week, and everyone, no matter how destitute, seemed to have a television with several hundred channels.) Sometimes tower complexes were so thoroughly damaged that only a single apartment retained a modicum of structural integrity. One day, I noticed a man sweeping debris from the roof of a three-story building whose top and bottom floors had no exterior walls; he lived in the middle. When he invited me inside, I found the living room impeccably restored, with plush carpets and decorative plaster molding. A polished wood-and-glass display cabinet had survived the battle; on its shelves, porcelain figurines and delicate teacups were arranged on lace doilies.
Most people in Raqqa live in far more squalid and hazardous conditions. Large families are often crowded into one or two rooms with bowed ceilings and bulging walls—masses of blasted concrete literally pressing in on them. Given the state of these apartments, I was surprised to discover that there are few squatters in Raqqa. Almost everyone I met, including Khairi, paid rent.
At one of the dozens of real-estate offices downtown, Hassan Yassin, a middle-aged agent wearing a kaffiyeh and traditional tribal robes, told me, “We’ve never seen such a high demand.” Yassin said that property owners can usually be tracked down, and if they are dead, imprisoned, or abroad, relatives suffice. Prices range from about ten dollars a month, in the suburbs, to as much as thirty dollars a month in the popular Al Firdous neighborhood. (Al Firdous is no less damaged than anywhere else, but it boasts the Electric Park of Raqqa, whose Ferris wheel and bumper cars withstood two air strikes, and Rashid Stadium. A former ISIS torture center, the stadium has a synthetic track that people now jog around.) Yassin waved a stack of papers—his backlog of would-be tenants seeking accommodation. “It’s like that everywhere in Raqqa,” he said.
During the day, the city resonates with the din of banging hammers, power tools, and machinery. Wood shops fabricate furniture; boom trucks and bulldozers clog the roads; venders hawk salvaged brick, tile, metal, and marble. But almost none of this industry is geared toward creating new structures. At a high school flattened by an air strike, a crew of workers contracted by the Civil Council explained their work to me. As backhoes clawed through heaps of concrete, raking out gnarled rebar, laborers fed the steel rods through a straightening machine. Earthmovers then exhumed the foundation, so that the school could be resurrected on its original footprint. This final step, however, was merely theoretical: no building had occurred on any of the sites the crew had prepared.
The U.S. and its allies have refused to fund construction projects in Syria as long as Assad remains in power. “It’s become a collective consensus among donors that we will not do reconstruction in Syria,” a senior humanitarian officer told me. “ ‘Reconstruction’ is a dirty word.” The ostensible reason for withholding such assistance is to incentivize the resolution of a U.N.-sponsored peace process. But the process has been stalled for years, and few people expect it to succeed. The Western aversion to durable investment in Syria more likely arises from a broad but unspoken recognition that Assad is winning the war. “It’s political,” the humanitarian officer said. “We don’t want to do anything that will eventually benefit the regime.”
Even though the State Department and U.S.A.I.D. no longer have personnel in Syria, they still determine how the majority of foreign funding is spent there. The U.S. government distinguishes between “stabilization” and “reconstruction,” allowing the former and proscribing the latter. Stabilization projects are subject to guidelines that forbid, among other things, the building of load-bearing walls. In practical terms, this means that, if a school was minimally damaged by an American air strike, the U.S. can finance basic refurbishments, such as replacing doorframes or applying new paint. But if the school was destroyed—as the vast majority of structures in Raqqa were—the U.S., as a matter of policy, cannot replace it. The Europeans and the Gulf states generally follow the same rule.
For even these limited interventions, only public structures are eligible. Since the Second World War, the U.S. has rarely paid directly for the reconstruction of private homes in any conflict; the crucial difference in Syria is the absence of other actors to provide such aid. In Iraq, the U.N. has rebuilt more than twenty-five thousand residences that were destroyed during the war against ISIS, and the World Bank is funding major infrastructure projects. In Raqqa, deferring to the regime, neither institution has done anything.
Yassin told me that, among the buildings where he had placed renters, “we estimate that at least seventy per cent of them will have to be torn down—they’re not safe.” I asked what will happen to their occupants if that happens. “They’ll have to go somewhere else,” he said.
In Raqqa, you can’t walk down the street without encountering people whose lives have been shattered by American arms. An investigation by Amnesty International found that the U.S.-led coalition killed at least sixteen hundred civilians in the city; locals say that the actual toll is much higher. Although American officials like to claim that the U.S. “liberated” Raqqa, nobody I met there felt liberated.
One afternoon, in a neighborhood adjacent to Al Firdous, we passed a yellow taxi parked outside a building that looked as if it had been stepped on by a giant. A sheet hung over the doorway. When my translator asked if anyone was home, a middle-aged man with gray hair and a gray mustache emerged. His name was Mustafa al-Hamad. We followed him into a room with crumbling walls lined with blankets and pillows, where we were joined by his wife, Namat.
They were originally from Aleppo, where Hamad had managed a shoe store. In 2012, the revolution turned violent in their neighborhood, and they moved with their four children to Raqqa. The war had not yet reached Raqqa, and Namat’s family lived there. Hamad bought a taxi and began working as a driver. He and Namat had another daughter. After ISIS captured Raqqa, in 2014, they considered fleeing—but nowhere they could go was significantly safer. Two years later, the S.D.F. began its advance on the city, and ISIS, recognizing the need for human shields, prohibited civilians from leaving.
In 2017, as the S.D.F. approached Raqqa, the already ferocious deluge of munitions intensified. That July, a shell or an air strike killed Namat’s brother, Khalid. She and Hamad resolved to get out. The taxi could fit only them, their five children, and Khalid’s thirteen-year-old son, whom they had adopted. Hamad promised to return for Namat’s mother, sister, nieces, and nephews. They left at night, following a rutted dirt road through the wetlands on the edge of the Euphrates. Eventually, they arrived at a line of vehicles—other residents trying to escape the city—backed up from where the road disappeared into a marsh. ISIS militants had blown up a levee, flooding the way.
About a dozen men were helping people move their cars, one after another, across several hundred feet of water. “If we hear a plane, we have to go,” they told Hamad. The Americans, fearing that ISIS militants were sneaking out of Raqqa, had dropped leaflets threatening to bomb anyone attempting to ford the river.
When it was Hamad’s turn, he and his two teen-age sons got out and pushed. Namat and her daughters waded alongside them. The water rose to Namat’s chest; she held her infant above her head. They made it across, and the next day reached a town under the control of the S.D.F.
Hamad did not go back for Namat’s mother and sister—to do so would have been suicidal. Both women, along with four of Namat’s nieces and nephews, were later killed in an air strike. As soon as Raqqa was accessible, Hamad and Namat visited the site, hoping to recover their bodies. There was too much rubble.
The day after I met Hamad, he led me and my translator to the place where he had pushed his taxi across the marsh. The dirt road was still flooded, and looked exactly as he had described it. On the way back to the city, we stopped at a small scrap yard. In a wooden shack surrounded by rusty engine parts, shutters, gears, wheels, and other refuse, we found the young owner sitting on a crate, drinking tea with one of his suppliers. While I spoke to the owner about his business—there had been a brief boom, he said, but the city was soon picked over—the supplier regarded me suspiciously. He was missing several teeth, and cotton spilled from holes all over his dirty coat. He grew agitated as I continued asking questions, and finally interrupted me. “During the battle, a mortar killed my wife and three of my daughters,” he said. “Another one of my daughters lost her leg.”
The man, named Hussein Ahmad, invited me to his house, where I met his ten-year-old daughter, Fatma, who is now in a wheelchair. Fatma recalled cooking dinner with her mother and sisters when a shell tore through their kitchen. Rima was fifteen, Amira fourteen, and Waffa twelve. Ahmad said he had asked several N.G.O.s about getting a prosthesis for Fatma. He’d taped his phone number to the wall, in case someone showed up while he was out collecting metal.
Most civilians who were injured by U.S. artillery and air strikes were treated at the Raqqa Public Hospital. A former doctor from the hospital told me that by the end of the fighting only ten of his colleagues remained, the others having fled or died. Amputation became the default treatment for wounded limbs, the doctor said. One physician had performed so many amputations that ISIS accused him of deliberately impairing people. Infection and sepsis were common. Fatma said that, when she woke up in one of the wards, “they were cleaning my leg but I couldn’t feel anything—then it started to smell and they cut it.”
Because the hospital also treated ISIS militants, it was a frequent target of U.S. air strikes. (Toward the end of the offensive, it also became an ISIS fighting position.) When the current director of the hospital, Kassar Ali, took me inside the original facility, we had to scrabble through downed pipes and caved-in ceilings, the walls and floors scorched black by fire. Scattered everywhere were the remnants of medical supplies: white piles of cast plaster, contorted gurneys, smashed exam tables. Air strikes had destroyed all of the X-ray machines, CAT scanners, and MRI devices. Doctors Without Borders has financed the renovation of a new wing—which is currently the only public-health facility in Raqqa—but none of this essential equipment has been replaced. According to Ali, American commanders had visited the hospital on several occasions: “Each time, they took pictures, we had long meetings, and they promised support. But so far they’ve given us nothing.” Since October, even the visits have stopped. Reached by phone recently, Ali said that he is deeply worried about the possibility of a COVID-19 outbreak in Raqqa. “We can take care of one or two patients, at most,” he explained. The hospital has two ventilators—eight were lost to air strikes.
If people in Raqqa knew the U.S.’s rationale for refusing to engage in any substantive reconstruction of their city—because it might end up in the hands of the regime—they would no doubt feel even more betrayed than they do now. Raqqa is an Arab city, and most of its residents, unlike the Kurds, are unwilling to accept any deal with the regime. While interviewing people in Raqqa, I often heard the phrase “the devil before Assad.” When General Mazloum made his accommodation with the regime, protests broke out in the city. Some Arabs, fearing the regime’s return, have since fled. Hamad and Namat told me that if the regime comes back they, too, will leave. After they escaped Raqqa, in 2017, their daughter Noor married and moved to Hama Province, in western Syria; six months later, she was killed, along with her husband and her in-laws, in an air strike by the regime or the Russians. Hamad and Namat’s anger aside, staying would be foolhardy: as natives of Aleppo, they risk meeting the same fate as the tens of thousands of Syrians whom the regime has disappeared since 2011. When their eldest son turned eighteen, he would be conscripted.
The partially demolished apartment where they now live once belonged to Namat’s mother. When they returned to Raqqa, Hamad and Namat spent ten days clearing out rubble and shoring up the walls. Hamad wired in electricity, and Namat planted vegetables in an empty lot outside. They even had a kitchen with a sink and running water. If they left this place, I asked, where would they go? Hamad reflected, then said, “Wherever the regime isn’t.”
Dread of the regime is even more acute for those who have worked, even in limited capacities, with the U.S. At the offices of Citizenship House, a local N.G.O. based in the Al Firdous neighborhood, I met half a dozen women who ran democracy-education workshops funded by the State Department and by European governments. One of them, Yamam Abdulghani, told me, “To the regime, we’re terrorists. They accuse us of applying a Western agenda and Western ideologies.” When I asked what punishment such activities might elicit, Abdulghani said, “Look at Caesar’s pictures.” In 2013, a former military-police photographer using the pseudonym Caesar divulged thousands of images of Syrian prisoners who had been tortured and executed in regime detention centers.
The workshops at Citizenship House are quintessential “stabilization” programs. In contrast to humanitarian operations—which are supposed to address immediate needs—such programs are designed to forestall the emergence of ISIS and other extremist movements; for this reason, the U.S. and its allies will fund them. But, in Raqqa, the absence of any U.S. protection against the regime—and of any U.S. investment in rebuilding—has created exactly the kinds of conditions in which radical groups like ISIS flourish. According to Abdulghani, a bellwether for such instability in Raqqa is the current situation of its women.
Women’s rights are central to the political philosophy of Abdullah Ocalan, and the S.D.F. and the Autonomous Administration vigorously promote gender equality. A billboard outside the Raqqa Civil Council declares, “With women at the forefront of the twenty-first century, we will end all violence against humanity.” Moreover, before ISIS, few women in Raqqa wore niqabs and veils. Yet Abdulghani was one of only two uncovered women I met in the city. The other was the Kurdish co-chair of the Civil Council. Abdulghani said that the prevalence of niqabs and veils could be attributed, in part, to the lingering influence of ISIS. But the U.S. withdrawal was a bigger factor. “Before October, some women had started to uncover,” she said. “Now it’s stopped. Women are afraid of what’s coming.”
Abdulghani, who, in 2016, smuggled herself out of Raqqa in a truckful of goats, said that people often harass her on the street, calling her a prostitute and warning that ISIS will soon be back. “Everyone is preparing to leave,” she said. “No one feels secure. No one can think about tomorrow.”
Two weeks after Trump ordered a full withdrawal of the thousand or so U.S. troops in Syria, he decided to send half of them back. They would not be defending their Kurdish allies against Turkey, or deterring the regime from encroaching on Raqqa. Instead, Trump said, “we are leaving soldiers to secure the oil.” Cryptically, he went on, “Maybe somebody else wants the oil, in which case they’ll have a hell of a fight.” The Pentagon has characterized the mission differently: the “somebody” it is concerned about is ISIS, and American troops are in Syria “for the oil” only insofar as safeguarding it deprives ISIS of a potential source of revenue.
Both of these explanations feel disingenuous. It’s true that ISIS persists around the S.D.F.-controlled oil fields of Deir Ezzour Province, where U.S. Special Forces continue to carry out counterterrorism raids. But Iran, which supports the Assad regime, is also active there. Nashat Khairi and his family, for instance, can’t return to their village in Deir Ezzour because it is occupied by an Iranian-backed militia. Until October, containing Iranian adventurism was a key U.S. priority in Syria, and Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach to Iran has been perhaps the most consistent feature of his foreign-policy agenda. Iranian operations in Syria are overseen by the Quds Force, which used to be commanded by Qassem Suleimani, the general who was assassinated in a drone strike in January. Trump later defended his decision to order the strike by saying that Suleimani had “viciously wounded and murdered thousands of U.S. troops.” A U.S. withdrawal from Deir Ezzour could entail surrendering U.S. bases to the Quds Force.
Another place in Syria where U.S. troops are currently stationed is also rich in oil—a Kurdish region called Jazira. But ISIS has no presence in Jazira, and there is little need to protect its oil. Most of the crude in both Jazira and Deir Ezzour is exported to the regime, which refines it and sells a portion back to the Kurds, as diesel and petroleum. Although the Kurds and the regime fundamentally oppose each other, they engage in this commerce because neither could subsist without it: international sanctions prevent the regime from buying sufficient oil on the global market, and the Kurds have no refineries of their own. Jazira is strategically valuable not because of its peculiar oil trade but because it is where the M4 crosses into northern Iraq—another Kurdish-governed territory. The border is a lifeline for Syrian Kurds, and also a bridge between two major spheres of U.S. influence. Russia is thus determined to control it. When I visited Jazira, this winter, U.S. and Russian patrols were confronting one another almost daily on the muddy roads that crisscross its barren hills.
Russia has long presented itself as a preferable alternative to U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, and Trump’s disengagement has galvanized Putin’s regional ambitions. The most arresting thing about the video showing the Russian takeover of the U.S. airbase near Ain Issa is not the Russian helicopter touching down on an American landing zone, or the Russian soldiers moving into American barracks; it is the Russian officer invoking timeworn American rhetoric. “We are here to deliver humanitarian and medical aid to civilians, and to provide them with peace and security,” he says.
The Kurds know that Russia, Iran, and the regime want the same thing Turkey wants: an end to their autonomy in Syria. This is why many Kurds, despite Trump’s oft-expressed indifference to their welfare, cling to the hope of a renewed alliance with the U.S. Nearly all the Kurdish officials I interviewed were so desperate to salvage what remained of the American commitment to Syria that they refused to speak on the record about the withdrawal. One S.D.F. commander told me that, even during the Turkish invasion, he and his peers refrained from criticizing the U.S. in the press. “We discussed it, and decided to say we felt ‘disappointed’ instead of ‘betrayed,’ ” he said. Trump’s opinion of the Kurds, however, seems to have only deteriorated since he abandoned them. In November, he hosted Erdoğan in the Oval Office, where the Turkish President reportedly produced an iPad and showed a video comparing General Mazloum to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the founder of ISIS. Afterward, Trump thanked Erdoğan and the Turkish military “for the job they’ve done” in Syria. He has also mused, “The Kurds, it’s very interesting—Turkey doesn’t like them, other people do.”
Were Trump to remove the remaining U.S. forces in Jazira and Deir Ezzour, the S.D.F. would have to make additional concessions to the regime in order to secure a bulwark against Turkey. This could include handing over Raqqa. But, even if the U.S. stays in Syria, and Turkey does not renew its offensive, the status quo appears unsustainable. Once Russia, Iran, and the regime have defeated the final pockets of the Arab opposition, they will almost certainly turn their attention to the Kurds. Arthur Quesnay, a political scientist at the Sorbonne, who recently co-authored a report on northern Syria, told me, “It may take a couple of years, but the regime will gradually return and recapture territory.” Quesnay believes that the fall of Raqqa and Deir Ezzour will be only the beginning. If the regime managed to take control of a few strategic sites, such as the border crossing in Jazira, it could starve the S.D.F. of resources, precipitating its collapse. In that case, Mazloum’s army would revert to what it was before his fateful introduction to the U.S., in 2014: a small Kurdish militia, surrounded by enemies.
All over northern Syria, the Kurds are preparing for this scenario by building an extensive network of tunnels. According to Mazloum, Trump promised him that he would never allow Erdoğan to attack Kobani. But Mazloum seems to have little confidence in the reassurance: I saw more tunnels in his home town than anywhere else. Twenty-five miles of paved road connects the former U.S. airbase near Ain Issa to Kobani, which abuts the Turkish border. The entire length of this route is lined with small blue tents, spaced around seventy feet apart, each standing beside a large mound of soil. When my translator and I pulled over and entered one of them, we found two teen-agers, covered in dirt, peering into a narrow shaft. A winch was suspended above the mouth of the shaft, and when the boys retracted its cable a man in a harness surfaced from the subterranean dark. They had been digging for three weeks straight. The tunnel, which parallels the road, was thirty feet underground.
While the Kurds are adjusting to the fact that the sky is no longer on their side, so are the area’s civilians. West of Ain Issa on the M4, where the front line with the Turks cuts across sweeping plains, a small Christian village called Tell Tawil sits on a low rise, conspicuous from a distance because of its abundant trees. In 2015, as ISIS neared Tell Tawil, the entire population fled. A year later, after the S.D.F. expelled ISIS, some people returned. When the Turks invaded, there was another exodus. One afternoon, as I accompanied an S.D.F. fighter through Tell Tawil’s deserted streets, he explained that Turkish-backed militias across the fields frequently shelled the village, despite the ceasefire, and Turkish drones sometimes targeted it with missiles. All the houses were empty, and the church was boarded up.
I was therefore surprised when we came upon two old men, sitting shoulder to shoulder, on a stoop in the sun. Their names were David Abraham and Khoshaba Samuel. Abraham, who is eighty-seven years old, wore a pin-striped blazer over a V-neck sweater and a collared shirt. He said that he had lived in Tell Tawil since 1935. His wife had died six years ago, four of his five sons had settled in Sweden, and his daughter lived in the U.S. Samuel, who is eighty, had known Abraham since he was a child and still appeared to respect his seniority. “I love this land,” Abraham said. “I’ll never leave it.” Samuel nodded in agreement.
After saying goodbye to Abraham and Samuel, I asked the S.D.F. fighter to show me his unit’s forwardmost position. We were heading down a hill to the northern edge of the village when I heard footsteps approaching from behind and turned to see Abraham briskly following us. At the end of the road, the S.D.F. fighter pointed to several sandbagged foxholes outside a gated property. He gestured toward the open expanse, strewn with old tractor parts, that stretched from where we stood: this was the no man’s land.
When Abraham caught up to us, he insisted that we come to his house for a cup of coffee. I asked where he lived.
“Here,” he said, opening the gate behind the foxholes.
Three huge dogs barked and jumped on Abraham as he led us into the yard. Pushing them away, Abraham complained to the S.D.F. fighter that someone had recently shot one of the dogs in the paw. We sat at a picnic table, on a deck looking out toward the Turkish front line. Abraham said that mortars sometimes whistled over his roof. He went inside and returned with whiskey tumblers containing espresso. Roosters crowed. After a while, Samuel appeared and, without a word, took a seat across from Abraham. Like almost everyone else from Tell Tawil, they were cotton farmers. Abraham owned a six-acre parcel across the road, but, even if peace came to Syria before he died, he knew that he’d never work it again. ISIS, the Turks, and the S.D.F. had all littered it with mines.
As we stood to leave, I asked Abraham what Tell Tawil had been like during the Second World War, when Britain and Vichy France fought for control of Syria. He said that his memories were vague. One, however, did stand out. He remembered lying flat in the fields, with other children, each time planes passed overhead. ♦
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SDF commander: Turkey, its mercenaries prepare for launching massive attack
SDF commander in Ain Issa district ‘s fronts has linked the Turkish reinforcements and sleeper cells attacks of mercenary gangs to preparing for launching massive attack on the areas of north and east of Syria.
NEWS21 Apr 2020, Tue – 10:312020-04-21T10:31:00 AIN ISSA- JIHAN BALKI
As we know all world’s states are preoccupied with confronting Coronavirus pandemic, but Turkish state is interested to occupy large swaths of the lands of north and east, where it escalated its attacks on it.
Despite all UN invitations to cease-fire in Syria, but all the evidence that refer to massive attack are being prepared to be launched.
Preparations for a massive attack
In an interview with Hawar news agency (ANHA), SDF commander in the fronts of Ain Issa, Ardal Kobani, said that the signs indicate a Turkish preparation for a large-scale attack on north and east Syria.
“The occupiers are taking advantage of the status quo, to occupy more areas, and deliberately targeting civilians, the people are resisting on two fronts, resisting to prevent the emergence of the Coronavirus, and resisting the attacks of the Turkish occupation army, as the Turkish occupation state tries to transfer the Coronavirus to our areas to put north and east Syria In trouble“.
He continued in the same context, “We have information stating that people infected with the Coronavirus have been taken to Serêkaniyê area, Tel Abyad and Afrin, and they are also trying to transfer infected people to Ain Issa.”
ISIS is reorganizing its ranks
Ardal Kobani drew attention to the fact that ISIS mercenaries are taking advantage of the curfew conditions in the area, and said, “A few days ago, they attacked civilians in their homes with grenades, with this dirty method, they are trying to push the people out of their homes to break the measures taken to prevent the emergence of the Coronavirus and empty it of their residents, recruiting children as old as 15 years to carry out suicide attacks, it is clear that ISIS is preparing for an attack and reorganizing its ranks. There are movements of sleeper cells with the aim of weakening SDF. “
SDF is committed to defending the people
The leader reaffirmed the commitment of the Syrian Democratic Forces SDF to international calls for a cease-fire, but at the same time affirmed the readiness of the forces to confront the continuous attacks by the Turkish occupation army and its mercenaries.
T/S ANHA
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Socially dangerous’ for having fought off ISIS
3 April 2020
Stefania D’ignoti speaks to a group of volunteers met with hostility and legal persecution after returning to Italy from the autonomous Kurdish-held region of Rojava.
The entrance graffiti of the Ex-Caserma Livorno. Credit: Stefania D’Ignoti
At the entrance of the Ex-Caserma Occupata, a community centre in the Tuscan seaside city of Livorno, there is some graffiti of a woman holding a gun. She wears a green, red and yellow-coloured headscarf.
Posters bearing the word ‘Rojava’ and flags with red stars on yellow backgrounds signal the centre’s clear support for the Kurdish social revolution that began in early 2013 in north-eastern Syria – now named Rojava.
Rojava has a Kurdish majority population, but is also home to other ethnic minorities, including Arabs and Yezidis. According to Yilmaz Orkan, coordinator of the Kurdistan Information Office in Italy, signs of support for Rojava, similar to those at Ex-Caserma Occupata, can be spotted at youth and social centres scattered around the country, particularly in the northern regions of Piedmont, Tuscany and Emilia Romagna, where Kurdish refugees have flocked to since the late 1980s.
‘In Italy there have always been people showing interest in the Kurdish cause, and since the People’s Protection Unit, more commonly known as YPG, fought and helped defeat ISIS, the topic gained international resonance,’ Orkan says.
‘But what made it even more popular recently is the trial of a group of Italian volunteers who joined YPG units on the ground.’
In January 2019, a court in the northern city of Turin began a peculiar legal procedure called ‘special surveillance’ against five volunteers from Italy who joined the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel), the primary component of the Syrian Democratic Forces, in north-eastern Syria.
The defendants, Maria Marcucci, Davide Grasso, Jacopo Bindi, Fabrizio Maniero and Paolo Andolina, pictured during the trial. Credit: Jacopo Bindi
Revolutionary ideas
The five volunteers – Maria Edgarda Marcucci, Davide Grasso, Jacopo Bindi, Fabrizio Maniero and Paolo Andolina – were mostly in Syria between 2016 and 2018. They had never met each other before this, but had previously been active in social and political movements in Italy.
They travelled to Syria after becoming fascinated by the revolutionary ideas emerging from Rojava after the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011. According to Orkan, these Rojavan ideals are rooted in building a ‘multi-ethnic society, based on principles of gender equality, social cohesion and environmental protection.’
Four of them ended up enrolling in the YPG and Marcucci in the YPJ, the women’s combat unit.
It’s absurd to think that they’re the ones considered dangerous while real acts of terrorism often pass unpunished
In January 2019, Turin’s court instigated a ‘special prevention procedure’, a legal process aimed at potentially ‘dangerous subjects’, to limit the volunteers’ civil freedoms.
Judges recommended they be expelled from their hometown of Turin for at least two years, revoking their passports and driving licences, banning them from all social and political activities – including engaging in public life by discussing their experiences in panel events and conferences. The suggested measures also included placing the defendants under curfew between 7.00pm and 6.00am.
The volunteers were labelled ‘socially dangerous’, and judges said that they represented a threat because of the combat training they received while on the ground.
The case attracted widespread criticism from young people in Italy and social centres like the Ex-Caserma in Livorno mobilized through solidarity campaigns to condemn what they see as ‘unfair’ and ‘undemocratic’ treatment, according to Elisa, a regular attendee of the community centre’s activities.
‘[This legal procedure] is a lack of respect for the European and international victims of fundamentalism and to those, Syrians and not, who perished in the war against the Islamic State,’ she said.
Jacopo Bindi, one of the five defendants, explains to New Internationalist that they all ‘felt [they were] victims of an unfair judicial system that focuses on our political views, rather than our actual conduct.’
Cracking down on dissent
Before leaving for Syria, Bindi was part of the popular ‘No Tav’ grassroots civil movement criticizing the TAV (Italian for ‘high-speed trains’) and more generally the unsustainable train infrastructure development in northern Italy. The group claims the development ignores the environment dangers inherent to the project, and the movement itself has been widely opposed by Italian authorities. Bindi believes his involvement in No Tav is what pushed judges to consider him ‘dangerous’.
‘I was a young student curious to learn about new social systems that could give an answer to my ideals,’ he says. ‘So in 2017 I decided to go to Syria and see with my own eyes the revolution that was taking place there. I needed to witness change.’
Initially, Bindi planned to stay for a month as an international observer. Hundreds of young people from western countries were already on the ground, offering what help they could. Apart from combat help, they would help organizing activities at youth centres and engage with the local population through cultural and ideological exchanges, helping out with farming and ecology activities, or write reports on the ground for western readers.
Compelled to take a more active role, Bindi ended up extending his stay by nine months, during which he served as a volunteer for youth activities and at the media centre in Afrin. Of the five, he was the only one who did not get involved in military operations. ‘I was in charge of peaceful activities, that’s why in my situation, this scenario was even more absurd,’ he says, exasperated.
Claudio Novaro, the defense attorney of the five defendants, told the Italian magazine L’Espresso that ‘the court’s claim is that their military skills could potentially be used in the No Tav context,’ making it a trial against their potential intentions rather than actual crimes committed.
A solidarity march in support of Rojava and remembering Lorenzo Orsetti. Credit: Jacopo Bindi
The court case began a few days before another Italian volunteer, Lorenzo Orsetti, died on the battlefield in the village of Baghouz on 18 March 2019. His death attracted significant media attention in Italy.
Zerocalcare, an Italian cartoonist and author of Kobane Calling, a comic book about his own volunteer experience in Rojava, paid tribute to Orsetti’s ‘martyrdom’, as he called it, through one of his comics.
Elisa says that Orsetti’s act of courage resonated with her because she sees regimes imposing their power through fear and violence as the enemy of her generation, as fascism was for her grandparents, who lived through the Second World War.
‘I think many politically active young people felt represented by Orsetti’s commitment to social justice, that’s why we raised our voice and gathered social media resonance to not let this episode pass by unnoticed,’ she said.
Both the media and the committee in charge of their case labelled the group as ‘foreign fighters’, a term normally used to refer to jihadists joining ISIS, who both Grasso and Bindi were surprised to be associated with
As a result of the public outcry in Italy, the judges decided to drop the charges against two of the defendants – Davide Grasso and Fabrizio Maniero – and postpone a separate decision about the remaining three to the fall of 2019 which, according to the defendants, was a move to separate and weaken them.
‘[But] when Turkey began bombarding north-eastern Syria in October, the judges postponed their decision again,’ Davide Grasso told New Internationalist. On 16 December 2019, prosecutors finally convened on a special surveillance against the remaining three, with a 90-day period to officially approve the decision to convict them, or overturn it. Finally, on 17 March this year,, the court of Turin decided to apply the special procedure solely to Maria Edgarda Marcucci, the only woman of the group.
The court based their decision on the notion that Marcucci was the most threatening case, because in the fall of 2019 she took part in a protest against the arm trade between Italy and Turkey while Turkey was implementing aerial bombardment over northern Syria this past October.
‘We all feel personally attacked by this decision, without distinctions. We still feel proud of what we did for Syria and democracy, to free people from fundamentalism, and to inform Italians about what really happens in Syria,’ the five defendants wrote in a joint statement reflecting on the decision.
‘It’s a serious action against a woman who risked her life to fight ISIS and terrorism and protect civilians.’
The trial has represented a mental burden for the young activists. Years after his return, Grasso admits he was shocked and disappointed to learn the news that his own country now considered him a threat. His bank account was shut down for ‘safety reasons’ connected to his service in Rojava, and his Facebook account was suspended three times for having shared photos and posts about his experiences in Syria.
On the other hand, Bindi says his time in Syria as a peaceful supporter was life-changing: ‘It made me realize our indifference toward what happens in the rest of the world, and how isolated we are.’
But when he returned, the trial aimed to limit his freedom to share his experience. Despite the year-long legal procedure they’ve had to face, both Bindi and Grasso feel relieved to have had public opinion on their side.
Stefania Pusateri, a humanitarian worker, produced a documentary about the trial, with the title Dangerous Subjects, to raise awareness about what she considers to be an example of legal injustice.
‘It’s absurd to think that they’re the ones considered dangerous […] while real acts of terrorism often pass unpunished,’ she says.
QAMISHLI, Syria (Kurdistan 24) – The Syrian regime-affiliated National Defense Forces on Saturday opened fire on a police vehicle of the Kurdish-led self-administration in the northeastern Syrian city of Qamishli, local authorities said.
A Kurdistan 24 news team reported that the shooting killed one member of the Kurdish security forces, known as Asayish, and wounded another.
A Russian patrol unit headed to the site of the incident and intervened to de-escalate and prevent clashes amid underlying tensions in the area, a Kurdistan 24 correspondent in Qamishli reported.
Local Asayish officials said in an online statement, “Members of the Syrian regime forces targeted a military vehicle belonging to our forces, which was in a joint patrol with a municipality vehicle carrying some cleaners as well as another for emergency medical transport.
The Asayish were guarding the cleaners and the ambulance, both on duty as part of efforts to prevent an outbreak of the new coronavirus disease in the region, the statement said. It added that the attack disrupted their work.
The Syrian forces killed a member of the Kurdish security forces and wounded at least three others. The shooting also resulted in the death of one passerby civilian.
The Kurdish police condemned the shooting and blamed the Syrian regime forces for the attack.
“We condemn the cowardly act carried out by members of the Syrian regime, and we assure our people that such attacks will not discourage our resolve and our insistence on achieving security and stability in our regions,” the statement read.
The shooting happened in the regime-held part of Qamishli near a roundabout in the city’s center where a statue of the former Syrian president Hafez Al-Assad stands.
This regime-held roundabout links two Kurdish-held neighborhoods of Qamishli. It is a road that vehicles of the Kurdish self-administration have taken without any obstacles over the past seven years.
Syrian regime troops have only had brief and intermittent clashes with Kurdish-led forces since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011. Both sides appear to have purposefully avoided escalation, but confrontations in Qamishli and Hasakah–both mostly regime-controlled in previous years–have resulted in Kurdish forces taking over a large portion of the two Kurdish-majority cities.
Editing by Kosar Nawzad
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“A federalist system is a system of free women and free men”
A novel Middle East Women Leaders Index, published by the Middle East Women Initiative, ranked Syria relatively low in women’s representation and leadership in the public sector. The data used (primarily from the World bank and UNDP) for the index covered the status of women in the Syrian government and areas it controls. However, the situation in Syria today is far more complex, almost ten years into the conflict.
In addition to the central Assad-led government, both the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and various opposition groups control territory in the country— and will likely have some say in its post-war future. Yet their respective policies on women’s rights and representation are vastly different— an important distinction to make in assessing the country’s progress and determining international support.
Leadership and Representation
Women in the Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces hold senior leadership roles across policy functions and at all levels of their institutions. Ilham Ahmed, the co-chair of the Syrian Democratic Council, acts as the region’s de facto head of state, speaking before the U.S. Congress and meeting U.S. President Donald Trump last year. Further, the SDF operation to liberate Raqqa from ISIS control was led by a woman commander, Rojda Felat.
With the exception of women-only institutions, every deliberative body operates under a co-chair system, where all leadership positions are held jointly by one woman and one man. Offices and commissions within the Executive Council of the Administration, equivalent to cabinet departments, also use this system.
The Syrian opposition, however, lacks senior female leaders. In 2012, an early conference of the Syrian National Council elected no women to its 41-member decision-making group and the Syrian National Coalition has never had a woman president. In fact, the first woman to serve as the head of any opposition local council was only elected in 2018.
These disparities in senior leadership are reflected across the political structures of each faction. The Autonomous Administration’s constitution mandates that elected bodies and political parties, from the highest levels of the Administration to the smallest neighborhood commune, be made up of at least 40% women. Autonomous women’s organizations, like the Women’s Council of North and East Syria, exist in parallel to every mixed-gender institution, making the percentage of women actually serving in government slightly higher than men. These institutions have the ability to overrule and advise mixed-gender institutions on issues of women’s rights.
The Autonomous Administration’s constitution mandates that elected bodies and political parties, from the highest levels of the Administration to the smallest neighborhood commune, be made up of at least 40% women.
In contrast, a 2016 report from the Syrian Feminist Lobby quoted a study of 105 of the 427 local councils in opposition-held Syria at the time, which found that just 2% of their members were women. Just two women, including the Vice President, serve on the 23-member Political Committee of the Syrian National Coalition, and just 10% of the members of the Coalition’s General Body are women.
Based on this data, the Autonomous Administration would fall into the Middle East Women Leaders Index’s categorization of Ascending Representation— meaning women’s participation and leadership is high at all levels of government and across all policy areas. The report accurately classifies the Syrian government in the category of Aspiring Representation— meaning that women’s participation outside of traditional roles is still low. Despite claiming to represent a new future for the country, the Syrian opposition falls into this category as well.
Legal Status and Protections
New laws implemented by the Autonomous Administration contrast favorably with opposition laws and policies on women’s issues. In North and East Syria, the Women’s Laws address inequities in personal status that existed in Syrian law, and explicitly ban and criminalize child marriages, domestic abuse, and other forms of social inequity and gender-based violence. The region’s constitution states that “men and women are equal in the eyes of the law” and “guarantees the effective realization of equality of women and mandates public institutions to work towards the elimination of gender discrimination.”
Women who face discrimination or violence have significant institutional and social recourse. Women’s NGOs, like the Free Women’s Foundation and the Sara Organization for the Prevention of Violence Against Women, operate openly. Institutions known as “women’s houses” provide community-based mediation for domestic disputes and protection from unsafe home situations. Jinwar, an all-women’s village, is home to women who have lost their husbands in war, experienced sexual violence, and otherwise require support.
In opposition-held regions, no pretense of formal legal equality or legal protections is made. HTS, which controls much of Idlib, excludes women from political bodies and limits their basic freedoms, running gender-segregated schools,enforcing conservative dress codes, and forcing women whose husbands have been killed in the ongoing conflict to move in with a male “guardian.” These policies are enforced by ISIS-like morality police. Activists and civil society organizations that resist them face persecution, and must operate in secret; there is no legal resource for domestic violence, forced marriage, and other gender-based violence under religious law.
In opposition-held regions, no pretense of formal legal equality or legal protections is made. HTS, which controls much of Idlib, excludes women from political bodies and limits their basic freedoms…”
A recent UN report condemned the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army’s treatment of women in areas it has taken over, warning that “by targeting almost every aspect of Kurdish women’s lives…armed groups generated a palpable fear of violence and duress…[which] resulted in an undermining of women’s ability to meaningfully participate and contribute to their community.”
The report stated that these actions— like the assassination of Hevrin Khalaf, a former economy co-minister and then co-chair of the Syria Future Party targeted by Ahrar al-Sharqiya militants in October— constituted a concentrated attempt to “dismantle” the Autonomous Administration’s efforts to advance the status of women.
As the Index notes, laws and policies that regulate the lives of women and girls can either prepare them for political participation and leadership or act as obstacles to it. It is clear that the Autonomous Administration has done the former— while opposition groups have not been willing to implement such protections, and have even gone so far as to seek to force women out of public life altogether.
Why does it matter?
The Autonomous Administration provides a tried and tested blueprint for women’s political empowerment, a policy priority the opposition lacks. The gap in political and social opportunities for women between areas controlled by each faction is shocking. In areas that the SNA has captured from the SDF, like Afrin, Ras al-Ain, and Tel Abyad, the deterioration of women’s rights and basic personal safety is notable.
However, this dynamic has not factored into discussions on the country’s future, or determination of which factions deserve political and diplomatic support. Opposition groups that marginalize women have not faced any consequences for their actions— and the Autonomous Administration’s empowerment of women has not been discussed as a model for the rest of the country or a project that deserves support. Greater understanding of the fundamental differences on this issue, and the unique advances the Autonomous Administration has made, is essential for ensuring that women can play the role they deserve in all aspects of Syria’s future.
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Mazlum Kobanê calls for “radical solution” to the ISIS problem
In a prison in Hesekê, ISIS prisoners instigated a riot on Sunday evening and attempted to escape. SDF Commander General Mazlum Abdi Kobanê demands “radical solution” to the ISIS problem from the international community.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Tuesday, 31 Mar 2020, 13:27
The Commander General of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazlum Abdi Kobanê calls on the international community to find a “radical solution” for the ISIS prisoners in North and East Syria. On Sunday evening, detained members of the jihadist militia instigated a riot in a prison in Hesekê. Some managed to escape at first but were later caught. Immediately after the incident, other security forces moved in, the area around the prison was surrounded by SDF anti-terrorist units, and the anti-ISIS coalition supported the intervention by aerial surveillance. Since Monday afternoon, the situation is under control again.
About 5,000 ISIS prisoners from 50 different states are held in the complex in the Xiwêran district. Another 7,000 are held in other prisons in the region, in addition to tens of thousands of ISIS members in various camps. But the autonomous authorities and the SDF are left alone with the problem, the home countries are not meeting their responsibility for their own citizens.
SDF Commander Kobanê says that the burden of the ISIS prisoners should not rest solely on the shoulders of the autonomous administration authorities and their institutions. In a Twitter post, he wrote: Due to great efforts made by our forces and swift intervention against the insubordination of ISIS detainees inside one prison, we were able to avoid catastrophe and take control. No prisoners escaped. Our allies must find a quick radical solution to this international problem.”
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Turkish Government cut water supplies on Al-Hasaka city
Turkish Government cut water supplies
A violation of IHL who can be fatal of thousands of people.
On Saturday, Turkish Government cut the flow from a reservoir that supplies water to areas in northeastern Syria’s Hasakah province that the Kurdish-led local authorities control.
The Alouk Water Station is located near the border town of Serekaniye, which Turkey and its militant proxies took control of in October 2019 during Turkey’s so-called “Peace Spring Operation”. Since then, Turkishbacked groups have regularly cut off the water flow. This is confirmed also by a public UNICEF statement, which one claimed the move was the latest in a series of disruptions in water pumping over the past weeks.
The Allouk pumping station, which usually serves more than 460,000 people in and around Hasakah, has not been functional since 30 October 2019. Since then, KRC with other actors has been taking emergency measures to find alternative sources of water for people in the region.
Protecting water resources and infrastructure to ensure a reliable supply of water and electricity to the population is a basic need for the civil population. Water facilities are covered under a number of terms and provisions of international humanitarian law, either by treaty or by customary law.
Starvation as a method of warfare is explicitly prohibited regardless of the nature of the conflict, and the concept of objects essential for the survival of the civilian population includes drinking-water installations and supplies and irrigation works. Immunity for indispensable objects is waived only when these are used solely for the armed forces or in direct support of military action. Even then, the adversaries must refrain from any action, which could reduce the population to starvation or deprive it of essential water.
The water pipeline is still regularly cut off.
More than 460.000 people are without water supply.
The international community have to take a serious step to reduce this catastrophe.
In civil wars, which today account for most of the armed conflicts in the world, the use of water by the belligerent parties constitutes a serious threat to the population concerned. To attack water is to attack an entire way of life and makes access to water well nigh or completely impossible, thereby heightening the risks to the civilian population despite the protection it is granted under international law.
Moreover, a United Nations representative in Syria on Monday said interruption to a key water station in the country’s northeast puts at least 460,000 people at risk as efforts ramp up to prevent the spread of the coronavirus disease.
The COVID-19 pandemic (or coronavirus) is unprecedented in recent history and is spreading rapidly. It is not only a public health crisis, but also a humanitarian crisis in the making. In war-torn countries, COVID-19 represents a dramatic threat to life. Health system has already been ravaged by violence, and the threat of further strain on health care from the coronavirus is an enormous risk for communities. Plans to prevent and respond to the virus must urgently move forward before it gains a foothold in countries in conflict. Denying hundreds of thousands of people access to water is denying them a basic source of protection against Covid19, given that handwashing is a fundamental means in shielding oneself of the virus.
Meanwhile, the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) replying to a calling by UN Secretary-General, declared a ceasefire in all the area.
The KRC urges all parties to the conflict to declare a ceasefire and to respect civilian life by taking every possible measure to protect and respect civilians and civilian infrastructure.
International Humanitarian Law aims at ensuring that the basic needs of civilians are met, even in times of conflict. In northeast Syria, the infrastructure (e.g. water stations and dams) for water supply systems happen to be located near the frontlines and it is critical that they are protected.
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols protect sick, wounded and shipwrecked persons not taking part in hostilities, prisoners of war and other detainees, civilians and civilian objects. Military operations must be conducted in accordance with IHL, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. Attacking, or rendering useless, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as water and sanitation facilities, is prohibited.
KRC ask the Turkish Government to allow providing water to areas deprived of it immediately and urgently and to guarantee that no further water interruption is to happen under any pretext.
Owing to these circumstances and due to the critical and dramatic situation due to COVID-19 pandemic, we strongly recommend and ask the UN Security Council an immediate reopening of Yaroubiyeh border.
According to the UN, the border crossing in the past enabled support to an estimated 1.4 million people in northeast Syria.
KRC took it as our humanitarian mandatory to serve all people no matter of their background, nationality, race, religion, gender. However, the International Community have to be aware and to support these activities. We will always continue our work accepting the international humanitarian principles, protecting the ideas of international laws and principles.
Fight against pandemic in the besieged Shehba region
The North Syrian region of Shehba is under a siege. The supply of hygiene materials and medicines is difficult. Under these conditions, the population is trying to fight the pandemic.
ANF – ROJ DENİZ/HÎVDA HEBÛN
SHEHBA
Friday, 20 Mar 2020, 14:37
In the desert region of Shehba live 90,000 original inhabitants and about 140,000 displaced people from Afrin. It borders on the areas occupied by Turkey and its militias and is repeatedly the target of artillery fire. The region is also acutely affected by the risk of COVID-19 pandemic. The autonomous administration, the local government and the health committee of Shehba are doing everything in their power to prevent the spread of the pandemic. After the closure of schools and public facilities, all areas are being disinfected.
Even though the Syrian regime has not yet issued a statement on the pandemic, reports of COVID-19 cases in Latakia, Aleppo and Damascus are putting people in fear. The internally displaced persons from Afrin, who live in difficult conditions in the region, are particularly threatened. The co-mayor of the Shehba Municipality, Melek Huseyin, reports that no cases have yet been detected in the region; health committees, communes and councils are active and taking precautions against the virus. Information events are being organised and people are warned through television programmes, brochures and leaflets.
The co-mayor reports on a cleaning campaign in three phases;
The first phase is the cleaning of outside areas and disinfection of all facilities, schools, shops and restaurants.
The second phase will involve the disinfection of all houses, streets, rubbish dumps, the sewage system and mosques.
In the third phase, all streets will be steamed with disinfectant.
The work is to be carried out every 15 days for the next six months.
The co-mayor concludes with the warning: “As you know, Shehba has been a war zone. For this reason, most of the houses have been destroyed, which is not good for health.”
Wide-spread fear and popular discontent prevail NE Syria as SDF release more than 80 ISIS members
21/03/2020
Less than a minute
Reliable sources have informed Syrian Observatory that Syria Democratic Forces and “Autonomous Administration in northern and north-eastern Syria” released more than 80 ISIS members. Those members had been arrested by SDF during the war against ISIS. According to SOHR sources, all released persons are Syrians and descended from Al-Raqqah, Al-Hasakah and Deir Ezzor.
It is noteworthy that some of the released members have served their sentence and some others have not. This action triggered Wide-spread popular discontent for fear that these released members could return to fight in the ranks of ISIS, especially with ISIS members spreading widely in SDF-held areas.
SOHR sources reported early this year that the “Autonomous Administration in northern and north-eastern Syria” and Syria Democratic Forces released ten persons in Al-Hasakah city, after mediation by tribal elders and Sheikhs in the area. The ten persons were arrested earlier on charge of dealing with ISIS.
This action comes few days after the release of at least 39 persons from Deir Ezzor, Al-Haskah and Al-Raqqah, by SDF after mediation by tribal elders and dignitaries. They were arrested for the same accusation.
The release of those persons is a part of the outcomes of a meeting held in early May 2018, between “Syria Democratic Council” and tribe dignitaries.
YPJ: With Newroz’s flame, we will defeat occupation
The General Command of the Women Protection Units YPJ congratulated on March 21, and said, with the flame of Newroz, we will defeat the occupation, pledged to raising the pace of the struggle in the spirit of Newroz.
WOMAN21 Mar 2020, Sat – 14:102020-03-21T14:10:00 NEWS DESK
The General Command of the Women’s Protection Units issued a written statement in which they congratulated Newroz, who falls today, March 21.
The text of the statement states:
We receive Newroz 2020, which has become a symbol of the spring of peoples with a spirit of Resisting Dignity, and we bless Newroz on the martyrs of the revolution, the leader Ocalan, the resisting people, and the peoples of the Middle East and the world.
For thousands of years, the Kurdish people have resisted against the suppression of the occupier, a resistance known through Kawa Hsinkar epic, which the Kurdish, Assyrian, Persian, Turkmen, and Yezidi people have introduced to the new day, celebrating their victory over the oppressors, and in this sense Newroz is not just a celebration, it is a reminder of victory on Dahkan.
As YPJ, we say that the commemoration of Newroz means a renewal of our promise to take revenge, as we have offered thousands of martyrs for the sake of freedom and in the Rojava Revolution, so for this day, raising the pace of the struggle for freedom and existence is for us the greatest promise we can make to Newroz fighters.
Today, more than ever, we must prove our existence in a spirit of resistance to Newroz, in order to protect our identity and our homeland.
In order to defeat Dahkan of the times, everyone must protect themselves, their identity, their existence, their dignity and their homeland by the thought of the leader Ocalan. The Kurdish people have suffered from injustice, from Halabja to the Qamishlo uprising, from the Zilan Valley to the Mahabad and Afrin, and more recently in Ras al-Ain and Tel- Abyed.
The tyrants are still seeking to eliminate the presence of the Kurdish people and the peoples of the region, and therefore heroes and heroines such as Arian Mercan, Ilan, Avista, and more recently Ronahi and Berxwedan sacrificed their lives to revive these peoples, and standing against the massacres and conspiracies committed against them, and this is evidence that thousands of Kawa Today, they are fighting a struggle against Dahkan of the times.
Dignity battles continue to be led by YPJ fighters
This year we celebrate Newroz with the spirit of Ronahi, Zain, Amara, Zylan, Delovan, Bimal, Hefrin and Mother Aqidah, and we are certain that with the organization of women and the struggle, Newroz 2020 will become Newroz’s revenge and historical victory.
We, YPJ, pledge to escalate our struggle with the spirit of Newroz, and we hope that all our days will be like Newroz and that our people will be victorious, and we will bless Newroz once again on our people, and on all free women”.
(T/S) ANHA
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PYD: Solution in Syria through expel Turkish occupation from occupied areas
The General Council of PYD indicated that the resistance shown by the people of Afrin demonstrated that the truth of defending the revolution lies in adhering to democracy and dignity, noting that there is no real stability and no solution that serves Syria and its people except through the exit of Turkey and those with it from its areas of occupation in the foreground is Afrin.
POLITICS17 Mar 2020, Tue – 13:042020-03-17T13:04:00 NEWS DESK
The General Council of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) issued today a statement of public opinion, on the occasion of the passage of two years since the occupation of Afrin, by the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries.
The text of the statement read:
“These days, the second anniversary of the occupation of Afrin by the Turkish fascism and its tools, which caused the displacement of our people from its cities and villages, and the practice of the most heinous crimes and abuse and demographic change, bypassing all of the agreed rights and norms. In light of the clear deviation of the course of the revolution in Syria and the overlapping of agendas regional and dependency, as well as the emergence of extremist organizations, the revolution has been emptied of its content, while our regions in northern and eastern Syria have maintained a state of stability and contributed to preserving the foundations on which to build change in Syria through the project of Democratic Autonomous Administration DAA and the philosophy of self-defense project and the brotherhood of peoples, where these factors have contributed to the transformation of our regions to prevent the yard danger to Syria and its future as compared to other regions, which met the wrath of some of the parties.
The success of the experience of AA as well as the resistance that took place against the projects of creating chaos, destruction and rivalry in our regions made many forces rally to attack these areas, especially the Turkish state headed by a Syrian spear that is groups with weak Syrian affiliation and with deep loyalty to Turkey, as the failure of these plans on the hands of the people of northern and eastern Syria components pushed Turkey into direct intervention, after its plans went bankrupt through the paid forces and, unfortunately, the Syrian ones.
Afrin was one of the regions that enjoyed free will and developed a democratic project that was distinguished by the pioneering and leadership role of women, and Afrin has become a real attraction for Syrian civilians fleeing the Syrian war zones (more than 450 thousand displaced Syrians were in Afrin before the Turkish attacks). Where Turkey began invading Afrin on 20 January 2018 in order to undermine the state of stability in it and a public attempt to thwart the democratic experience in northern and eastern Syria.
The resistance that our people demonstrated in Afrin came against the expectations, as it was proven that the truth of defending the revolution lies in adhering to democracy and dignity as it appeared in Afrin and before it in Kobani in 2014, these historical resistance strengthened the Kurdish spirit and reinforced true cohesion in Afrin between the four parts of Kurdistan not to mention the volume of echo that the world circulated about the resistance of the times and its continuity for 58 days in the face of a country the size of Turkey that used various types of weapons against a small geographical spot.
Two years after the occupation of Afrin by Turkey and its mercenaries, we confirm the General Council of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) condemning the silence of the world and ignoring what Turkey is doing today in Afrin and the whole of the occupied areas in Syria, we confirm that there is no real stability and no solution that serves Syria and its people except through the exit of Turkey and those with it from the areas of its occupation, especially Afrin. We also appeal to all of our people and all democratic components and forces keen on their moral and patriotic duty to work together to close ranks to confront the Turkish threat and occupation in Syria and the necessity of getting them out.
In conclusion, we extend our sincere appreciation and greetings to our steadfast people in al-Shahba camps and confirm that we continue to struggle with them and the resistance until the liberation of Afrin and the return of its people to it and we recall the heroic resistance of the YPG and YPJ and their great sacrifices, where we all draw from the spirit of the resistance of the age in Afrin our strength and our insistence on the struggle and we affirm that the continuation of the second stage of the resistance until now, and our people in al Shahba cling to the residents of Afrin and clinging to all difficulties for one option is to return to Afrin with their dignity, indicating that the continuous resistance is the path towards victory for Afrin and its people. A great retreat without victory.
We also salute the forces of the liberation of Afrin and their sacrifices and their continued heroic resistance in their struggle on the path of the martyrs of Afrin and its resistance fighters, and we affirm that the resistance continues and we will escalate it and achieve victory in the spirit of the martyrs Avista, Karkar, Barin and all their companions who sacrificed of themselves for the sake of Afrin and its people. “
The statement concluded with slogans, “A salute to the spirit of the martyrs of Afrin and the martyrs of freedom, a tribute to our wounded heroes.
Greetings to our resisting people in Afrin and al-Shahba. “…
(T/S) ANHA
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Syria is geopolitical prize, Kurds seek new Middle East
The American expert Dr. Thoreau Redcrow has said that Syria is a global chess board. It is not a problem that must be solved from the point of view of the interventionists, but a geopolitical prize to be won. Stressing that Ocalan’s ideas provide a road map “The Kurds will be the first domino to seek a new Middle East for all,” he said.
As the Syrian crisis enters its tenth year the interventionist parties want to prolong the life of this crisis to make the most of it and divide Syria. In this context our agency interviewed the expert Dr. Thoreau Redcrow, an American specialist in international conflicts and Kurdish affairs. The text of the dialogue reads.
1. As the Syrian crisis enters its tenth year. What are the dimensions of the international conflict in it?
Unfortunately for the people of Syria, their country has become a global chessboard where many nations have been pushing their own geopolitical interests through the use of proxy forces. Since the US and Russia/Iran don’t want to fight an open conflict with each other in their own nations, they use Syria as an arena to test each other’s will and commitment. Moreover, Turkey wishes to expand their neo-Ottoman project and is hoping to annex northern Syria for themselves or form some break away territory like Northern Cyprus which they can control. Meanwhile, the Autonomous Administration is attempting to establish their own form of local self-governance built on a multi-ethnic and gender equal vision, that is unique to the wider region.
2. All regional and international parties involved in Syria take the fight against terrorism as an excuse, but what are their real goals?
The term “terrorist” is often times not helpful, as it can be a synonym for “armed opponent”. However, if any group meets the definition as commonly understood then ISIS and al-Qaeda (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham aka HTS) would, and both of them have been armed and assisted by the Turkish Government in Syria. Most groups in Syria at present could say they are battling terrorism by fighting either of these two groups, for instance the SDF/YPG/YPJ and the US Military both have been fighting ISIS, while the Syrian Government and Russia are battling al-Qaeda (HTS) in Idlib. Meanwhile, the one nation that sets up outposts in al-Qaeda territory and doesn’t fight them is Turkey, as HTS are essentially their ground forces in Idlib.
3. Throughout history there has been a Turkish-Iranian war; what is the impact of the Turkish-Iranian conflict on Syria and the future of the region?
I wouldn’t say there’s been a war between the two, in fact I think Iran is the one country in the region which Turkey legitimately fears and doesn’t believe they could defeat in a direct conflict. In the same way that the US and Russia can’t openly fight one another since both possess nuclear weapons, Turkey and Iran both realize that fighting one another directly would badly damage both nations, so they battle in a third party territory through proxy forces (Iran has Hezbollah and Shia militias, while Turkey has various jihadist groups like al-Qaeda / HTS and the defeated remnants of ISIS which they’ve formed into their so called “Syrian National Army”).
4. Erdogan is seeking to establish a Sunni state in the region led by him and that includes parts of Syria that include Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ezzor, and Hasaka; why does the international community not cut the road ahead, or is there an international trend to redraw the region again?
The Turkish Army looted the industrial base of Aleppo very early on the conflict, and once they realized that Assad’s Government wouldn’t be overthrown, their Plan B was simply to take as much territory as possible to either form a puppet state like Northern Cyprus, or directly annex and steal the territory from Syria as they already did historically with Hatay. Whether they are allowed to do this will depend if the US supports such land theft, and if Russia is willing to assist the Syrian Government in driving Turkey out from the lands they now illegally occupy. I should add, that Turkey also wanted to keep “Rojava” or the Autonomous Administration early on from spanning the entire border of Turkey and reaching the sea potentially, which is what motivated their invasion and occupation of Afrin and backing of jihadi groups in Idlib.
5. Why has the Syrian crisis not been solved yet? What is the impact of the international conflict on the shape of the Middle East in general?
Syria is not a problem to be solved, but a geopolitical prize to be won. Early on the US was hoping to prevent Russia from having their only Naval Base on the Mediterranean Sea in Tartus if Assad was overthrown, but that plan was unsuccessful. Now, likewise, the Syrian Government is trying to prevent the U.S. from having any airstrips or bases in Eastern Syria within Kurdish areas, which the U.S. is hoping to use to counter Iranian regional influence and the so called “Shia highway” from Beirut to Tehran. This is also taking place in the wider picture of a regional-wide battle for influence across the Middle East between 3 factions, (faction 1) Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen vs (faction 2) Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Jordan vs (faction 3) Turkey, Qatar, and Azerbaijan. With the Autonomous Administration and SDF in Syria being neutral with faction 1, gaining support with faction 2, and at war with faction 3. Meanwhile Russia backs faction 1, the US backs faction 2, and both of them at times try to win the favor of faction 3.
6. Kurdish, for how long will the Turkish Kurdish conflict last? What are the main objectives of Turkey to launch attacks on the Kurdish-majority regions of northern and eastern Syria?
The Kurdish conflict will last as long as the 40+ million Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran do not have equal rights to exist as Kurds, and either autonomy or independence in all of the areas in which they live. Turkey’s motivations are first that they have a very deep fear about the 20+ million Kurds within Turkey rising up in mass against their continued occupation and brutality. This fear spills over into Syria, as they fear Kurds in Turkey will take inspiration from their example, and want to establish local governance in a similar manner.
7. Turkey committed grave violations against the Kurds in Syria during its attacks in Afrin, Ras al-Ain and Tel Abyad and caused the displacement of the Kurds from their lands. Why is it not held accountable internationally despite all the documents and evidence?
Turkey is not held accountable because they are in NATO, which means they can carry out war crimes and be shielded from blame. American and Western media also does not cover Turkey’s war crimes in the same way they would if Assad’s Government was carrying them out, because it doesn’t fit with the geopolitical objectives of the US military. The US, UK, and Germany know that if Turkey was held accountable for their war crimes, then the US who sells them the jets, the UK who sells them the missiles, and Germany who sells them the tanks would also be guilty.
8. What is the role of world powers in fueling the Turkish Kurdish conflict? And why does the United Nations and the United States of America not play their role in resolving the Kurdish issue?
Turkey’s constant need for weapons to use in their fight to oppress their Kurdish population is good for business, and makes NATO nations a lot of money. So that’s the first obstacle. The US is also worried that if they forced Turkey to stop oppressing their Kurdish population, the Turkish Government would realign themselves with Russia instead of NATO, which would ruin NATO’s plan of keeping Russia locked into the Black Sea via the Bosporus. As for the United Nations, they are not that interested in solving the Kurdish issue, as then they would also be forced to solve the Tamil, Balochi, Western Sahara, West Papuan, Ambazonia, Basque, Hazara etc issue. Many nations around the world deny the self-determination of new nations because they know it might also apply to occupied groups within their own. That is a box they are afraid to open.
9. Why does the international community not respond to Ocalan’s proposals to solve the Kurdish issue politically away from militarization? Does this have anything to do with the Greater Middle East project?
Ocalan’s ideas are a threat to every nation in the Middle East because they provide an alternative democratic roadmap of how the multi-ethnic mosaic of the region could govern themselves locally, which threatens all of the authoritarian regimes and royal families who use their nations as their personal bank accounts. History shows us that power never gives away their stranglehold easily, they must be made to with force. Luckily the Kurdistan liberation movement has both ideas and arms.
10. How does solving the Kurdish issue affect the problems of the Middle East?
Solving the Kurdish issue would have huge spill over effects for the entire Middle East, as many of the Kurdish groups would like to display an alternative model of democratic governance and defend ideas like religious freedom, and gender equality, which are lacking in much of the region. It’s seen as a Kurdish issue, but it’s really a Middle East issue, as the model that the Kurds want would also appeal to many of the ethnicities in the Middle East as it’s based around local people controlling their own destiny and promoting a sustainable and communal way of life. The Kurds would be the first falling domino to a new Middle East for everyone.
Report: Kurdish population in Afrin dropped to 18 percent
Within two years of Turkish occupation, the Kurdish population in Afrin has dropped to 18 percent. The human rights organization of Afrin has presented a report on ethnic cleansing and other violations of rights.
ANF
SHEHBA
Tuesday, 17 Mar 2020, 20:20
In March 2018 Afrin was occupied by the Turkish state. The human rights organization of Afrin has presented a report on the violations of rights during the past two years. The report was publicly read out by Heyhan Ali in the Serdem camp in Shehba.
According to the report, more than 300,000 people from Afrin were displaced by the Turkish invasion to the neighbouring canton of Shehba and other places in Syria. The Kurdish population in Afrin has dropped to 18 percent. In the course of the demographic change, jihadists from Idlib and other areas were settled with their families in Afrin.
Turkification policy
Heyhan Ali explained that the “Turkification policy” is being further advanced in Afrin. Places and streets have been given Turkish names. For example, the Kawa crossroads, whose name refers to the Kawa the Blacksmith from the Newroz myth, has been renamed Olive Branch Crossroads. “Olive branch” was the name Turkey had given to its invasion two years ago, which was contrary to international law. Today, Turkish language classes are given in schools in Afrin. According to the report, the new school uniforms represent “the Turkish culture”. Pictures of Turkish President Erdogan hang in many places. Turkish identity cards are being forced upon the people in Afrin.
6,200 people kidnapped
In Afrin, according to the human rights organisation, 6,200 people have been forcibly abducted. The fate of 3,400 abduction victims is unknown.
Attacks against women
Women are particularly affected by the occupation regime in Afrin. The human rights organisation has documented 61 cases of attacks against women. The suicide rate of women has also increased since the occupation. Three women have committed suicide after being attacked by jihadists.
553 civilians killed
According to the report, 553 civilians have been killed by direct attacks of the Turkish state and its jihadist proxies. 55 of the victims were tortured to death.
200,000 olive trees cut down
The report states that not only the civilian population and their property are affected by the systematic attacks, but also nature and historical and sacred sites. Heyhan Ali stated that over 200,000 olive trees have been cut down and 11,000 hectares of cultivated land burned: “The green nature of Afrin has become a desert. The tree trunks were brought to Turkey for recycling.
75 historical sites plundered
75 historical sites have been looted by the occupying forces, according to the report. Dozens of mosaics were removed. In addition, 15 graves, which were sacred to various religious communities, were destroyed.
Before the eyes of the world public
Heyhan Ali concluded by pointing out that these crimes take place in front of the eyes of the world public. The human rights organisation called on the UN to fulfil its responsibility and to remove the Turkish state with its jihadist proxies from Syria.
ISIS standards in Girê Spî: Women forced to veil themselves
In Girê Spî in northern Syria, standards similar to those once established under the rule of the ISIS in Raqqa are gradually being introduced under Turkish occupation. Women are no longer allowed to leave the house without full body cover.
ANF
GIRÊ SPÎ
Friday, 20 Mar 2020, 15:15
In the city of Girê Spî (Tal Abyad) in northern Syria, which has been occupied since October 2019 by Turkey and its jihadist allies with the de facto approval of the US, Russia and the European Union, standards similar to those once established under the rule of the ISIS in Raqqa are gradually being introduced. In many places, women are now no longer allowed to leave the house without full body cover and male company. In neighbouring settlement areas such as the town of Siluk and the village of Hemam al-Turkmen, the veil obligation is also enforced.
Girê Spî and the surrounding areas are largely controlled by the Turkish-backed jihadist militia Ahrar al-Sharqiya – the mercenary group that executed Kurdish politician and Secretary General of the Future Party of Syria (Hizbul Suri Mustakbel), Hevrîn Xelef (Havrin Khalaf), and her driver.
New living space for ISIS mentality
The houses of the Kurds expelled from Girê Spî are now occupied by the occupation troops and members of jihadists who had been brought to the city from other regions of the Turkish occupation zone in northern Syria. In the meantime, every Kurdish business has been expropriated without exception. The situation is no different for Syrian internally displaced persons. Their businesses have now also been confiscated.
The situation for young people is also critical. The so-called “military police” under the command of the Turkish army wants to increase their ranks and is luring with money. Because of the lack of prospects under the occupation, human rights organisations fear that young men will be recruited by the militias because they see no other choice for their survival.
People can no longer afford basic food
Due to the looting and destruction of the infrastructure during the Turkish invasion, there are still bottlenecks in the supply of basic goods such as water, bread and food in Girê Spî. Prices have risen dramatically. Many people can already no longer afford basic foodstuffs. In addition, kidnappings by the occupying forces to extort ransom money are increasing. This method represents a lucrative source of income.
TURKISH PROVISION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT TO AL-QAEDA-LINKED GROUPS IN IDLIB:
[The Rojava Information Center (RIC) is an independent media
organization based in North and East Syria. The RIC is made up
of local staff as well as volunteers from many countries across
Europe and North America. Some of us have experience in journalism
and media activism and came here to share our skills,
and others joined bringing other skills and experiences to the
team. There is a lack of clear and objective reporting on Rojava,
and journalists are often unable to make contact with ordinary
civilians and people on the ground. We set up the RIC to fill this
gap, aiming to provide journalists, researchers and the general
public with accurate, well-sourced, transparent information.
We work in partnership with civil and political institutions, journalists
and media activists across the region to connect them
with the people and information they need.
RIC has assisted reporters and researchers from all leading international
newspapers, websites and news sources with their
work, including: BBC, CNN, ITV, NBC, Fox News, ABC and Al Jazeera;
New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal,
LA Times; Die Welt, Die Zeit, El Pais, El Monde, Corriere Della
Sera: TFI, France 24, ZDF, ARD, DW, ARTE; Associated Press, AFP,
DPA, EFE, ANSA; Cambridge, Yale and Madrid Universities; Amnesty,
Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations: and many
other national and international news sources.]
This dossier will briefly examine the evolving relationship between Turkey and
al-Qaeda offshoots and proxies in Idlib, in particular HTS, before compiling visual
evidence of the proliferation of armored vehicles and heavy weaponry among
these groups in Idlib province.
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 GROUPS PRESENT IN IDLIB
1.1.1 Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
1.1.2 Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP)
1.1.3 Hurras ad-Din (HaD)
1.1.4. National Front for Liberation (NLF) and Syrian National Army (SNA)
1.2 HTS AND OTHER GROUPS – LINKS TO AL-QAEDA
1.3 HTS AND OTHER GROUPS – LINKS TO ISIS
1.4 TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS AND OTHER AL-QAEDA-LINKED GROUPS IN IDLIB
1.4.1 The situation in Idlib: creeping Turkish control and influence
1.4.2 Joint Turkish-HTS operations room
1.4.3 Turkish proliferation of armor and heavy weapons among
al-Qaeda-linked groups
1.4.4 The MANPADS question
2 VISUAL EVIDENCE OF TURKISH MATERIAL SUPPORT
FOR HTS AND OTHER AL-QAEDA-LINKED GROUPS
3 CONCLUSION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 Taking up the offer of support from North and East Syria
3.2 Supporting the political process towards a federal solution in Syria
3.3 Bringing an end to Turkish support for al-Qaeda-linked militias
4 APPENDIX
4
1 INTRODUCTION
During the Syrian Arab Army’s latest advance in north-western Syria, ongoing
since 19 December 2019 and entailing the capture of over 2000km² of land to
the south and east of Idlib city, international condemnation has focused on the
immense humanitarian cost of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and Russian bombing
campaign and the displacement of up to a million civilian IDPs.
The context of the bloody war being waged by the SAA notwithstanding, it is important
that Western policy-makers maintain a clear eye when scrutinizing the
opposition in Idlib and in particular Turkey’s increased involvement in co-ordinating,
arming, fighting alongside and proliferating man-portable anti-aircraft defence
systems (MANPADS) throughout territory controlled by al-Qaeda offshoot
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with potentially disastrous consequences for American
and global security.
Turkey variously seeks to justify its actions in Idlib as support for the legitimate
Syrian opposition; as humanitarian intervention; and even as an act of self-defence
against the Kurdish forces which have no presence whatsoever in Idlib governate.
The waters are further muddied by Russian disinformation efforts which,
in effectively insisting that everyone in Idlib is a legitimate target, ironically make
it more difficult for objective commentators to make their voices heard on the
true situation in the province.
The reality is that no meaningful secular opposition remains in Idlib, now controlled
by al-Qaeda offshoots of varying hue, and moreover that Turkey has little
interest in either defending the civilian population of Idlib, or the secular values
of elements of the original Syrian revolution.
Rather, Turkey is using the conflict in Idlib to advance its own interests, extending
its geographical and military sphere of influence deep into Syrian territory
through increasingly open and reckless collaboration with HTS – despite the fact
that HTS are listed by the Turkish government themselves as a terror organisation.
Thus we see jihadist militants sporting ISIS’ Seal of Muhammad logo riding
in US-made armored vehicles – not seized in war, but handed to them by the US’
NATO partner, Turkey.
5
Turkey’s current approach offers the worst of both worlds. While unlikely to make
any significant impact on the Russian advance and inevitable recapture of Idlib,
the provision of high-end military equipment to HTS will have devastating security
consequences for the US and its partners across the world. As such, we will
close with brief policy recommendations on how the situation in Idlib may be
resolved to ensure a safe and secure existence for civilians and IDPs, the removal
of the international security threat posed by HTS and the neutralization of Turkish
moves to arm and support this listed terror group, and a process of accountability
for the Syrian Government and its backers.
Fighters sporting ISIS insignia ride in an armored vehicle provided to them by NATO partner Turkey
INTRODUCTION
6
There are three main groupings of armed factions present
in Idlib, namely:
1. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and associates, most notably the
Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), professedly independent
though still understood to maintain ties with al-Qaeda;
2. Hurras ad-Din and associates, al-Qaeda’s direct proxy
in Syria which itself works in coordination with HTS; and
3. Factions grouped under the National Front for Liberation
(NFL), long under heavy Turkish influence and
incorporated into the Turkish-controlled Syrian National
Army as of October 20191.
We will examine each of these groupings in turn, giving a
brief summary of their history and relationship to one another,
before moving on to discuss their relationship with
al-Qaeda, ISIS and Turkey.
1.1 GROUPS PRESENT IN IDLIB
1 https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/syrian-opposition-merger-into-national-
army-battle-sdf.html
INTRODUCTION
7
1.1.1 HAYAT TAHRIR AL-SHAM (HTS)
The dominant faction in Idlib is HTS, a Sunni Islamist group which is dominated
by the former Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda’s original proxy force in Syria following
their split from ISIS) and hardline elements from Ahrar-al-Sham2. HTS can field
a reported 15,000 to 30,000 fighters, a majority of whom are former al-Nusra
fighters3.
Al-Nusra itself operated as the official Syrian branch of al-Qaeda from the outset
and committed acts of torture, child abduction, and summary execution – including
stoning to death women accused of committing adultery – as part of ‘a
strict interpretation of Sharia law… imposing punishments amounting to torture.’4
Al-Nusra also executed at least 20 members of the Druze minority who opposed
a campaign of forced expropriation of their houses and destruction of their religious
shrines5.
During the latest operation, HTS fighters have filmed themselves with decapitated heads of rival combatants,
and filmed themselves torturing captives
2 https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/hay%E2%80%99-tahrir-al-sham
3 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-defeat-al-quaeda-syria-growglobal-
attention-islamist-terrorists-jihadis-un-us-west-iraq-raqqa-a7932881.html
4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Nusra_Front#cite_note-72
5 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-druze/calls-for-aid-to-syrias-druze-afteral-
qaeda-kills-20-idUSKBN0OR0NV20150611?irpc=932
GROUPS PRESENT IN IDLIB INTRODUCTION
8
As of June 2013, al-Nusra Front had claimed responsibility for 57 of the 70 suicide
attacks in Syria during the conflict, along with mass executions and other atrocities6.
HTS itself claimed a 2017 twin bombing in Damascus that killed at least 40
people, the majority of them Iraqi Shia pilgrims7.
HTS describes itself as a military force, but retains tight control on civil society
through its ‘Salvation Government’ and system of sharia courts, often staffed by
individuals with no formal legal training or even training in sharia law. Much like
ISIS, HTS conducts morality patrols, arresting young women for failing to follow
religious dress codes; young men for shaving or listening to music; and civilian
activists for any activity in opposition to HTS’ de facto control of Idlib. HTS’s religious
police, known as ‘Sawid Al Khayr’, enforce dress codes and the segregation
of males and females on buses and in the streets8.
HTS conduct public executions for witchcraft and heresy – as well as of ISIS members9.
Human Rights Watch has documented consistent arbitrary detention and
torture of civil society activists who sought to document HTS abuses or protest
their rule, as well as assassinations and the restriction of humanitarian aid to
civilians living under its rule10. Local human rights organisations have documented
184 such cases in the space of three months11, while HTS has also conducted
widespread confiscations of Christian property12.
The US and Turkey designated the group a foreign terrorist organization affiliated
with al-Qaeda in 2018, at which time it was also sanctioned by the UN13.
INTRODUCTION GROUPS PRESENT IN IDLIB HTS
6 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/06/suicide_bombers_kill_14_in_dam.php
7 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-39250040
8 https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/women-are-at-the-forefront-of-challenging-extremism-
in-idlib
9 http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=149003
10https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/28/syria-arrests-torture-armed-group
11 https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/28/syria-arrests-torture-armed-group
12 https://stj-sy.org/en/syria-at-least-750-christian-houses-illegally-seized-in-jisr-al-shughuridlib/
13 https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/
hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts
9
TIP GROUPS PRESENT IN IDLIB INTRODUCTION
1.1.2 TURKESTAN ISLAMIC PARTY (TIP)
In a still from a recent Turkestan Islamic Party propaganda video from Idlib, children in military uniform receive
ideological indoctrination on the role of the mujahidin [Islamic warriors]
The TIP is an Uyghur Salafist-jihadist group which has spent decades fighting for
an independent Sunni state in Xinjiang, western China. It has killed hundreds in
its bombing campaigns and, since 2002, been sanctioned by the UN due to its ties
to al-Qaeda14/15.
Since 2015, the organization has sent fighters to Syria to participate in the conflict
via front organizations based in Turkey, and currently fields around 5,000 fighters
in Idlib16. They operated in close coordination with Jabhat al-Nusra, and continue
to do so with HTS. As well as killing Christians and desecrating their churches,
the TIP is notable for its extensive – and often openly advertised – deployment of
child soldiers17.
Chechen Caucasus and Uzbek al-Qaeda proxy organisations are similarly present
in Idlib, operating in coordination with HTS.
14 https://apnews.com/79d6a427b26f4eeab226571956dd256e/AP-Exclusive:-Uighurs-fightingin-
Syria-take-aim-at-China
15 https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/
eastern-turkistan-islamic-movement
16 https://web.archive.org/web/20150618235954/http://www.jamestown.org/regions/middleeast/
single/?tx_ttnews
17 https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/turkistan-islamic-party-continues-
to-train-children-in-syria.php
10
INTRODUCTION GROUPS PRESENT IN IDLIB
1.1.3 HURRAS AD-DIN (HAD)
HaD are the official al-Qaeda proxy group in Idlib and Syria, breaking away from
HTS in 201818. As the group maintaining the most overt ties with al-Qaeda, they
have faced targeted US airstrikes against their senior leadership, and former ISIS
emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was being sheltered by HaD elements when he was
assassinated by the United States in 201919.
They field several thousand fighters and maintain military co-ordination with
HTS, despite some disagreements (see below).
1.1.4 NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION (NLF)
& SYRIAN NATIONAL ARMY (SNA)
There are also militant groups in Idlib under the direct command, control and
influence of the Turkish government. The National Front for Liberation (NFL) incorporates
a score or so of factions of varying size, with dominant forces including
the Sham Legion, Ahrar al-Sham, Suqqour al-Sham, Jaysh al-Ahrar and Nour
ad-Din al-Zenki Movement remnants.
In October 2019, immediately prior to its invasion of North and East Syria, Turkey
incorporated the NFL and the Syrian National Army (SNA) – another Turkish-
armed, controlled and funded umbrella organisation which has its base of
operations in Turkish-occupied regions of Syria including Afrin, Bab, Jarabalus and
now Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad – into one command structure20. SNA elements
have entered Idlib to participate in the current conflict, while NFL elements have
also passed via Turkish soil to participate in Turkish offensives against the SDF
and territories controlled by the Autonomous Administration of North and East
Syria.
Directly Turkish-controlled groups in north-west Syria are not ideologically homogenous,
ranging from Salafist jihadists through to opportunists seeking to
profit from the war, though they are united in their execrable human rights records.
18 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-48353751
19 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/27/us/politics/baghdadi-isis-leader-trump.html
20 https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/10/syrian-opposition-merger-into-national-
army-battle-sdf.html
11
The militias Turkey has united under its control have been accused of war crimes
by the UN and Amnesty International, including raping women, carrying out mass
killings against Kurdish civilians, torturing, electrocuting, executing and parading
caged civilians in the streets as a human shield21. Turkish-backed militias often
worked alongside the al-Nusra Front, and together “applied a strict interpretation
of Shari’a and imposed punishments amounting to torture or other ill-treatment
for perceived infractions,” as well as torturing and disappearing lawyers and civil
society activists22.
Turkey also used SNA and to a lesser extent NLF forces as its proxies during its
2018 and 2019 invasions of Afrin, Sere Kaniye and Tel Abyad, killing hundreds and
displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians23/24. Those who survived have faced
summary rule by Turkish-backed militias imposing sharia law, kidnapping, torturing
and executing civilians, and committing human rights violations possibly
amounting to war crimes, along with an ongoing policy of forcible demographic
change in regions formerly populated by Kurds, Yazidis and Christian minorities25/
26.
Per a 2020 UN report, Turkish-backed groups have committed war crimes across
areas under their control, constituting “myriad violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law by SNA fighters, using language comparing their
“enemies” to “infidels”, “atheists” & “pigs” when referring to civilians, detainees &
property…“, the displacement of the entire Yazidi population in Sere Kaniye and
large swathes of the Kurdish population, the expropriation and looting of schools,
businesses, bakeries, olive groves, vehicles, agricultural tools, “the war crime of
murder and repeatedly the war crime of pillaging… hostage-taking, cruel treatment
and torture… these violations may entail criminal responsibility for Turkish
commanders who knew or should have known about these crimes.”27
NLF/SNA GROUPS PRESENT IN IDLIB INTRODUCTION
21 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/storage/2019/03/TNA_report.pdf
22 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/07/syria-abductions-torture-and-summarykillings-
at-the-hands-of-armed-groups/
23 http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=102951
24 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/world/middleeast/afrin-turkey-syria.html
25 https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/19/who-exactly-is-turkey-resettling-in-syria/
26 https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2019/02/inside-rojava-democratic-province-
trapped-between-turkish-forces-and-isis
27 https://twitter.com/UN_HRC/status/1234436461245673472
Rojava Information Center and Syrian
Observatory for Human Rights have
documented over 100 former ISIS
fighters and commanders now part of
Turkish-backed forces.
12
1.2 HTS AND OTHER GROUPS:
LINKS TO AL-QAEDA
The US position on HTS is clear
– yet NATO partner Turkey is
now supplying HTS with heavy
weapons
Though HTS insists it is independent from al-Qaeda, the UN, the US and Turkey
all continue to regard it as associated with the international terror organization28.
Internationally speaking, al-Qaeda’s use of proxy groups is on the increase. In
2018, it carried out a total of 316 attacks around the world, according to data
collected by The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project29. Its proxies have
killed hundreds including an attack in Mogadishu in 2017 that left 600 dead, while
as noted above HTS themselves have claimed terror attacks killing scores of civilians30.
In brief, HTS emerged as a merger dominated by Jabhat al-Nusra (including its
commander-in-chief, al-Qaeda operative Abu Mohammed al-Jolani), hardline Ahrar-
al-Sham elements and other jihadist groups in Idlib. As Jabhat al-Nusra, the
group openly declared allegiance to al-Qaeda31,while a subsequent rebranding to
Jabhat Fatah al-Sham did not change the reality that senior al-Qaeda members
are embedded throughout the group’s command structure.
INTRODUCTION LINKS TO AL-QAEDA
28 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48056433
29 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48056433
30 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/15/truck-bomb-mogadishu-kills-people-somalia
31 https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2013/04/al-qaeda-jabhat-al-nusra-merge.
html
32 https://sy.usembassy.gov/amendments-to-the-terrorist-designations-of-al-nusrah-front/
13
As such, the establishment of HTS was widely seen as a rebranding exercise, with
the US Embassy issuing a statement to the effect that “the United States is not
fooled by this al-Qaeda affiliate’s attempt to rebrand itself.”32 Prominent al-Qaeda-
linked individuals and designated terrorists joined the group following its formation.
More broadly, despite paying lip-service to reform and moderation in recent
months, HTS continues to violently crush dissent and apply a strict interpretation
of sharia law in the area under its jurisdiction (see above).
Per US think-tank Soufan, “HTS maintained links with al-Qaeda’s loyalists in northern
Syria and even allocated areas and resources for its supposed rivals… While
HTS proclaims that it is an independent entity not affiliated with al-Qaeda, the
organisation grew out of al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, following a
series of strategic rebrandings. Throughout its numerous iterations, HTS has not
altered its ideology and is still widely thought to maintain links with al-Qaeda.”33
Senior al-Qaeda figures embedded in the Syrian organization’s command structure
have continued to be assassinated by the United States via strikes on Idlib34/35.
It is important to note that al-Qaeda’s ‘official’ representative in Idlib and Syria
is now HaD, and moreover that HaD and HTS have come into occasional, albeit
limited, conflict. These conflicts, however, were resolved through dialog mediated
by senior al-Qaeda figures, and the groups reconciled under the aegis of al-Qaeda36.
Practically speaking, HaD and HTS operate together on the battlefield
against the SAA (see below), and HaD are only able to operate in Idlib as a result
of HTS’ blessing, logistical support and coordination.
Recent conciliatory statements by Jolani towards the West do not change the reality
that HTS and al-Qaeda at the least share a common ideology and history, that
HTS leadership is full of known al-Qaeda elements, and that the groups engage in
strategic and military coordination in north-west Syria.
LINKS TO AL-QAEDA INTRODUCTION
33 https://www.france24.com/en/20190114-al-qaedas-shadow-still-hangs-over-syrias-idlibanalysts
34 http://www.businessinsider.com/egyptian-al-qaeda-leader-killed-by-drone-strike-in-idlibsyria-
2016-10?IR=T
35 http://aranews.net/2016/11/us-drone-strike-kills-prominent-turkish-al-qaeda-leader/
36 https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/02/analysis-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-and-hurras-
al-din-reach-a-new-accord.php
14
1.3 HTS AND OTHER GROUPS:
LINKS TO ISIS
Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS (then known as the Islamic State of Iraq) both emerged
as al-Qaeda proxy forces, in Syria and Iraq respectively. By 2013, Jolani’s al-Nusra
and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s ISIS were clashing with one another, with Jolani
swearing loyalty to al-Qaeda while Baghdadi attempted to subsume the Nusra
Front into ISIS. There are significant strategic, tactical, and to a lesser extent theological
differences between ISIS and what is now HTS. On the one hand, then,
al-Nusra and its later incarnation HTS have been involved in armed conflict with
ISIS. Open conflict between the two groups left hundreds dead in 2014, after
which their spheres of influence coalesced in separate areas of Syria37.
INTRODUCTION LINKS TO ISIS
37 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-nusra-front-al-qaedas-affiliate-syria
Fighters wearing ISIS insignia are a common sight among the ranks of HTS and other groups which receive
Turkish backing
15
Until at least 2019, ISIS sleeper cells continued to operate against – and were captured
and executed by – HTS, in HTS areas of control38.
However, it must not be forgotten that both HTS and ISIS originated as al-Qaeda
proxies, that they subscribe to broadly similar Salafist ideologies, and that
they have used similarly brutal methods both in enforcing these ideologies on
populations under their control and in seeking to expand their sphere of influence39.
As such, it is unsurprising that many former ISIS members have travelled
to north-western Syria to join HTS and Turkish-controlled groups there.
The Rojava Information Center has documented the names and biographies of
over 40 former ISIS members now part of Turkish-controlled forces in north-western
Syria, while the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights has similarly recorded
the identities of over 70 former ISIS members now part of Turkish-controlled forces
in their new zone of occupation east of the Euphrates40. They include former
emirs, commanders and those responsible for coordinating jihadist fighters with
their handlers in the Turkish military intelligence services (MIT).
Turkish toleration of former ISIS elements in the ranks of factions under its direct
control is an open secret. Just as we are seeing now in Idlib, their 2018 and 2019
invasions of Kurdish regions of northern Syria featured scores of identifiable former
ISIS members making use of Turkish armor and heavy weaponry, in some instances
while openly displaying ISIS insignia. Turkish-backed groups openly filmed
themselves ‘liberating’ ISIS-linked detainees from detention facilities operated by
the SDF, and hundreds of ISIS-linked individuals were able to escape from at least
three secure facilities as a result of Turkey’s 2019 invasion east of the Euphrates41.
Idlib itself “also plays host to relocated ISIS fighters and dependents,” per a UN
report published in February 202042. The most notable instance is of course Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was able to cross into Idlib during ISIS’ demise as a territorial
entity and was being sheltered by a HaD commander at the time of his assassination
by the USA. More broadly, ISIS militants who managed to escape the final
operation to eradicate their physical caliphate – or those able to pay smugglers to
LINKS TO ISIS INTRODUCTION
38 https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/hts-executes-rival-isis-sleeper-cell-fighters-inidlib/
39 https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/
hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts
40 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2019/08/database-over-40-former-isis-membersnow-
part-of-turkish-backed-forces/
41 https://rojavainformationcenter.com/2019/12/report-turkeys-war-against-civilians-1/
42 https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/will-recapture-syrias-idlib-affect-islamic-
state
16
flee SDF detention facilities – inevitably
head for north-western Syria, either to
Idlib or to Turkish-controlled regions.
As can be seen below, ISIS insignia are
on common display in Idlib, with an
ISIS-style Seal of Muhammed in identical
stylization and font often to be
seen proudly sported by fighters using
Turkish-supplied hardware.
Some pro-HTS commentators have
sought to downplay the significance of
this insignia, arguing it is a long-standing
Muslim symbol not specifically tied
to ISIS: but the layout and stylization
used by mujahidin [Islamic warriors] in
Idlib is invariably a carbon-copy of ISIS’ black standard. No actors in the Syrian
Civil War are unaware of its significance either locally or globally, and its omnipresence
in Idlib provides the clearest visual indication possible of the ideological
stance of those armed groups Turkey is backing, arming and funding in Idlib.
Indeed, former ISIS members are even more prominent among the supposedly
less-radical groups which Turkey directly, openly supports and controls than they
are among the ranks of HTS, their old rivals in jihad. The scores of former ISIS
members identified by RIC and SOHR among the ranks of Turkish-backed factions
are just the tip of the iceberg.
Turkey provided heavy weapons, including armor, to
extremist SNA factions like Jaysh-al-Islam during their
2019 invasion of North and East Syria
Turkish-backed fighters openly bragged in propaganda videos like the one pictured about using Turkish armor to
‘liberate’ ISIS-linked individuals from SDF detention facilities
INTRODUCTION LINKS TO ISIS
17
IDLIB TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS INTRODUCTION
1.4 TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS
AND OTHER AL-QAEDA-LINKED
GROUPS IN IDLIB
1.4.1 THE SITUATION IN IDLIB:
CREEPING TURKISH CONTROL
AND INFLUENCE
As outlined above, Turkey’s relationship with jihadist groups in Idlib ranges from
direct support, arming, funding and issuing commands through a deliberately
opaque relationship with HTS to a relatively distant engagement with Hurras-ad-
Din.
Simplest to define is the relationship between Turkey and those factions directly
under its control – that is, the NLF in Idlib, now incorporated into the SNA command
structure following their aforementioned merger in October 2019, and the
SNA in Turkish-occupied regions to the north. A cursory investigation of the command
and control structure of jihadist factions in the SNA, such as Ahrar-al-Sharqiya,
Jaysh-al-Islam and Sultan Murad, shows that responsibility flows directly up
to the TAF – and by extension their commander-in-chief, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
These factions are technically subordinate to the Syrian Interim Government, a
Turkish-sponsored body which lobbies on behalf of the SNA in Geneva and other
foreign capitals. In practice, they are trained, armed, funded and commanded by
the Turkish government. The SNA number “at least 35,000 full-time fighters, all
under the near-total control of Turkey’s Ministry of Defense and National Intelligence
Organization (MIT).” 43
43 https://www.mei.edu/blog/turkish-backed-syrian-armed-opposition-groups-unite-underone-
banner
18
In areas under nominal SNA control, they are granted limited autonomy to plunder
and extort money from the local population. But real power is retained by
Turkey, through direct control of local political bodies, top-down exploitation of
economic resources, and governance through proxies “dependent on Turkey’s
political, economic and military backing for their survival.”
On the battlefield, likewise, the SNA take their commands directly from Turkey.
A recent piece of in-depth research by Elizabeth Tsurkov, speaking to multiple
sources within the ranks of the SNA,
confirmed: “All decisions, big and small,
in the ‘National Army’ are made by the
operations room run by Turkish intelligence.”
44
While Turkey’s control of the Idlibbased
NLF is less total than its control of
the SNA, it has nonetheless been able
to establish an “influential client-proxy
relationship with the NLF by offering its
groups a rear base, having them participate
in Turkish operations in Afrin
and in the Azaz-Jarabulus corridor, and
providing them with equipment, training
and salaries.”45 The October 2019
merger constituted a further solidification
of Turkish control over the NLF,
illustrated by the participation of NLF
elements – most notably Faylaq-al-Sham
and Jaysh-al-Ahrar – in the execution
of Turkish policy objectives against
the SDF.
2018 saw clashes between NLF and
HTS, with HTS objecting to the extension
of Turkish control and influence
into its zone of control in Idlib.
INTRODUCTION TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS IDLIB
Less ideologically extreme than HTS, the Turkish-controlled
SNA nonetheless committed multiple atrocities
during their invasion of NE Syria, including this field
execution.
44 https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2019/11/27/who-are-turkeys-proxy-fighters-in-syria/
45 https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2019/strategies-of-turkish-proxy-warfare-in-northernsyria/
4-key-characteristics-of-turkish-use-of-syrian-armed-proxies/
19
HTS were the victors in that conflict, with NLF forced to sign a cease-fire agreement,
but since 2019 the Turkish-backed grouping and HTS have operated together
jointly to fight against the SAA under HTS’ aegis.
Turkey’s relationship with HTS, then, is a more complex question. As noted above,
Turkey initially listed HTS as a terror group, but over the years their relationship
has evolved into one of mutual co-dependency, with Turkey of course retaining
technical and military superiority but at the same time recognizing HTS’ territorial
dominance in Idlib. HTS is too powerful, in other words, to merely be considered
as a Turkish proxy: it has other sponsors and backers, and the jihadi organization
is able to exert a certain influence on Turkish policy in Idlib, rather than merely
following Turkish orders as in the case of the SNA. As such, Turkey’s increasing
trust in and cooperation with the Salafist-jihadist organization has alarmed observers
who fear Turkey is handing power, influence – and lethal weaponry – to
an organization it cannot expect to control.
The gradual extension of Turkey’s military operation in Idlib began with occasional
minor clashes with HTS, but as Turkey became entrenched in observation
posts so they began a tacit relationship with the dominant grouping in Idlib.
HTS guarded Turkish convoys as they entered Idlib and permitted Turkey to operate
within its zone of control. By May 2019, HTS and the NLF were coordinating
their attacks and the use of heavy weaponry, including anti-armor missiles, from
a joint operation room. HTS’ total control of Idlib means that Turkey’s extensive
operations in the region cannot take place without HTS’ express knowledge, approval
and coordination.
A Chatham House research paper summarizes this evolution well:
“Hostility between HTS and Turkey has turned into a form of peer-to-peer coordination.
This was clear when HTS allowed Turkish patrols to enter territories under
its control and protected Turkish observation points in northern Syria, despite
previously expressing disapproval at their presence. This nascent coordination
turned into wide-ranging cooperation, with HTS exclusively facilitating Turkish
logistics and military operations in the north. The group prevented any other
armed group being involved except with itself as an intermediary. Even Faylaq
al-Sham, which had been very close to Turkey, cannot liaise with the Turks without
the approval or agreement of HTS.”46
IDLIB TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS INTRODUCTION
46 https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/reviewing-the-turkey-hts-relationship
20
1.4.2 JOINT TURKISH-HTS
OPERATIONS ROOM
From 2019 until the present day, Hurras-al-Din, HTS and Turkey’s NLF and SNA all
coordinate their operations in Idlib, meaning that Turkey is in coordination with
al-Qaeda’s appointed proxy in Syria, as well as al-Qaeda-linked HTS47, through its
Syrian proxies.
Since Spring 2019, the NLF and HTS have been operating together via an operations
room known as “al-Fatih al-Mubeen”, thus uniting the Turkish-controlled
and al-Qaeda-linked forces in a single fighting coalition48.
HTS upload images of Turkish-provided armor through their official channels – but refer to ‘al-Fatih al-Mubeen’
operations room as a figleaf.
47 https://t24.com.tr/haber/han-seyhun-idlib-in-kale-kapisi-nin-dusmesi-suriye-de-savasinseyrini-
ve-turkiye-yi-nasil-etkileyebilir,835771
48 https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict/internal_
conflict_in_north_west_syria.pdf
INTRODUCTION TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS OPERATIONS ROOM
21
This operation room has not been prominently featured in either Turkish or
al-Qaeda media, with neither HTS nor Turkey wishing to draw attention to the
increasing extent of their cooperation. In particular, the NLF do not mention this
operations room in their own propaganda published through their own channels.
It appears that Turkey’s NLF units have been merged with HTS units. HTS media
originally only covered HTS, and not NLF and other Turkish-backed units, but
NLF and even SNA units now appear in HTS propaganda videos. It is likely for
this reason that most of the combatants in footage released by HTS propaganda
channels have now removed their patches, in order to disguise the extent of collaboration
between Turkish-backed and HTS forces.
On HTS’ behalf, meanwhile, the new operations room serves as a figleaf to cover
Turkish supply of armaments to the al-Qaeda-linked group – presumably at Turkish
request. That is, HTS still refer to their own units as the ‘Mujahidin of [Hayat]
Tahrir al-Sham’ in videos without any Turkish armor or weapons pictured, but
when Turkish armor is included in the shot they refer to the new operations room
instead.
Hurras-ad-Din and other smaller, hard-line Salafist groups in Idlib have their own
operations room, ‘Incite the Believers’. As outlined above, this separate operations
room operates in coordination with the dominant faction HTS49, who in turn
are in coordination with Turkey.
49 https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/05/al-qaeda-linked-operations-
room-counterattacks-as-bombs-fall-northern-syria.php
In videos where HTS’ new
Turkish supplies aren’t visible,
they continue to refer
to themselves as ’the Mujahidin
of Tahrir al-Sham’
OPERATIONS ROOM TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS INTRODUCTION
22
1.4.3 TURKISH PROLIFERATION OF
ARMOR AND HEAVY WEAPONS
AMONG AL-QAEDA-LINKED GROUPS
INTRODUCTION TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS AL-QAEDA-LINKED GROUPS
Following the escalated SAA and Russian operation against HTS starting December
2019, and Turkey’s well-documented intervention alongside HTS, the extent
of Turkey’s support for al-Qaeda-linked groups has dramatically increased. Turkey
has both provided HTS with heavy weapons and armored vehicles for the
first time, and proliferated high-end weapons systems throughout territory under
HTS control.
Turkey’s provision of armor to HTS and other extremist factions marks a serious escalation. Note the ISIS flag
being worn by this HTS militant
23
AL-QAEDA-LINKED GROUPS TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS INTRODUCTION
The following section of this report will provide visual evidence of HTS fighters
and members of other extremist organizations in Idlib – in some cases openly
sporting the ISIS-style Seal of Muhammed – making use of Turkish-provided armored
vehicles, fighting under the cover of Turkish grad salvos, and otherwise
benefiting from Turkey’s deployment of tanks, armored vehicles, rocket launcher
systems and special forces into the Idlib region.
Turkey has supplied its proxies with small arms, mortars and anti-tank guided
missiles in large amounts. Despite protestations to the contrary from pro-Turkish
propaganda channels, visual evidence clearly indicates that HTS and other al-Qaeda-
linked factions including the TIP are making use of Turkish armor to launch
their latest assaults, including American-made M113 personnel carriers sold to
Turkey and then provided to the al-Qaeda offshoots.
Weapons systems such as ‘GRAD’ Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (MRLS) may
have not been handed directly to HTS, but are certainly being put to joint use by
HTS and the NLF via their joint operations rooms50. Again, HTS propaganda footage
shows them advancing under the cover of GRAD fire, while at least one piece
of propaganda footage shared by HTS shows fighters loading up Turkish-marked
GRAD missiles. Even where these heavy armaments remain in the hands of Turkish-
dominated groups in the NLF, they are being put to joint use with HTS, while
their proliferation through HTS territory means they may well fall into HTS hands.
Finally, as a recent review from the Soufan Center thinktank noted, “While Turkey
prefers to support rebels from the National Liberation Front and the Syrian National
Army, HTS remains an effective fighting force. Turkey has supplied its proxies
with a range of weaponry, including small-arms, mortars, and anti-tank guided
missiles (ATGMs). There are growing concerns that the chaos in northwestern
Syria is allowing the al-Qaeda-linked Hurras ad-Din to rebuild its network, one
that could potentially seek to launch external operations against the West.”51
50 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-idlib/turkey-sends-weapons-to-syrian-
rebels-facing-russian-backed-assault-syrian-sources-idUSKCN1SV0FA
51 https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-conflict-in-idlib-escalates-between-turkey-
and-syria-while-civilians-suffer/
24
1.4.4 THE MANPADS QUESTION
Perhaps most serious is Turkey’s proliferation of man-portable air-defence systems
(MANPADS) throughout the Idlib region. A MANPADS can be used to shoot
down a helicopter, low-flying jet or civilian airliner, and these systems ending up
in the hands of al-Qaeda-linked terrorists would be an unmitigated disaster52.
As such, Turkey is tightly controlling information about the proliferation of these
systems in Idlib. In at least one incident in February, HTS claimed a MANPADS
strike which took down an SAA helicopter53. There is no visual evidence to date
of MANPADS in HTS hands, and in those pieces of footage which have leaked out
of MANPADS being used in Idlib it appears to be TAF commandos operating the
systems.
Nonetheless, with the situation in Idlib highly volatile, Turkey’s proliferation of
these lethal systems into territory held by HTS means it is increasingly likely that
al-Qaeda-linked groups will get their hands on these lethal weapons systems, capable
of shooting down airliners.
52 http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Security_Issues/manpadsthreat.html
53 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5jFg_U6s4HU
INTRODUCTION TURKISH SUPPORT FOR HTS MANPADS
25
2 VISUAL EVIDENCE OF TURKISH
MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR HTS
& OTHER AL-QAEDA-LINKED GROUPS
Where: Idlib
When: 29 February
Who: HTS
What: HTS fighters using a US-built M113
Equipment supplied: M113
Source: Ebaa News (Official HTS channel)
VISUAL EVIDENCE
A)
26
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Idlib
When: 27 February
Who: HTS
What: HTS fighters wearing the ISIS patch
using a US-built M113
Equipment supplied: M113
Source: Ebaa News (Official HTS channel)
B)
27
VISUAL EVIDENCE
28
Where: Kuffar Awid, Idlib
When: 29 February
Who: HTS
What: Militiamen wearing the insignia of HTS militia Jaysh
abu-Bakr al-Sidiq using a US-made built M113
Equipment supplied: M113
Source: HTS media operative Mohammed Othman
VISUAL EVIDENCE
C)
29
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Idlib Governate
When: 20 February
Who:
What: HTS loading Turkish-marked MRLS (GRAD) missiles
Equipment supplied: MRLS missiles
Source: Ebaa News (Official HTS channel)
D)
30
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Abin Selman
When: 13 February
Who: HTS
What: Advancing under cover of GRAD rocket salvo
Equipment supplied: GRAD launcher
Source: Video shot by Turkish-backed forces,
supplied to journalist Lindsay Snell
E)
31
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Mayzanaz and Kafr Halab, west Aleppo
When: 16 February
Who: HTS
What: HTS fighters using US-made M113,
fighter wearing ISIS patch visible in same video
Equipment supplied: M113
Source: HTS-linked Insight media
F)
32
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Idlib
When: 26 February
Who: Turkestan Islamic Party
What: Using Turkish-supplied armored vehicles
Equipment supplied: ACV-15
Source: TIP channel
G)
33
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Eastern Idlib
When: 20 February
Who: HTS
What: Using US-made M113 and Turkish-supplied ACV-15
Equipment supplied: ACV-15 (rear of first image), M113 (second image)
Source: Ebaa News (Official HTS channel)
H)
34
Where: Nayrab, Eastern Idlib
When: 24 February
Who: HTS
What: HTS using US-made M113
Equipment supplied: M113
Source: Ebaa News (Official HTS channel); pro-NLF media
I)
VISUAL EVIDENCE
35
VISUAL EVIDENCE
36
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Idlib
When: 20 February
Who: HTS
What: HTS using Turkish-supplied ACV-15
Equipment supplied: ACV-15
Source: SNA channels
J)
37
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: al-Narb, Idlib
When: 21 February
Who: HTS
What: HTS using Turkish-supplied M113
Equipment supplied: M113
Source: A24 News Agency
K)
38
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Idlib
When: 26 February
Who: HTS
What: ‘the mujahidin of HTS’ in US-made M113
Equipment supplied: M113
Source: Ebaa News (Official HTS channel)
L)
39
VISUAL EVIDENCE
Where: Kafr Awaid, Idlib
When: 29 February
Who: HTS
What: HTS fighters using Turkish-supplied
armored vehicles
Equipment supplied: ACV-15 and M113R
Source: Ebaa News (Official HTS channel)
M)
40
3 CONCLUSION:
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
For as long as the Syrian conflict in general – and Idlib in particular – is conceived
in black-and-white terms, no solution will be found. This is equally true of the
‘regime vs. rebels’ and the ‘legitimate state vs. jihadis’ narratives propagated by
Turkish and Western press on the one hand, and Russian press on the other.
War crimes committed by HTS and Turkish-backed groups against civilians living
in areas under their control do not excuse the Russian and SAA carpet-bombing
campaign: but nor should Turkey’s intervention be misunderstood as anything
less than a power-grab carried out in coordination with radical jihadist groups,
which will have potentially disastrous security consequences for the West as
Turkey recklessly provides these groups with heavy weapons and disseminates
MANPADs through areas under their control.
Given that – as is clear by this stage in the conflict – NATO and the Western community
are unwilling to proactively intervene in north-western Syria, Turkey’s
intervention cannot prevent the eventual return of Idlib to Damascus’ control.
On the basis of this reality, there are some concrete steps which can be taken
towards reconciliation, while also ensuring Western security interests are protected
and that lethal weapons systems are not handed to extremist groups
who pose a threat to civilians in the USA, Europe and Middle East alike.
41
SUPPORT FROM NORTH AND EAST SYRIA CONCLUSION
3.1 TAKING UP THE OFFER OF SUPPORT
FROM NORTH AND EAST SYRIA
Though Turkey claims its intervention into Idlib is to protect Syrian civilians, Turkey’s
invasions of Syria have killed hundreds and displaced hundreds of thousands
of ordinary Syrians. At the same time, Turkey’s border remains closed to
refugees fleeing the lethal Russian-SAA assault, and Turkish border guards have
shot dead at least 422 civilians trying to flee into Turkey throughout the Syrian
conflict54.
Meanwhile, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has
demonstrated its willingness to host up to a million IDPs from all over Syria55.
Most recently, the AANES opened its doors to IDPs fleeing Idlib, with at least 6000
IDPs from Idlib now being housed by the AANES. Loqman Ahmi, spokesperson
of the AANES, recently spoke with the UN to reaffirm North and East Syria’s willingness
to partner with the UN to house IDPs from Idlib, relieving the burden on
Europe and enabling these Syrian IDPs to remain in their own country56.
As noted above, a 2020 UN report found that Turkish-backed groups have committed
war crimes across areas under their control, constituting “myriad violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law by SNA fighters, using
language comparing their “enemies” to “infidels”, “atheists” & “pigs” when referring
to civilians, detainees & property…“, the displacement of the entire Yazidi
population in Sere Kaniye and large swathes of the Kurdish population, the expropriation
and looting of schools, businesses, bakeries, olive groves, vehicles,
agricultural tools, “the war crime of murder and repeatedly the war crime of pillaging…
hostage-taking, cruel treatment and torture… these violations may entail
criminal responsibility for Turkish commanders who knew or should have known
about these crimes.”
54 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/syrians-at-the-turkish-border-humiliation-
torture-and-death/
55 http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/2530
56 Rojava Information Center interview with Loqman Ehmi, 28 February 2019
42
The same report found no evidence of war crimes committed by the SDF, and on
the contrary praised the AANES for its ground-breaking efforts towards democratic
and gender equality in the regions under its control. Indeed, the AANES and
SDF are the only actors in Syria which consistently strive to meet international humanitarian
standards. Despite the US withdrawal which allowed Turkey to invade
North and East Syria, the AANES and SDF have consistently proven themselves
the West’s best partners in Syria, and loyal custodians of US and international
interests.
The fact that the AANES are welcoming IDPs from Idlib in their thousands once
again demonstrates that there was no need for Turkey to invade and occupy
North and East Syria to install Arab IDPs there. Nor is there any need for the UN
and EU to bow to Turkey’s use of refugees as a political weapon. Rather, NE Syria
has always been open to receive IDPs from all over Syria, and as such a strengthened
partnership between North and East Syria and the international community
is fundamental to resolving the humanitarian crisis in Idlib.
The USA and Europe should also act to house refugees fleeing Idlib on their own
account, rather than allowing Turkey to use refugees as a political bargaining chip.
As well as opening routes to safe third countries in the EU and elsewhere, they
should recognize that they have a loyal partner in North and East Syria willing and
able to house these IDPs on Syrian soil.
CONCLUSION SUPPORT FROM NORTH AND EAST SYRIA
43
A FEDERAL SOLUTION CONCLUSION
3.2 SUPPORTING THE POLITICAL
PROCESS TOWARDS A FEDERAL
SOLUTION IN SYRIA
As outlined above, a military solution is not feasible in Idlib, with international
intervention off the table and Turkey unable to seriously resist Russian aerial and
military dominance. As such, rather than allowing Turkey to prolong the conflict in
the hope of securing a larger slice of territory in North and East Syria, the United
States and the international community should offer meaningful support for a
political process and the vision of a federal Syria.
This will mean forcing Turkey to admit that it cannot – not does it seriously expect
to – prevent Russia and the SAA from taking Idlib, and recognizing that despite
recent flare-ups Turkey and Russia are taking great care not to engage one another
militarily in the field of conflict. The pressure Moscow exerts on Ankara is too
great, and Ankara likewise recognizes that NATO is not about to intervene on its
behalf in a war it has brought upon itself as part of its efforts to seize land, influence
and power in Syria.
In the words of analyst Aaron Stein, “The United States is Turkey’s ally, but has
little interest in the Turkish armed forces being bogged down in an unwinnable
war in Syria, taking casualties and being humiliated by Russian bombardment. A
ceasefire makes sound strategic sense. It also would be preferable to an outcome
in which more Syrians will die fighting for an unwinnable endeavor. Negotiations
with Russia will not be easy, nor straightforward.
“Idlib is a massive humanitarian catastrophe and the Assad regime is almost certain
to exact revenge on innocent civilians it accuses of being disloyal. The United
States ought to work to prevent this, but the path to doing so is not continuing
aid to an insurgency that will not win. The United States and Europe both should
consider continuing — if not expanding — its humanitarian assistance to ease
Turkey’s burden and support Syrian civilians.”57
57 https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/cleaning-up-turkeys-mess-in-idlib-and-ending-the-war/
44
The more the USA and Western community play a role in this process, the more
they can influence its outcome to ensure the best possible outcome for civilians
in north-western Syria and in terms of their security interests in the Middle East.
This means ensuring that all actors in Syria have a seat at the negotiating table,
including the AANES and SDF who are the USA’s most loyal partners in Syria but
are currently excluded from this process, as well as representatives of the wider
Syrian opposition.
The vision of a federal, devolved Syria being put forward by the AANES represents
the best possible outcome for civilians in Idlib and across Syria, but for so long as
the debate is polarized between hopeless investment in a lost war in Idlib on the
one hand and Damascus’ hardball demands on the other, the best interests of
local civilians and the international community alike cannot be met.
3.3 BRINGING AN END TO TURKISH
SUPPORT FOR AL-QAEDA-LINKED
MILITIAS
The more the burgeoning humanitarian crisis in Idlib is resolved, the less Turkey
will be able to use it as a figleaf to disguise its ambitions of territorial expansion.
Curbing Turkey’s proliferation of lethal weapons systems and heavy armor
throughout territory controlled by HTS and other al-Qaeda-linked militias is not
only a security prerogative, but a necessary step on the path toward an enduring
reconciliation and resolution in Syria outlined above.
To achieve this policy objective, it will be necessary for the international community
in general and the US and NATO partners in particular to exercise pressure
on Turkey, which is currently acting as a rogue actor and supporting listed terror
organizations, including HTS.
45 END TURKISH MILITIAS SUPPORT Even setting aside the fact that Turkey has aided and abetted the growth of ISIS in Syria and to this day shelters scores of high-ranking former ISIS members in the ranks of its militias, Turkey’s current actions in Idlib alone warrant its formal listing by the US Treasury Department as a State Sponsor of Terror. Taking decisive action against Turkey’s open support for al-Qaeda-linked factions in Idlib today could prevent a civilian airliner being shot down by these same factions tomorrow.
***********************************************************************************************
Report: 447 civilians killed by Turkish forces at Syrian border
The 447 refugees killed by Turkish security forces at the border with Syria include 83 children under the age of 18 and 56 women.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Sunday, 15 Mar 2020, 16:34
The Human Rights Organization of Afrin – Syria released a statement announcing that 447 refugees were killed by Turkish soldiers at the Turkish-Syrian border.
The statement includes the following:
“Turkish border guards shoot Syrian asylum seekers, including Kurdish citizens, and beat them when they try to enter Turkish territory, causing the death and injury of a number of them. Especially recently, after the Turkish state and its armed Syrian factions occupied Afrin area and as a result of the pressure that the indigenous people in Afrin are exposed to by the armed factions of the Turkish occupation, the cases of the flight of citizens, especially the Kurds, from them, and their asylum to Turkey across the common borders, especially in Afrin, increased.
According to the testimony of the relatives and local residents, which were documented by international and local human rights organizations, including the “Human Rights Watch” violence is used against asylum seekers and Syrian smugglers.
If Turkey has the right to secure its borders with Syria, it is obligated to respect the principle of non-refoulement that prohibits the expulsion of asylum seekers at the border when they are at risk of persecution and torture, or when their lives and freedom are threatened. Turkey is also obligated to respect international standards related to the use of excessive force, the right to life and physical liberty, including the absolute risk of subjecting anyone to inhuman or degrading treatment.
At a time when Turkey is blackmailing the European Union with refugees on its soil, in order to obtain financial and political benefits to legitimize their stay in Syria, and subject them to death and beatings, Turkey is using live ammunition and rifle butts to counter the flow of refugees, and among the victims that the border guards are killing are children and women.
Local and international human rights observatories (Human Rights Watch, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Center for Violations in Northern Syria), noted in their reports the extent of the violations that took place and are still occurring during the asylum of the citizens of Syria with various components and nationalities who are trying to enter the Turkish lands to escape the death that has been chasing them in the conflict that has been going on in Syria for 9 years. In addition, residents of the Syrian border villages and towns or farmers and landowners near the border are also targeted by Turkish gendarmerie with live bullets.
The number of Syrian citizens who were shot by Turkish border guards (gendarmerie) reached 447, including 83 children under the age of 18 and 56 women. In addition, 420 Syrian citizens were injured with gunfire or assault. Also, the Turkish state has built a separation wall along its 911 km long border with Syria to prevent the entry of refugees, resulting in continuous civilian deaths and injuries.
Although Turkey is one of the guarantor countries to de-escalation, and participates as one of the main parties to the conflict in Syria, and has the task of protecting refugees and displaced persons, it acts completely the opposite.
We, as the human rights organization in Afrin-Syria, appeal to all international human rights and civil organizations, led by the United Nations, to put pressure on the Turkish government to prevent the use of excessive force against Syrian refugees and displaced persons and others, as one of the countries of the Council of the European Union, and it must respect all international laws and regulations that stipulates respect for human rights principles and all relevant international agreemen
“Erdoğan experiences a political and military defeat in Idlib”
The HDP’s foreign policy spokesperson, Hişyar Özsoy says: “Turkey has tried to play off powers against each other, but this policy no longer works. Therefore it experiences a political, military and diplomatic defeat in Idlib”.
ANF
ANKARA
Friday, 6 Mar 2020, 15:30
Hişyar Özsoy is deputy co-chair and foreign policy spokesperson of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and is currently participating in various meetings in the US. ANF talked to him about current developments in the context of the Idlib dispute and the use of refugees as a means of blackmailing the EU by the Erdoğan regime.
What do you think about the fact that Erdoğan is trying to direct the anger about the killed soldiers towards the refugees?
This is nothing new. From the very beginning the refugee issue has been used to threaten Europe. This time it has partly worked, but partly it has not. Erdoğan could not achieve much with this threat. There were very strong reactions from Europe, but Angela Merkel started to support the Turkish wish for a “security zone” within Syria. Even if the refugee card does not build up as much pressure as before, it is still in Erdoğan’s hands. This is his strongest trump card against Europe.
You are currently taking part in various meetings in the US. How is the situation viewed there?
In the US this refugee question is taken very seriously. But for Washington, the relations between Russia and Turkey and the S-400 missiles are in the foreground. It looks like there will be very serious sanctions in April if Turkey does not do anything about the S-400s. But if Turkey abandons the S-400, Turkey can count on strong US support in Idlib. Some US politicians are trying to take a Turkey-friendly position. They try to support Turkey in Idlib, but that doesn’t mean that the US will send troops to Idlib or provide air support. There are fierce discussions about this in the US government.
The supporters of Erdoğan are isolated in this respect. They don’t get much support from the Pentagon, nor from Congress in this sense. But a humanitarian aid package has been announced. This is set to be used to pull Turkey to its side. This logic is directed against Russia. Especially because of the escalation of hostilities against Iran, the US wants Turkey on its side. But as I said, the crucial point is the S-400 missiles. If this deal with Russia is abandoned, the US will make a great effort to direct relations with Turkey. But if this does not happen and Turkey does not move into an anti-Russia position as the US wants, Ankara will probably soon come under very strong pressure from the US.
Do Turkey’s blackmail attempts not isolate the country?
Look, at the moment Turkey no longer has any real diplomatic relations with Europe, the US and, to be honest, with Russia. It is constantly trying to threaten and blackmail Europe. The reason for their cooperation with Erdoğan and its government is not because they like it. They are actually tired of this government. We can talk about anger here. Erdogan has built a relationship with all of Europe based on threats. This relationship is rapidly moving towards collapse.
The policy towards the Kurds in Syria has also isolated Turkey from the US. Even Turkey’s supporters have so far been unable to make their support openly known. All institutions are against Erdoğan. The refugee question is not important for the US, it mainly concerns Europe. Some countries in Europe do not want to turn Erdoğan against themselves. For example Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and the southern countries. Erdoğan can get Merkel to make concessions, even if only partially. And that is what he is trying to do.
Will this save Turkey from its internal crisis?
Whether it works or not, we’ll see. But Erdoğan has gone so far beyond threats and blackmail that he is diplomatically at his wits’ end. This is a big problem for him, because he is currently facing Russia militarily, but he doesn’t have Europe on his side. That is a big obstacle. Turkey has tried to play the powers against each other, but this policy no longer works. That is why it is experiencing a political, military and diplomatic defeat in Idlib.
In a recent interview, Bashar al-Assad stated that a Kurdish question did not exist in Syria and accused the autonomous administration of separatism. The latter called on Damascus to develop an understanding for democracy.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Saturday, 7 Mar 2020, 20:36
The unresolved Kurdish question in the Middle East has been one of the most serious conflicts in the region for more than a century, with dramatic political and humanitarian consequences – for all four central states, to which the historical settlement territory of the Kurds was divided quite arbitrarily: Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The “divide and rule” policy has not only created a Middle East that resembles an open powder keg and is constantly fed with dynamite. In the “quadripartite” Kurdistan, starting with the denial of a Kurdish existence at all, an unresolved identity conflict has established itself. Also from this aspect, the solution of the Kurdish question and Kurdish self-determination is seen as the key element of the democratization of the Middle East.
In Syria, the Kurds form the largest minority in the country. Their oppression, similar to that in Turkey, has a history of decades. The Syrian regime also relied on tyranny and denial of Kurdish existence. The recognition of Kurdish identity was considered a threat to national unity. Even before the country was marked by political instability in the 1960s – one coup followed the next – the Kurds experienced brutal oppression. In 1958, the publication of Kurdish books and the teaching of the Kurdish language in schools was banned. The authorities Arabized the names of Kurdish villages and towns. In 1962, 120,000 Kurds were deprived of Syrian citizenship after a census in Hesekê. In 1963, shortly after the Baath Party took power, plans to “Arabize” northern Syria began to take shape with the so-called “12-point plan” by Talab Hilal, the then police director of Hesekê. His racist and anti-Semitic ideas about how to deal with the Kurds were clear: Hilal called the Kurds a “malignant tumour”. To “cut it out” was the only right way to “cure” Syria.
Ten years later, the so-called “Arabization” was implemented in a 350-kilometer long and about fifteen-kilometer wide “Arab belt” along the border with Turkey in order to change the ethnic composition of the population in favor of the Arab population. In the course of the Arabization project, dozens of new villages were built and four thousand Arab families from Raqqa and Aleppo were settled as early as the beginning of the 1970s. Kurds were deliberately expelled or deported from their ancestral homeland, their cultivable land confiscated and given to the newly settled Arabs. The regime presented this de facto expropriation as “privatization”, deprived the expropriated Kurds of their citizenship and Arabized all Kurdish place names. Nevertheless, the Kurds remained steadfast and refused to comply with the regime’s demand to leave the region.
Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad, who has continued the oppressive policy of his father Hafiz al-Assad since 2000, recently stated in an interview on Russian television that there is no “Kurdish question” in Syria. Claims to the contrary were “illusory and a lie”, he said and argued that, moreover, all Kurds living in northern Syria have immigrated from Turkey in the last century.
The fact that the Assad regime, despite the crisis in Syria, which has now been going on for nine years and is getting worse and worse, has apparently not changed its attitude towards the Kurds and is sticking to its assimilation policy has provoked sharp criticism in the self-governing areas of northern and eastern Syria. In a written statement, the autonomous administration recalls that Syria, once torn by internal conflicts, has become a theatre of war for numerous armed groups and international state actors within a scant decade.
“The Syrian regime, as the architect of this as yet unresolved crisis, is shirking its responsibility to find solutions instead. That Bashar al-Assad under these circumstances is sticking to the mentality that created this crisis, is unacceptable”.
The autonomous administration emphasizes that the regime’s approach and language against the Kurds do only serve the Turkish state, which occupies large areas of Syrian territory; “The government in Damascus claims that Syria will defend its territory and will not accept any occupation of ‘Syrian soil’. However, Assad’s most recent statements testify to the regime’s lack of interest in dialogue and hamper the search for a solution to the crisis. The Kurdish question is one of the most fundamental problems and the key to the democratisation of the country. A peaceful solution will pave the way to defusing Syria’s crisis.”
Alluding to the accusations of separatism raised by Assad against the Kurdish part of the population and the peoples of northern and eastern Syria, the autonomous administration calls on the regime to take a look at the recent past and at Afrin’s resistance against the Turkish state and its “terrorist jihadist factions” – a struggle that was aimed at defending the integrity of Syria.
“All those who are now accusing us of separatism in Syria should remember emphatically those who defended Serêkaniyê (Ras al-Ain) and Girê Spî (Tal Abyad) with their lives. It should not be forgotten that the regime remained silent on the invasion and merely observed incidents from a distance. We, the peoples of Northern and Eastern Syria, are committed to defending the very Syrian soil that the regime claims to protect. Our merit is obvious, we do not have to present the evidences of our struggle but we have the right to ask the Syrian regime if it has achieved any success.”
In its statement, the autonomous administration emphasizes that the regime must finally adopt a solution-oriented attitude in order to lead Syria out of the crisis, saying that, in the contrary case, the conflicts would intensify further.
“The current mentality, which has failed to come up with a solution to the Syrian crisis for years, is what has made the occupation of Northern Syrian cities by Turkey possible.”
For a Syria-wide perspective to solve all problems, a renewed political agenda is needed that allows for change and internalizes democracy, the autonomous administration proposes.
“To build a democratic Syria, the paths must be opened. At the same time it should be accepted that the Kurdish question is one of the main factors in Syria’s crisis. The autonomous administration of northern and eastern Syria is not a system that seeks to divide Syria. The project of a democratic nation, which is implemented in the self-governing areas, is based on the fraternity of the peoples. It has proved to be successful. Statements aimed at defaming this alternative system, which has already proved its worth, are of benefit only to those who want Syria to be divided,” the statement said.
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Autonomous administration welcomes people from Idlib
North and East Syria is open to displaced people from Idlib. The autonomous administration takes care of the people who fled the war. Since the region itself is undersupplied due to the Turkish invasion, an appeal is made to the UN.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Sunday, 1 Mar 2020, 16:39
Over 1,500 families fled the war in Idlib to the autonomous region of North and East Syria. The autonomous administration has accommodated the displaced civilians from Idlib in camps despite their own limited possibilities and takes care of the basic supply of food and health care.
Today the Autonomous Administration has again declared that people from Idlib who had to leave their homes due to the fighting are welcome.
The statement says:
“Due to the humanitarian crisis caused by the war in Idlib, the civilian population is in a very bad situation. Cooperation is needed to alleviate the suffering of civilians in the face of the wave of migration that is taking place. Action must be taken.
The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have already declared that they will fulfil their humanitarian duty towards the people of Idlib in accordance with their responsibilities. On this basis, we are once again informing the people of Idlib that we will provide them with care within the limits of our possibilities. We declare that despite the high number of migrants in our region we will fulfill our duty.
Call to international institutions
As the autonomous administration, we face serious obstacles due to the hundreds of thousands of displaced persons from the areas occupied by the Turkish state, the closure of the Til Kocher [al-Yaarubiyah on the Iraqi-Syrian border] border crossing and the small quantities of UN aid shipments via Damascus.
We call on the UN and other international institutions to cooperate with the autonomous administration in view of the flight from Idlib. They should propose solutions on how to overcome the current difficult situation.
This should be accompanied by a reconsideration of the decision to close the Til Kocher border crossing for humanitarian aid deliveries. Humanitarian aid must arrive in north-east Syria in order to guarantee basic supplies for those seeking protection”.
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Another step towards Turkification … Turkish language courses in Gire Spi
The Turkish occupation continues to follow the policy of Turkification in the areas it occupied from Syria with the aim of changing the demography of the region, and this was evident by the courses that were announced yesterday in the occupied city of Girê Spi.
NEWS02 Mar 2020, Mon – 14:332020-03-02T14:33:00 Ain Issa
Turkey and its mercenaries occupied each of the cities of Serekaniye and Gire Spi after its brutal attack on the regions of northern and eastern Syria in October 9 last year.
Since its occupation of the two cities, it began with the assistance of its mercenaries, whom it uses to implement its agendas of pillaging and pillaging the region’s goods, and displacing the indigenous people with flimsy pretexts that it creates for them, in order to displace them and resettle the mercenary families instead of them.
After its indiscriminate bombing of populated cities and villages, it managed to displace more than 300 thousand people of the two cities, and it is currently restricting the rest of the people with the aim of displacing them.
After seeing that the people adhered to their cities and villages, it started with other plans, including the Turks, with the aim of spreading the Turkish language among the people, as it announced yesterday the opening of free Turkish educational courses in Gire Spi.
According to local sources, Turkey announced that it would receive all those who would like to learn the Turkish language, and identified the educational complex in the neighborhood of housing as a place for registration and education.
About a month ago, Turkey opened a similar course in the occupied canton of Afrin and forced more than 30 young people from Afrin to join that course.
The same source added that the people in the occupied area reject the behavior of the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries, and the high cost of living there, in addition to the lack of security, and the large number of arrests and theft by mercenaries there.
J.O. ANHA
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Syrian Kurds push UN for action on Idlib humanitarian crisis
Children walk along a mudpath at a camp for displaced Syrians in the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib, Dec. 12, 2019. (Photo: AFP)
ERBIL (Kurdistan 24) – On Saturday, officials from the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) discussed the dire situation for large numbers of displaced civilians fleeing from the embattled city of Idlib with the director of the United Nations Office for Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
The ongoing fighting in Idlib has already displaced over 800,000 civilians. So far, 1,000 of them have fled the city to areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij, Raqqa, and Tabqa following the call of the group’s leader, according to a Feb. 21 statement released by the US-based aid group Burma Free Rangers.
The SDF says it expects at least another 5,000 to flee to the northeast. “In light of the recent deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Idlib, we have talked to UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator Kevin Kennedy today to express our readiness to scale up these efforts, with the assistance of the UN and the international community,” said AANES spokesperson Luqman Ahmi.
“We talked about how the Self Administration of North and East Syria and the UN can support one another to help IDPs fleeing war in Idlib,” Ahmi told the Rojava Information Centre.
“IDPs from Idlib have already arrived to North and East Syria. We have welcomed them and prepared camps for them. We are ready to continue this work in an organized, efficient way, in collaboration with the UN,” he added.
The local administration also called on the international community and the UN in a public statement to coordinate with the local administration to “offer proposals and resolutions to face this challenge in these severe circumstances and reconsider its decision to close the Yaroubiyeh border crossing.”
The UN’s Yaroubiyeh operation that previously supplied 40 percent of the medical provisions used in areas run by the Self-Administration was closed in January due to a veto of China and Russia in a UN Security Council vote. As a result, the humanitarian situation has worsened in northeastern Syria.
Thomas McClure, a Syria-based researcher at the Rojava Information Center, told Kurdistan 24 on Saturday, “Turkey claims its intervention into Idlib is to protect Syrian civilians, but in reality, Turkey’s invasions of Syria have killed hundreds and displaced hundreds of thousands of ordinary Syrians.”
“At the same time, Turkey’s border remains closed to refugees fleeing the lethal Russian-SAA [Syrian Arab Army] assault, and Turkish border guards have shot dead hundreds of civilians trying to flee into Turkey throughout the Syrian conflict.”
“The AANES, meanwhile, has demonstrated its willingness to host up to a million IDPs from all over Syria, most recently opening its doors to IDPs fleeing Idlib. Indeed, the AANES and SDF are the only actors in Syria which consistently strive to meet international humanitarian standards.”
McClure underlined the fact that the Autonomous Administration welcomes people fleeing from Idlib demonstrates that there is no need for “UN and EU to bow to Turkey’s use of refugees as a political weapon.”
Thousands of immigrants recently gathered at the closed Greek border after Ankara said it will not prevent their passage to Europe following the death of several Turkish soldiers in Idlib.
“Rather, Northeastern Syria has always been open to receive IDPs from all over Syria, and as such a strengthened partnership between Northeastern Syria and the international community is fundamental to resolving the humanitarian crisis in Idlib.”
Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdoğan asked NATO to exercise its mutual defence agreement stipulated by Article 5 of its charter when 33 Turkish troops were killed by Russian and Syrian forces in Idlib.
Turkey’s request is cynical and self-serving. Erdoğan betrayed the Alliance, siding with Russia in a war he helped foment.
After the 2011 popular uprising in Dara’a, which marked the beginning of Syria’s civil war, Erdoğan embraced the Muslim Brotherhood and supported Islamist rebels fighting the regime of Bashar Assad. Erdoğan envisioned himself the Caliph of Mesopotamia, leading a worldwide community of Sunni brothers.
Turkey was the major conduit for weapons and money, thinking the victory of jihadists was inevitable. However, Assad’s forces were tenacious.
Former U.S. President Barack Obama promised a regime change and drew a red line on the use of chemical weapons (CW). His warnings were hollow. More than 1,300 people, including hundreds of children, were killed in the Damascus suburbs of Ghouta, Muadhamiya, Ein Tarma, and Zamalka on 21 August 2013. Obama had no appetite for military intervention. He claimed the red line was a warning, rather an actual threat to intervene.
Erdoğan decided to expand support for the rebels and overthrow Assad he had, a year ago, hugged as ‘dear brother.’. Turkey’s National Intelligence Agency established the jihadi highway from Şanlıurfa in Turkey to Raqqa, the Islamic State (ISIS) capital in Syria. It assisted 40,000 foreign jihadists from more than 100 countries who transited through Turkey to the front lines in Syria.
The presence of Chechens and other Islamists from the Southern Caucasus was deeply unsettling to Russia. Their advances presented a risk to Russian bases in Latakia and Tartous, threatening Russia’s warm-water port on the Mediterranean. They also threatened Iran’s corridor through Iraq and Syria that was supplying Lebanon’s Hezbollah with sophisticated missiles to attack Israel.
General Qassem Soleimani, head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) Quds Force, met Putin in Moscow. With Turkish-backed rebels advancing on Damascus, Soleimani unfurled a map of rebel positions. Despite the consternation of his Russian hosts, he assured them, “All is not lost.”
Russian and Iranian officials agreed on a plan to rescue Assad. The IRGC, Hezbollah, and other Shiite militias would engage Sunni rebels on the battlefield. Russia would provide air support.
Putin announced Russia’s military intervention at the U.N. General Assembly on September 28, 2015. Turkey and Russia were on opposite sides. Turkey supported regime change and gave weapons to the rebels, while Russia backed the regime.
Russian-Turkish relations collapsed when a Turkish F-16 shot down a Russian Sukhoi-24 along the Syrian border.
Turkey was also alienated from the United States. The United States and Turkey had a major falling out after Erdoğan alleged Washington’s complicity in the so-called coup of July 2015. Ever pragmatic, Erdoğan reached out to Putin and forged an alliance in Syria.
Turkey joined Russia in parallel diplomacy called the Astana process in January 2017. The Astana process marginalised the U.N. and excluded the United States.
Putin agreed to look the other way, while Turkish-backed jihadis and Turkish armed forces targeted the Syrian Kurds, who Erdoğan called the “real terrorists.”
Turkey invaded Afrin in January 2018. The offensive, cynically called “Operation Olive Branch”, killed hundreds of Kurds and displaced nearly a quarter million. Russia controlled the air space west of the Euphrates and was complicit.
Turkey invaded Kurdish lands east of the Euphrates in October 2019. Hundreds were killed and many displaced, including Kurds,
Armenians and Syriac Christians. Turkey’s jihadist proxies committed atrocities, mutilating the bodies of female fighters.
Erdoğan sought to dissuade Putin from attacking Idlib, the last rebel stronghold in Syria’s northwest. Despite Erdoğan’s appeal, Syrian ground forces backed by Russian air power intensified attacks, pushing 900,000 people from their homes. Turkey sealed its border leaving displaced Syrians with no place to go.
Turkey presents itself as the victim of actions by Russia and Syria. In fact, it is the aggressor.
The recent armed conflict between Turkey and Russia is a direct result of Erdoğan’s ill-conceived bravado. It was a strategic miscalculation to think that Russia and Syria would stand down in Idlib.
Now Erdoğan wants NATO involved. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Charter stipulates that an attack on one member of the Alliance is an attack on all members.
However, Erdoğan’s appeal has fallen on deaf ears. In addition to his duplicity, Erdoğan’s anti-American, anti-European and anti-NATO positions have deeply riled the West.
For sure, any loss of life is regrettable. It is, however, hard to side with the Turks when Erdoğan’s actions led to Turkey’s woes.
Turkey intensified the civil war by supplying jihadis. When the war persisted and millions of refugees went to Turkey, Erdoğan extorted money from the European Union to manage the refugee crisis, which he helped create. Turkey scorned the U.N., joining the Astana process, and it repudiated the U.S., spending $3 billion to buy Russian weapons.
The US assiduously avoided a military role in Syria. Years ago, it missed an opportunity to intervene when intervention could have saved Syria.
Despite the heart-wrenching suffering of people in Idlib, the Trump administration is unlikely to intervene militarily. Turkey will pay a steep price for Erdoğan’s hubris and bad judgment.
Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces have reportedly stopped a pumping station in Ras al-Ain from providing water hundreds of thousands of people including internally displaced Syrians and Islamic State captives and their families.
REUTERS/Kemal Aslan
A vehicle belonging to Turkey-backed Syrian rebel fighters is parked next to a Turkish military bulldozer in the Syrian town of Ras al-Ain, as seen from the Turkish border town of Ceylanpinar, in Sanliurfa province, Turkey, Oct. 30, 2019.
Turkey’s pressure campaign on Kurdish-controlled northeastern Syria took a fresh sinister turn this week when Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces reportedly halted service at the Alok pumping station in the Turkish-occupied town of Ras al-Ain. The facility supplies water to approximately 460,000 people, including hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Syrians as well as Islamic State captives and their families.
“The Turkish-backed sources entered the water station [Feb. 24] and forced it to stop its work and threw out the technicians as well,” wrote Sozda Ahmed of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria. She told Al-Monitor via the Rojava Information Center in emailed comments, “As a result the city of al Hasakah, Tell Tamar and the rest of the Hasakah region — including Hol and Shedadi — have been left without water. Arisha camp, Hol camp [housing Islamic State fighters’ families] and Washokani camp [housing internally displaced Syrians from Ras al-Ain] have all been affected.”
Ankara has long been accused of seeking to suffocate the Syrian Kurdish-run region economically as well as militarily and politically, all part of a campaign to torpedo Kurdish aspirations of self-rule. Turkey’s borders with the Kurdish-administered northeast from Manbij all the way to the Iraqi border further east remain sealed, including to humanitarian organizations.
“Water is a weapon that Turkey has used against Syria in the past and it will likely continue to do so,” Fabrice Balanche, Syria expert and associate professor at France’s Lyon II University, told Al-Monitor.
With all eyes trained on the rebel-held province of Idlib, where Russian-backed Syrian government forces and the Turkish army have been clashing since the start of this month, the Alok affair has largely slipped under the radar. A Russian delegation was expected to arrive in Ankara tomorrow to break a deadlock over Turkish demands for a cease-fire as close to a million displaced civilians remain massed along the Turkish border, reported the state-run Anadolu news agency.
At least 16 Turkish military personnel have died so far, some of them victims of Russian airstrikes.
Balanche reckons that despite all the hawkish rhetoric, the two sides will eventually agree. A putative deal might include Russia letting Turkish forces take the Kurdish-controlled town of Kobani and move people displaced from Idlib there, Arabizing Kobani as was done in Afrin, the Kurdish-majority enclave Turkey invaded in early 2018. “All depends on whether the Kurds cut a deal with regime and tell the Americans to go or not,” Balanche noted.
Meanwhile, coming amid a global scare over the coronavirus epidemic, a sustained water cut could spell disaster for Hasakah as local authorities struggle to cope with overcrowded displacement camps crammed with infants and children.
Ahmed said that the reasons for the stoppage were not clear to the local authorities. “We only know the station has been prevented from working. We don’t know why they did this or what they want from us.” Nor was it clear whether Turkey gave the orders.
The technicians who were allegedly evicted from the Alok facility are believed to be members of a Syrian government team that routinely visits the station for maintenance purposes and has continued to do so following Turkey’s October “Operation Peace Spring” invasion of Ras al-Ain. Alok was first put out of service by shelling during the Turkish push, the United Nations reported on Oct. 18.
Kurdish authorities blamed Turkish artillery fire. Service was partially restored with the facility operating at about 20% of capacity.
Well-informed sources familiar with humanitarian relief efforts in northeast Syria said they had heard matching accounts of the situation at Alok from local authorities.
“Alok water station remains a critically important source of clean water for nearly half a million people in northeast Syria. As was done last year, when the station was damaged in hostilities, the UN and humanitarian partners are advocating to parties to ensure the station runs uninterrupted,” Danielle Moylan, spokesperson for the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, told Al-Monitor. “In addition, the UN and humanitarian partners are planning emergency water supplies to affected families in the area.”
Found in:internally displaced persons, turkish intervention in syria, ras al-ain, water crisis, water supply
Amberin Zaman is a senior correspondent reporting from the Middle East, North Africa and Europe exclusively for Al-Monitor. Zaman has been a columnist for Al-Monitor for the past five years, examining the politics of Turkey, Iraq and Syria and writing the daily Briefly Turkey newsletter. Prior to Al-Monitor, Zaman covered Turkey, the Kurds and conflicts in the region for The Washington Post, The Daily Telegraph, The Los Angeles Times and the Voice of America. She served as The Economist’s Turkey correspondent between 1999 and 2016, and has worked as a columnist for several Turkish language outlets. On Twitter: @amberinzama
Turkish armed forces have controlled a strip of land in northeast Syria between the towns of Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ayn (Serekaniye in Kurdish) since October 9, 2019. Turkey, which has had a presence in northwest Syria since it invaded the Afrin region in January 2018, has split the territorial integrity of this Kurdish region, Rojava (“west” in Kurdish) or the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, politically autonomous since 2013.
Turkey’s actions are a direct threat to the political and military alliance established by the PYD (Democratic Union Party)—the Syrian branch of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)—and northeast Syria’s other main demographic groups, the Arabs and Syriac Christians. This alliance, the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), and its political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), also have to reckon with the forces of Bashar al-Assad who still hopes to regain control of the whole region, from which he withdrew in 2012. Seven years after its creation, what remains of the PYD’s pluralist, democratic project?
We set out from the Newroz refugee camp in Derik, near the Turkish and Iraqi borders. A woman living there said she had fled six times since 2018: “My family and I are from Afrin. When the Turks came, we went first to Shabab, then toward Aleppo. From there we reached Kobane. Then my son found work in Ras al-Ayn. After the Turks attacked, we had to flee barefoot to Tell Tamr and now we’re here in this camp.” A man said he had left his small farm in Tell Abyad last autumn: “We were living happily. The political system worked well. Then the Turkish president sent planes to bomb us and all the Kurds left.”
Ethnic makeup to be changed
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin signed a 10-point agreement in Sochi on October 22, 2019, ratifying Turkey’s presence in northeast Syria and forcing the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the PYD’s armed forces, to withdraw from Turkish-held territory. Since then, Turkey has been accused of driving out the Kurdish population and replacing them with 2 million Sunni Arabs who had fled from elsewhere in Syria to Turkey. “Erdoğan wants to change the ethnic makeup of the territory his army controls,” according to Abdel Karim Omar, foreign minister in the Federation’s autonomous government. “Before Turkey invaded in 2018, 85 percent of Afrin’s population was Kurdish. Now it’s 20 percent.”
We can’t be sure if these profound changes mean the end of Rojava as a political entity. When the Turkish army and its Syrian militias—known as çete (gangsters)—tried to expand their territory, they met fierce resistance.
We set off from Qamishli for Kobane, which was where Kurdish forces first seriously defeated ISIS in January 2015. At a main checkpoint held by the federation’s security forces, we were redirected to avoid the M4 east-west highway, as it was too dangerous: Turkish military drones overfly it and pro-Turkish militias, based just 400 yards from the road, make regular incursions. On October 12, 2019, Hevrin Khalaf, an influential Kurdish politician, was intercepted on the M4 at Tirwazi near Tell Abyad and brutally killed by Turkish-backed jihadist militias.
The Trump administration’s announcement on October 6 of a US military withdrawal from the region opened the way for a Turkish invasion and left the SDF no option but to call for military support from Damascus. After the Sochi agreement, Syrian troops were deployed between Kobane and the Iraqi border, except for the Turkish-occupied enclave. The Syrian army has small military posts every six miles; according to people we spoke to, its role is mainly to discourage further Turkish expansion.
The Turks have put a price on the head of SDF military commander Mazloum “Kobane” Abdi, who said of the Syrian army, “It’s largely a politically symbolic presence.” He added that there is no other Syrian military presence in SDF-controlled zones. Throughout our journey we saw only the Asayish, the Arab-Kurdish SDF police, watching the roads. We asked Abdi about future relations between Rojava and Damascus, and he said the priority was a political agreement: “We want political autonomy to be written into the Syrian constitution and the SDF to be part of the defense of the whole of Syria. These are demands we won’t compromise on. Under such an agreement, defending the north of the country would be the SDF’s responsibility.”
‘We will not let Kurds lose their rights’
Would the Syrian government accept a change that would end decades of centralism and the quest for a single Arab national identity? Damascus has given no sign of this. We spoke to Polat Can, an SDF commander who led the operation to liberate the Deir al-Zor region, long under ISIS control. “Rojava will not revert to its pre-2010 state. We will not let the Kurds lose their rights, and we will not destroy the relations we’ve established with the Arabs and the Syriac Christians.” He suggested everything else was negotiable, including the autonomous entity’s name and how its borders would be controlled.
The Kurds feel bitterness and anger over how the enclave between Tell Abyad and Ras al-Ayn was abandoned to the Turks. This feeling is especially acute because of the lack of air protection. Abdi said, “The Russians have let Turkish planes bombard our civilians, children, and defense forces. They haven’t kept their promises. Nor has the US.” Polat Can’s verdict was starker: “The Turks are killing Kurds with European weapons. Their drones are Italian and their Leopard tanks are German. If we had an air exclusion zone that could stop our troops being bombed from the air, we would kick the Turks out of Rojava in a week.”
We reached Kobane after a six-hour detour via Raqqa on badly damaged roads. The many oil tankers on the road made the air almost unbreathable. Some of the cheap, low-quality crude oil extracted in northeast Syria is used by the local population and the rest is sold by Damascus through intermediaries. The autonomous government runs public services and funds infrastructure projects through oil revenue and taxes on goods crossing the Iraqi border in both directions. But oil extraction is not at full capacity. Ziad Rustem, a member of the autonomous government’s energy commission, told us, “Only 25 percent of oil wells in northeast Syria are operating. The rest have stopped because of the war and the embargo on Syrian oil.”
Raqqa, the ISIS capital from 2014 to 2017, is now SDF-controlled. The city was badly damaged by fierce fighting, but reconstruction has begun. In the center, where ISIS used to display human heads on stakes, there are huge letters spelling “I love Raqqa.” ISIS still has a support base in this Arab-majority region and cells regularly carry out operations, including suicide attacks. But the city seemed relatively calm. When Erdoğan invaded the north, he counted on an Arab uprising against the Kurds. It hasn’t happened.
Brainwashed against the Kurds
Polat Can explained, “The Arab clans in Deir al-Zor told us, ‘Don’t bring the regime back here. You’re Kurds and we don’t like you, but at least you’re Sunnis—we can work with you.’ The Syrian regime used to brainwash the Arab population against the Kurds by telling them we’re Zionists, atheists, capitalists. But in the regions that are almost 100 percent Arab, there have been no uprisings against the SDF.”
The recent Turkish invasion brought together Kurdish groups that used to oppose PYD dominance. Nari Mattini, a longtime opponent of the SDC, has now joined them. Mohsen Tahir, a member of the Kurdish National Council (ENKS), created at the instigation of the PDK (Democratic Party of Kurdistan), which is on good terms with Turkey and is intended to counterbalance PYD-PKK influence in the region, now admits that the priority is Kurdish unity to stop ethnic cleansing. That unity will depend on how relations between the PYD and the PDK develop; currently the PYD will not allow any other military force on the ground in Rojava.
In Ain Issa, midway between Raqqa and Kobane, a Russian patrol suddenly emerged from a military base: Russia has replaced the United States here. We had already encountered a Russian patrol near the Tell Tamr front line further east, around Hasakah, and a US patrol near the eastern oil fields. It’s unclear who is calling the shots.
Do the Kurds trust the Russians more than they trust the United States? Abdi told us that, for now, “Moscow is working on a solution between the Kurds and the Syrian regime.” But he and other prominent Kurds know Russia and Turkey made a bargain over Rojava that benefited the Syrian government. “Initially, Russia ‘gave’ Afrin to Turkey in exchange for Homs, Ghouta, and a small part of Idlib for the Syrian regime. Then it ‘ceded’ Ras al-Ayn and Tell Abyad to Turkey in exchange for another bit of Idlib.” The Kurds could be the biggest losers in these trades.
It was cold and wet in Kobane, and reconstruction work in the town was on hold because of fears of another invasion. In 2014 the invader was ISIS. Kobane is now threatened by the Turkish army and its allied militias, some including former jihadist fighters. The inhabitants, convinced that war was imminent, were digging tunnels to withstand attack. If it happens, the fate of Kobane might determine Rojava’s fate too.
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Syria: Who’s in control of Idlib?
By Zulfiqar AliBBC Reality Check 18 February 2020
The northern Syrian province of Idlib is the last remaining stronghold controlled by forces opposed to President Bashar al-Assad.
Syrian government forces have been pushing into rebel-held territory with the help of Iranian-backed militias and Russian airstrikes.
Dozens of towns and villages have been captured by Syrian forces including a key strategic highway, the main economic artery through Syria from north to south, linking Damascus, Homs and Aleppo.
The fighting has led to the collapse of a fragile cease-fire brokered in 2018 by Turkey, Iran and Russia.
Turkey supports the Syrian rebels, while Russia backs the Syrian government’s campaign to retake the area.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has threatened to drive back Syrian troops already in Idlib province unless they withdraw by the end of February.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based war monitor, said 1,240 Turkish military vehicles have crossed into Idlib in February, along with around 5,000 soldiers.
Image copyrightGetty ImagesImage caption Syrian government forces have captured the crucial M5 highway first time since 2012
Who controls Idlib?
Idlib has been controlled by a number of rival opposition factions since government forces lost control of the province in 2015.
The main armed groups operating there are:
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, a jihadist alliance)
National Liberation Front (Turkish-backed rebel alliance)
Hurras al-Din (pro-al-Qaeda HTS offshoot)
Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP, Chinese Uighur-dominated jihadist group)
In January 2019, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an alliance of jihadists groups, launched a large-scale offensive against rival rebel groups in the area.
HTS has now become one of the strongest militant groups in northern Syria. It largely controls Idlib province, including the provincial capital and the border crossing with Turkey at Bab al-Hawa.
In 2016, al-Nusra Front declared that it had severed formal ties with the al-Qaeda network and renamed itself Jabhat Fateh al-Sham.
The following year, it merged with several small jihadist groups fighting in Syria and formed HTS.
Although HTS insists it is independent and not linked to an external entity, the UN, US and Turkey consider it a group associated with al-Qaeda and list it as a terrorist organisation.
Although analysts are cautious about making numerical estimates, Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, an independent analyst, says he believes HTS is the biggest group, which still controls large parts of Idlib province, carries out most of the fighting against government forces and has between 15,000 to 20,000 fighters.
“HTS has also set up and backed a civilian administration in the area – the Salvation Government- that has thousands of employees,” Al-Tamimi says.
In a report published in January, the UN gave a slightly lower estimate of between 12,000 and 15,000 fighters in Idlib associated with HTS, including many foreigners.
This report says that there are an additional 3,500 to 5,000 fighters affiliated with the Hurras al-Din group.
Syrian government supporters say the numbers are significantly higher.
Pro-government politician, Fares Shehabi, told us that he believes there are there are as many as 100,000 HTS fighters in Idlib.
He says HTS is affiliated to al-Qaeda despite its denials. “They carry al-Qaeda flags, they practise al-Qaeda methods,” he said
Image copyrightGetty ImagesImage caption HTS is the most powerful group in the only remaining area still held by rebels in Syria
Other groups
The other significant force is the National Liberation Front (NLF), which was formed in 2018 by rebel factions wanting to counter HTS.
It is a Turkish-backed alliance that includes hardline Islamist groups like Ahrar al-Sham and Faylaq al-Sham, as well as several groups fighting under the banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – a force considered more “moderate” by Western powers.
In October NLF merged with other rebel groups in northern Syria and rebranded itself to become part of the Syrian National Army (SNA) under the command of the Syrian Interim Government’s (SIG) Ministry of Defence.
But Aron Lund, a fellow with the US-based research group The Century Foundation, says the NLF “is still the same group of Idlib-based factions as before the SNA rebranding”, noting that the alliance is held together by Turkish leadership, as well as Turkish money, weapons and supplies.
“They’re clearly a weaker force than HTS,” according to Lund. “They lack the cohesion, logistics, and organization of that group, and they are not as well armed. However, they add some manpower and are closer to Turkey whose role is going to be key to what happens next in Idlib,” he says.
According to a report by the US Department of Defense released in February, the “Turkish-supported opposition likely consists of between 22,000 and 50,000 fighters from more than 30 different groups.”
There are other groups as well.
One is Hurras al-Din (Guardians of Religion), a splinter group from HTS that is widely believed to be al-Qaeda’s new affiliate in Syria.
Hurras al-Din is largely made up of HTS defectors and the two groups have so far found it difficult to set aside their differences and work together beyond occasional, limited collaboration.
Image copyrightAFPImage caption Idlib is the last rebel stronghold – if re-taken it would effectively signal the opposition’s defeat
Foreign militants
There are also many foreign jihadists in Idlib, many of whom are fighting for groups associated with al-Qaeda.
The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) is a group of Uighur fighters, who mostly fight alongside HTS.
The Uighurs – a Muslim ethnic minority primarily based in China’s Xinjiang province – established a presence in northern Syria in the early years of the civil war.
There are also the predominantly-Uzbek Tawhid and Jihad Brigade, which is aligned with HTS, and the Imam al-Bukhari Brigade.
“We believe there are about 30-40,000 foreign fighters mainly Uighur, Tajik, Uzbek, Turks, and others from 103 nationalities – many with their migrated families,” says Syrian MP Fares Shehabi.
But Raffaello Pantucci, of the UK-based security think tank the Royal United Services Institute, believes this number is too high.
“They and their families may not number more than several thousand,” he says.
There are also believed to be other foreign jihadists in Idlib, including Chechens and Uzbeks, although the numbers are likely to be smaller.
Civilians trapped in Idlib
A major concern now is for the civilians living in Idlib.
The UN estimates it is home to 3 million people, including 1 million children.
More than 40% of these come from other areas previously held by opposition forces.
The UN says the air and ground attacks in Idlib have been causing both “massive waves” of displacement and “major loss of civilian life”.
At least 1,710 civilians have been killed, including 337 women and 503 children since the escalation of the conflict in northwest Syria in April 2019
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YPJ fighter Nûcan Cuma martyred in Serêkaniyê
YPJ announced the martyrdom of Nûcan Cuma in the resistance against the Turkish invasion of Serêkaniyê.
ANF
NEWS DESK
Thursday, 13 Feb 2020, 20:20
The General Command of the Women’s Defense Units (YPJ, Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) has announced that YPJ fighter Şêrin Silêman Murad (Nom de Guerre: Nûcan Cûma) fell a martyr in the resistance against the Turkish invasion of Serêkaniyê (Ras al-Ain).
Serêkaniyê was one of the first cities to be attacked during the Turkish invasion of northern Syria, which began on 9 October 2019. For ten days, resistance was put up against NATO’s second largest army until the agreement of a ceasefire – which was actually never respected by the Turkish army and its jihadist auxiliary forces – implicated the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from Serêkaniyê.
When exactly and under what circumstances Murad died, however, is unclear. For a long time it was not known whether the Kurdish woman was captured or died in battle, which delayed the announcement of her death.
Şêrin Silêman Murad was born in Girkê Legê (Arabic: al-Muabbada), a small town in northeastern Syria in which Kurds make up the majority of the population, as the daughter of a patriotic working class family. In 2011, Murad, who had been taking part in the Rojava revolution since its inception, joined the local women’s struggle groups. Since the YPJ was founded on 3 April 2013, she has been an active member.
YPJ described Murad as a selfless woman who followed her convictions with courage and dedication; “She fought in the front ranks of the resistance without batting an eyelid, her attitude testifying to the passion for revolution in the hearts of the women of R
A Russian soldier stands guard as troops escort a convoy of Syrian civilians leaving the town of Tal Tamr in the northeastern Hasakah province, to return to their homes in the northern town of Ain Issa in the countryside of the Raqqa region, via the strategic M4 highway on Jan. 10, 2021. The town of Tal Tamr is on the front line between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian factions supported by Turkey. Photo by DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP via Getty Images. 
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Madeleine Khamis
Assyrian Church in Til Temir
Church damaged during attacks
